tain brands of cigars who will estimate most closely the number of cigars of all brands on which taxes would be collected by the government during a named month is a "lottery," though the distribution does not depend exclusively on chance, and the advertising of the same is a misdemeanor. People ex rel. Ellison v. Lavin, 71 N. E. 753, 754, 179 N. Y. 164, 66 L. R. A. 601, 1 Ann. Cas. 165.

As gambling device

See Gambling Device. Game of skill

"A lottery is commonly understood as a scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance, especially a gaming scheme in which one or more tickets bearing particular numbers draw prizes, and the rest of the tickets are blank." A knife rack, consisting

of an inclined table, with knives stuck therein, and so arranged that rings could be thrown on them, which rings are sold to customers, who endeavor to ring the knives on

the table, they being entitled to any knives rung, or on which the rings caught, is not a lottery. McRea v. State, 81 S. W. 741, 46

Tex. Cr. R. 489.

Gift enterprise

Under the provisions of Rev. St. § 3394, as amended by Act Aug. 5, 1909, c. 6, § 33, that no packages of manufactured tobacco shall be permitted to have packed in them "any paper, certificate or instrument purporting to be or represent a ticket, chance, share or interest in, or dependent upon, the event of a lottery," the definition of a lottery is not limited to a scheme whereby the value of the certificate or ticket is dependent upon lot or chance, but includes as well a scheme, whereby the possession of a certificate or prize, having a fixed value, is made to depend on lot or chance, and the statute is violated by concealing in 1 out of each 100 five-cent cuts of plug tobacco a tag redeemable by the maker for 50 cents. United States v. One Box of Tobacco, "Foot Prints," 190 Fed. 731, 732, 111 C. C. A. 459.

Policy playing

A scheme, generally known as "playing policy," whereby an association sells for five cents, or any other specific sum of money, certificates or tickets which entitle the purchaser to a lead pencil of trifling value, and also permits such purchaser to select certain numbers, say 3-9-13, which, if all drawn by a blind-folded boy from a revolving wheel in which several numbers are placed, entitle the person purchasing the certificate or ticket to a prize of money much larger in amount than he has paid for his certificate or ticket, is a "lottery." State ex rel. Kellogg v. Mercantile Ass'n, 25 Pac. 984, 985, 45 Kan. 351, 11 L. R. A. 430, 23 Am. St. Rep. 727.

Pool selling

396, provides that if any person shall sell or dispose of any lottery policy, certificate, or of anything by which such person or any number of persons promises or guarantees. that any particular number, character, ticket,

Rev. Code 1852, amended to 1893, p.

or certificate shall, in an event or on the
happening of any contingency in the nature
of a lottery, entitle the purchaser or holder
to receive money, property, or evidence of
debt, every person so offending shall on con-
viction be subject to a penalty. Held, that
the fact that tickets representing member-
ship in a baseball pool did not in themselves
show a promise or guaranty that on the
happening of an event, the holder should
be entitled to money, did not save the scheme
from being a violation of the statute, since
the term "lottery," as used therein, includes
any scheme for the distribution of money or
prizes by chance, not limited to a sale of
tickets nor to the terms or promises printed
or written upon them. State v. Sedgwick
(Del.) 81 Atl. 472, 473, 2 Boyce, 453.
As public nuisance

See Public or Common Nuisance.
Trading stamp business

the same to their customers on purchases of goods, the number of stamps given being being determined by the amount of the purchase, and the stamps, on presentation at the trading stamp store, entitling the holders to select any article from the assortment of articles, each article being plainly marked with its value in stamps, such value not being greater than the market value of the articles, is not a "lottery," within a statute denouncing lotteries, etc. State v. Shugart, 35 South. 28, 29, 138 Ala. 86, 100 Am. St. Rep. 17.

There can be no "lottery," in the absence of the element of chance. A trading Defendant, to induce the sale of a cereal stamp business, consisting of the selling of called "Mother's Oats," placed in each pack-checks or stamps to merchants, who give age a coupon on which one of the letters which spelled the word "Mother's" was printed, and offered premiums to persons holding coupons which would spell the word "Mother's"; the letter "O" being placed on only one coupon in 500. Held, that such scheme was a lottery, within Act Cong. March 2, 1895, c. 191, providing that any person who shall cause to be carried from one state to another in the United States any paper, certificate, or instrument purporting to be or representing a ticket, chance, share, or interest in, or dependent upon the event of, a lottery, etc., or other similar enterprises of fering prizes dependent upon lot or chance, shall be guilty, etc. United States v. Jefferson, 134 Fed. 299, 300.

