V. Hickman, 22 Sup. Ct. 18, 21, 183 U. S. 53, 46 L. Ed. 78. San Diego City Charter, c. 5, art. 3, § 2, provides "that the common council shall have control of all litigation of the city, and may employ other attorneys to take charge of any such litigation, or assist the city attorney therein." Held, that the term "litigation of the city" applies to civil actions only, and that the council has no power to appoint a special prosecutor to prosecute criminal violations of ordinances, so that no liability results from such appointment. Dadmun v. City of San Diego, 99 Pac. 983, 984, 9 Cal. App. 549. LITTORAL AND AQUATIC RIGHTS "Littoral and aquatic rights" are simply those rights which, in default of special statutory provisions to the contrary, appertain to lands abutting upon tide-waters, to which the common-law doctrine of riparian ownership does not apply. Barataria Canning Co. v. Ott, 37 South. 121, 124, 84 Miss. 737. Statement of a witness that he lived at a certain street and number in a specified city was not inconsistent with his "residence" in another county, since a person may “live” in one place, and have a legal residence in another. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 116 Pac. 692, 694, 16 Cal. App. 103. Under Rev. Laws, c. 154, § 6, providing that the libel for divorce must be filed, heard, and determined in the county in which one of the parties "lives," a wife who has separated from her husband because of his adultery may obtain a domicile in a county other than that in which he resides, and bring a libel against him for divorce at the domicile so obtained. Clark v. Clark, 77 N. E. 702, 191 Mass. 128. The word "lives," in Code, § 1313, providing that moneys and credits shall be listed where the owner "lives," is the equivalent of "residence." Cover v. Hatten, 113 N. W. 470, 471, 136 Iowa, 63. The place where a person lives, within Code, § 1313, providing that moneys and credits shall be listed and assessed where the owner lives, is the place of his residence. Glotfelty v. Brown, 126 N. W. 797, 798, 148 Iowa, 124. Land fronting on a sound was leased, and the lessee obtained from the county board of supervisors the right to bank, plant, and cultivate oysters in the sound within the limits of the entire front of the property, and thereafter the lessor deeded the land to the lessee, reserving all "littoral and aquatic rights appurtenant to the land," and in a suit between the parties it was decided on appeal that, the lessor having had no exclusive right to the water or fish, and the grant of the supervisors having vested a property right in the lessee, the reservation was of a thing which would not other-worth, 19 Me. 278, 279. wise have passed under the deed, and did not deprive the lessee of his exclusive right to the oysters. Held, that such decision did not bar a reformation of the deed after remand of the cause on the ground that the real intent of the agreement between the parties had been that the lessor should have the right to the oysters and oyster beds. Barataria Canning Co. v. Ott, 41 South. 378, 379, 88 Miss. 771. As used in St. 1821, c. 60, § 27, providing that in extending execution upon real estate the officer may appoint an appraiser for the debtor, if he neglect or refuse to choose one after being duly notified by the officer, if the debtor be living in the county where the land lies, the phrase "living in the county" means actual residence at the time of the levy in the county where the land levied upon is situated. Dodge v. Farns LIVE-LIVING See Then Living. As resides "One of the definitions given in the dictionaries of the word 'live' is to dwell, to reside, to abide." Powers v. United States, 119 Fed. 562, 565, 56 C. C. A. 128. A witness could state in a "trustee suit" to collect taxes, in which defendant's residence was involved, that defendant lived in P. in a certain year; the word "live" not stating the ultimate fact of residence, but a fact bearing on the question of residence. Coolidge v. Taylor, 80 Atl. 1038, 1041, 85 Vt. 39. Death of testator or life tenants referred to Testator gave to his son and the son's wife the use of certain real estate for life, and provided that at their death the property should descend to the son's children living at the time and the issue of any child of the son then deceased. Held, that such description of the remaindermen did not mean children of the son living at the time of testator's death, but excluded children living at testator's death who did not survive the life tenants. Birdsall v. Birdsall (Iowa) 132 N. W. 809, 810, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1121. LIVE APART Under Ky. St. 1903, § 2117, making “living apart" without any cohabitation for five consecutive years next before the application a ground for divorce, the time elapsing since a spouse became a lunatic cannot be counted as part of the five years required by the statute, but if the parties lived apart without cohabitation