unless a demand for payment of the lien has been made before suit, unless the court finds that the claimant had reasonable grounds to believe that the owner or a person having control of the property on which the lien was claimed was attempting to defraud the claimant. Held, that the terms "lienholder" and "lien claimant" included a person having a lienable claim, though not perfected, and hence a demand before the filing of the lien notice was a sufficient compliance therewith. Sumpter v. Burnham, 99 Pac. 752, 753, 51 Wash. 599. LIEU OF See In Lieu of LIFE See During Natural Life; Expectancy of Life; For Life; Imprisonment for Life or Less Than Natural Life; Quarterly During His Natural Life; Take His Own Life. "By the term 'life,' as here used [referring to the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution], something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which 'life' is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body, by the amputation of an arm or leg, or the putting out of an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with the outer world. The deprivation, not only of 'life,' but of whatever God has given, to every one with 'life' for its growth and enjoyment, is prohibited by the provision in question, if its efficacy be not frittered away by judicial decision." MacMullen v. City of Middletown, 98 N. Y. Supp. 145, 150, 112 App. Div. 81 (quoting Field, J., in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77). The use of the word "life," in a will creating a trust, devising the fund to the trustees to hold and collect the rents, income, and profits thereof, and pay over the same to such three children annually, during the term of their natural "life," in the singular, if significant, tends to show that the testator was thinking of the life of each. Brown v. Farmer, 68 N. E. 32, 33, 184 Mass. 136. LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE "Life and accident insurance" is a contract whereby one, for a stipulated consideration, agrees to indemnify another against injuries by accident or death. State v. Willett, 86 N. E. 68, 70, 171 Ind. 296, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 197. LIFE ESTATE See Conventional Life Estate; Legal As dower of use, benefit, and profits, see An "estate for life" is a "freehold" estate not of inheritance. Cummings v. Cummings, 75 Atl. 210, 211, 76 N. J. Eq. 568. Life estates are freehold estates not of inheritance, and an estate that may last for a life or lives, that is not inheritable, not at will or for any fixed period of time, is a "life estate." Disley v. Disley, 75 Atl. 481, 483, 30 R. I. 366. "The very idea of a 'life estate' presupposes a fee as existing elsewhere than in the tenant for life, though the latter may be empowered to convey the fee and thus divest him who, but for the exercise of the power, would be holden of the fee conditionally, or a contingent remainderman." Beatson V. Bowers, 91 N. E. 922, 924, 174 Ind. 601. An "estate for life" is a freehold interest the life or lives of some particular person or in lands, the duration of which is confined to persons or to the happening or not happening of some uncertain event. Where a grantee agreed that the grantors should remain on the premises during their natural lives, free from rent, the grantors had a life estate. Robb v. New York & C. Gas Coal Co., 65 Atl. 938, 939, 216 Pa. 418. "At common law there were two classes The As to of 'life estates': First, conventional 'life estates,' or those which were created by contract; and, second, those which came into existence by operation of law. The former were not impeachable for waste, unless expressly made so by the conveyance. reason assigned for this rule is that it is presumed that, if the grantor intended to limit the enjoyment of the estate, he would have expressed his intention in the deed. the second class of 'life estates,' on the other hand, they are, as a general rule, impeachable for waste; that is to say, the tenant for life cannot use the property for any purpose which would result in an injury to the inheritance, save those only to which it had been devoted at the time the life estate came into existence." Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil Co., 86 S. W. 740, 742, 98 Tex. 597, 69 L. R. A. 986, 8 Ann. Cas. 1117. Testator having devised certain lands to his three sons by clauses under which, without more, they would have taken the lands in fee, in a subsequent clause provided that the estates so taken by his sons should only be "life estates," and, in case any of them died without issue, the land thereby willed for life should go to the other living children or the issue of such as had died. Held that, two sons having died subsequently to testator's death, without issue, the third took a fee simple, and not merely a life estate; the words "life estate" being equivalent to defeasible fee. Smoot v. Kirk (Ky.) 104 S. W. 716, 717. A life estate may be created by a deed, lease, or devise, with or without a stipulation LIFE INSURANCE See Life and Accident Insurance. Since the term "life insurance" includes accident policies, Act Pa. June 23, 1885, providing that when a policy of life insurance contains a warranty of the truth of the answers contained in the application no untrue statement made in good faith shall effect a forfeiture, unless the untrue statement relates to some matter material to the risk, is applicable to accident insurance. Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., 193 Fed. 343, 348, 113 C. C. A. 267. As chose in action See Chose in Action. As contract to pay certain sum Life insurance is a promise to pay a certain sum upon the death of the insured. Ellison v. Straw, 97 N. W. 168, 170, 119 Wis. 502. a A "life insurance" policy is not merely contract of indemnity. It is a contract to pay to the beneficiary a sum certain in the event of death; and if the contract was valid in its inception, and so continues until its maturity, the beneficiary is entitled to Keckley the whole of the stipulated sum. v. Coshocton Glass Co., 99 N. E. 299, 300, 86 Ohio St. 213, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 607. A "life insurance policy" is not a contract of indemnity, but is a contract to pay money upon the death of the assured in consideration of certain payments made during his life. Wayland v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 148 S. W. 626, 630, 166 Mo. App. 221; Reed v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc., 82 N. E. 734, 736, 190 N. Y. 111. As insurance See Insurance. Benefit societies A certificate in a mutual benefit association, providing that defendant association would pay on the member's death to his sister as beneficiary a specified sum on certain conditions, was a life insurance policy, within Act April 11, 1903 (Acts 1903, c. 119), providing that, after its passage, the suicide of a policy holder of any life insurance company doing business within the state should not be a defense to the policy, whether the suicide was voluntary or involuntary, or the holder was sane or insane. Head Camp Pacific Jurisdiction Woodmen of the World v. Sloss, 112 Pac. 49, 50, 49 Colo. 177, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 831. A "life insurance contract" or policy is "a contract by which a company or association agrees to pay a certain sum of money on the death of a member, in consideration of the payment by the member of fixed sums at fixed periods." A certificate issued by a fraternal mutual benefit society, providing that on the death of the member a specified sum will be paid his wife out of the mortuary fund on condition of payments by the member of fixed sums at fixed periods, is a life insurance contract or policy, within An "insurance" upon life is a contract Code 1887, § 3251, providing what shall be a on an action sufficient declaration in by which the insurer, for a stipulated sum, engages to pay a certain sum of money if an- policy, and is not merely a certificate of other dies within the time limited by the membership in a beneficial society. Cosmopolicy. It is a chose in action and even be- politan Life Ins. Co. v. Koegel, 52 S. E. 166, fore the death of the insured may be as- 168, 169, 104 Va. 619 (citing Logan v. Fidelsigned. Rylander v. Allen, 53 S. E. 1032, ity & Casualty Co., 47 S. W. 948, 146 Mo. 114; 1033, 125 Ga. 206, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 128, 51 Bacon Benefit Societies & Life Insurance, Ann. Cas. 355. As expressly defined by Civ. Code Ga. 1895, § 2114, "life insurance" is "a contract, by which the insurer for a stipulated sum engages to pay a certain amount if another dies within the time limited by the policy. The life may be that of the assured, or of another in whose continuance the assured has an interest." Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Lane, 151 Fed. 276, 278. § 52). a The object of an association was to furnish each of its members at death a specific sum for application to his funeral expenses, by a system of mutual contribution; the members at the death of any member paying It employed agents to death assessments. solicit business from the general public and was not founded on principles of philanthropy. Held, that its contracts with its members constituted "life insurance," within Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 4713, forbidding the taking of an application for insurance upon the life of any person in the state in favor of a person not having a bona fide insurable interest in the life of insured, or who is not related to him within a certain degree. State v. Willett, 86 N. E. 68, 71, 171 Ind. 296, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 197. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY In the ordinary sense, a fraternal order That is not a "life insurance company." class of fraternal organizations which agree to pay a sum of money upon the death of a member have that characteristic in common with life insurance companies, but the two classes of corporations are organized under different acts and for different purposes. The insurance company is an ordinary business corporation, and its policies are obtained for ordinary business purposes, for investment, for security for the benefit of credit, as well as the protection of the family, while the beneficiary association is not organized for purposes of profit, its certificates cannot be used for business purposes, and its members can receive no pecuniary advantage from its certificates and creditors cannot reach them. The Modern Woodmen of America is not an insurance company within the meaning of a question in an application for life insurance, "Have you ever been de clined or postponed by any company?" Peterson v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 91 N. E. 466, 469, 244 Ill. 329, 18 Ann. Cas. 96. LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY Under the Constitution, no one may be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the terms, "life," "liberty," and "property" include every personal, political, and civil right, including that to labor, to contract, and to acquire Western Steel Car & property. Josma v. Foundry Co., 94 N. E. 945, 946, 249 Ill. 508. "The terms life,' 'liberty,' and 'property' embrace every right which the law protects; they include not only the right to own and hold, but also the right to use and enjoy, property." Kansas City Gas Co. v. Kansas City, 198 Fed. 500, 510 (quoting Spring Valley Water Co. v. San Francisco, 165 Fed. 667). Coffeyville except by due process of law. The terms "life," "liberty," and "property," as used in the fourteenth constitutional amendment, embrace every right which the law protects; they include not only the right to own and hold, but also to use, property, and profits and income are within the protection of the amendment, subject, however, to the rule that when property is devoted to a public use the owner is entitled to earn only such income therefrom as is just and reasonable as between him and the public. Spring Valley Water Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 165 Fed. 667, 676. "The term 'life, liberty, and property,' as used in the federal Constitution, embraces every right which the law protects. They include, not only the right to hold and enjoy, but also the means of holding and enjoying, acquiring, and disposing of, property. The right to labor is property. It is one of the most valuable and fundamental of rights. The right to work is the right to earn one's subsistence, to live and to support wife and family. The right of master and servant to enter into contracts, to agree upon the terms and conditions under which the one will employ and the other will labor, is property. The master has the right to fix the terms and conditions upon which he is the servant willing to give employment; has the right to fix the terms and conditions upon which he is willing to labor; and any statute which curtails or limits that right deprives the party affected of his property, and, in the same measure, of his liberty. Both parties are free to enter into, or refuse to enter into, the contract. Before the law there is the same freedom to employ as to work, to buy as to sell, to choose one's employé as to choose one's employer." Branson v. Industrial Workers of the World, 95 Pac. 354, 361, 30 Neb. 270 (quoting Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union No. 220, 159 Fed. 500). LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PURSUIT OF The refusal to permit one to engage in a The terms "life," "liberty," and "property" are representative terms, and intended business of an undertaker is a violation of a to cover every right to which a member of right to enjoy "life, liberty, and the pursuit the body politic is entitled under the law. of happiness," secured under the state and These terms include the right of self-defense, federal Constitutions, unless there is some freedom of speech, religious and political good reason for the refusal; and the refusal freedom, exemption from arbitrary arrests, to permit one to bury the dead body of a reland the right freely to buy and sell as others ative or friend, except under an unreasonmay. Indeed, they may embrace all our lib-able limitation, is an unlawful interference erties, personal, civil and political, including with a private right. Wyeth v. Board of the rights to labor, to contract, to terminate Health of City of Cambridge, 86 N. E. 925, contracts, and to acquire