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art. 4, § 7, par. 12, providing that property
shall be assessed under general laws and by
their uniform rules. Eastwood v. Russell,
81 Atl. 108, 109, 81 N. J. Law, 672.

due course of law. A fraternal insurance
order, consisting of a supreme lodge and of
subordinate lodges, had no capital stock and
did not accumulate any funds beyond the
amount required to discharge the benefits
The inheritance tax imposed by Laws
promised in its certificates. It had a relief 1901, p. 61, c. 62, § 1, is not a "property tax,”
fund charged with the payment of benefit but a tax imposed on the right of devolution
certificates. The right to receive sick bene- and succession. Dixon v. Ricketts, 72 Pac.
fits was contingent on provision being made 947, 948, 26 Utah, 215 (citing and adopting
therefor by the subordinate lodge under its In re Swift's Estate, 32 N. E. 1096, 137 N.
by-laws. A subordinate lodge was suspend-Y. 77, 18 L. R. A. 709; Knowlton v. Moore,
ed without notice. There was nothing to
show that it had provided for sick benefits.
Held, that the suspension did not affect
rights of property within the Bill of Rights,
in the absence of any showing of any mis-
appropriation of the relief fund, or in the
absence of any loss of sick benefits, especial-
ly since the right to such benefits was merely
an incident to membership. Lone Star Lodge
No. 1,935, Knights and Ladies of Honor, v.
Cole (Tex.) 131 S. W. 1180, 1185.

Political right distinguished
See Political Right.

20 Sup. Ct. 747, 178 U. S. 41-56, 44 L. Ed.
969; Strode v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. 181).

A tax on the franchise of public service
Honolulu
companies is a "property tax."
Rapid Transit & Land Co. v. Wilder, 29 Sup.
Ct. 44, 45, 211 U. S. 137, 53 L. Ed. 121.

An ordinance requiring barber shops to
pay a license of a certain sum on each chair,
where more than two chairs are used, is not
a "property tax," but an occupation tax.
City of Louisville v. Schnell, 114 S. W. 742,
743, 131 Ky. 104, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 637.

PROPERTY RIGHT TO BE OWNED IN public service corporations is a "property

THE FUTURE

The accrued interest of an heir, though undivided, is not a "property right to be owned in the future," within the provisions of Porto Rico Mortgage Law, art. 108, defining things not mortgageable, as the property right in things which, although they will be owned in the future, are not yet recorded in the name of the person who will have a right to own them. Cabrera v. American Colonial Bank, 29 Sup. Ct. 623, 628, 214 U. S. 224, 53 L. Ed. 974.

PROPERTY TAKEN

The courts generally give to the words "property taken," in the Constitution, referring to eminent domain, a construction to include permanent damages to property. Ingram v. Maine Water Co., 57 Atl. 893, 894, 98

Me. 566.

An ad valorem tax laid on franchises of tax"; their franchise being deemed "property.” Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort v. Capital Gas & Electric Light Co. (Ky.) 96 S. W. 870, 872.

A tax on the gross receipts of a street railroad company imposed as a condition to the exercise of the special privileges granted it is not a "property tax" but is a license fee. North Jersey St. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 67 Atl. 33, 34, 74 N. J. Law, 761.

Ky. St. 1909, §§ 4077, 4082, provide that certain corporations, including gas companies, shall, in addition to other taxes, annually pay a tax on their franchise to the state and a local tax thereon to the county, town, etc., where the franchise is exercised; and each corporation shall report the amount of tangible property in the state, and where situated, and assessed and the fair cash value thereof; and the board of valuation and assessment is required to fix the The tax imposed by the transfer tax value of the capital stock of each corporalaw is not a "property tax" (that is, one im- tion and from such amount deduct the asposed by reason of the ownership of prop-in the state; the remainder to be the value sessed value of all tangible property assessed erty), but is in the nature of an excise tax, of its corporate franchise subject to taxation, to wit, on the transfer of property. In re Keeney's Estate, 87 N. E. 428, 429, 194 N. Y. etc. 281 (citing In re Vanderbilt, 64 N. E. 782, 784, 172 N. Y. 69, 74).

PROPERTY TAX

The tax on bank stock provided by Rem. & Bal. Code, § 9134, is a "property tax," and not an "excise tax," its primary purpose being to raise revenue; and hence is subject to Const. art. 7, § 2, relative to uniformity in taxation on property. Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. Spokane County, 126 Pac. 54, 55, 70 Wash. 48.

A tax levy on property passing by will, by virtue of the act of 1894 (P. L. 1894, p. 318), is not a "property tax" within Const.

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By another provision all the property
of domestic corporations, including intangi-
ble property considered in determining the
value of the franchises, shall be subject to
taxation unless exempt by the Constitution.
Held, that within Const. § 174, requiring the
property of corporations and natural persons
to be similarly taxed, and allowing such
further license, income and franchise taxes
as the Legislature may deem proper, the tax
on the franchise of a gas company was a
"property tax" on the intangible property,
and not a "privilege tax" for engaging in a
business that natural persons could not, since
under section 4082 natural persons engaged.