Three things must concur in order to constitute a "lottery": (1) There must be the purchase of a right; (2) the right must be a contingent one to receive something greater than that which is purchased; and (3) the

whole width of the creek. Heiney v. Nolan, 67 Atl. 1008, 1009, 75 N. J. Law, 397.

contingent right must depend upon a lot or chance. Const. art. 18, § 2, and Mills' Ann. St. § 2927, prohibiting "lotteries" or gift enter"Low-water mark" of natural fresh waprises, does not authorize an ordinance pro- ter rivers is the water's edge at its lowest hibiting gift enterprises, designed to include stage. City of Peoria v. Central Nat. Bank, the giving of trading stamps, since the term 79 N. E. 296, 299, 224 Ill. 43, 12 L. R. A. "gift enterprise" as used in the Constitution (N. S.) 687. and statute applied only to transactions in which the element of chance is involved.

City and County of Denver v. Frueauff, 88 Pac. 389, 394, 39 Colo. 20, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1131, 12 Ann. Cas. 521 (quoting and adopting definitions in Lohman v. State, 81 Ind. 17).

LOTTERY TICKET

Fresh rivers not subject to tide may rise and fall at certain seasons and thus have defined high and low water marks. The "lowwater mark" is the point to which the river recedes at its lowest stage, while the "highwater mark" is the line which the river impresses on the soil by covering it for sufficient periods to deprive it of vegetation and to destroy its value for agriculture. State ex rel. Citizens' Electric Lighting & Power Co. v. Longfellow, 69 S. W. 374, 377, 169 Mo. 109 (citing Gould, Waters [3d Ed.] § 45).

A "ticket" is a thing which is holder's means of making good his rights. Policy slips written by a customer to indicate a choice of numbers and delivered by him to an agent of the policy game to be forwarded by him to headquarters in another state are not within the provisions of the act of Congress making it an offense against the United States to be caused to be carried from one state to another any ticket in a "lottery." Francis v. United States, 23 Sup. Ct. 334, | waters by rains, floods, and the like, filling its 335, 188 U. S. 375, 47 L. Ed. 508.

LOW

See Too Low.

LOW BRIDGE

In railroad parlance, a "low bridge" is one so low as to prevent those engaged upon box cars in the freight service from passing under the same in a standing position. Koller v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 129 N. W. 220, 221, 113 Minn. 173.

LOW JOINT

A "low joint" in a railroad is where a tie underneath that joint has been pounded so many times by wheels passing over it that there is a little space underneath that tie, so that the rails will give when the wheels go over it. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Benton, 132 Fed. 460, 461, 65 C. C. A. 660. LOW-WATER MARK

Ordinary Low-Water Mark.

The "low-water mark" which under Act Aug. 19, 1749, is the boundary line between York and Lancaster counties, is the line to which the water recedes at ordinary states of low water, and not the lowest line the water has ever been known to reach. Appeal of York Haven Water Power Co., 62 Atl. 97, 98, 100, 212 Pa. 622.

Where in ejectment the location of a "low-water mark" of tidewater on the easterly side of a creek is involved, it cannot be assumed without proof that that mark was not west of the center line of the creek, since one bank may have fallen sheer, and the other have been a shoal very nearly the

The margin of the bed of a river which lies between high and low water mark is called the "beach" or "shore," which is actually a part of the bed of the river, and, when the river is at its full flow, whether caused by the tide or by the natural increase of

natural bed to its highest reach of flow, it marks its high-water, while its lessened range of flow by summer heats shows its low-water, mark. Sun Dial Ranch v. May Land Co., 119 Pac. 758, 762, 61 Or. 205. LOW WOMAN

The statement of a person of another that she is a "low woman" and "half negress" does not impute a want of chastity. Kenworthy v. Brown, 92 N. Y. Supp. 34, 35, 45 Misc. Rep. 292.

LOWERMOST PORTION

The words "beginning from the lowermost portion thereof" should be construed as bed of stream; not from the lowest depths meaning from the lowermost portion of the of some hole or sudden depression therein, but from the lowermost part of the general contour of the channel. Krause v. Oregon Iron & Steel Co., 77 Pac. 833, 835, 45 Or. 378. LOWEST BIDDER

A single bid for public work made under due advertisements for bids, pursuant to an ordinance requiring such method of letting contracts, authorizes the city council to contract with the bidder; the term "lowest," in such connection, being used in its logical and practical, rather than its grammatical, sense. Hager v. Melton, 66 S. E. 13, 17, 66 W. Va. 62.