property. None of 927, 200 Mass. 474, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147, 128 these liberties and rights can be taken away, Am. St. Rep. 439. LIFE LICENSE v. Brown, 29 Sup. Ct. 106, 108, 211 U. S. 321, 53 L. Ed. 202. LIFE POLICY Old line life policy, see Old Line Policy. LIFE RIGHT The devise of a "life right" creates a "life estate." Goldsboro Lumber Co. v. Hinės Bros. Lumber Co., 68 S. E. 929, 930, 153 N. C. 49. LIFE TENANT As owner, see Owner. LIFE USE An act approved March 7, 1905 (Acts 1905, p. 492, § 1; Burns' Ann. St. Supp. 1905, The rule has reference to time, and not § 5902a), provides that no person shall be to persons; the term "life or lives in being" eligible to the office of county superintendent referring not to the persons who are to take, of schools unless he shall hold a 36 months' as testator may select as the measure of license, a 60 months' license, a life or profes-time the lives of any persons in existence, and sional license to teach in the common schools "twenty-one years afterward" are 21 years of the state. The act concerning common in gross without regard to the life or coming schools, approved March 6, 1899 (Acts 1899, p. of age of any person. Hays v. Martz, 89 N. 488, c. 214, § 1; Burns' Ann. St. 1901, E. 303, 305, 173 Ind. 279. 5905b), provides for the issuance of a 36 months' license and a 60 months' license by the state superintendent of public instruction. The act of 1899 (Acts 1899, p. 243, c. 143, §7; Burns' Ann. St. 1901, § 5905a), provides for the issuance of a professional license on such examination held by the county superintendent as may be prescribed by the state board of education, and that such license shall issue only on the approval of the state board. The school law of 1865 (Acts 1865, p. 34, c. 1, § 155; Burns' Ann. St. 1901, § 5851), provides for the issuance of state certificates of qualification by the state board of education, which shall entitle the holder to teach in any of the schools of the state without further examination and be valid during the lifetime of the holder. The act approved March 5, 1873 (Acts 1873, p. 199, c. 86, § 3; Burns' Ann. St. 1901, § 6049), in amendment of and supplemental to the original act creating the State Normal School, authorizes the board of trustees to grant certificates of proficiency to teachers completing the prescribed courses of study, and provides that two years after graduation, satisfactory evidence of professional ability to instruct having been received, such teachers shall be entitled to diplomas appropriate to such professional degrees as the trustees shall confer on them, which diplomas shall be considered sufficient evidence of qualification to teach in any of the schools of the state. Held, that a post graduate diploma, granted pursuant to the act approved March 5, 1873 (Acts 1873, p. 199, c. 86; Burns' Ann. St. 1901, § 6049), to a graduate of the State Normal School of two years' standing, was not a life license within the act approved March 7, 1905 (Acts 1905, p. 492, c. 163, § 1; LIGHT (WEIGHT) Burns' Ann. St. Supp. 1905, § 5902a). State ex rel. Benham v. Bradt, 84 N. E. 1084, 1086, 170 Ind. 480. LIFE OF AGREEMENT See During Life of Agreement. LIFE OF CONSPIRACY See During Life of Conspiracy. LIFE OR LIVES IN BEING A corporation or joint-stock company to which an annuity is bequeathed will not be deemed a life in being where so to regard it would cause a trust created by the will to violate the rule against perpetuites. Fitchie A provision in a judgment awarding to a widow a "life use" of an interest in certain property in controversy instead of a right of dower therein was improper, the life use not being the same as a dower interest, prior to assignment of dower. Humphrey v. Gerard, 79 Atl. 57, 58, 84 Conn. 216. LIFT See Topping Lift. LIGHT-LIGHTING See Flare up Light; Joss Light. LIGHT STATION See Electric Light Station. As quasi public corporation, see Quasi LIGHTER MATERIAL In a claim of a patent for a frame or foundation for collars of dresses, a description of an upper band as of "lighter material" than the lower band applies to material of which the band is composed, as distinguished from the band itself, and requires it to be comparatively different-whether lighter in weight, or simply more pliable-from material composing the other. Warren Featherbone Co. v. Roberts & Co., 128 Fed. 745, 747. LIGHTER As private carrier, see Private Carrier. LIGHTNING Under a fire insurance policy containing a clause extending the policy to "any direct loss or damage caused by the lightning" meaning thereby the commonly accepted use of the term "lightning," and excluding loss by cyclone or windstorm, damage to goods from water and débris, into which they were thrown by the falling of the wall as a result of lightning, was the direct and natural consequence of the