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board of capital commissioners and defining | nized and approved for the classification of its powers and duties, authorizing the Governor to accept, for capital purposes, the proceeds of the sale of land, or donations from other sources, and declaring an emergency," is not a "local law," within Const. art. 5, § 32, providing that no special or local law shall be considered by the Legislature until notice of the intended introduction thereof shall first have been published in newspapers, etc. Coyle v. Smith, 113 Pac. 944, 948, 28 Okl. 121.

Acts 31st Leg. c. 20, § 2, providing for a state tax and authorizing a county tax for maintaining in prohibition territory a cold storage where intoxicating or nonintoxicating liquors are kept on deposit for others, is not a "local or special law," within the prohibition of Const. art. 3, §§ 56, 57. Ex parte Flake (Tex.) 149 S. W. 146, 151.

Rev. St. 1899, §§ 8278-8317c, providing for the drainage of overflowed land, applies to and governs all persons equally who come within its scope, and is not a "local law," within Const. art. 4, § 53, prohibiting local laws. State ex rel. Applegate v. Taylor, 123 S. W. 892, 916, 224 Mo. 393 (citing State v. Etchman, 88 S. W. 643, 189 Mo. 648; State ex inf. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 116 S. W. 902, 218 Mo. 1; Coffey v. City of Carthage, 98 S. W. 562, 200 Mo. 616).

cities for the purpose of general legislation.
An act is "general" in the restricted sense in
which the term is used in article 7, § 21, pro-
viding that no general law shall be in force
until published, when it is of that character
within the broad meaning of the term, and
also when it is "public" in that its effects ex-
tend to the people of a locality such as a
county, city, town, or village, or a collection
of localities not forming a legislative class
formed for some legitimate cause; the term
"general" and the term "public" being con-
When
sidered in this respect synonymous.
an act is "general" merely because it is "pub-
lic," it is, at the same time, "local," and
must be tested as to its validity by section
21, art. 7, and section 18, art. 4, as well, and,
if it belong to one of the prohibited classes of
special legislation, it must also be tested by
the constitutional restriction upon that sub-
ject. Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 85 N.
W. 131, 135, 109 Wis. 9, 53 L. R. A. 635.

Where all objects which can constitution

ally be included in a class are by legislation recognized by inclusion therein, such legislation will be general in the constitutional sense, and P. L. 1907, p. 365, art. 25, supplementary to the school law creating and is not a private, local, or special law, violative of Const. art. 4, § 7, par. 11, prohibiting the passage of such laws in certain cases, because for constitutional reasons it did not compel teachers whose contracts antedated the enactment of the supplement to become members of the fund, but only those whose contracts were made after it became effec tive. Allen v. Board of Education of City of Passaic, 79 Atl. 101, 103, 81 N. J. Law, 135.

providing for the Teachers' Retirement Fund,

"In order to determine whether or not a given law is general, the purpose of the act and the objects on which it is intended to operate must be considered. If these objects are distinguished from others by characteristics evincing a peculiar relation to the legislative purpose, and showing the legislation to be reasonably appropriate to the former and inappropriate to the latter, the A law, general in its terms, applying to objects will be considered, as respects such all persons alike throughout the state, is not legislation to be a class by themselves, and a "local law" within Const. arts. 48, 49, forlegislation affecting such a class to be gen- bidding local laws, merely because the coneral. But if the characteristics used to dis-ditions under which it can operate prevail tinguish the objects to which the legislation applies from other be not germane to the legislative purpose, or do not indicate some reasonable appropriateness in its application, or if objects with similar characteristics and like relation to the legislative purpose have been excluded from the operation of the law, then the classification is incomplete and faulty, and the legislation not general, but 'local and special.'" Parker-Washington Co. v. Kansas City, Kan., 85 Pac. 781, 782, 73 Kan. 722.

only in certain parts of the state, and Rev. St. § 910, as amended by Acts 1902, No. 66, relating to the sale of intoxicating liquor and restricted so as to apply only to prohibition parishes, and Acts 1902, No. 107, as re-enacted by Acts 1908, No. 176, fixing the punishment for illegal sales of liquor, construed to apply only to nonprohibition parishes, are not local laws. State v. Donato, 53 South. 662, 664, 127 La. 393.

Act April 17, 1908, providing for special elections for the relocation or removal of county seats, being applicable to all the counties of the state alike, is not invalid as a special or local law, prohibited by Const. art. 5, §§ 32, 46. City of Pond Creek v. Haskell, 97 Pac. 338, 341, 21 Okl. 711.

