at a place where the road is not fenced, and | of self-propulsion by means of a sprocket the stock is frightened by any locomotive or wheel on the axle under the boiler, connected train and injured, the company shall be lia- by a chain with the engine, the chain being ble; and section 4160 provides that words removed when driving a pile, is not a “locoand phrases shall be taken in their plain and motive engine," within Burns' Rev. St. 1901, usual sense. Held, that a "speeder"-a con- § 7083, subd. 4, providing that every railroad, trivance similar to a hand car, save that it etc., shall be liable for injuries suffered by is operated by a gasoline engine-is not a "lo- an employé, and caused by the negligence of comotive," within the statute, and a railroad any other employé having charge of any "sigis not liable for injuries to stock frightened nal, telegraph office, switch yard, shop, roundthereby. Henson v. Williamsville, G. & St. house, locomotive engine, or train upon a L. Ry. Co., 85 S. W. 597, 598, 110 Mo. App. | railway." Jarvis v. Hitch, 67 N. E. 1057, 1059, 161 Ind. 217. 595. Rev. Laws, c. 106, § 71, cl. 3, declaring that a master shall be liable for injuries to a servant caused by the negligence of a person in his employ, who is in charge of an engine or train on a railroad, extends to a manufacturing plant which operates a system of railroad tracks. in its yard in connection with a commercial railroad, and an engine and cars operated on the tracks constitute a "locomotive and train on a railroad." Hines v. Stanley G. I. Elec. Mfg. Co., 85 N. E. 851, 852, 199 Mass. 522. Ky. St. § 786, relating to "railroads," requiring every company to provide every locomotive engine on its road with a bell and steam whistle, and to ring the one and sound the other outside cities, at a grade crossing of its road with a highway, in view of section 842a, subsec. 1, providing that all interurban electric companies authorized to construct a railroad 10 miles long shall be under the same duties, so far as practicable, as railroad corporations, requires such an interurban electric to sound the gong and electric whistle of its motors at such crossings; any engine used in producing motion, whether by steam or other power, being a locomotive engine, within the statute; and the gong and electric whistle, being but substitutes for the bell and steam whistle required by the statute. Commonwealth v. Louisville & E. R. Co., 133 S. W. 230, 231, 141 Ky. 583. A whirley, derrick, or locomotive crane built upon car trucks, and equipped with a boiler and engine furnishing the power to operate the crane, and to move the machine about upon the railroad tracks in the vicinity where it is being operated by a railway company for the purpose of unloading heavy materials to be used in the construction of docks, and not employed by the railway company in its business as a common carrier in moving state traffic, is not, while being so operated, a "locomotive, car, tender, or similar vehicle used in moving state traffic," required by sections 8950 and 8952 of the General Code to be equipped with an automatic coupler and provided with drawbars of standard height. Where a railway company, as a common car-nals at crossings, though the term "locomorier, has deposited on tracks built upon a partly constructed dock, cars loaded with materials to be used by it in the further construction of such dock, the use of this machine to shift these loaded cars a short distance to meet the needs and convenience of the employés engaged in unloading the same, does not bring the machine, during the time it is so employed, within the provision of these sections. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Benson, 97 N. E. 417, 419, 85 Ohio St. 215, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 945. The term "locomotive engine" has a wellknown significance, and is used generally for an engine to draw a train of trucks or cars along a permanent or temporary set of rails. There is also a well-known class of engines, such as traction engines, which, though they are capable of being moved from place to place, are never spoken of as locomotive engines. A pile driver, consisting of a steam engine placed on a flat car at one end and a driver used in raising the hammer at the other end, all forming one machine, capable An inspection car, operated by a steam engine placed in the center thereof, and designed to run from place to place for use by the officers of the railroad in making inspections, is a locomotive engine within a city ordinance limiting the speed of engines, and requiring the giving of signals, and within Rev. St. 1899, § 1102, requiring the giving of sig tive engine" usually signifies a steam engine used to draw a car or train of cars along a railroad. Mudd v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 124 S. W. 59, 61, 146 Mo. App. 388. By the words "locomotive engine or train road and locomotive engine and trains opupon a railroad" must be understood a railerated and run, or originally intended to