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$ 13, subsec. 1, authorizing taxation of per- not subject to taxation in the town where sonalty employed in trade where the owner deposited, since the field where the lumber occupies a landing place. Inhabitants of was "stuck up” was not a "landing place" Georgetown v. William E. Hanscome & Co., within the statute, the term "landing" first 79 Atl. 379, 380, 108 Me. 131.

incorporated into the statute in Laws 1869, c. Rev. St. c. 9, § 12, provides that all per navigable water for landing and unlanding

53, then meaning a place on a river or other sonal property within or without the state shall be assessed to the owner in the town goods, or for taking on or letting off passenwhere he is an inhabitant on the 1st day of gers or a place where any kind of craft each April. Section 22 provides that part- Cann v. Inhabitants of Town of Minot, 78

lands or for storing logs for winter. MCners in business whether residing in the

Atl. 465, 467, 107 Me. 393. same or different towns, may be jointly taxed under their partnership name in the

LANDLORD town where their business is carried on for all personal property enumerated in section A man to be a "landlord" must sustain 13, par. 1, employed in such business, except some relation to the land, such as owner, or that, if any portion of such property is quasi owner, and, while a landlord may asplaced or situated in a town other than sign the rent, the assignee is not a “landlord" where their place of business is under speci- within the meaning of the statute giving a fied circumstances, they shall be taxed there landlord's lien. State V. Elmore, 46 S. E. for in such other town. Section 13, par. 1, 939, 941, 68 S. C. 140. provides that all personal property employed "A landlord' is a person whose lands in trade shall be taxed in the town where so are occupied." Hence, when a petitioner employed on the 1st day of each April, pro- said he was a landlord, he, in effect, said he vided that the owner, his servant, subcon- was the person whose lands were occupied. tractor, or agent so employing it occupies Loft v. Kaziz, 84 N. Y. Supp. 228, 230. any “landing place,” etc., therein for the purpose of such employment. Held that, to sus- 20, 36, inhibiting all persons from leasing or

Under General Milwaukee Ordinance, c. tain an assessment of taxes on lumber be letting either as landlord or agent, any longing to a firm in a certain town, it must ap room, house, or other premises to be used for pear that the firm were at the time of the as the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, the sessment carrying on business in the town, term "landlord” is not restricted in its meanand that the property assessed was employed in that business, or if their place of business ing to the owner of an estate in lands, but

refers to lessees who let particular rooms. was in another town that the property so em City of Milwaukee v. Beatty, 135 N. W. 873. ployed was placed or situated in the town

874, 149 Wis. 349. where sought to be assessed and the property must be employed in trade, etc.; and, if

Under a statute enacted in the reign of their place of business is in another town George II, a landlord was permitted to apthan that in which the property is deposited, pear and defend in ejectment, and the word it must appear that the firm or their serv- "landlord" was interpreted to include all ants or agents so employing the property oc- persons claiming title consistent with the cupied for purposes of the employment a persons sued as tenants in possession. Bow. "landing place," etc., in the town where the er v. Cohen, 54 S. E. 918, 919, 126 Ga. 35. assessment is sought to be made, and where

Premises were leased for one year, and members of a firm resided in other towns before the expiration of that term the landand cut logs in other towns, which were lord leased to another the premises for a hauled to a town where they were sought to term to begin at the expiration of the first be assessed for taxation, there sawed by a term. The first tenant held over, and the portable sawmill, and “stuck up" to season landlord brought summary proceedings to in a field within the town with the intent to dispossess him. Section 2231, Code Civ. Proc. leave it there until sold, when it was to be provides that a tenant holding over at the hauled to a railroad siding, half a mile expiration of his lease may be removed and distant also in the town, for shipment, and section 2235 provides that the application all the work done on the lot was done under may be made by the "landlord or lessor." contract of another person, the firm, how- Held that the lessor of both tenants was the ever, supervising the work so far as to de- "landlord or lessor” within the statute, and termine the size and shape of the manufac- could maintain an action to dispossess the tured product, the firm having no office any first tenant, if there had been no election by where, their books being kept in another the landlord to continue the lease. Eells v. town at a dwelling house from where the Morse, 127 N. Y. Supp. 438, 440, 142 App. correspondence of the firm was carried on Div. 592. and prospective purchasers taken by the firm

A petition in summary proceedings for to the sticking grounds to examine the lum- the possession of land, alleging that the petiher, the business of the firm was being car- tioner is the lessee and "landlord" thereof, ried on in another town, and the lumber was is not a sufficient compliance with Code Civ.

an

ance.

