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A "magistrate” is an "officer having | MAGNETISM power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public offense.” Peo- See Electro-Magnetism, ple v. Swain, 90 Pac. 720, 722, 5 Cal. App. 421 (citing Pen. Code, & 807).
MAHOGANY "A magistrate is an officer having pow- See San Domingo Mahogany. er to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with the commission of a crime.
MAIL The following persons are magistrates: (1) The justices of the Supreme Court; (2) the See By Mail; Fast Mail; Fraudulent judges of the Circuit Court; (3) the county Use of the Mails; Send by Mail. judges and justices of the peace; (4) all mu- Service by mail, see Service (In Pracnicipal officers authorized to exercise the tice). powers and perform the duties of a justice Use of, as commerce, see Commerce. of the peace." Wallowa County v. Oakes, "The term 'mail' is perhaps universally 78 Pac. 892, 46 Or. 33.
comprehended as being that over which the The clerk of the county court having no government has the management for the authority to issue a warrant for a misde- purposes of conveyance and distribution." meanor is not a "magistrate" within Sny- Searight v. Stokes, 3 How. 151, 185, 11 L. der's Comp. Laws, $ 6575, providing that a Ed. 537. "magistrate” is an officer having power to is
MAIL CARRIER sue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public offense. Bowen v.
As civil officer, see Civil Officer.
As officer, see Officer.
As passenger, see Passenger. the decisions or sentences of magistrates, includes judges of municipal courts as well as MAIL MATTER trial justices. Sprague v. Inhabitants of An- A post office superintendent discovered droscoggin County, 71 Atl. 1090, 1091, 104 Me. a misboxed letter, which had been placed in
a "dead" pigeonhole at the top of the case, Code 1907, § 7519, providing that judges where defendant, a clerk, was engaged in of city courts, etc., are “magistrates,” within sorting mail. The letter was removed by the the meaning of the chapter (“Proceedings to superintendent and handed to a post office inPreserve the Peace”), and authorized to re- spector, who took it to the addressee, and, quire persons to give security to keep the without delivering it, obtained permission to peace, etc., refers only to affidavits and war- open it. He then returned it to the post office, rants under that chapter, and not in prosecu- unsealed the letter, and took from it an extions for illegal liquor selling. Herring v. press order for $2, a statement of account, State, 48 South. 476, 477, 158 Ala. 31.
and a letter from the sender of the money
order. After making a copy of the letter, he District attorney
placed it in the envelope with two marked $1 The district attorney to whom a confes- bills, and forwarded the money order and the sion is made is not a magistrate before whom statement to the addressee. The envelope accused is brought for a Judicial hearing, containing the letter and bills, having been and required by Code Cr. Proc. $$ 188, 196, duly sealed, was returned to the dead pigeonto advise him that he is entitled to the aid hole, and a short time thereafter was embezof counsel, and to inform him that he has zled by defendant. Held, that the letter at the right to make a statement in relation to the time it was returned by the inspector to the affair. People v. Randazzio, 87 N. E. the dead pigeonhole had not ceased to be 112, 116, 194 N. Y. 147.
"mail matter," and that defendant was there
fore properly convicted of embezzling a letAs judge
ter containing inclosures, in violation of Rev. See Judge.
St. § 5467. Ennis v. United States, 154 Fed.