for five years before one became a lunatic, and they have since continued to live apart, divorce may be granted. Andrews v. Andrews' Committee, 87 S. W. 1080, 1081, 120 Ky. 718. LIVE IN ADULTERY See, also, Live Together. To constitute "living in adultery," there must be more than a single act, but there need not be a living together continuously, or for a given time, nor is it necessary for the man to abide in the same house with the woman; but the offense is committed if he at stated periods, or frequently, spends the day or night, or any considerable part of his time, with a woman, not his wife, at such times having carnal knowledge of her at will, though at other times he be domiciled with his wife. Baker v. Baker, 124 S. W. 866, 867, 136 Ky. 617. A single act of criminal intercourse does not constitute "living in adultery or fornication." Lawson v. State, 42 S. E. 752, 116 Ga. 571 (citing McLeland v. State, 25 Ga. 477; Bish. St. Crimes, § 697). One act, or even occasional acts, of illicit intercourse do not constitute the of fense of "living together in a state of adultery or fornication, or of adultery and fornication," in violation of Pen. Code 1895, § 381. Winkles v. State, 61 S. E. 1128, 1129, 4 Ga. App. 559. LIVE TOGETHER See, also, Live in Adultery. A husband and wife are "living together" when they dwell under the same roof, eat at the same table, and hold themselves out to the world and conduct themselves towards each other as husband and wife, and it is incorrect to say that they are living as husband and wife when they do not occupy the same room or have sexual intercourse. Levy v. Goldsoll (Tex.) 131 S. W. 420, 421. The mere fact that a man took his meals at the house of a married woman did not constitute a "living together" by such man and woman, within the meaning of the statute defining the crime of adultery. Paul V. State, 90 S. W. 171, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 20. Where defendant had sexual intercourse with prosecutrix while she was living in defendant's house as his general servant, during the illness of defendant's wife, defendant was not guilty under an indictment charging that defendant and prosecutrix "lived together and had carnal intercourse." The statute does not intend to convey the idea that a married man with a family was "living together" with a servant merely because the servant might occupy a room in the house of the master. To give the statute such construction would be to hold that, where a landlord or family slept under the same roof with the servant, this would be a "living together" with the servant. Boswell v. State, 85 S. W. 1076, 1077, 48 Tex. Cr. R. 47, 122 Am. St. Rep. 731. any donation of immovables, does not mean that the parties must have dwelt or resided together. Succession of Jahraus, 38 South. 417, 418, 114 La. 456. LIVED UPON Where, on a trial for violating Act April 26, 1909 (Laws 1909, c. 196), punishing any supported in whole or in part by the money person who shall knowingly live on or be procured by any female through the prostitution of any other female, accused relied on the fact that the money given him by a third person was received in payment of debts or to redeem jewelry for the third person, and the third person testified that she never gave accused any money for his own use, a charge authorizing a conviction if accused received money from the third person with knowledge that the same was derived through the prostitution of another, and that he used the same for his own living or personal expenses, was erroneous, because broader than the statute, and as eliminating the defense; the phrase "lived upon" meaning to be maintained in life; to acquire a livelihood; to subsist with, on, or by, as to live on spoils. Trozzo v. People, 117 Pac. 150, 156, 51 Colo. 323. LIVE ENGINE An engine having no steam is called a "dead engine," and one with steam is a "live engine." Turner v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 111 Pac. 433, 83 Kan. 315. LIVE SPRINGS Springs occupying a space of about onehalf acre in a ten-acre tract, marshy part of the year, resting right upon the brow of a little drop-off, so that there was quite a lot of water standing around in the springs, of which it looked as there might be five or six, but into which no stream led, and the water from which formed no channel or stream, though, during a part of the wet season, some of the water would flow down the hillside for a short distance and disappear in the soil, were not "live springs," but constituted nothing more than a bog occasioned by seepage of the water. Dickey v. Maddux, 93 Pac. 1090, 1091, 48 Wash. 411. LIVE STOCK INSURANCE COMPANY A "live stock insurance company" incorporated under Rev. St. 1895, art. 642, subd. 46, authorizing the incorporation of fire, marine, life, and live stock insurance companies, to conduct a live stock insurance company on a mutual or co-operative plan without capital stock, and to issue