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by him in order to be a "livery stable keep-| Barker v. Koenig, 119 N. Y. Supp. 777, 778, er,” within the meaning of the lien law, but 135 App. Div. 16. his business must be substantially that indicated thereby. Under Civ. Code 1895, $LOAD 2810, his lien includes, not only the actual
See Car Load. feeding of a horse placed with him, but also such charges as are directly connected with LOADER his keeping as were naturally in the line of a livery stable keeper's business, but expenses
See Ground Loader. of transporting a horse by railroad to races LOADING in or out of the state, and of entering him
See Time Saved in Loading. therein, do not furnish the basis of a lien;
Ready for loading, see Ready. and where a horse is left with a stableman to be boarded or kept at an agreed price, and
Under a charter party for a vessel to the stableman had two or more stables in carry a cargo of coal, which provided that this state for the accommodation of stock, she should “have turn in loading" and "be and by agreement with the owner kept the loaded promptly,” she was entitled to be loadhorse at one of the stables, the fact that he ed promptly in view of the facilities of the was not kept at one of the stables rather than port and the climatic conditions which existat another would not defeat his lien, al- ed at the time, and to have such facilities though, where a horse is delivered to a livery used to their normal capacity, not only in stable keeper and, under contract with the her own loading, but also in the loading of owner, is sent to races at distant points and other vessels after her arrival while she was kept in the stable of another person who is waiting her turn. Harding v. Cargo of 4,paid by the liveryman, the liveryman there- 698 Tons of New Rivers Steam Coal, 147 Fed. by acquires no statutory lien. Elliott v.971, 973 (citing Abb. Shipp. [13th Ed.] 297). Hodgson & Jackson, 65 S. E. 405, 407, 133 Charter parties required the vessel in Ga. 209, 134 Am. St. Rep. 206.
each case to load a cargo of phosphate at An owner and keeper of a livery stable, should proceed to the Port Inglis anchorage,
Port Inglis, Fla., and provided that the vessel who boarded horses by the month at so much or as near thereunto as she may safely get, per stall, but did not feed or care for them, is entitled to a lien as a "livery stable keep- brought alongside and taken from alongside
and there load.
The cargo to be er,” within Lien Law (Laws 1897, p. 533, c. free of risk and expense to the vessel, any 418, $ 74, as amended by Laws 1899, p. 912, custom of the port to the contrary notwithC. 465), giving a person keeping a livery stable or a boarding stable, or boarding animals, ceed to safe anchorage at port of loading and
Steamer or vessel to proa lien for the care, keeping, or boarding of there load.” Also: “The cargo to be supsuch animals; and the relation between the parties was not that of landlord and tenant. plied at the average rate of not less than 400
tons per weather working day, Selner v. Lyons, 110 N. Y. Supp. 1049, 1050.
commencing 24 hours after vessel is in load“Livery stable keepers" are those whose ing berth and is ready to receive cargo and business it is to care for the horses and car- written notice given to that effect." Vessels riages of others and to let their own horses were obliged to load at such port some miles and carriage either with or without drivers, from shore, and the government had estabbut they are not common carriers of passen- lished there two loading buoys. Three vesgers, within the legal meaning of that term, sels were ordered to proceed to the port at and the rule of law which requires the high- the same time, and they reached there and anest degree of diligence of a carrier of passen- chored, and gave notice that they were ready gers is not applicable to them. Stanley v. to load. Held, that the “loading berth" reSteele, 60 Atl. 640, 642, 77 Conn. 688, 69 L. ferred to in the charter was the "safe anR. A. 561, 2 Ann. Cas. 342.