842, 843, 83 C. C. A. 478 (citing Montgomery v. Notary public
United States, 16 Sup. Ct. 797, 162 U. S. 410, Where a notary public was authorized 40 L. Ed. 1020; Scott v. U. S., 19 Sup. Ct. 209, by state law to issue a warrant of arrest for 172 U. S. 343, 43 L. Ed. 471; Goode v. U. S., misdemeanor, and on such affidavit the gov- 16 Sup. Ct. 136, 159 U. S. 663, 40 L. Ed. 297). ernor of the state had instituted requisition proceedings, the notary was a “magistrate" MAIL ORDER within Rev. St. $ 5278, governing interstate The chief element of the "mail order” extradition, and providing that the same method of doing business consists in dealing may be based on a magistrate's warrant. directly with the customer or consumer by Compton v. State of Alabama, 29 Sup. Ct. means of placing in his hands a printed cata605, 606, 214 U. S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 885, 16 Ann. logue containing a description of the articles
of merchandise offered for sale and the price
thereof. An assoriation of retail dealers can In an affidavit, which charged that de lawfully agree ainong themselves that they fendant unlawfully, wantonly, or maliciously will not purchase merchandise from whole- killed or maimed a cow, followed the Code salers and jobbers who sell to mail order form for an indictment for wanton and mali. houses and to inform each other as to what cious injury to animals (Code 1907, 88 6230, wholesalers and jobbers do sell to such 7161, form 71), except that the word “maimhouses. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. South ed” was substituted for the word “injured," Dakota Retail Merchants' & Hardware Deal- the word “maim” implied a deprivation of a ers' Ass'n, 150 Fed. 413, 415.
necessary part, a crippling, disabling, or per
manent injury, and was more than equivalent MAILED
in meaning to the word “injure," and includThe word “malled," as used in the speci-ed the meaning of the word “injure.” Hence fications on which a contract for the sale the affidavit sufficiently charged the statuof coal was made, requiring notice of a fail- tory offense. Richmond v. State, 58 South. ure to deliver to be mailed,” being used in 973, 974, 4 Ala. App. 139 (citing 5 Words its ordinary sense, referred to mailing in ac
and Phrases, p. 4275). cordance with the ordinary method of busi- To “maim" an animal, within the meanness, and did not contemplate the sending of ing of a statute making it an offense to kill a notice by registered mail, so that the mere or maim cattle, is to be understood in its delivery to the postal authorities and regis- technical signification, and the person who intration of a notice did not put the seller in flicts upon an animal injury of a character default. Price v. City of New York, 93 N. less than that which would deprive it of or Y. Supp. 967, 970, 104 App. Div. 198.
render useless one or more of its useful memThe general statement of one that he bers, is not guilty of an offense under the "mailed" a letter to another is sufficient evi- statute, and the owner of the animal is re dence that he did everything necessary to mitted to his action for damages. But one raise the presumption that it was received in who injures one of the useful members of due course of mail, and thereby show that an animal, such as its members of locomotion, the addressee had notice of matters therein or such as are useful to the owner of the ani. stated. To be properly "mailed" a letter mal, violates the statute. Brown v. State, must be addressed, stamped, and deposited in 56 S. E. 405, 406, 127 Ga. 287. the proper place for the receipt of mail, and, White's Ann. Pen. Code, art. 612, prosince the word “mailed” implies the doing of vides that "to maim" is to willfully deprive all these acts, a general statement that a let- a person of the hand, arm, finger, toe, foot, ter was “mailed" is sufficient. Ward v. D. A. leg, nose, or ear; to put out the eye, or deMorr Transfer & Storage Co., 95 S. W. 964, prive a person of any member of his body. 965, 119 Mo. App. 83 (citing Pier v. Heinrichs- Article 614 provides that “to disfigure” is to hoffen, 67 Mo. 163, 29 Am. Rep. 501; Rolla willfully place any mark on the face or other State Bank v. Pezoldt, 95 Mo. App. 404, 69 part of the person. Article 604 provides a S. W. 51).
punishment for assault with intent to com
mit the offense of maiming or disfiguring. Prepayment of postage
Held, that a charge of maiming and disfigurThe word "mailed,” when applied to a ing carries with it a charge of assault with letter, means that it was properly prepared intent to maim and disfigure. Pool v. State, for transmission by mail, and was placed 129 S. W. 1135, 1136, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 482. in the custody of the officer whose duty it was to forward the mail. Southern Engine &
MAIN Boiler Works v. Vaughan, 135 S. W. 913, 915, 98 Ark. 388, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1062.