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See Property Not Within the State.

in such business are taxed as such corpora- | PROPERTY WITHIN THE STATE
tions are. Commonwealth ex rel. Auditor's
Agent v. Louisville Gas Co., 122 S. W. 164,
166, 135 Ky. 324.

Acts 1906, p. 549, entitled "An act relating to revenue and taxation providing for license taxes on compounded, rectified, adulterated or blended distilled spirits, known and designated as single stamp spirits, and providing penalties for violations of its provisions," and imposing a license tax on every wine gallon of compounded, rectified, blended, or adulterated spirits, etc., does not levy a "property tax," within Const. § 171, requiring taxes to be uniform on all property subject to taxation, but imposes a license tax, the amount of which is determined by the amount of spirits produced; the tax being on the business and not on the spirits. Brown-Foreman Co. v. Commonwealth, 101 S. W. 321, 323, 125 Ky. 402.

For the purpose of the collateral inheritance tax, shares of stock in a corporation organized under the laws of the state are "property within the state," without regard to the place of residence of the stockholder, or the place of deposit of the certificates of stock, or the location of the property owned by the corporation, or the place where its business is carried on. Neilson v. Russell, 69 Atl. 476, 478, 76 N. J. Law, 27.

Where a domestic corporation issued a "policy of life insurance" to a resident of another state, in which state the corporation had designated a person on whom process might be served, and the policy was never in this state, its proceeds, paid to a foreign executor of the insured, are not "property within the state," subject to a transfer tax. In re Gordon's Estate, 99 N. Y. Supp. 630, 631, 114 App. Div. 202.

"Occupation taxes" are not "property taxes," and therefore are not subject to the Const. art. 8, § 1, requiring all property restrictions imposed upon property taxation in the state owned by natural persons or corby statutes and Constitutions. A monthly license tax of $100 levied by a city on gas porations other than municipal to be taxed, companies, regardless of the business done etc., embraces every kind of "property withand the earnings, does not infringe Const. in the state" over which the state has jurisart. 13, § 1, requiring all property to be tax-diction, whether owned by citizens or noned in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law, and defining property as including franchises, etc.; occupation taxes not falling within the constitutional provision. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Independent Gas Co., 93 Pac. 1006, 1007, 152 Cal. 765 (citing and adopting People ex rel. Attorney General v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 252, 52 Am. Dec. 312).

PROPERTY TAXPAYER

"Property taxpayers," entitled to vote at a special municipal election, means the owners of property assessed, and a joint owner of realty is a "property taxpayer" to the extent of his interest. Endom v. City of Monroe, 36 South. 681, 683, 112 La. 779.

PROPERTY TO BE ADMINISTERED
See To Be Administered.

PROPERTY WITHIN CITY

residents. Hall v. Miller, 115 S. W. 1168, 1170, 102 Tex. 289.

Deposits in foreign savings banks made by a resident of the state are "property within the state" within Laws 1905, p. 432, c. 40, imposing a collateral inheritance tax on all "property within the jurisdiction of the state," since the right created by the deposits is property constructively within the state, and passing under the will of the resident by force of the statute of wills, and the deposits are subject to the tax imposed, though they may be subject to a similar tax in a foreign state. Mann v. State Treasurer, 68 Atl. 130, 131, 74 N. H. 345, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 150.

A vessel engaged in commerce on the high seas was "property in the state," within the meaning of Const. art. 13, § 1, relating to revenue and taxation, and was taxable in the city and county of San Francisco, where the managing owner of the vessel resided, alThe tax on personal securities as "money though the vessel had been temporarily regisat interest" provided by the act of 1879 (P. tered in Washington, and had received no L. 130) and its supplementary acts, making permanent registration at San Francisco, and such property taxable, annually, for state had never been in the waters of California, purposes at the rate of four mills on each although some of her owners resided withdollar of the value thereof, is a state tax, out the state. Olson v. City and County of though a large part thereof is, under the San Francisco, 82 Pac. 850, 852, 148 Cal. 80, statute, returned to the counties, and the per-2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 197, 113 Am. St. Rep. 191, sonal securities upon which such tax is 7 Ann. Cas. 443. levied cannot be included in the assessed value of the "property therein," within Const. art. 9, § 8, limiting the borrowing power of a city to 2 per cent. upon the assessed value of the taxable property therein. Elliot v. City of Philadelphia, 78 Atl. 107, 110, 229 Pa. 215.

Transfer Tax Law (Laws 1892, c. 399) § 1, provides that a tax shall be imposed on the transfer by will, or intestate law, of property within the state, where the decedent was a nonresident at the time of his death. Held, that bonds passing under the will of a nonresident pursuant to a power of appointment

were not "property within the state" within | PROPORTIONAL such act, and subject to taxation because the bonds were secured by mortgages on for an assessment, means proportional to the lands located in New York. In re Fearing's Will, 93 N. E. 956, 958, 200 N. Y. 340.