policies of indemnity on live stock to its members, is a live stock insurance company conducted on the mutual or co-operative plan, and is not a "mutual relief association" within article Civil Code, art. 1481 providing that those 3096, providing that nothing in the titlewho "have lived together" in open concu- title 58, entitled "Incorporation of Insurance binage are incapable of making to each other Companies"-shall apply to mutual relief as sociations. State v. Burgess, 109 S. W. tation and adultery, mean the living together 922, 923, 101 Tex. 524. An information drawn under section 27, c. 495, p. 823, Sess. Laws 1905, relating to the inspection by the "live stock sanitary commissioner" of cattle imported from places beyond the south line of the state, which charges a want of inspection by the live stock sanitary "commission," and charges generally the want of any inspection, is not invalidated by the omission of the terminal syllable “er" from the word used to describe the official having power to make the inspection, since there is no substantial differ ence between a commission composed of a body of individuals having lawful warrant to perform certain acts and a commissioner having identical authority. Both terms are general characterizations without fixed legal signification and import an office with prescribed duties. State v. Asbell, 86 Pac. 457, 458, 74 Kan. 397, 121 Am. St. Rep. 345. LIVE WIRE The term "live wire" is used in electricity to describe a wire charged with a dangerous voltage of electricity. Potts v. Shreve port Belt Ry. Co., 34 South, 103, 110 La. 1, 98 Am. St. Rep. 452. A "live wire" is one charged with a deadly current of electricity. City of Owensboro v. Knox's Adm'r, 76 S. W. 191, 192, 116 Ky. 451. A "live wire" is one charged with a deadly current of electricity. Mangan's Adm'r v. Louisville Electric Light Co., 91 S. W. 703, 705, 122 Ky. 476, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 459 (quoting and adopting City of Owensboro v. Knox's Adm'r, 76 S. W. 191, 116 Ky. 451). LIVING The word "living," as ordinarily used in reference to legatees, without anything in the context to qualify its meaning, signifies such legatees as are living at the time of making the will. Bryant v. Flanders, 87 N. E. 574, 575, 201 Mass. 373. Child en ventre sa mere The term “en ventre sa mere" comes clearly within the description "a child living at the time of its father's death." State v. Atwood, 102 Pac. 295, 297, 54 Or. 526, 21 Ann. Cas. 516. LIVING HEIRS See Remaining Living Heirs. as husband and wife; and to justify a conviction it must appear that there existed between defendants an adulterous cohabitation. People v. Breeding, 126 Pac. 179, 181, 19 Cal. App. 359. LIVING ISSUE See Issue (Descendants). LIVERY STABLE As mercantile pursuit, see Mercantile. horses or vehicles are kept or let for hire; A "livery stable" is a building where hired; where vehicles are let;" a stable a "place where horses are groomed, fed, and and vehicles are let; a stable where horses where horses are kept at livery and hire, are kept for hire, and where stabling is proE. 405, 407, 133 Ga. 209, 134 Am. St. Rep. vided. Elliott v. Hodgson & Jackson, 65 S. 206 (quoting and adopting definition in Williams v. Garignes, 30 La. Ann. 1094; Stand. Dict.; and Webster, International Dict.). A "livery stable" is ordinarily a place where horses and carriages are kept to be let for hire, and, in the ordinary conduct of the business, the horse or vehicle so let is in charge and under the control of the hirer or his representative. City of Des Moines v. Bolton, 102 N. W. 1045, 1046, 128 Iowa, 108, 5 Ann. Cas. 906. LIVERY STABLE KEEPER A "livery stable keeper" has been defined to be the keeper of a stable where horses or vehicles are kept or let for hire; one whose business it is to keep horses for hire or to let, or to keep, feed, or board, horses for others: one who takes horses to bait and board, and he usually keeps horses to let; the keeper of a stable where horses are groomed, fed, and hired, where vehicles are let; the keeper of a stable where horses are kept at livery and hire, and vehicles are let, where horses are kept for hire and stabling is provided. While it is not absolutely necessary for a stable keeper to exercise all the different functions mentioned in the above definitions in order to be a livery stable keeper, his business must be substantially that as indicated. Elliott v. Hodgson & Jackson, 65 S. E. 405, 407, 133 Ga. 209, 134 Am. St. Rep. 206 (quoting Abbott, Law Dict.; Anderson, Law Dict.; Black, Law Dict.; Stand. Dict.; Webster, International Dict.; Groves v. Kilgore, 72 Me. 489; Williams v. Garignes, 30 La. Ann. 1094). A "livery stable keeper" is "one whose business it is to keep horses for hire, or to let, or to keep, feed, or board, horses for others"; one who takes horses to bait and The words "living in a state of cohabita- board; and he usually keeps horses to let. tion and adultery" in Pen. Code, § 269a, as It is not absolutely necessary for a livery amended by Act March 21, 1911 (Laws 1911, stable keeper to exercise all of the different p. 426), punishing living in a state of cohabi-functions which may be sometimes performed 3 WDS.