MAIN CHANNEL In testimony that a letter containing a
The “main channel" of the Mississippi notice was mailed, the word “mailed” implies river means the principal navigable and nar. the payment of the necessary postage. City igated channel, the one customarily followed of Omaha v. Yancey, 135 N. W. 1044, 1047, in steamboat navigation. Franzini y. Lay91 Neb. 261.
land, 97 N. W. 499, 502, 120 Wis. 72. See,
also, State v. Muncie Pulp Co., 104 S. W. 437, The single word "mailed," as used by a 442, 119 Tenn. 47. notary in his certificate, is held to imply that the requisite postage was prepaid. Cutting v. MAIN LINE Harrington, 71 Atl. 374, 377, 104 Me. 96, 129 The words “main line,” in municipal orAm. St. Rep. 373 (citing Rolla State Bank v. dinances granting, respectively, the right to Pezoldt, 69 S. W. 51, 95 Mo. App. 404).
construct a small extension to the Garden
Street branch of the Cleveland street railway MAIM
system and the right to lay a second track
on a portion of that branch, to terminate “Maiming" is to deprive a person of some with the expiration of the grant for the member of his body. Cooper v. State, 132 s. main line, must be deemed to refer to the rest W. 355, 356, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 411.
of the Garden Street branch, and not to the
Euclid Avenue line. Cleveland Electric Ry., of a railroad, the assessment of which shall Co. v. City of Cleveland, 27 Sup. Ct. 202-210, be made by the state authorities, shall include 204 U. S. 116, 51 L. Ed. 399.
“the 'roadbed,' not exceeding 100 feet in
width with its rails and sleepers, (and) depot MAIN SEA
building used for passengers connected there"Main sea" and "high sea" are synony- with." A supplement to such act (P. L. 1906, mous. United States v. Newark Meadows p. 220) declares that “main stem" shall hereImp. Co., 173 Fed. 426, 428.
after be held to include the "roadbed" not
exceeding 100 feet in width with its rails MAIN SHAFT
and sleepers, and all structures erected thereThe word "shaft,” as used in connection on and used in connection therewith, not inwith or applied to factories, is a revolving cluding, however, any passenger or freight bar to convey the force which is generated by buildings erected thereon. The term “roadsome prime mover to the different working bed" is of plain import and significance, the machines, and a "line or main shaft" is a bed or foundation on which rests the superbar of considerable length, and usually bear structure of rails and sleepers. By giving ing a number of pulleys by which power is due effect to the word "main" in the phrase transmitted to countershafts. Hohenstein "main stem,” the “roadbed" that is to conHarmetz Furniture Co. v. Matthews, 92 N. E. stitute “main stem” must be deemed the bed 196, 199, 46 Ind. App. 616.
or foundation of the principal tracks of the
railroad at the place in question. In re UnitMAIN STEM
ed New Jersey R. & Canal Co., 67 Atl. 1075, The term “main stem,” as used in the 1076, 75 N. J. Law, 385. New Jersey statute relating to taxation of Act April 8, 1906 (P. L. 1906, pp. 122, railroads, is expressly defined to include the 220), providing a method for the taxation of rradbed not exceeding 100 feet in width with railroad property, defines the main stem" of its rails and sleepers and structures thereon a railroad as the roadbed, “not exceeding not including passenger or freight buildings. 100 feet in width, with its rails and sleepers, The original statute made passenger depots and all structures erected thereon and used a part of the main stem. United New Jersey in connection therewith, not including, howR. & Canal Co. v. Parker, 69 Atl. 239, 243, 75 ever, any passenger or freight buildings N. J. Law, 771.