The expression "lowest bidder" necessarily implies a common standard by which to measure the respective bids, and that common standard must necessarily be previously prepared specifications of the work to be done and materials to be furnished. Where an equipment of an automatic fire alarm office for a city, as designed by the city electrician,

was authorized by ordinance, a subsequent | St. 1909, § 1017, providing for competitive
notice to bidders, after call for bids had been bids before awarding contracts for public
published, which abrogated the specifications improvements, implies skill, judgment, and
and established in lieu thereof an equipment integrity necessary to a faithful performance
which the board and city electricians might of the contract, as well as sufficient financial
deem adequate, rendered the bids void under resources and ability. Williams v. City of
the requirements of the city charter that pub- Topeka, 118 Pac. 864, 866, 85 Kan. 857, 38
lic improvements made by contract should L. R. A. (N. S.) 672, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 497.
be let to the "lowest bidder" and that the
contracts and specifications must at that time.
be on file subject to public inspection. Gos-work was the lowest as to part of the work
hert v. Seattle, 107 Pac. 860, 862, 57 Wash.

645.

LOWEST RESPONSIBLE BIDDER

The expression "lowest bidder" necessarily implies a common standard by which to measure respective bids, which standard must necessarily be previously prepared specifica

Where one whose bid for county road

failed to submit samples of material to be
tested as reasonably requested and the bid
of the one to whom the contract was award-
ed was the lowest on all the work, such lat-
ter bid could be regarded and accepted by
lowest responsible bidder," as required by
the county commissioners as the "bid of the
statute. Suburban Inv. Co. v. Hyde, 55
South. 76, 78, 61 Fla. 809.

LUBRICATOR

See Force Feed Lubricator.

tions of work to be done and materials to be
furnished; specifications freely accessible to
all who may desire to compete, on which
alone their respective bids must be based.
By the phrase "lowest responsible bidder,"
as used in a statute relating to school build-
ings, it was not intended to limit the power LUCID INTERVAL
of the board to the simple examination of the
different bids tendered without reference
from whom they came, and that they should
blindly select one solely from the considera-
tion that it was lowest in price, but it re-
quired the board to select that bidder who,
all things being considered, had ability to
respond to the requirements of the contract
having full regard to the subject-matter.
The word "responsible," as employed in the
act when applied to contracts requiring for
their execution not only pecuniary ability,
but also judgment and skill, imposes not
merely a ministerial duty on the city au-
thorities, but also duties and powers deliber-
ate and discretionary. Hannan v. Board of
Education of City of Lawton, 107 Pac. 646,
650, 654, 25 Okl. 372, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 214
(citing Mazet v. City of Pittsburgh, 20 Atl.
693, 137 Pa. 548; Commonwealth ex rel. Sny-
der v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. 343).

The court was well within the rule laid
down by text-writers and cases, in instruct-
ing that by the term "lucid interval" is
meant that period of time during which the
person concerned, had so far regained the po-
sition of her faculties as to be of sound and
disposing mind and memory as defined there-
in, and that it does not mean that there has
been a simple diminution in her insanity, but
that her mind has been temporarily restored
to sanity, and sufficiently restored to quali-
fy her to make a will as a person of sound
and disposing mind and memory. King v.
Gilson, 90 S. W. 367, 370, 191 Mo. 307.

"A lucid interval,' under the civil law, is
not an apparent tranquility or seeming re-
pose. It is not a simple diminution or re-
mission of the disease, but a temporary
cure an intermission so clearly marked that
it perfectly resembles a return to health.
And, as the nature of the interval cannot be
ascertained in an instant, it must continue
during a length of time sufficient to give the
certainty of the temporary return to reason.
The time must in all cases be considerable.
*
The Roman jurisconsults distin-
guished two classes of insane persons. One
class they called 'furiosos'; the other, 'mente
captos.'
All the Roman laws which
speak of 'lucid intervals' have exclusive ref-
erence to the first class. For instance, the

The statute requiring that contracts for public improvements shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder does not require the letting of contracts to the lowest bidder, on ascertaining his financial responsibility only, but the term "responsible" includes the ability to respond by the discharge of the contractor's obligations in accordance with what may be expected or demanded under the contract, and where the board of local improvements has exercised its discretion in the award of a contract for a public improve-Law 39, Digest de Judiciis, authorized the inment, the presumption arises that its action was legal, and the party asserting the contrary has the burden of overcoming the presumption by proof that the board acted without jurisdiction or fraudulently. Hallet v. City of Elgin, 98 N. E. 530, 532, 254 Ill. 343. The word "responsible" in the phrase "lowest responsible bidder," as used in Gen.

sane of the first class to discharge judicial
functions during lucid intervals. But this
was never permitted in cases of simple in-
sanity." Succession of Morere, 38 South. 435,
437, 114 La. 506 (quoting and adopting defi-
nition in Aubert v. Aubert, 6 La. Ann. 108,
quoting from Coin-Delisle, Donations et Tes-
taments, p. 82).