to some extent by steam. Employers' Liabe operated and run, in some manner and bility Act March 4, 1893, p. 295, c. 130, § 1 (Burns' Ann. St. 1901, § 7083), providing that every railroad or other corporation shall be liable for damages for personal injuries suffered by an employé, where the injury was caused by the negligence of any employé having charge of any signal, telegraph office, "locomotive engine, or train upon a railroad," does not apply to employés operating electric cars; such a car not being a "locomotive engine" or a "train upon a railroad," within the meaning of the statute. Indianapolis & G. Rapid Transit Co. v. Andis, 72 N. E. 145, 150, 33 Ind. App. 625. As any car See Any. As freight car See Freight Car. As vehicle See Vehicle. LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEER See Engineer. LODE and development. Noyes v. Clifford, 94 Pac. 842, 847, 37 Mont. 138. Veins or "lodes" are lines or aggregations of metal imbedded in quartz or other rock in place, consisting of a strip of mineralbearing rock within defined boundaries in the general mass of the mountain, which must be continuous and without interruption, bounded by country rock mineralized to no greater extent than the general condition of the vicinity. Rock or matter of any kind, in order to constitute a vein or "lode," within the meaning of the statute, must be metal See Known Lode or Vein; Mineral Lode. liferous and contain such mineral value as As any mineral matter will distinguish it from the country rock, especially where no well-defined walls appear. A "lode," within the meaning of the fed- What values the filling or material of a fiseral statute making the discovery of a vein or sure should contain to constitute it a vein, "lode" a prerequisite to the location of a min- within the meaning of the act of Congress, ing claim, is whatever the miner could fol- must necessarily depend upon the characterlow and find ore. A valid location of a min-istics of the district or country in which the ing claim may be made whenever the prospec- vein or lode, in any particular instance tor has discovered such indications of min- claimed to exist, is located, and upon the eral that he is willing to spend his time and character, as to boundaries, of the vein itself. money in following with the expectation of Values, therefore, of the filling of the vein finding ore, and a valid location may be made must be considered with special reference of a ledge deep in the ground and appearing to the district where the vein or lode is at the surface, not in the shape of ore, but found. In the absence of defined walls and in vein matter only. Columbia Copper Min. of mineralization appreciably greater than Co. v. Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelting that contained in the general mass of the Co., 79 Pac. 385, 386, 13 Wyo. 244 (quoting mountain, broken, stained, and fissured maand adopting definition in 1 Lindley, Mines terial, or crushed and brecciated matter, [2d Ed.] p. 610). characteristic of the district, cannot be held to constitute a vein or "lode," under the statute. In such case the limits of fractur Defined boundaries required "A 'vein' or 'lode' is mineral-bearing rocking do not constitute the limits of the vein, or other earthy matter in place in a fissure in rock, so that its boundaries are sharply defined by rocky walls in place." Webb v. American Asphaltum Mining Co., 157 Fed. 203, 204, 84 C. C. A. 651. A "lode" is a zone or belt of mineralized rock, lying within boundaries clearly separating it from the neighboring rock. Ambergris Min. Co. v. Day, 85 Pac. 109, 112, 114, 12 Idaho, 108 (quoting and adopting definition in Eureka Consol. Min. Co. v. Richmond Min. Co., 8 Fed. Cas. 819, and citing definitions quoted in 5 Words & Phrases, p. 4423). and even if there be found an occasional vug or fragment of ore, yet where it is disconnected from any ore body and so intermingled with the surrounding country rock that it cannot be regarded as continuous, it does not mark the line of the vein or "lode," within the meaning of the law. Grand Central Min. Co. v. Mammoth Min. Co., 83 Pac. 648, 676, 677, 678, 679, 29 Utah, 490. Placer distinguished A "lode" is a solid vein of metal, while a "placer" is earth, sand, or gravel containing valuable mineral in particles. A mining lode is a totally different thing from a placer mine, and not a mere state or condition of such mine. They are two distinct things, and not two different states of the same thing. McCarter v. Sooy Oyster Co., 75 Atl. 211, 215, 78 N. J. Law, 394 (quoting and adopting definition in Webst. Dict.). LODE CLAIM A vein or "lode," within Rev. St. U. S. § 2333, providing that, where an application for a patent for a placer claim does not include an application for a known vein or lode within its boundaries, the application shall be construed as a declaration that the claimant of the placer claim has no right of possession of the vein or lode claim, but that, where the existence of a vein or lode claim is not known, a patent for