Proc. $ 2235, requiring the petition to state , possession being essential eleme the interest of the petitioner in the premises. Whiteside v. Oasis Club, 142 S. W. 752, 750, The statement that the petitioner was the 162 Mo. App. 502. "lessee" and "landlord" is the assertion mere

The words "landlord and tenant" signify ly of an interest and not a description of not only the immediate parties to a lease, such interest. Ferber v. Apfel, 99 N. Y. but also their respective successors in interSupp. 215, 216, 113 App. Div. 720 (citing est. Where a landlord assigns his lease with Kazis v. Loft, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1015, 81 App. his right to the control, occupancy, and posDiv. 636; Loft v. Kaziz, 84 N. Y. Supp. 228; session of the premises for more than four Engel-Heller Co. v. Henry Elias Brewing Co., years beyond the expiration of the term, and 75 N. Y. Supp. 1080, 37 Misc. Rep. 480; Pot- the tenant holds over, the assignee may elect ter v. New York Baptist Mission Soc., 52 to treat the holding over as a tenancy for N. Y. Supp. 294, 23 Misc. Rep. 671; Ross v.

another year. United Merchants' Realty & Same, 52 N. Y. Supp. 303, 23 Misc. Rep. 683; Improvement Co. v. Roth, 103 N. Y. Supp. Cram v. Dietrich, 78 N. Y. Supp. 948, 38 1112, 1113, 53 Misc. Rep. 92. Misc. Rep. 790.

Under the direct provisions of Code 1896, Owner not equivalent

$ 2711, where one party furnishes land for A description of the petitioner as the raising a crop and another furnishes the "landlord of the premises hereinafter de labor and the team to cultivate it, with a scribed" is insufficient to confer jurisdiction stipulation for a division of the crop between of summary proceedings, for that does not them, the relation of landlord and tenant exstate that he is the owner, but merely alleg- ists between them; the status, fixed by the es the relation of the parties without stating statute, being contractual. Kennedy v. Mcpetitioner's interest in the premises. Under- Diarmid, 47 South. 792, 793, 157 Ala. 496. hill v. Cohen, 114 N. Y. Supp. 115, 117, 61

Where one enters into possession of land Misc. Rep. 627.

under a deed claiming it in good faith as

owner, and does not recognize any interest in LANDLORD AND CROPPER

the grantor, the relation of "landlord and tenA verbal contract between a cropper, who ant" does not exist, and he cannot be sumowed a large supply account for which his marily dispossessed as a tenant at sufferlandlord was security and also owed his

Sharpe v. Mathews, 51 S. E. 706, 707, landlord for supplies, and his landlord, 123 Ga. 794 (citing Watson v. Toliver, 29 S. whereby it was agreed that, if the cropper E. 614, 103 Ga. 123). should desire to work elsewhere the follow

The reservation of rent in some form ing year, he should settle up his supply account and notify the landlord before a time and allegiance to the title are distinguishing fixed, so that he might have time to get some characteristics of a contract by which the