An act is "general," as contradistinguished from, and inconsistent with, "local," in the sense the latter term is used in Const. art. 4, § 18, providing that no private or local bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title only when its operation extends to the whole state, or Laws 1903, p. 9, c. 7, authorizing every perhaps to the whole of some class of locali- city, "heretofore" incorporated under a speties therein which the Legislature may con- cial charter, having less than "10,000” institutionally make upon the principle recog-habitants, to be determined by the "last pre

ceding United States census," and having "power to make special assessments to construct sewers," to make such assessments in a specified manner, is not unconstitutional as a "local or special law," within Const. art. 3, § 27, prohibiting such laws for the incorporation of municipalities, or changing or amending their charters, etc., on the theory that the restriction of the act to cities theretofore incorporated under a special charter prevented other cities from entering the class, since the only cities under special charters are those theretofore incorporated, and since under the Constitution no other city can be especially incorporated. And the act is not "local or special" within such constitutional prohibition, on the theory that the phrase "last preceding United States census" limits the act to cities having the required population at the last census before the passage of the act, since the phrase relates to the census last preceding any date which may become material in ascertaining whether any particular city has come within the statute. And the act is not "local or special" within such constitutional prohibition, because restricted to cities, incorporated under a special charter, having 10,000 inhabitants. And the act is not "local or special" within such constitutional prohibition, because limited to cities acting un-theless, open to every locality when brought der a special charter, and having the prescribed population, "having power to make special assessments to construct sewers," though a particular city is the only one which could make such assessments when the act was passed. McGarvey v. Swan, 96 Pac. 697, 701, 17 Wyo. 120.

ciency of the title of the act. People ex rel. Central Trust Co. of New York v. Prendergast, 95 N. E. 715, 717, 202 N. Y. 188.

The good roads law, Rev. Codes, §§ 10491068, inclusive, providing for organization and government of good road districts, being general in its application, applying alike to all sections of the state where the taxpayers are willing to assume the burden of additional taxation to improve the roads within such sections and applying to all good road districts within the state, relating to all of a class, is not a local or special law within Const. art. 3, § 19, prohibiting the Legislature from passing local and special laws in certain cases. Hettinger v. Good Road Dist. No. 1 of Washington County, 113 Pac. 721, 723, 19 Idaho, 313.

Const. art. 11, § 2, grants to the legal voters of every city and town power to enact and amend their municipal charter, and article 4, § 1a, provides that the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people are further reserved to legal voters of every district as to all local, special, and municipal legislation. Held that, as the words "local" and "special" mean enactments intended only to affect certain persons who operate in specified localities, an incorporated port cannot under a special election had under such powers extend its boundaries by annexing other territory without the consent of the inhabitants of the territory annexed, this being particularly true in view of L. O. L. § 3209, and Laws of 1911, p. 158, § 3, both of which provide for the annexation of new territory to municipalities and ports only with the consent of the inhabitants of the territory to be annexed. State ex rel. Anderson v. Port of Tillamook, 124 Pac. 637, 640, 62 Or. 332.

Highway Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 25) § 59a, added by Laws 1910, c. 701, providing that awards under any statute for damages to real estate by change of grade of any street, etc., shall bear interest, is a general, and not a local, law, as affecting the suffi

A "local statute" is one which applies only to a particular locality or limited part of the state and the inhabitants of that part. But a law is not local or special that is applicable throughout the state, even though its operation in any locality is made to depend upon a local contingency, or a particular expediency to be ascertained or determined by a public vote in the locality or by petition, or adjudication of a court or other authority authorized by the act. It is, never

within its terms. Within Const. art. 4, § 23,
subd. 10, forbidding the enactment of special
or local laws for the assessment and collec-
tion of taxes for state, county, township, or
road purposes, Act Nov. 22, 1905 (Laws 1905,
p. 410), providing for the improvement of
roads at the expense of the lands benefited
thereby on petition of a majority of the
resident landowners, etc., is general and ap-
plicable throughout the state, and is not a
local statute applicable only to a particular
locality or limited part of the state and the
inhabitants of that part, though its operation
is contingent, depending on the wish of the
landowners in the vicinity of a proposed im-
provement and the existence of certain con-
Marion
ditions. St. Benedict's Abbey v.
County, 93 Pac. 231, 233, 50 Or. 411 (citing
Fouts v. Hood River, 81 Pac. 370, 46 Or. 492,
1 L. R. A. [N. S.] 483, 7 Ann. Cas. 1160; Bax-
ter v. State, 88 Pac. 677, 49 Or. 353; Good-
rich v. Winchester & D. Turnpike Co., 26 Ind.
119; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329; Paul
v. Gloucester County, 15 Atl. 272, 50 N. J.
Law, 585, 1 L. R. A. 86).