See Dressed Lumber; Fire Proofed Lumber; Logs, Lumber, and Other Timber; Sawed Lumber.

Merchantable lumber, see Merchantable.

"By 'lucid intervals' is meant, not merely | LUMBER a cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder, but a temporary restoration of reason such as to create responsibility for acts done during its continuance. Still, restoration of the mental faculties to their original condition is not necessary. It is sufficient if there be such restoration that the person is able, beyond doubt, to comprehend and to do the act with such reason, memory, and judgment as to make it a legal act." Team v. Bryant, 51 S. E. 148, 150, 71 S. C. 331.

LUCRATIVE OFFICE

The deputy auditorship of a county is a "lucrative office" within Burns' Ann. St. 1908, 9539, providing that no person holding a lucrative position shall be a notary public, and his acceptance of such office shall vacate his appointment as notary. Sharp v. State (Ind.) 99 N. E. 1072, 1075.

The word "lumber" is in common use to describe both trees suitable to saw and the products into which they are sawed. Where a deed of standing lumber and trees suitable to saw into lumber stipulated that the lumber remaining on the premises at the end of a specified time should revert to the grantor, but not suggesting that the trees were to be sawed on the premises, it was held that the forfeiture clause applied only to standing trees, and the sawed lumber which remained on the premises after expiration of the specified time did not revert to the grantor. Tuttle v. D. W. Pingree Co., 73 Atl. 407, 408, 75 N. H. 288.

The meaning of the word "lumber" is A "lucrative office" is one whose pay is vague and indefinite, and it has different affixed to the performance of its duties; and, senses according to the context in which it when the duties of the office are fixed by is used or the nature of the transactions to Most often it desstatute, it is immaterial that the compensa- which the parties refer. tion of the officer is fixed by some other board ignates materials of wood used in constructor officer. The office of deputy sheriff, wheth- ing houses, fences, and other like structures er entitled to the compensation fixed by con--wooden building material. The Standard tract between the sheriff and the deputy, or entitled to the fees allowed by law, is a lucrative office, within Const. art. 2, § 26, declaring that no person shall hold more than one lucrative office at the same time. State v. Slagle, 89 S. W. 326, 327, 115 Tenn. 336 (citing State ex rel. Platt v. Kirk, 44 Ind. 401, 15 Am. Rep. 239; Chambers v. State ex rel. Barnard, 26 N. E. 893, 127 Ind. 365, 11 L. R. A. 613).

Rev. St. U. S. §§ 1245-1259, provide for the retirement of army officers. Section 1259 authorizes the assignment of retired officers to duty at the Soldiers' Home, and by subsequent enactments retired officers may be detailed for service with the militia of the several states or in colleges and military schools, and in time of war may be employed on active duty other than in command of troops. Act March 2, 1903, c. 975, 32 Stat. 927, 932; Act April 23, 1904, c. 1485, 33 Stat. 259; Act Nov. 3, 1893, c. 13, 28 Stat. 7; Act Aug. 6, 1894, c. 228, 28 Stat. 223, 2 Supp. Rev. St. U. S. 226; Act April 21, 1904, c. 1403, 33 Stat. 225. Held, that a retired army officer is not, by reason of such retirement, holding an office within State Const. art. 4, § 20, making any person holding any lucrative office under the United States ineligible to any civil office of profit under the state. Reed v. Schon, 83 Pac. 77, 78, 2 Cal. App. 55.

LUGGAGE

Dictionary defines it as "timber sawed into merchantable form; especially boards;" the Century, as "timber sawed or split for use, such as joists, boards, planks, staves, hoops, and the like;" Webster's Unabridged, as "timber sawed or split into the form of beams, joists, boards, planks, staves, hoops, etc.; especially that which is smaller than heavy timber." Plaintiffs, who were regular shippers of "lumber," ties, and piling, wrote to defendant railroad, asking the rate on "lumber." Defendant replied, guaranteeing a rate to the point of delivery to a connecting carrier. Plaintiff shipped ties, for which defendant charged and collected a greater rate than agreed on in its letter to plaintiff. Defendant's tariff sheet did not include ties within the term "lumber," and there was no evidence that defendant understood or could have been reasonably expected to have understood, when applied to by plaintiff, that the latter intended to ship ties, when he asked the rate on "lumber." Held, that the letter written by defendant did not amount to an agreement to carry ties on the rate specified therein. Greason v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 86 S. W. 722, 725, 112 Mo. App. 116.