chorage" spoken of in the prior clause; that,
having reached such anchorage and given LLOYDS
the required notice, the lay days commenced,
and the charterer could not require the vesThe word "Lloyds" has, by use, come to sels to await their turn at the loading buoys be understood by the general public as syn- before the time commenced, even though that onymous with “insurance.” Under General may have been the custom of the port, nor Corporation Law (Laws 1909, p. 15, c. 28 avoid liability for demurrage because of their [Consol. Laws, c. 23)) $ 6, providing that no time, either because they could not get to the
detention for two or three weeks beyond the corporation shall be organized with the name buoys or because they could not, perhaps have of “insurance” in it, except a corporation been fully loaded where they lay—its duty formed under the banking or the insurance being to load them there, so far as could be law, a corporation cannot be formed under safely done, and then permit them to move the business corporations law with the name further out for its completion. Constantine “Lloyds" in its name, as that word has by & Pickering S. S. Co. v. Auchincloss, 161 Fed. use become synonymous with "insurance." | 843, 846, 88 C. C. A. 661.
The sum added to the net life insurance pretended lender, or when any reservation premium to meet expenses and contingencies or limitation shall be pretended to have been is called "loading" the premium. United made of a use of property, by way of condiStates Life Ins. Co. v. Spinks (Ky.) 96 S. W. tion, etc., the transfer shall be held fraudu889, 893, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1053.
lent, unless the loan is declared by a written Where insurance premiums and renewal instrument duly acknowledged or proved and premiums were greater than the amount recorded. Held, that such section had no apnecessary to pay for the insurance, the excess plication to a chattel placed in the hands of is called “loading." Mutual Benefit Life Ins. bailees to be stored without charge for a reaCo. v. Commonwealth, 107 S. W. 802, 806, sonable time without any agreement that 128 Ky. 174.
such bailees should have the right to use the
Woodward v. San Antonio Traction LOAF
Co. (Tex.) 95 S. W. 76, 78 (citing Templeman
V. Gibbs, 24 S. W. 792, 86 Tex. 359; Hunstock See Loiter, Loaf, and Idle.
v. Roberts [Tex.] 65 S. W. 676).
Evidence, in an action by an ex-county LOAN
treasurer against the county for commission,
on the theory that a transaction by which, See Money Loaned and Invested; Sell, during his term, a judgment creditor of the
Barter, or Loan; Stock Loan; Tem-county transferred the judgment to a bank, porary Loan.
it paying him therefor, was a loan by the Passing a loan, see Pass.
bank to the county and a payment of the See, also, Lend; Money Lent.
judgment creditor by the county, so that From the use of the word “loan," in its such treasurer was entitled to commissions ordinary signification, the law implies a for receiving and disbursing the money, held promise to repay. Herlihy v. Coney, 59 Atl. sufficient to support a finding that the trans352, 953, 99 Me. 469.
action was not a "loan," but a purchase by Rev. St. c. 48, $ 64, providing that pre: ion County, 95 S. W. 713, 43 Tex. Civ. App.
the bank of the judgment. Benefield v. Mar. miums for building association loans shall
245. consist of a percentage charged on the amount lent in addition to interest, and sec
The word "loan" is defined to mean "to tion 65, providing that the monthly interest deliver to another for temporary use, on conshall not be at a greater rate than 6 per cent. dition that the thing be returned, or to deper annum, mean by the words "loan” and deliver for temporary use, on condition that “lent” the whole sum contracted for, not the an equivalent in kind shall be returned with sum actually advanced. Tibbetts v. Deering a compensation for its use." State v. Brown, Loan & Building Ass'n, 72 Atl. 162, 165, 104 102 S. W. 394, 395, 83 Ark. 44, 119 Am. St. Me. 404.