erected thereon.” The statute has made a Under Act 1888 (Gen. St. p. 3325, § 214)
distinction between the strictly essential right as amended (P. L. 1906, p. 220, c. 122), de
of way of a railroad, the existence of which fining the "main stem" of a railroad for pur
is indispensable to its operation and the reposes of taxation as "the 'roadbed' not ex
maining land of the company used for railceeding one hundred feet in width with its
road purposes, and this distinction rests upon rails and sleepers, and all structures erected
the ground, not that these different classes of thereon and used in connection therewith,
property are put to different uses, but upon not including, however, any passenger or
the dependence of the several companies upfreight buildings erected thereon.” does not on local police protection, and, as compensaestend beyond the "roadbed." although such / tion for that protection, the local municipal *roadbed" be less in width than 100 feet. governments are permitted to tax that part of The court said: “ 'Roadbed' signifies the bed
the railroad property not included within the or foundation upon which rests the super
“main stem" of the railroad. Central R. Co. structure of rails and sleepers. Giving due
of New Jersey y. State Board of Assessors, effect to the word 'main' in the phrase 'main 67 Atl. 672, 674, 680, 681, 75 N. J. Law, 120. stem,' the 'roadbed' that is to constitute 'main A "main stem,” as the term is used in stem' must be deemed the bed or foundation P. L. 1884, p. 142, as amended by P. L. 1888, of the principal tracks of the railroad at the p. 269, providing for the taxation of railplace in question. The width of 100 feet, as roads, includes the roadbed not exceeding 100 used in the statute, is a measure of limita- feet in width, with its rails and sleepers, detion, not of extension; and the fact that a pot buildings used for passengers connected railroad company at any place on its line therewith, and must always exist in every inorus land of the width of 100 feet or more corporated railroad operated for the transdoes not extend 'main stem' to the width of portation of freight and passengers, or either. 100 feet, unless the 'roadbed' of its principal Jersey City v. State Board of Assessors, 68 tracks at the place in question extends to Atl. 227, 228, 74 N. J. Law, 720. that width." In re New York Bay R. Co., Land on which railroad tracks are main67 Atl. 1049, 1051, 75 N. J. Law, 389 (quoting
| tained, which originally formed a part of the and adopting definition In re United New Jer
| main line, and which were left out of the sey Railroad & Canal Co., 67 Atl. 1075, 75 main line by a straightening of tracks, but N. J. Law, 385).
| are continued in operation for railroad purThe act of 1888 (Gen. St. p. 3325, par. poses, do not form parts of the “main stem" 214), relating to the taxation of railroad and of the principal line of the railroad, and are canal property, declares that the main stem" ' not branch railroads having their own main
3 Wos.& P.20 SER.-14
stem, but are in contemplation of law the ( Roberts v. Warren Bros. Co., 72 Atl. 461, 464, same as a "siding." Jersey City v. Stato 110 Md. 47. Board of Assessors, 69 Atl. 200, 201, 75 N. J. “Maintain" is defined to mean to hold or Law, 571.
keep in a particular state or condition, espe MAIN TRACK
cially in a state of efficiency; to support, sus
tain, not to suffer to decline. Kovachofrv. A short piece of railroad track used only St. Johns Lumber Co., 121 Pac. 801, 803, 61 for freight, to which defendant's trains were Or. 174. deflected by a switch, admitting them to defendant's freight depot, and ending at a post, The power to "maintain and operate" was not defendant's “main track,” within waterworks and electric light plants is not Laws 1907, p. 475, § 1, relating to railroad necessarily incident to or implied in the crossings, and providing that any railroad power to "purchase or construct” waterworks company desiring to cross the main track of or electric light plants. The word “mainanother railroad company should, before con- tain" does not mean to provide or construct, structing any such crossing, apply to the rail. but to keep up and preserve. State ex rel. road and warehouse commission for permis- City of Chillicothe v. Wilder, 98 S. W. 465,sion so to do, and comply with certain pro- | 467, 200 Mo. 97. ceedings therein specified. Chicago, P. & St.