To understand the signification of the words "municipal legislation," as used in Const. art. 11, § 2, prohibiting the Legislature from amending the charters of cities and towns, the right of which is reserved to the voters thereof, and article 4, providing that the referendum may be demanded by the people, which power is reserved to the legal voters of every municipality and district as to all local, special, and municipal legislation of every character in and for their respective

municipalities and districts, requires an interpretation of the term "local and special legislation," the right to formulate rules in relation to which is impliedly denied to cities and towns, on the principle that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. The qualifying words "local" and "special" are synonymous, and, in the sense in which they are used, mean any enactment that is plainly intended to affect a particular person or thing or to be in effect in some specified locality only. The words "municipality" and "district" are evidently expressions of equivalent import, for a district legally created from a designated part of the state and organized to promote the convenience of the public at large is a municipal corporation. The authority of such a corporation has been heretofore derived from an act of the legislative assembly creating it, and, as such statute is applicable to and enforceable in a part of the state only, it is a local or special law. The change in the or

ganic law deprives the legislative assembly of all authority to enact, amend, or repeal any charter of a town, the legal voters of which reserve to themselves the exercise of all such power, except the right of repeal, and it was evidently the intention of the

framers of such constitutional provision, and also the people who ratified it, to vest an incorporated city or town with authority to provide the manner of exercising the initiative and referendum powers as to amendments of a charter, which change is reasonably within the term of "municipal legislation." Acme Dairy Co. v. City of Astoria, 90 Pac. 153, 154, 49 Or. 520.

Gen. St. 1906, §§ 3772, 3775, regulating the catching of fish in rivers, creeks, bays,

bayous, or other waters on the coast, are not "local or special laws," where the first provision therein covers the full territory of the state defined as on the coast of the state, while the latter applies to all the rivers of the state, and are not in violation of Const. art. 3, §§ 20, 21. Carlton v. Johnson, 55 South. 975, 976, 61 Fla. 15.

A class of laws are known in common

parlance as "local option laws," relating to subjects which, such as intoxicating liquors or the running at large of cattle, may be differently regarded in different localities, and are sustained on the ground that the subject, though not embraced within the ordinary power of the municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is within the class of police

regulations in respect to which it is proper that the local judgment should control. In re O'Brien, 75 Pac. 196, 200, 29 Mont. 530, 1 Ann. Cas. 373 (citing Cooley, Const. Lim. 146).

Law applying to class

lar persons or things of the same class. Hall v. Bell County (Tex.) 138 S. W. 178, 179 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4208; 7 Words and Phrases, p. 6577).

A "local law" applies to all persons within the territorial limits prescribed by the act, while a special law applies to particular of Prince George's County v. Baltimore & O. persons or things of a class. Commissioners R. Co., 77 Atl. 433, 434, 113 Md. 179.

Classification as to population

A statute classifying counties for certain purposes and providing that the twenty-seventh class, consisting of only one county, should be classified according to the population, as shown by the federal census of 1900, whereas the method of ascertaining the population in all other counties is different, is a "local and special law." Johnson v. Gunn (Cal.) 84 Pac. 370, 371.

A statute classifying counties according to population, providing that the population of some of the counties shall be determined by the federal census of 1900, and that in other counties the population shall be determined by different modes, is not a "local or special law," in violation of Const. art. 11, §

5.

Johnson v. Gunn, 84 Pac. 665, 666, 148 Cal. 745.

Act April 3, 1903 (P. L. 136), authorizing county commissioners in counties having a population of over 500,000 and less than 1,000,000 to erect a memorial hall or building in memory of the soldiers and sailors of the War of the Rebellion, is not a “local act” regulating the affairs of Allegheny county alone, but is a classification of counties according to population in order to permit ex

penditure of public money in a specified way. Yoho v. Allegheny County, 67 Atl. 648, 650, 218 Pa. 401 (citing Commonwealth v. Gilligan, 46 Atl. 124, 195 Pa. 504; Seabolt v. Commissioners of Northumberland County, 41 Atl. 22, 187 Pa. 318).

A law is not "local" or "special," within the constitutional inhibition against such laws regulating county and township affairs, for classifying counties and townships on the basis of population, if population makes a substantial difference in the conditions affected by the statute, and the statute, if conaffairs, did not violate the constitutional insidered as regulating county and township

ties and cities having a larger population. hibition for fixing a lower tax rate in counPeople ex rel. Booth v. Opel, 91 N. E. 458,

461, 244 Ill. 317.