the placer claim Laws 1903, p. 360, entitled "An act to shall convey all valuable mineral and other regulate the construction, equipment and deposits within the boundaries thereof, is a operation of metalliferous mines, body of mineral or mineral-bearing rock with- providing penalties for violation thereof, in defined boundaries in the general mass provides by section 18 (Rev. St. of the mountain, and that a "known vein or 1908, § 4297) "that all abandoned mine shafts, lode" is one clearly ascertained, and of such pits or other excavations endangering the extent as to render the land more valuable life of man or beast shall be securely covered on that account and justify its exploitation or fenced." The complaint in an action * * against the owner of an unused mining shaft | mands Lumber Co. v. Morgan City Timber for damages for the death of plaintiffs' in- Co., 41 South. 332, 340, 117 La. 1. fant son, resulting from the alleged negligence of the owner in failing to cover or fence the shaft, averred that the shaft was abandoned, that it belonged to the defendant, that the defendant was a corporation existing under the laws of this state and engaged in mining gold and other precious metals, and that the shaft was located upon mining property known as the Australia lode mining claim belonging to the defendant. Held that, while the act applied only to mines yielding metals, the term "lode claim" meant a mining claim containing a vein of metallic ore, and hence that the complaint sufficiently averred that the shaft was upon a metalliferous mine. Richardson v. El Paso Consol. Gold Mining Co., 118 Pac. 982, 985, 51 Colo. 440. Lumber distinguished See Lumber. As merchandise See Merchandise. As timber See Timber. LOG MEASURE See Scribner's Log Rule. LOGS AND BOX MATERIALS Blocks of wood from 6 to 15 inches in diameter and 38 to 42 inches long, sawed from round logs in their natural state, are not classified as "logs and box materials” by the 110 commodities act (Laws 1907, p. 209); and a contract for their transportation, which describes them as cordwood, at the LODE LOCATION A "lode location" is a location of min-rate fixed for cordwood, is binding on the eral-bearing rock in place in a fissure in rock in the manner prescribed by the act of Congress. Webb v. American Asphaltum Mining Co., 157 Fed. 203, 204, 84 C. C. A. 651. Ordinarily the landlord supplies a "lodger" with furnished rooms, the care and occupation of which the landlord has, the lodger merely having the use of rooms without the exclusive possession, while the tenant has exclusive possession. Mathews v. Livingston, 85 Atl. 529, 531, 86 Conn. 263. One who is in the possession of apartments by virtue of a formal lease in writing, by the terms of which the absolute right of use and occupation is given to the lessee for the purpose of a dwelling for himself and family, the lessor having no right to enter except for the purpose of making repairs or alterations, and in which the lessee is designated as "tenant" and the lessor as "landlord." is not a "lodger." within the intent of Laws 1899, p. 834, c. 380, giving a lien to a lodging house keeper on the baggage and other property brought upon the premises by a lodger. Shearman v. Iroquois Hotel & Apartment Co., 85 N. Y. Supp. 365, 366, 42 Misc. Rep. 217. LOFT Of barn as building, see Building. LOG See Prize Logs; Saw Logs. The word "log," as used in a logging contract, does not mean "tree." Des Alle shipper and carrier; and the mere fact that the consignee or subsequent buyer may manufacture the blocks into barrel heads does not justify the carrier in reclassifying them as logs and box material, and demanding a higher rate as a condition precedent to a delivery. Southern Ry. Co. v. Lowe, 54 South. 51, 170 Ala. 598. LOGS AND OTHER TIMBER PRODUCTS See Other Timber. LOGS AND ROUND UNMANUFACTURED TIMBER Pulp wood subjected to the rossing process, by which the bark and excrescences are mechanically removed, in order to prepare it for use, is not, by reason of this treatment, to be excluded from the provision in Tariff Act July 24. 1897, c. 11, § 2, Free List, par. 699, for "logs and round unmanufactured timber,' including pulp woods, * * * not specially provided for." United States v. Pierce, 140 Fed. 962, 963. LOGS AND TIMBER Under Rev. St. 1878, § 3330, as amended by Laws 1879, c. 187, § 1, giving a lien on "logs and timber" to any person furnishing supplies to those engaged in getting out logs and timber, the word "logs" clearly means the stem or trunks of trees cut into convenient lengths for the purpose of being afterwards manufactured into timber of various kinds, and does not include manufactured lumber of any kind nor timber which is squared or otherwise shaped for use without further change in form, and the word "timber" was clearly intended to include the same stems or trunks of trees when cut and shaped for use in the erection of buildings or other structures, and not to be manufactured into lumber, within the meaning of the word "lumber." Railroad ties are usually