Where a boom company agreed with a L. Ry. Co. v. Jacksonville Ry. & Light Co., riparian owner, during the continuance of a 91 N. E. 1024, 1027, 245 Ill. 155.
license granted such company by the owner In the Revenue Act, $ 89 (Laws 1903, pp. to use the river and maintain therein piles 414 418, c. 73), relating to assessment of rail- and booms convenient in its business and roads, and providing that the valuation of releasing the company from all claims for each mile shall be determined by dividing the future damages to plaintiff's land by acts of whole value by the number of miles of the defendant in the management of its business, “main track” of each road or line, the words to maintain a boom of logs along the bank “main track” are clearly used to distinguish on the owner's land to protect the banks from from side or second track, and turnout, spur, injury, the word “maintain," as used in the and warehouse tracks, and not to distinguish contract, meant to keep up in a particular the main line from the branch line. State state or condition, and did not bind the comex rel. Platte County v. Sheldon, 113 N. W. pany to indemnify the landowner against 208, 210, 79 Neb. 455.
loss, where such maintenance became impos
sible for a time because of an unprecedented MAINLAND
flood, which carried away the boom, where the The word "mainland,” in Revisal 1905, company had constructed a boom and exercis§ 3474, forbidding anchoring of a floathouse ed due care in its maintenance, and renewed it for fishing or hunting wild fowl in shoal wa
within a reasonable time after the flood. ter not more than 300 yards from the main- Coleman v. Mississippi & Rum River Boom land on the west side of Currituck Sound, Co., 131 N. W. 641, 642, 114 Minn. 443, 35 L. means the principal land, as opposed to is- R. A. (N. S.) 1109. land. State v. Barco, 63 S. E. 673, 674, 150 Civ. Code, $ 551, which provides that no N. C. 792.
canal can be laid out, constructed, or main
tained so as to obstruct any public highway, MAINS
and that the one so maintaining or using such Water mains as personal property, see a canal must repair the bridges, etc., was enPersonal Property.
acted in its present form in 1905. Before By the word “mains," in Laws 1890, c.
that it provided that every water or canal 566, p. 1148, $ 65, providing that any owner corporation must construct and keep in good or occupant of any premises within 100 feet repair at all times for public use across their of any main laid down by any gas light cor- canal, flume, etc., all the bridges that the poration may require it to supply him with county may require. This section was based gas, were intended those pipes through which on prior statutory provisions, passed nearly the company distributed the gas that was half a century before. Pol. Code, 8 2694, prodesigned to be taken therefrom into the vides that when highways are laid across buildings to be lighted. Moore v. Champlain canals on public lands those using the canals Electric Co., 85 N. Y. Supp. 37, 39, 88 App. must prepare them so that the highway may Div. 289.
cross without danger, and section 2737, pro
viding penalties for obstructing or injuring MAINTAIN
highways, contains provisions for bridging
ditches which cross pre-existing highways. See Establish and Maintain.
Held that, in view of these provisions the Keep and maintain, see Keep.
original act did not impose upon the owners
of canals the duty of bridging them whenever The word "maintain" has been defined as the public should lay out a road over them, meaning to support that which has already and that the present section does not impose been brought into existence. Kendrick &' that duty, for the word "maintain,” which is
the basis of the claim, should be construed As continue an action merely as a prohibition against maintaining
The word "maintained," as used in seca canal in such a way that it would injure tion 54, c. 66, R. S., means to prosecute to a an existing highway. City of Madera v. Ma conclusion an action already begun. Shurtdera Canal & Irrigation Co., 115 Pac. 936, leff v. Redlon, 82 Atl. 645, 648, 109 Me. 62. 938, 159 Cal. 749.
The verb "maintain" in pleading has a As clean
distinct technical signification. It signifies
to support what has already been brought The cleaning of streets is “repairing” or
into existence. Under a statute requiring "maintaining" them within Laws 1893, p.