Laws having local application

A law which has a bona fide application to the entire state as to some of its chief features is a "general" and not a "local law," A "local or special law," within the con- as defined by Const. 1901, § 110, though it stitutional prohibition against the passage does not apply in every detail. The law is a of such laws, is one which relates to particu-"general" and not a "local law," notwith

standing the fact that local laws on the sub- [the several courts of that district is not a ject were passed at the same session and ap- "local or special act," within Const. 1874, art. proved on the same day. State ex rel. Coll- 5, § 26, declaring that no "local or special man v. Pitts, 49 South. 441, 442, 160 Ala. 133, act" shall be passed until the notice provid135 Am. St. Rep. 79. ed for shall have been duly published. Waterman v. Hawkins, 86 S. W. 844, 845, 75

"Local law" means that code of laws which governs the affairs of a certain prescribed jurisdiction. Mather v. Cunningham, 74 Atl. 809, 813, 105 Me. 326, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 761, 18 Ann. Cas. 692.

Const. § 110, defines a "local law" as a law which applies to any political subdivision or subdivision of the state less than the whole. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Sayre, 39 South. 240, 142 Ala. 641.

Const. § 104, prohibits the Legislature from passing a special or local law in specified instances, and section 110 defines "local law" in this connection as one which applies to any subdivision or subdivisions of the state less than the whole. Sisk v. Cargile, 35 South. 114, 117, 138 Ala. 164.

The word "local," as applied to legislation, signifies legislation relating to part of the territory of a state only, while the word "special" is more appropriately applied to laws granting some special right, privilege, or immunity, or imposing some particular

burden upon some portion of the people of the state less than all. People v. Wilcox, 86

N. E. 672, 673, 237 Ill. 421.

A statute compelling the parish of Orleans to erect a courthouse with its own funds is a "local law," whose enactment should have been preceded by the publication of the notice required by article 50 of the Constitution. Such a statute does not

lose its character of a "local law" from the fact that it provides that the state shall contribute towards the erection of the building and be part owner thereof. Such provision adds a public side to the statute, but does not do away with the local side, as to which the inhabitants of the locality are entitled under the Constitution to be notified and to be heard. Benedict v. City of New Orleans, 39 South. 792, 796, 115 La. 645.

An act providing for the accomplishment of an object and providing means for payment therefor does not contain two subjects, and hence the provision of the Public Service Commissions law (Laws 1907, p. 889, c. 429) for payment of salaries and expenses of the commission for the First district by New York City does not constitute a local act joined with general legislation, within Const. art. 3, § 16, providing that no local act shall embrace more than one subject, etc.; such provision being a matter of apportionment, within the taxing power. Gubner v. McClellan, 115 N. Y. Supp. 755, 757, 130 App. Div. 716.

Act Feb. 25, 1905, abolishing the Watson judicial district of Desha county, and providing for the transfer of cases pending in

Ark. 120.

Act Sept. 26, 1903 (Acts 1903, p. 369), providing for the removal of causes from the city court of Bessemer, Jefferson county, to other courts in the county, is a "local law," within Const. § 106, requiring the publication of notice of intention to apply for the enactment of local laws. Dudley v. Fitzpatrick, 39 South. 384, 385, 143 Ala. 162 (citing Wallace v. Board of Revenue of Jefferson County, 37 South. 321, 140 Ala. 491).

A "local law" is one "which applies to any political subdivision or subdivisions of the state, less than the whole." An act to consolidate the courts of a certain state and county is a "local law." Wallace v. Board of Revenue of Jefferson County, 37 South. 321, 322, 140 Ala. 491 (quoting Const. § 110).

Loc. Acts 1907, p. 285, § 11, so as to provide Gen. Acts 1907, p. 542, which amends for the organization of grand juries for the

circuit court of a designated county, is a “local law," within Const. 1901, § 110, defining a local law as one which applies to any politi

cal subdivision or subdivisions of the state less than the whole. Sellers v. State, 50 South. 340, 341, 162 Ala. 35.

Law applying to single city

A "local statute" enacted for a particular municipality, for reasons satisfactory to the Legislature, is intended to be exceptional and parte Young, 95 S. W. 98, 104, 49 Tex. Cr. for the benefit of such municipality, Ex

R. 536.

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A "local act" is one confined to a particular municipality or particular part of the state. Gubner v. McClellan, 115 N. Y. Supp. 755, 759, 130 App. Div. 716.