made from the stems of small trees and shaped for use in the construction of a railroad track, and are clearly "timber," within the meaning of the word as used in the statute. Kollock v. Parcher, 9 N. W. 67, 69, 52 Wis. 393. port, by the fact that only occasionally he has employment at odd jobs, being for the most part without employment, the terms "loiter," "loaf," and "idle," when construed with the words "larger portion of their time," LOGS, LUMBER, AND OTHER TIM- require proof, to sustain a conviction of va BER See Other Timber. LOGS OF WOOD Sandalwood in pieces of varying sizes, several feet long and several inches thick, to which nothing has been done beyond removing the bark and sawing the wood into lengths convenient for transportation, is not dutiable under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule C, par. 198, 30 Stat. 167, as "wood, unmanufactured, not specially provided for," but is free of duty, under the provision in paragraph 699 of said act (section 2, Free List, 30 Stat. 202, for "logs of wood." George Lueders & Co. v. United States, 131 Fed. 655. LOGGING RAILROAD As railroad, see Railroad-Railway. LOGROLLING "Logrolling" consists in framing a bill with numerous separate or independent provisions, none of which would pass upon its own merits, but each of which is made attractive enough to command a certain number of votes, which, being united, are sufficient to pass the bill. People v. Sullivan, 65 N. E. 989, 996, 173 N. Y. 122, 63 L. R. A. 353, 93 Am. St. Rep. 582. grancy, that the person charged was able to work, and, being so able, habitually loafed, loitered, and idled in the city for the greater part of his time, without employment or visible means of support. Ex parte Strittmatter, 124 S. W. 906, 907, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 156, 137 Am. St. Rep. 937, 21 Ann. Cas. 477. LOITERER The term "loiterer," in a charge that, if mere "loiterer" about deplaintiff was a fendant's station after his discharge, he could not recover for injuries, of necessity implies plaintiff's presence about the station without consent, permission, or license, and, if anything, it is even broader than those terms, for one may be about the premises without consent, permission, or license, and yet not be a "loiterer" but a trespasser. Hern v. Southern Pac. Co., 81 Pac. 902, 907, 29 Utah, 127. The services of an attorney, rendered in an action or actions under a single or differWhat is commonly known as "logrolling" ent retainers, which merely involves charges is passing through a measure, not on its own in connection with the various steps in the merits, by combining it with other measures, litigation, cannot be said to constitute a each of which has a certain strength, and long account. On the contrary, the charge in thus pulling them through by virtue of their each action, although the service be permiscombined strength. Christie v. Miller, 57 S. sible of exhaustive itemization, is essentially E. 697, 698, 128 Ga. 412 (quoting and adopt-a single charge respecting each action, and ing the definition of Judge McCay in Con- exceptional circumstances must be made to ner's Case, 51 Ga. 573). appear in order to remove the case from the operation of such rule. Prentice v. Huff, 90 N. Y. Supp. 780, 782, 98 App. Div. 111. "Logrolling," as applied to elections, consists in the combining of several questions so that a voter cannot exercise his judgment as to one or more of the several propositions, but must either adopt or reject them as an entirety. Tolson v. Police Jury, 43 South. 1011, 1014, 119 Ga. 215, 12 Ann. Cas. 847. LOITER LOITER, LOAF, AND IDLE In Gen Laws 31st Leg. c. 59, § 1, par. "d," defining as vagrants all able-bodied persons who habitually "loaf, loiter, and idle" in any public place, etc., for the greater part of their time, without any regular employment or visible means of support, and declaring that one is not relieved from a charge of vagrancy who habitually loafs, loiters, and idles, if he is without visible means of sup Where the issues framed by the pleadings in a cause are very numerous, involving many dealings between the parties growing out of farming transactions under a contract under which plaintiff farmed certain lands for the defendant, also growing out of sale of personal property of various kinds and at various dates, and for work, labor, and services performed by plaintiff for defendant, also for numerous items or claims for money advanced to and paid out and expended at various dates by each party at the request of and for the benefit of the other, and where there are numerous causes of action set forth in the complaint, as well as those set forth in various counterclaims contained in the answer, are all for the recovery of money upon contract, and some of the causes of action embrace many separate items of account, all of which are denied by the opposite party, and where the issues are such as to render it practically impossible for a jury to intelligently try and determine the same, the case is one eminently