Rep. 109 (quoting and adopting definition in
Webst. Dict.). A party advancing money to another to enable the latter to manufacture lumber on Where a bond guaranteed that the prinan understanding that the lumber shall be cipal would return certain securities on a spesold by the former on commission, so that cified day, and contained no provision either the former may get back the advances, does permitting or requiring the principal to disnot make a "loan," within the strict defini-charge his obligation by payment of money on tion of the term. Murphy v. Dalton, 102 N. or before the day named, which he was auW. 277, 139 Mich. 79.
thorized to do by a collateral agreement, the Where the note of a borrowing member bond was not given for the "loan or forbearof a building and loan association contained ance of money” within the New York usury the words "monthly installments on said
law (1 Rev. St. (1st Ed.) pt. 2, c. 4, tit. 3, $ 5), share," but no reference indicated an agree
making all bonds, whereon is reserved any ment to apply such installments on the mem- greater sum than 6 per cent. for the loan or ber's loan, and the deed to secure the loan
forbearance of any money, void. Klein v. was conditioned on the payment of the "loan" Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 166 Fed. 365,
368. and of "installments on certain shares," referring to the principal debt covered by the Though payment of money be called a note both as a “loan upon 18 membership "loan," it is not a loan where the money sha res," the terms "loan" and "installments" was not to be paid back at all events but the were not used synonymously. Cooper v. New- agreement was that on a certain condition it ton, 160 Fed. 190, 193.
should be paid back. Teed v. Parsons, 66 N. Rev. St. 1895, art. 2547, provides that
E. 1044, 1046, 202 Ill. 455. where any loan of goods or chattels shall be A corporate officer having misappropriatpretended to have been made to any personed funds, acceptance by the directors of his with whom, or those claiming under him, notes in satisfaction of the misappropriations possession shall have remained for the space did not constitute a “loan,” within a charter of two years without demand made and pur- provision prohibiting "loans” of corporate sued by due process of law on the part of the funds to corporate officers or employés. Mur
phy v. Penniman, 66 Atl. 282, 287, 105 Md., create a preferential claim. State ex rel. 452, 121 Am. St. Rep. 583.
Carroll v. Corning State Sav. Bank, 115 N. Bailment distinguished
W. 937, 940, 139 Iowa, 338. See Bailment.
A deposit of moneys belonging to an inDeposit
surance corporation in a bank, returnable on
demand in accordance with certificates of deThe deposit of a national bank constitutes “loans” to it and confers on the deposit- in Insurance Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 28)
posit issued at the time, is not a "loan," withtor a mere chose in action. State v. Clement § 36. People v. Thomas, 130 N. Y. Supp. Nat. Bank, 78 Atl. 944, 950, 84 Vt. 167, Ann. 246, 249, 71 Misc. Rep. 339. Cas. 1912D, 22.
As purchase money The transaction between a depositor and
See Purchase Money. the bank is really a "loan” of money and not a deposit, in the strict legal sense of the As sale term. Schippers v. Kempkes (N. J.) 67 Atl. See Sale.. 1042, 1043.
LOAN ASSOCIATION An ordinary deposit of money in a bank
See Homestead Loan Association. is not a “hoan” of the money to the bank. Elliott v. Capital City State Bank, 103 N. W. LOAN FOR CONSUMPTION 777, 778, 128 Iowa, 275, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.)
“A loan for consumption' is a transfer 1130, 111 Am. St. Rep. 198.
of personal property, such as corn or money, A “deposit" in a bank is a "loan” payable to be consumed by the borrower and to be on demand, and the depositor may not, as a returned to the lender in kind and quality." general rule, maintain an action for his State v. Brown, 102 S. W. 394, 395, 83 Ark. deposit until he has first made a demand 44, 119 Am. St. Rep. 109 (quoting and adoptfor its payment. Pratt v. Union Nat. Bank, ing definition in Kinne v. Kinne (N. Y.) 45 75 Atl. 313, 314, 79 N. J. Law, 117.