& P.2D SER.-11 LOAD See Car Load. See Ground Loader. LOADING See Time Saved in Loading. by him in order to be a "livery stable keep- | Barker v. Koenig, 119 N. Y. Supp. 777, 778, er," within the meaning of the lien law, but 135 App. Div. 16. his business must be substantially that indicated thereby. Under Civ. Code 1895, 8 2810, his lien includes, not only the actual feeding of a horse placed with him, but also such charges as are directly connected with his keeping as were naturally in the line of a livery stable keeper's business, but expenses of transporting a horse by railroad to races in or out of the state, and of entering him therein, do not furnish the basis of a lien; and where a horse is left with a stableman to be boarded or kept at an agreed price, and the stableman had two or more stables in this state for the accommodation of stock, and by agreement with the owner kept the horse at one of the stables, the fact that he was not kept at one of the stables rather than at another would not defeat his lien, although, where a horse is delivered to a livery stable keeper and, under contract with the owner, is sent to races at distant points and kept in the stable of another person who is paid by the liveryman, the liveryman thereby acquires no statutory lien. Elliott v. Hodgson & Jackson, 65 S. E. 405, 407, 133 Ga. 209, 134 Am. St. Rep. 206. An owner and keeper of a livery stable, who boarded horses by the month at so much per stall, but did not feed or care for them, is entitled to a lien as a "livery stable keeper," within Lien Law (Laws 1897, p. 533, c. 418, § 74, as amended by Laws 1899, p. 942, c. 465), giving a person keeping a livery stable or a boarding stable, or boarding animals, a lien for the care, keeping, or boarding of such animals; and the relation between the parties was not that of landlord and tenant. Selner v. Lyons, 110 N. Y. Supp. 1049, 1050. Under a charter party for a vessel to carry a cargo of coal, which provided that she should "have turn in loading" and "be loaded promptly," she was entitled to be loaded promptly in view of the facilities of the port and the climatic conditions which existed at the time, and to have such facilities used to their normal capacity, not only in her own loading, but also in the loading of other vessels after her arrival while she was waiting her turn. Harding v. Cargo of 4,698 Tons of New Rivers Steam Coal, 147 Fed. 971, 973 (citing Abb. Shipp. [13th Ed.] 297). Charter parties required the vessel in each case to load a cargo of phosphate at Port Inglis, Fla., and provided that the vessel should proceed to the Port Inglis anchorage, "or as near thereunto as she may safely get, The cargo to be and there load. * brought alongside and taken from alongside "Livery stable keepers" are those whose business it is to care for the horses and carriages of others and to let their own horses and carriage either with or without drivers, but they are not common carriers of passengers, within the legal meaning of that term, and the rule of law which requires the highest degree of diligence of a carrier of passen-chored, and gave notice that they were ready gers is not applicable to them. Stanley v. Steele, 60 Atl. 640, 642, 77 Conn. 688, 69 L. R. A. 561, 2 Ann. Cas. 342. LLOYDS The word "Lloyds" has, by use, come to be understood by the general public as synonymous with "insurance." Under General Corporation Law (Laws 1909, p. 15, c. 28 [Consol. Laws, c. 23]) § 6, providing that no corporation shall be organized with the name of "insurance" in it, except a corporation formed under the banking or the insurance law, a corporation cannot be formed under the business corporations law with the name "Lloyds" in its name, as that word has by use become synonymous with "insurance." to load. Held, that the "loading berth" referred to in the charter was the "safe anchorage" spoken of in the prior clause; that, having reached such anchorage and given the required notice, the lay days commenced, and the charterer could not require the vessels to await their turn at the loading buoys before the time commenced, even though that may have been the custom of the port, nor avoid liability for demurrage because of their time, either because they could not get to the detention for two or three weeks beyond the buoys or because they could not, perhaps have been fully loaded where they lay-its duty being to load them there, so far as could be safely done, and then permit them to move further out for its completion. Constantine & Pickering S. S. Co. v. Auchincloss, 161 Fed. 843, 846, 88 C. C. A. 661. The sum added to the net life insurance | pretended lender, or when any reservation premium to meet expenses and contingencies or limitation shall be pretended to have been is called "loading" the premium. United States Life Ins. Co. v. Spinks (Ky.) 96 S. W. 889, 893, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1053. Where insurance premiums and renewal premiums were greater than the amount necessary to pay for the insurance, the excess is called "loading." Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 107 S. W. 802, 806, 128 Ky. 174. LOAF See Loiter, Loaf, and Idle. LOAN See Money Loaned and Invested; Sell, Passing a loan, see Pass. See, also, Lend; Money Lent. made of a use of property, by way of condition, etc., the transfer shall be held fraudu'lent, unless the loan is declared by a written instrument duly acknowledged or proved and recorded. Held, that such section had no application to a chattel placed in the hands of bailees to be stored without charge for a reasonable time without any agreement that such bailees should have the right to use the same. Woodward v. San Antonio Traction Co. (Tex.) 95 S. W. 76, 78 (citing Templeman v. Gibbs, 24 S. W. 792, 86 Tex. 359; Hunstock v. Roberts [Tex.] 65 S. W. 676). Evidence, in an action by an ex-county treasurer against the county for commission, on the theory that a transaction by which, during his term, a judgment creditor of the county transferred the judgment to a bank, it paying him therefor, was a loan by the bank to the county and a payment of the judgment creditor by the county, so that such treasurer was entitled to commissions for receiving and disbursing the money, held sufficient to support a finding that the transaction was not a "loan," but a purchase by pre-ion County, 95 S. W. 713, 43 Tex. Civ. App. the bank of the judgment. Benefield v. Mar From the use of the word "loan," in its ordinary signification, the law implies a promise to repay. Herlihy v. Coney, 59 Atl. 952, 953, 99 Me. 469. Rev. St. c. 48, § 64, providing that miums for building association loans shall consist of a percentage charged on the amount lent in addition to interest, and section 65, providing that the monthly interest shall not be at a greater rate than 6 per cent. per annum, mean by the words "loan" and "lent" the whole sum contracted for, not the sum actually advanced. Tibbetts v. Deering Loan & Building Ass'n, 72 Atl. 162, 165, 104 Me. 404. .245. The word "loan" is defined to mean "to deliver to another for temporary use, on condition that the thing be returned, or to dedeliver for temporary use, on condition that an equivalent in kind shall be returned with a compensation for its use." State v. Brown, 102 S. W. 394, 395, 83 Ark. 44, 119 Am. St. Rep. 109 (quoting and adopting definition in Webst. Dict.). A party advancing money to another to enable the latter to manufacture lumber on Where a bond guaranteed that the prinan understanding that the lumber shall be cipal would return certain securities on a spesold by the former on commission, so that cified day, and contained no provision either the former may get back the advances, does permitting or requiring the principal to disnot make a "loan," within the strict defini-charge his obligation by payment of money on tion of the term. Murphy v. Dalton, 102 N. or before the day named, which he was auW. 277, 139 Mich. 79. Where the note of a borrowing member of a building and loan association contained the words "monthly installments on said share," but no reference indicated an agreement to apply such installments on the member's loan, and the deed to secure the loan was conditioned on the payment of the "loan" and of "installments on certain shares," referring to the principal debt covered by the note both as a "loan upon 18 membership shares," the terms "loan" and "installments" were not used synonymously. Cooper v. Newton, 160 Fed. 190, 193. Rev. St. 1895, art. 2547, provides that where any loan of goods or chattels shall be pretended to have been made to any person with whom, or those claiming under him, possession shall have remained for the space of two years without demand made and pursued by due process of law on the part of the thorized to do by a collateral agreement, the bond was not given for the "loan or forbearance of money" within the New York usury law (1 Rev. St. [1st Ed.] pt. 2, c. 4, tit. 3, § 5), making all bonds, whereon is reserved any greater sum than 6 per cent. for the loan or Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 166 Fed. 365, forbearance of any money, void. Klein v. 368. Though payment of money be called a “loan," it is not a loan where the money was not to be paid back at all events but the agreement was that on a certain condition it should be paid back. Teed v. Parsons, 66 N. E. 1044, 1046, 202 Ill. 455. A corporate officer having misappropriated funds, acceptance by the directors of his notes in satisfaction of the misappropriations did not constitute a "loan," within a charter provision prohibiting "loans" of corporate funds to corporate officers or employés. Mur |