lightning. Cummins v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 134 N. W. 79, 83, 153 Iowa, 579, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1169, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 235. LIGHTNING ARRESTER A devise used by a telephone company to divert lightning from the line to the ground is spoken of as a “lightning arrester," though it might have more properly been termed a lightning diverter; its office being, not to arrest the lightning, but to divert it from the wire by offering a comparatively easy course to the earth. Wells v. Northeastern Telephone Co.. 64 Atl. 648, 652, 101 Me. 371. LIKE See With Like Intent. See, also, Same. LIKE CASES The phrase "in like cases as natural persons," as used in Const. Ala. 1901, § 240, giving the right to foreign corporations to sue in all courts "in like cases as natural persons," must mean, where the cases are alike, the same description of contract or tort. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Alabama, 155 Fed. 792, 799 (citing Smith v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 75 Ala. 449). The word "like" has been judicially defined to mean "having the same or nearly the same appearance, qualities, or characteristics; resembling; similar to; equal in quantity, quality, or degree" (19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 130); and, when the Constitution declares that "all corporations shall have the right to sue and shail be subject to be sued in all courts in like cases as natural persons," it must be construed to mean exactly what it says, and, if the facts are such as to give a private individual a cause of action under similar circumstances, if there are facts which bring the case within equitable principles, a municipal corporation has the same rights that a private corporation or an individual would have. Village of Haverstraw v. Eckerson, 108 N. Y. Supp. 506, 507, 124 App. Div. 18. LIKE CIRCUMSTANCES use of the expression "under like circumstances"; this being the equivalent of “under the same or similar circumstances," which is the proper standard. Warden v. Miller, 87 N. W. 828, 830, 112 Wis. 67. LIKE COMPANY As used in Ky. St. 1899, § 4077, imposing a franchise tax on 20 enumerated classes of corporations, all having special or exclusive. privileges or franchises not allowed by law to natural persons, and on every other like company, the word "like" refers to corpora tions having or exercising some special or exclusive privilege or franchise not allowed by law to natural persons, or performing some public service. Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 74 S. W. 1050, 1052, 115 Ky. 787. LIKE EFFECT Under an instruction that an affidavit produced by defendant on cross-examination, to impeach the credibility of the witness who made it, may be considered in connection with the affiant's deposition, as evidence against the plaintiff of the facts therein stated under oath with "like effect" as his deposition, the words "with like effect" were evidently intended to instruct the jury that the deposition and the affidavit were each independent of the other and each affirmative testimony, not, however, that they were of equal weight, and such instruction should be given where such affidavit is introduced in evidence by plaintiff on the cross-examination of another witness. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 23 Sup. Ct. 294, 296, 188 U. S. 208, 47 L. Ed. 446. LIKE KIND The words "like kind," as used in Code, c. 151, § 1, providing that a person who shall keep or exhibit a gaming table commonly called A. B. C. or E. O. table, or faro bank, or keno table, or "table of like kind," etc., shall be punished, etc., are used in a broad sense, and the act forbids certain kinds of gaming, among which are faro banks and keno tables, and all other games like them. So, on a trial for unlawfully keeping and to instruct the jury that if they shall beexhibiting a slot machine, it is not error lieve that the slot machine described is a gaming table, and that the machine is so constructed that it offers unequal chances to the player and exhibitor, and that the unequal chances are in favor of the exhibitor, then the slot machine is a gaming table of like kind and character to A. B. C. and E. O. tables, faro bank, and keno table. State v. Gaughan, 48 S. E. 210, 212, 55 W. Va. 692. The expression "like kind of property," as An instruction that "ordinary care" was used in Rev. St. 1899, § 1129, providing that, such care as the great majority of mankind if a carrier shall charge a greater or less would and do exercise in the transactions of compensation for any services in the transhuman life under like conditions and circum-portation of any kind of property than it stances, was not erroneous because of the charges any other person for doing him a |