How. Prac. 61). A national bank had through an ployé deposited money with a savings bank, LOBBY and subsequently, upon a request for more money, the national bank wrote, offering to
“Lobbying,” which has a well-defined deposit more money, but refusing to make a meaning, and signifies to address or solicit loan. In response, it received a certificate members of a legislative body for the purpose of deposit with a letter, asking that it be of influencing their votes, is contrary to pubplaced to the credit of the savings bank. lic policy, whether or not it is carried on in The certificate was issued to L., the president, such manner as to constitute a crime under of the savings bank, and was by him indors- the statute; and a note given for money aded to A., an employé of the national bank, vanced for the expenses of a person to enable who, in turn, indorsed it to the bank, which him to engage in the business of lobbying gave credit on its books to the savings bank will not be enforced. Le Tourneux v. Gilfor the amount of the certificate. The certi- liss, 82 Pac. 627, 628, 1 Cal. App. 546. cate was marked "Paid," taken up, and re- A lobbyist is one who solicits members newal certificates issued from time to time in of a legislative body, in the lobby or else the same way. After failure of the savings where, with the purpose of influencing their bank, recovery was sought on the last certifi- votes, and a contract to render such services, cate, which was issued directly to A., and or services which consist in part of lobbying, signed by the cashier of the savings bank. is void as against public policy, and an action Held, that the transaction was a "loan" and cannot be maintained thereon. Burke v. not a "deposit," and hence did not create a Wood, 162 Fed. 533, 537. preferential claim. State v. Corning State Sav. Bank, 113 N. W. 500, 503, 136 Iowa, 79. LOCAL A bank wrote to its correspondent that
A "local," in railroad parlance, is a train $30,000 worth of bonds had been allotted to which stops at all stations and does not run it, and that it would have to take up and with great rapidity when in motion. Hicks carry about $15,000 of old bonds, stating that v. Union Pac. R. Co., 107 N. W. 798, 800, it would have to finance the deal, and asked
76 Neb. 496. if the correspondent could help out on $10,000 for 30 or 40 days; that, if so, it would
The words "local and special" are fresend up
some paper maturing the next quently used interchangeably, though they month; and that it did not object to any do not have the same meaning; “local” sigfair rate. Seven days later two certificates nifying a belonging or confinement to a parof $5,000 each bearing 7 per cent. interest ticular place and being a counter term to payable in 40 and 45 days were mailed to "general.” People v. Wilcox, 86 N. E. 672, the correspondent. Credit for the full amount 673, 237 Ill. 421, was given. Held, that the transaction was The word "local,” which is the restrica "loan,” and not a deposit, and hence did | tive word used in the phrase "local improve
ments," is often used in reference to towns A "local action" as distinguished from a and cities so as to include the whole munici-transitory action is one where the principal pality. We speak of the “local affairs" of a facts on which it is founded are of a local town, its “local government,” the rights of nature, or which could have arisen only in its inhabitants to "local option," or their some particular county. Perry v. Seaboard liability to "local taxation,” referring in each Air Line Ry. Co., 68 S. E. 1060, 1061, 153 N. instance to the whole corporation. In the C. 117. same way, if the local authorities of a town
"The distinction between local and transhould undertake a general system of street
sitory actions is as old as actions themselves, improvement or a general system of sewerage, covering every street, we might, using which prescribe generally where one should
and no one has ever supposed that laws the language in its ordinary meaning, speak be sued included such suits as were local in of such work as a "local improvement”; the their character, either by statute or the compurpose thereof being a benefit to the local in- mon law, unless it was expressly so declared. habitants. Crane v. City of Siloam Springs, Local actions are in the nature of suits in 55 S. W. 955, 957, 67 Ark. 30.
rem, and are to be prosecuted where the LOCAL ACT
thing on which they are founded is situated." See Local Law.
A suit to enjoin a defendant from diverting,
in California, the waters naturally flowing LOCAL ACTION
down a river having its source in that state Where the cause of action can arise in and flowing into and through the state of one place only, the action is local; but, if the Nevada, where complainant's lands are situcause of action is one that might have arisen ated, he being the lowest proprietor on the anywhere, the action is transitory. Woolf river, is an action transitory in its nature, F. McGaugh, 57 South. 754, 755, 175 Ala. 299. so that a court in Nevada, having acquired Trespass to real property is a "local ac
jurisdiction of defendant's person, had juris
diction to try the same. Miller & Lux v. tion," and the suit must be brought in the county or place where the cause of action Ríckey, 127 Fed. 573, 577 (citing Casey v Mayor, etc., of City of Baltimore v.