Anone else, and that, if the cropper did not set relation of landlord and tenant exists. tle up and notify the landlord before the drews v. Erwin (Ky.) 78 S. W. 902, 903. time fixed, then he was to be a cropper for Reservation of rent is not essential to the landlord for the following year, does not the creation of the relation of "landlord and create the relation of landlord and cropper tenant." Plaintiffs conveyed to defendant within Act Dec. 17, 1901 (Acts 1901, p. 63), by deed all the timber and trees on the tract as amended by Act Aug. 7, 1903 (Acts 1903, of land described; the deed providing that p. 91), providing that, where the relation of the grantee should have all the rights of way landlord and cropper has been created, it and privileges over and upon the land shall be unlawful for any person during the usually extended to lumbermen, provided contract to employ the cropper or to disturb that the timber should be removed within in any way such relation; that act contem- three years, and that all refuse, timber, plating a complete contract and not a con- barns, houses, cabins, sheds, etc., remaining tract whereby the relation will be created in on the premises at that time should revert to the future on the happening or nonhappening and become the property of plaintiff's. Held, of a given contingency, dependent on the will that such deed was not a mere license, but of one of the parties. Polk v. Thomason, 61

was sufficient to create the relation of "làndS. E. 123, 124, 130 Ga. 542.

lord and tenant.” Alexander v. Gardner, 96

S. W. 818, 819, 123 Ky. 552, 124 Am. St. Rep. LANDLORD AND TENANT

378. The relation of "landlord and tenant" is

Plaintiff, who resided on a farm, conthat which subsists by virtue of a contract tracted to allow defendant to occupy free of for the possession of lands at will, for a

rent one of the houses on the farm and carry definite period, or for life. Foss v. Stanton, on the same for a term of years. Each party 57 Atl. 94 76 Vt. 365.

was to furnish certain things for the farm, The relation of landlord and tenant aris- and the crops were to be sold and proceeds es under contract, express or implied, for divided. Held, that the relation of "landpossession of lands or tenements in consid- lord and tenant" did not exist between the eration of certain rent to be paid therefor; parties as to the house, but that defendant's

.

occupancy was a mere incident of his carry- Rep. 529, 5 Ann. Cas. 963 (quoting and adopting on the farm, and an action would not lie ing definition from Bishop). against him to recover possession of the house under v. S. 1560, providing that, LAP when a lessee holds possession without right, the person entitled to possession may have

Where one grant conflicts in part with

another, occasioning what is called a "lap" a writ to restore him thereto. Mead V.

or "interlock," the elder patentee under his Owen, 67 Atl. 722, 724, 80 Vt. 273, 13 Ann. Cas. 231.

grant acquires at once constructive seisin in

deed of all the land embraced within its LANDOWNER

boundaries, although he has taken no actu

al possession of any part thereof. The junThe county named in the preliminary

ior grantee under his grant acquires similar report of the surveyor as a landowner affected by a proposed drainage is not a "land- constructive seisin in deed of all the land owner" within the provision of the drainage tion within the interlock, the seisin of which

embraced by his boundaries, except that poract requiring the dismissal of the petition had already vested in the senior grantee. upon remonstrance of two-thirds of the Green v. Pennington, 54 S. E. 877, 878, 105 "landowners” affected. Honnold v. Endicott, Va. 801 (citing Koiner v. Rankin's Heirs 83 N. E. 502, 170 Ind. 16.

(Va.] 11 Grat. 427). The word "landowner," in the statute giving a company power to condemn land, LAP POSITION and providing that it shall be liable for all In the railway automatic quick action such damages as may be established by any brake system, the position known as the “lap landowner, embraces not only the owner of position" was, where the engineer thought the fee, but a lessee for years and any other that the train pipe pressure had been suffiperson who has' an interest in the property ciently reduced by the resultant brake appliaffected by the condemnation. Woodstock cation, he moved the handle back a short disHardwood & Spool Mfg. Co. v. Charleston tance so as to close all the ports and hold Light & Water Co., 66 S. E. 194, 196, 84 S. the brakes at the point at which they had C. 306.

been set. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. New York Air Brake Co., 119 Fed. 874, 875,

56 C. C. A. 404. LANGUAGE

See Doubtful Language; Ordinary Lan- LAPPINGS

guage. English language, see English.

"Lappings" consist of a woven fabric Obscene language, see Obscene - Obscen-composed of a flax warp and a wool filling

and is dutiable under paragraph 346 of the ity.