partnerships transacting business under a 252, c. 264, authorizing the street and park commissioners to build, construct, repair, and ed to file a certificate stating the names of all
designation not showing the persons interestmaintain highways in the city, in view of the members, and to publish it once a week Laws 1893, c. 59, requiring towns to keep for four weeks, etc., and providing that pertheir highways in good repair, suitable for travel thereon, and creating a liability for the statute shall not maintain any action
sons doing business as partners contrary to fine and responsibility for damages suffered by travelers from defects in highways; for until they have filed the certificate and made the presence of rubbish, dirt, and ashes in a action is brought by a partnership, the firm
the publication therein required, where an street may cause it to be in a bad state of re
name of which does not indicate all the partpair and in an unsuitable condition for travel, and any act that is reasonably necessary
ners, failure to file the required certificate is to put or keep the street in good repair suit. matter of defense, and must be set up in the
answer by way of abatement; but if the able for travel thereon is "repairing" or “maintaining” the street. Connor v. Ctiy of requirement as to the filing and publication
are complied with before the defense is inManchester, 60 Atl. 436, 437, 73 N. H. 233.
terposed, it will be sufficient, even though As commence an action
the publication was not completed at the
time the action was commenced. Nicholson The word “maintained" in the Employ-v. Auburn Gold Min. & Mill. Co., 92 Pac. 651, ers' Liability Act, providing that no action 6 Cal. App. 547 (quoting California Savings for injuries thereunder shall be “maintained" & Loan Soc. v. Harris, 43 Pac. 525, 111 Cal. unless notice of the time, place, and cause of
133, 138). injury is given to the employer, is synonymous with the word “begun" or "commenced"
The statute requiring foreign corporaand the statute makes the giving of such tions to file a designation of a person on notice a condition precedent to the bringing whom process may be served within 60 days of an action under it. Grasso v. Holbrook, after commencing business within the state, Cabot & Daly Contracting Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. and providing that unless it does so it shall 101, 103, 102 App. Div. 49 (citing Burbank not "maintain” any action in the courts of v. Inhabitants of Auburn, 31 Me. 590; Boutil- the state, does not deprive foreign corporaler F. Steamboat Milwaukee, 8 Minn. 97, 105 tions of the right at any time to commence [Gil. 72]; Smith v. Lyon, 44 Conn. 178; an action for the protection of its property Byers v. Bourret, 64 Cal. 73, 28 Pac. 61; or the enforcement of its rights, and it is Mertz v. City of Brooklyn, 11 N. Y. Supp. 778, within its power at any time after the coniaffirmed 128 N. Y. 617, 28 N. E. 253).
mencement of the action to comply with the
statute and thereafter maintain such action, The word “maintain” in a statute in ref- Black v. Vermont Marble Co., 82 Pac. 1060, erence to actions comprehends the institu- 1062, 1 Cal. App. 718. tion as well as the support of the action, though it may be used to express a meaning
It was held in Carson-Rand Co. v. Stern, corresponding to its more restricted defini- 31 S. W. 772, 129 Mo. 381, 32 L. R. A. 420, tion. National Mines Co. v. Sixth Judicial that the word “maintain” meant literally “to. Dist. Court Humboldt County, 116 Pac. 996, hold by the hand,” and in its ordinary use, 1000, 34 Nev. 67.
"to uphold," "to sustain," "to keep up"; and
in pleading it means “to support what has A prohibition against "maintaining" an already been brought into existence." Triaction implies a prohibition against beginning State Amusement Co. v. Forest Park Highit, for the beginning of the action is one of lands Amusement Co., 90 S. W. 1020, 1022, the necessary steps in maintaining it. A for- 192 Mo. 404, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 688, 111 Am. eign corporation, incapacitated from suing at St. Rep. 511, 4 Ann. Cas. 808. the time of an institution of a suit by it on
Under a statute providing that “no acthe ground that it has not obtained the li- tion shall be 'maintained'" by a foreign corcense required by Rev. St. 1899, 88 1025, 1026 poration so long as it fails to comply with (Ann. St. 1906, pp. 888, 890), cannot cure the the law, when considered in connection with incapacity by thereafter taking out a license. other provisions of the act imposing penalAmalgamated Zinc & Lead Co. v. Bay State ties on officers and corporations for failing Zinc Min. Co., 120 S. W. 31, 34, 221 Mo. 7, 23 to comply with the law, and providing that a L. R. A. (N. S.) 492.
failure to comply shall not affect the valid