Adams, 102 U. S. 66, 26 L. Ed. 52). Meredith's Ford & Jarrettsville Turnpike Co. A suit for partition is a local action in Baltimore & Harford Counties, 65 Atl. 35, within the provisions of Act March 3, 1875, 36, 104 Md. 351.
c. 137, 8 8, 18 Stat. 472, and one in which any Ejectment is a "local action” such as question between any of the parties, plaintiff's can be maintained only in the district where or defendants, affecting their rights or interthe land lies. Act Cong. March 3, 1887, c. ests in the land may be put in issue and de373, 24 Stat. 552, provides that no civil suit termined; and a federal court is not without shall be brought before either of the federal jurisdiction because questions may arise be courts of original jurisdiction against any tween plaintiffs who are citizens of the same person or by any original process or proceed state, nor will it make a realignment of paring in any other district than that whereof he ties to defeat its jurisdiction because such is an inhabitant, but where the jurisdiction questions may arise, where the bill, although is founded only on the fact that the action properly setting out the interest of each paris between citizens of different states, suit ty in the premises, does not disclose any shall be brought only in the district of the controversy which renders it necessary. Gerresidence of either plaintiff or defendant. man Savings & Loan Soc. v. Tull, 136 Fed. 1, Held, that the restriction as to venue is not 11, 69 C. C. A. 1 (citing Greeley v. Lowe, 15 applicable to local actions, and hence eject- Sup. Ct. 24, 155 U. S. 58, 67, 74, 39 L. Ed. 69). ment can be brought in a federal court in the "Originally the pleader was required to district where the land lay, though both state truly the place where each fact assertplaintiff and defendant are foreign corpora-ed by him occurred, and, if issue was joined tions and nonresidents of the state. Elk thereon, the fact was tried by a jury sumGarden Co. v. T. W. Thayer Co., 179 Fed. moned from that neighborhood or venue. 556, 557 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. Afterwards, when jurors were no longer ex4202).
pected to decide issues of fact upon their By the common law an action for the own knowledge, a fictitious venue was, in recovery of damages for injuries to land is some actions, permitted, and the pleader as"local," and can be brought only where the signed to his facts, under a videlicet, the land is situated; and such is the law in most place in which he desired the trial to be held, of the states of the Union. In Minnesota, These actions were then styled 'transitory.' an action for pecuniary damages for trespass But this fiction was not allowed when the to real estate in another state is viewed, not cause of action was so related to a certain as relating to the real estate, but only as af- piece of land that it must have arisen on or fording a personal remedy. It is there deem- near the land, Actions for such causes were ed to be transitory in its nature, and not styled 'local,' and triable only in the vicinity local. Peyton v. Desmond, 129 Fed. 1, 4, where the land lay." Defiance Fruit Co. v. 63 C. C. A. 651.
Fox, 70 Atl. 460, 461, 76 N. J. Law, 482 (quot
ing Hill v. Nelson, 57 Atl. 411, 70 N. J. Law, be made. Sherwood Higgs & Co. v. Sperry 376, 378).