Tariff Act of 1897. United States v. E. De Profane language, see Profane-Profan

F. Wilkinson Co., 154 Fed. 751, 752. ity.

“Language” is the expression of thought LAPSE by means of spoken or written words which are but signs of ideas. United States v. One LAPSE OF TIME Car Load of Corno Horse and Mule Feed, The phrase "lapse of time," as used in 188 Fed. 453, 462.

a constitutional provision giving the Legisla“Language” is a generic term, and in- ture power to revive any remedy which may cludes any words or speech by which thought have been barred by "lapse of time" or "by may be conveyed, and language may be ob- any statute of limitations,” means a period scene and vulgar when used in the presence of time limiting the action, and relates alone of a female without the use of a single word either to an express statute of limitations or which could be intrinsically classified as be to a “lapse of time” dealt with either under ing obscene and vulgar. Morris v. State, 65 the statute or the general law, as a limitaS. E. 58, 59, 6 Ga. App. 395.

tion of time. North British & Mercantile

Ins. Co. of London & Edinburgh v. Edwards, “ 'Language' is the offspring of the past, 37 South. 748, 85 Miss. 322. but its life is in and for the ever opening and progressive future. Its principal mission is LARCENY to convey from one mind to another the new thoughts as they arise; for the old is con- See Compound Larceny; Grand Lartinually dying, while the new is being born.

ceny; Petit Larceny; Simple LarIf each word had a single fixed and un

ceny; Taking (In Larceny). changing meaning, and if there simply were Hog stealing, see Hog. certain established collocations of words, Property subject of larceny, see Personeach with one signification, the powers of al Property; Property. language would be very limited, and it could Stealth as element, see Stealth. never express a new idea." State v. Stuart, See, also, Fraud; Frauduleut Taking; 92 S. W. 878, 881, 194 Mo. 345, 112 Am. St. Horse Stealing; Theft.

woon

"Larceny" is taking personal property by same to the taker's use, and make it

Moss, SO stealing; by theft. Cox v. Territory, 104 without the consent of the owner.'

R. A. Pac. 378, 379, 2 Okl. Cr. 668.

Weatherman, 100 S. W. 482, 483, 202 “Larceny" is predicated on the wrongful (quoting and adopting definition in Sta. taking of property with intent to convert it. Gray, 37 Mo. 463). Axtell v. State, 91 N. E. 354, 355, 173 Ind. “Larceny" is a felonious taking and car711.

rying away of the personal goods or chattels “Larceny" is the felonious taking of the of another with intent to deprive the owner property of another. State y. Wasson, 101 of his property therein and to appropriate N. W. 1125, 1126, 126 Iowa, 320.

the same to the use of the taker. Asporta“Larceny” is the taking of another's per- ous intent to thereby convert the stolen prop

tion, nonconsent of the owner, and a felonisonal property without the owner's consent, erty to the defendant's own use are necessary accompanied by an intent to wholly deprive elements of larceny. Ladeaux v. State, 103 him of its value. State v. Hinton, 109 Pac. N. W. 1048, 1049, 74 Neb. 19. 24, 27, 56 Or. 428.

A “arceny" has been defined as a fe“Larceny" is the felonious taking and lonious taking of the property of another, carrying away of the personal property of without his consent and against his will, with another, with the intent to convert it to the intent to convert it to the use of the taker, or use of the taker without the consent of the “the wrongful or fraudulent taking or carryowner. State v. De Luca (Del.) 77 Atl. 742, ing away by any person of the personal goods 743, 2 Boyce, 158; State v. Stewart (Del.) 67 of another with a felonious intent to convert Atl. 786, 788, 6 Pennewill, 435.

them to his (the taker's) own use and make "Larceny" is the felonious taking and them his own property without the consent carrying away of the personal goods of an- of the owner." Bassett v. Spofford, 45 N. Y. other, with intent to deprive the owner of 387, 391, 6 Am. Rep. 101 (citing 2 Russ. his property therein, and to appropriate the Crimes, 1; Mowrey v. Walsh [N. Y.) 8 Cow. same to the use of the taker. State v. Spen- 238). cer (Del.) 53 Atl. 337, 338, 4 Pennewill, 92.