When plaintiff applied for cars for the transportation of oak cross-ties, one of defendant carriers had a joint rate to Kansas points, including the destination of the ties, applying to "lumber, car loads, all kinds," of 24 cents per 100 pounds. The other defendant carrier had a similar rate on "lumber,

See Ordinary Luggage; Personal Lug- all kinds," but neither carrier had a specific

gage.

See, also, Baggage.

rate on cross-ties. Held, that "lumber" being generally defined to include "any timber saw

LUMBER DEALER OR MERCHANT
As engaged in mercantile pursuit, see
Mercantile.

ed or split for use," whether by maul, wedge, ber for services in cutting logs. Engi v. Haror the use of machinery in a mill, anything dell, 100 N. W. 1046, 1048, 123 Wis. 407. manufactured out of a log with saw, ax, maul, wedge, or machine, for building houses, bridges, fences, or railroads, after the product leaves the log for commercial use, it inIcluded the cross-ties within such joint-rate schedules. Classification of railway crossties in a different class from "lumber," imposing on them a higher rate, constitutes unjust discrimination. American Tie & Timber Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 175 Fed. 28, 32, 99 C. C. A. 44.

Rev. St. 1903, c. 93, § 46, provides that whoever labors at cutting, hauling, rafting, or driving logs or lumber shall have a lien thereon for the amount due for his personal services and the service performed by his team. Held, that in view of the original provision in the statute (Laws 1848, c. 72),

providing a lien for "cutting, hauling, or
driving logs, masts, spars, or other lumber,"
meaning other lumber ejusdem generis, in a
condition similar to logs, masts, and spars,
that is, felled but not manufactured, but de-
signed for ultimate manufacture, as are logs,
or not to be manufactured, as are spars and
masts, the word "lumber" in section 46 is not
used in its broadest meaning as including

both the manufactured and the unmanufac-
tured product; but no lien is given for cut-
ting or hauling manufactured lumber.
Mitchell v. Page (Me.) 78 Atl. 570, 571.
As goods, wares and merchandise
See Goods.

Logs or timber distinguished

"Lumber" is to be distinguished from logs or timber, and in common parlance, as well, means more than ordinary logs. Craze v. Alabama State Land Co., 46 South. 479, 480, 155 Ala. 431 (citing definition in Webst. Dict.).

As merchandise

See Merchandise. Timber synonymous

Where, in a suit by attachment the affidavit set up a lien for stumpage, under Code 1907, § 4814, for timber sold, and the complaint charged for lumber sold, but also claimed under a lien for stumpage under the statute, which gives a lien for timber sold, the word "lumber," as used therein, is synonymous with "timber," when considered in connection with all the averments of the complaint and the affidavit, as against an objection that there was a fatal variance between

the pleading and proof, since it can reasonably be construed to harmonize with the affidavit and evidence showing a sale of timber, as distinguished from lumber. Sligh v. Frix, 51 South. 601, 602, 165 Ala. 230.

LUMBER AND TIMBER

Slabs are not included in the material designated as "lumber and timber" in the

One engaging in the business of keeping and selling lumber in considerable quantities is properly called a "lumber merchant." Jackson v. Town of Union, 73 Atl. 773, 774, 82 Conn. 266.

LUMP SUM

A charge in the items of a mechanic's lien is not a "lumping" one, where it inIcludes only lienable items which are the subject of an express contract for a given price, which, in case of a subcontract, is also shown to be the reasonable value thereof. Holland v. Cunliff, 69 S. W. 737, 740, 96 Mo. App. 67 (citing Hilliker v. Francisco, 65 Mo. 598; Deardorff v. Roy, 50 Mo. App. 70).

The term "lumping," in the vernacular of members of a trade union is used to designate a method of doing work where the contractor is only the figurehead of the owner who purchases the material and assumes all the responsibility in connection with the contract and the "lumper" merely furnishes the labor and acts as superintendent upon an agreed compensation for his services. People v. Weinseimer, 102 N. Y. Supp. 579, 581, 117 App. Div. 603.

LUNACY

The words "lunacy" and "unsound mind" have been bent out of their technical sense in some instances, a legislative construction being given thereto in harmony with the broad views of courts that they include every phase of unsound mind rendering one incapable of caring for himself or his property. In re Streiff, 97 N. W. 189, 191, 119 Wis. 566, 100 Am. St. Rep. 903.

Under section 7, Statutory Construction statute giving a lien on the lumber and tim-law, the terms "lunatic" and "lunacy" include