"The term 'local,' as applied to statutes, is of modern origin, and is used to designate an act which operates only within a single city, county, or other particular subdivision or place and not throughout the entire legislative jurisdiction. In this sense, the term 'local' is the antithesis of 'general.'" State ex rel. Attorney General v. Sayre, 39 South. 240, 142 Ala. 641 (citing State v. Chambers, 93 N. C. 600; Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y. 381).

The act passed in 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 517) to make judges of the Montgomery city court elective by the people is a "local law,” within the requirement of Const. § 106, that notice of such acts be given. State ex rel. Thomas v. Gunter, 54 South. 283, 284, 170 Ala. 165.

An act to consolidate the courts of a certain city and county, is a "local law," defined by Const. § 110, as a law which applies to any political subdivision or subdivisions of

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Without undertaking to discriminate nicely or define with precision, it may be said that the character of a law as general or "local" depends on the character of its subject-matter. If that be of a general nature, existing throughout the state, in every county, a subject-matter in which all the citizens have a common interest, if it be a court organized under the constitution and laws within and for every county of the state, and possessing a legitimate jurisdiction over every citizen, then the laws which relate to and regulate it are laws of a general nature, and, by virtue of the prohibition referred to, must have a uniform operation throughout the state, 92 Ohio Laws, p. 683, providing for the pensioning of school-teachers in school districts in cities of the third grade of the first class, is in violation of Const. art. 2, § 26, providing that laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state; such act at the time of its passage and taking effect being applicable only to the city of Toledo, and containing a provision in section 2 requiring the board of education to select three members of a pension committee at its first regular meeting within 30 days after the law went into effect, and making no provision in such regard for cities which might thereafter come into the class. Hibbard v. State, 64 N. E. 109, 111, 65 Ohio St. 574, 58 L. R. A. 654 (citing Kelley v. State, 6 Ohio St. 269, 271).

Charter of building and loan association

The charter of a building and loan association, obtained under the general law, is not a "local" or "private" law, within Code 1906, 8, providing that private and local laws, not revised and brought into the Code, are not affected by its adoption; and so is not saved from the operation of section 2678, revising the usury law, and doing away with the exception thereof, whereby building and loan associations could receive more than 10 per cent. interest. Mississippi Building & Loan Ass'n v. McElveen, 56 South. 187, 189, 100 Miss. 16.

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and an act is "local" when the subject re lates to a portion only of the people or their property, or when it operates only within a single city, county, or other particular division. Schubel v. Olcott, 120 Pac. 375, 378, 60 Or. 503.

The terms "local law" and "special law" are used interchangeably. Const. 1901, § 10, defines a “local law” as one applicable to any political subdivision of the state, and a "special law" as one which applies to an individual association or corporation. Montgomery City Charter (Acts 1892-93, p. 377) § 20, exempts persons procuring a liquor license from the city from paying any tax or license to the county. Act March 4, 1903 (Gen. Acts 1903, p. 184), provides for a county liquor tax, and repeals all laws, general and "special," inconsistent with itself, and Act Sept. 30, 1903 (Gen. Acts 1903, p. 298) § 4, again confers power on counties to levy a liquor tax, and provides that the statute shall not affect the exemption provided by any city charter. Held that, notwithstanding the constitutional definitions, the exemption was repealed by Act March 4, 1903 (Gen. Acts 1903, p. 184), and not revived by Act Sept. 30, 1903 (Gen. Acts 1903, p. 298) § 4. Gaston v. O'Neal, 41 South. 742, 743, 145 Ala. 484 (citing Maxwell v. State, 7 South. 824, 89 Ala. 150; Holt v. City of Birmingham, 19 South. 735, 111 Ala. 369). LOCAL LEGISLATION

See Local Law. LOCAL NATURE

A suit by a creditor of a railroad company to have its property, situated in different federal districts of the same state, administered for the benefit of all creditors is one of a "local nature," which, under Rev. St. § 742, may be brought in either of such districts, and the appointment of a receiver therein is an equitable attachment of all property of the defendant within the state. Horn v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 151 Fed. 626, 632.

LOCAL OFFICER

Const. art. 10, § 2, provides that city, town, and village officers whose appointment is not provided for by the Constitution shall be elected by the electors of such cities, etc., or appointed by such authorities thereof as the Legislature shall designate. No provision for election or appointment of local health officers is provided for. Public Health Law (Laws 1893, p. 1501, c. 661) § 20, as amended by Laws 1907, p. 427, c. 225, provides that the state commissioner of health shall appoint a health officer for each municipality except cities on the nomination of the local board of health, devolves certain. duties upon the commissioner respecting the competency and qualifications of applicants, and provides that there shall continue to be "local" health officers in the several villages,

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