The phrase "deemed guilty of larceny," “Larceny" is the felonious taking and as used in B. & C. Comp. § 1805, providing carrying away of the personal property of that, if any person shall embezzle or frauduanother, with intent to convert it to the lently convert any money belonging to anothtaker's use, and to deprive the owner of the er in his possession, he shall “be deemed guilsame, without the owner's consent. State v. ty of larceny,” and on conviction shall be Palmer (Del.) 53 Atl. 359, 4 Pennewill, 126. punished accordingly, refers to statutory

"Larceny" is the felonious taking and larceny and not larceny at common law. carrying away of the personal property of State v. Browning, 82 Pac. 955, 956, 47 Or. another, with intent to convert it to the tak- | 470. er's use and deprive the owner of its use

Where one collects money for another without his consent. State y. Dredden, 73 and neglects or refuses to turn it over but Atl. 1042, 1043, 6 Pennewill, 446.

uses the money himself, he commits a "lar“Larceny" is the wrongful or fraudulent ceny.” Specifically, it is embezzlement and taking and carrying away by any person of is punishable as “larceny." State v. Conklin, the personal goods of another without the 84 Pac. 482, 484, 47 Or. 509. owner's consent, with a felonious intent to

If the general bookkeeper of a bank, convert them to the taker's use. State v. having no general or special custody or posJames, 113 3. W. 232, 233, 133 Mo. App. 300. session of the funds of the bank, secretly

"Larceny" is the wrongful or fraudulent takes from the safe or drawer of the receiv. taking and carrying away of the personal ing or paying teller moneys of the bank, with goods or property of another, with the feloni- the intent to appropriate the same to his ous intent to convert it to his own use and own use, he commits an act of "larceny." make it his own property without the con- United States v. Breese, 131 Fed. 915, 920. sent of the owner. State v. Wolf (Del.) 66 In a prosecution for larceny, the state Atl. 739, 741, 6 Pennewill, 323.

must prove that the property taken was perAt common law, as well as by statute, sonal property of some value belonging to the "larceny" is the wrongful taking and carry

owner named in the indictment and that it ing away of the personalty of another, with was taken feloniously by the defendant with a felonious intent to convert it to the taker's intent to convert it to his own use within use without the owner's consent. State v.

two years prior to the finding of the indictBrewington (Del.) 78 Atl. 402, 403, 2 Boyce, ment, and in the county in which the case 71.

was being prosecuted. State v. De Luca “Larceny' is defined as the wrongful (Del.) 77 Atl. 742, 743, 2 Boyce, 158. or fraudulent taking and carrying away of A bill of particulars, filed with an indictthe personal property of another, from any ment for "larceny" of a receipt, which alleged place, with a felonious intent to convert the that accused told prosecutor that he would

occupancy secutor money and take from him was not error for the trial court to give the ing on thęteral a negotiable receipt of a third jury the following definition of "larceny,” to against for certain bonds, that accused false- wit: “ 'Larceny' is the felonious stealing, house presented to prosecutor that he intended taking, carrying, riding or driving away the whether to keep the certificate in his posses- property of another.” It is the felonious sion or to place the same as collateral with taking; that is, wrongful and corrupt taking. a bank for a loan, that accused loaned to Hendrix v. United States, 101 Pac. 125, 128, prosecutor money and received as collateral 2 Okl. Or. 240. the receipt, that accused sold the receipt, that

Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, C. 38, § 167, proafter the maturity of the debt prosecutor vides that larceny may be committed by femade demands on accused for the return of loniously taking and carrying away any bond, the receipt and tendered the amount of the bill, receipt, or any instrument of writing of debt, that accused declined to deliver the re- value to the owner. So an indictment chargceipt or any receipt of the same amount, and ing the larceny of a bill of exchange must that accused never intended to retain posses- aver the value thereof. People v. Silbertrust, sion of the receipt, but at the time of making 86 N. E. 203, 204, 236 Ill. 144. the representation and receiving the receipt ! he intended to dispose of the same, etc., per

Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 38, $ 75, provides mitted the commonwealth to prove common

that if any agent embezzles or fraudulently larceny, embezzlement, obtaining property by converts to his own use, or takes with intent false pretenses, or larceny, defined by Rev. to do so, without the consent of the employer, Laws, c. 208, $ 26, making one who, with in- any property of the employer which has come tent to defraud, obtains property by false pre to his possession or to his office by virtue of tense guilty of “arceny.” Commonwealth v. such employment, is to be deemed guilty of Althause, 93 N. E. 202, 205, 207 Mass. 32, 31 “larceny.” So an indictment, charging in L. R. A. (N. S.) 999.

the language of the statute that defendant

was the agent of B., and as such agent colIn a trial for “larceny,” the gist of the lected and embezzled funds belonging to her offense is the unlawful taking and appropri- in the amount of $7,000, was sufficient. Peoating by the accused of the property of an- ple v. O'Farrell, 93 N. E. 136, 139, 247 Ill. 44. other, the name of the owner being a matter of secondary importance or consideration.

Pen. Code, $ 484, defines "larceny" as the Where the name of the owner is not known, felonious stealing, taking, carrying away of it is sufficient to allege that fact. State v. the property of another. So an information McDuffy, 60 South. 80, 81, 131 La. 695 (citing charging that accused, from the immediate State v. Hanks, 1 South. 458, 39 La. Ann. presence of prosecutor, by means of force 234; State v. Dominique, 1 South. 665, 39 La. and against prosecutor's will, did take, steal, Ann. 323; State v. Harris, 8 South. 530, 42 and carry away certain property of the value La. Ann. 980; State v. Southern, 19 South. of $1,026 of the personal property of prose668, 48 La. Ann. 628).

cutor, was sufficient. People v. Ho Sing, 93

Pac. 204, 205, 6 Cal. App. 752. Statutory definitions

"A person who, with the intent to de“Larceny” is the felonious stealing or prive or defraud the true owner of his propcarrying away the personal property of an-erty, or of the use or benefit thereof, or to other. People v. Devlin, 76 Pac. 900, 143 appropriate the same to the use of the taker, Cal. 128 (citing Pen. Code, $ 484).

or of any other person, either: (1) Takes Pen. Code, $ 441, defines "larceny" as from the possession of the true owner, or of the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, lead- any other person, or obtains from such possesing, or driving away of the personal property sion by color or aid of fraudulent or false repof another. Buffehr v. Territory, 89 Pac. resentation or pretense, or of any false token 415, 11 Ariz. 165.

or writing, or secretes, withholds, or appro"Larceny” is the felonious stealing, tak- priates to his own use, or that of any person ing, carrying, leading, or driving away the other than the true owner, any money, perpersonal property of another. State v. Da- sonal property, thing in action, evidence of vis, 76 Pac. 705, 706, 28 Utah, 10 (citing Rev. debt or contract, or article of value of any St. 1898, § 4355).

kind; or (2), having in his possession, cus

tody, or control, as a bailee, servant, attor"Larceny" is to take, steal, and carry

ney, agent, clerk, trustee, or officer or any away. An instruction thus defining larceny person, association, or corporation or public in the words of the statute was sufficient, officer, or as a person authorized by agree since the words employed are daily in comment, or by competent authority, to hold or mon use and such as the jury were presumed take such possession, custody, or control, any to understand. State v. Carter, 121 N. W.

money, property, evidence of debt or con694, 695, 697, 144 Iowa, 280.

tract, article of value of any nature or thing Ann. St. 1899, Ind. T. & 965, defines "lar- in action or possession, appropriates the same ceny" as follows: “ 'Larceny' is the felonious to his own use, or that of any other person stealing, taking, carrying, riding or driving other than the true owner or person entitled away the personal property of another.". It to the benefit thereof, steals such property

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