& Hutchinson Co., 51 S. E. 1020, 1021, 139 An action to recover only the value of N. C. 299. ore or timber sévered from land is transito- Under a statute providing that citation ry, and may be maintained wherever the or other process against a foreign corporatrespasser can be served with summons, al- tion may be served on any "local agent" of though plaintiff therein may be compelled to the corporation within the state, where a ci. allege and prove ownership of the land from tation directed the officers to summon dewhich the timber is cut, or the ore extracted; fendant foreign corporation by delivering to but, where the whole or any part of the dam- B., "agent," and the return recited delivery ages claimed is for injury to the freehold, to B., "agent," and the petition alleged that the action is "local" and must, if the land is B. was defendant's agent in the state of located in this state, be tried, by the express Texas, who resided in a specified county, provisions of Code Civ. Proc. $ 392, in the and on whom service could be had, the recounty where the land is situated, or, if the turn was insufficient to show that B. was a land is located in another state, it must be local agent," within the state, and the detried in the courts of that state. Ophir Sil- fect was not cured by the allegation in the ver Min. Co. v. Superior Court of City and petition; hence a judgment by default was County of San Francisco, 82 Pac. 70, 72, 147 not authorized. National Cereal Co. v. EarnCal. 467, 3 Ann. Cas. 340.
est (Tex.) 87 S. W. 734. Since the Missouri statutes provide for
Rev. St. 1895, art. 1223, provides that every contingency as to the bringing of ac- citation may be served on a foreign corporations, the rule of the common law, which re tion by service on the “local agent,” and artigarded an action for breach of covenants of cle 1194, subd. 25, provides that a foreign seisin and warranty as “local” and not “tran- corporation may be sued in any county where sitory," was completely altered, and as to it has an agency or representative. Held, such action such rule of the common law no that the statute contemplates service on a longer obtains in Missouri; the title to real person employed in forwarding the particuestate being only incidentally involved in lar business for which the corporation was such action. Coleman v. Lucksinger, 123 s. organized, and service on an attorney repreW. 441, 443, 224 Mo. 1, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) senting the defendant, and who was in the 934.
county at the time of service merely for the
purpose of settling certain claims between LOCAL AFFECTION
the parties to the action, was insufficient. A "local affection" is not a local disease Bay City Iron Works v. Reeves & Co., 95 within the meaning of a warranty in a policy S. W. 739, 740, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 254. of insurance, unless such affection has suffi
One who, without compensation, prociently developed to have some bearing on the cured a watchman for a foreign corporation's general health. Cady v. Fidelity & Casualty sawmill and sold oil belonging to it for $7, Co. of New York, 113 N. W. 967, 971, 134 which he applied to the payment of the Wis. 322, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 260.
watchman's services, was not the agent of LOCAL AGENT
the corporation, within Revisal 1905, § 440,
providing that service of summons on a corSee, also, Agent.
poration may be made upon a "local agent,” The term "local agent," within Rev. St. and that any person receiving or collecting 1895, art. 1223, providing for service of writs moneys in the state for any corporation shall in suits against foreign corporations on any be deemed a local agent. Kelly v. Lefaiver local agent within the state, means an agent & Co., 56 S. E. 510, 511, 144 N. C. 4 (citing at a given place or within a definite district, Moore v. Freeman's Nat. Bank, 92 N. C. 590; and an "agent for the state" is not a local Copland v. American De Forest Telegraph agent within the state. Western Cottage Pi.Co., 48 S. E. 501, 136 N. C. 11). ano & Organ Co. v. Anderson, 79 S. W. 516,
The local operator of defendant wire517, 97 Tex. 432.
less telegraph company, who is in sole charge Under Code, $ 217, authorizing service of of defendant's property at a particular place summons to be made upon a corporation by and in control of its business there, and has delivering a copy thereof to the president, received messages from ships at sea for pay, secretary, etc., "or local agent thereof," and though the office is not yet open for general providing that any person receiving or col- business, is defendant's "local agent,” withlecting moneys within the state for any do- in a code provision, authorizing summons in mestic or foreign corporation shall be deem- an action against a corporation to be served ed a local agent for the purpose of service on its local agent; the proviso that any perof summons, a traveling auditor of a foreign son receiving or collecting moneys in the corporation, which has ceased to do any busi- state for any corporation shall be deemed a ness in the state, who is not authorized to "local agent" for the purpose of the section collect or receive money, for the corporation, not being intended to limit but to extend is not a “local agent,” on whom service may the meaning of the term “local agent.” Cop