proper to be referred as involving the examination of a "long account." Smith v. Kunert, 115 N. W. 76, 78, 17 N. D. 120 (citing Sutton v. Wegner, 43 N. W. 167, 74 Wis. 347; Turner v. Nachtsheim, 36 N. W. 637, 71 Wis. 16; La Coursier v. Russell, 52 N. W. 176, 82 Wis. 265; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Faist, 58 N. W. 744, 87 Wis. 360; Ittner v. St. Louis Exposition & Music Hall Ass'n, 11 S. W. 58, 97 Mo. 561; People v. Peck [N. Y.] 57 How. Prac. 315; Spence v. Simis, 33 N. E. 554, 137 N. Y. 617; Salem Traction Co. v. Anson, 67 Pac. 1015, 69 Pac. 675, 41 Or. 562; Lewis v. Snook, 84 N. Y. Supp. 634, 88 App. Div. 343; Haig v. Boyle, 45 N. Y. Supp. 816, 20 Misc. Rep. 155). The statute authorizing references does not apply to an action, ex delicto, though there may be a great number of items involved, since such an action does not involve the examination of a long account as contemplated by the statute. Foster v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 128 S. W. 36, 37, 143 Mo. App. 547. An action for work performed and material furnished does not involve a "long account," within the meaning of New York Code, so as to require a reference, where the work done, though upon 43 different apartments in an apartment house appears to have been under a single employment, and the only work specified in the bill of particulars is papering and kalsomining, and none of the items making up the charge appears to be at all complex, and all of them must of necessity have been of the same general character. Levine v. Royal State Bank, 113 N. Y. Supp. 523, 61 Misc. Rep. 226. A complaint alleged that between December and the following May plaintiff rendered medical services for defendant, and attached to the complaint was a schedule giving the date and charge for each visit. The answer admitted that the services were rendered, but denied the dates and values of the visits, and that the services were rendered as set forth in the schedule. Held, that the pleadings did not indicate that the trial would necessarily involve the "examination of a 'long account,'" within Code Civ. Proc. § 1013, authorizing a compulsory reference in such a case. Fowler v. Peck, 99 N. Y. Supp. 816, 817, 51 Misc. Rep. 645. Where services relate to one matter, or can be grouped into so few separate matters that a jury can easily bear them in mind, a compulsory reference is improper, for numerous itemized charges for one matter do not make a "long account," within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc. § 1013, authorizing the court to direct a reference, upon motion of either party without the consent of the other where the trial will require the examination of a long account on either side, and will not require the decision of difficult questions of law; and hence, in an action by an attorney for services and disbursements, where the disbursements are insignificant, and of the 25 separate charges for services 3 are retainers, and the remaining 22 relate to services performed in five separate matters, not complicated in character, consisting mainly of consultations, conferences, and negotiations of settlements, a reference should be refused. Russell v. McDonald, 110 N. Y. Supp. 950, 951, 125 App. Div. 844. In an action to recover part of the price paid for shoes, defendant claimed that plain tiff told him he would sell him the shoes at cost, and the way to figure the cost was to divide the first figure marked on each pair of shoes by 4, and add 5 to the next figure, and plaintiff admitted that the true way to find the cost was to divide the first figure by 4, but that he did not agree to sell the shoes at cost, but at 50 cents above cost, which was the price paid by defendant. Held that, under the compulsory reference statute, there was no long account involved so as to authorize a reference. Barger v. Beach, 127 S. W. 120, 121, 142 Mo. App. 389. LONG AS See As Long as; So Long as. LONG ON In the parlance of the stock and produce exchange, to say that one was "long on cotton" means that he had too much cotton. Whitley v. Newman, 70 S. E. 686, 690, 9 Ga. App. 89. LONG PRICE Tobacco in bond is sold in two ways: At the "long price," which denotes that the duty does not come in question but that the goods are sold at a flat price without reference to duty; and "short price" is that the merchandise and the duties are separated. Friend v. Rosenwald, 108 N. Y. Supp. 701, 702, 124 App. Div. 226. LONG TIME In a suit to enjoin the alleged illegal use of a trade-name, an affidavit that complainant had used the name for a “long time" is too indefinite for judicial action. Charles R. De Bevoise Co. v. H. & W. Co., 60 Atl. 407, 69 N. J. Eq. 114. Where the owner of lots wrote real estate agents that he would sell the lots for a given price, so much cash, and the balance on "long time," the agents were not authorized to sell on terms whereby notes running from one to four years, given by the purchaser for the balance, were payable "on or before" certain dates. The quoted words placed in each |