"The word 'proportional,' in a provision special benefits received." Cheney v. Beverly, 74 N. E. 306, 308, 188 Mass. 81 (quoting Under the statute which provides for an and adopting definition in Hall v. Street Cominheritance tax upon all "property within missioners of Boston, 59 N. E. 68, 177 Mass. the jurisdiction of this state," or any interest | 434). therein, which shall pass by will, descent, etc., whether belonging to an inhabitant or not, and whether tangible or intangible, a nonresident owner of shares of stock in a domestic corporation has an interest in "property within the jurisdiction of this state," which is subject to the tax. In re Culver's Estate, 123 N. W. 743, 745, 145 Iowa, 1, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 384.

A deposit in a bank, subject to withdrawal by check or surrender of the bank book, owned by a nonresident of the state at the time of his death, constitutes "property within the state," within Rev. Laws 1905, § 3627, authorizing administration of the estate of a nonresident leaving property in the state. In re Lansing's Estate, 131 N. W. 1010, 1011, 115 Minn. 73.

PROPIEDAD

PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM

By "proportional system," as applied to taxation, is meant a tax at a fixed and uniform rate in proportion to the amount of taxable property based upon a cash valuation. State ex rel. Foot v. Bazille, 106 N. W. 93, 96, 97 Minn. 11, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 732, 7 Ann. Cas. 1056.

PROPORTIONAL TARIFF

"Proportional tariffs" are a collection of freight rates which apply upon interstate shipments from certain points to certain other points, when the commodities shipped originate beyond the place of shipment or their ultimate destination is beyond the point to which the proportional rates apply. J. Rosenbaum Grain Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & T. R. Co., 130 Fed. 46, 47.

The word "propiedad," used in the Span- PROPORTIONATE MEASUREMENT ish text of article 8 of the treaty of peace with Spain of Dec. 10, 1898, declaring that the cession of sovereignty "cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which, by law, belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds," etc., is defined by Escriche as the right to enjoy and dispose freely of one's things in so far as the laws do not prohibit it. 4 Escriche, 736. The same word appears in article 9, providing that Spanish subjects may retain, whether they remain or remove from the territory, "all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds." So it is inferred that the right to practice law was not embraced in the provision of article 8. Bosque v. United States, 28 Sup. Ct. 501, 504, 209 U. S. 91, 52 L. Ed. 698.

"Proportionate measurement" is defined as a "measurement having the same ratio to that recorded in the original field notes as the length of the chain used in the new measurement has to the length of the chain used in the original survey, assuming that the origi nal measurement was correctly made." By actual measurement a county surveyor found that the south line of a section was longer than that returned by the governmental survey. He properly distributed the excess proportionately, for he could not conclude that the error arose in a part of the line, but was bound to conclude that it arose in and affected the whole line. Christ v. Fent, 84 Pac. 1074, 1076, 16 Okl. 375.

PROPONENT

"Generally speaking, a 'proponent' is one

PROPOSAL

Offer of reward as proposal, see Reward.
See, also, Offer.

An order given to a traveling salesman

who propounds a will for probate." Any per- for goods is a mere "proposal" to buy, subson interested may propound a will for project to withdrawal at any time before acbate. In re Jones' Estate, 106 N. W. 610, ceptance. Merchants' Exch. Co. v. Sanders, 612, 130 Iowa, 177.

PROPORTION

Const. c. 1, art. 9, providing that every member of society is bound to contribute "his proportion" toward the expense of the protection which the state affords him, is not contravened by Acts 1896, No. 46, taxing collateral inheritances; and this though estates not exceeding $2,000 are exempted. In re Hickok's Estate, 62 Atl. 724, 725, 78 Vt. 259.

84 S. W. 786, 787, 74 Ark. 16, 4 Ann. Cas. 955 (citing 1 Mechem, Sales, § 252).

A life insurance company furnished its agents a printed blank for use by applicants for insurance, which first had blanks, under the caption "Proposal for Insurance," to be filled and signed by applicants, next had a "memorandum for the solicitor to sign," followed by two questions as to amount of insurance now in force in the company and amount now applied for, and then, under the caption "Application for Insurance," ques

tions as to health and other matters affecting PROPRIETOR OF DRUG STORE
the risk, to be answered over the signature
of applicant, together with a declaration and
warranty as to the representations and an-
swers. Held, that neither the proposal for in-
surance nor the memorandum for the solici-
tor to fill was a part of the "application,"
within Rev. Laws, c. 118, § 73, requiring, as
a condition to the insurer introducing the ap
plication in evidence, that a correct copy of it
shall have been annexed to the policy. Bon-
ville v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 85
N. E. 1057, 200 Mass. 197.

PROPOSE

PROPOSED ORDINANCE

Any proposed ordinance, see Any.

PROPOSITION

An assignment that the court erred in instructing to return a verdict for defendant, in receiving a verdict for defendant, and in entering judgment thereon that plaintiff pay the costs, did not constitute a "proposition" within the rules governing appeals. Olivarri v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (Tex.) 116

S. W. 392.

PROPRIETARY

The word "disturb," according to Webster, means "to interrupt a settled state of," and "proprietary" means "belonging or pertaining to a proprietor, considered as property owned," and the words "the property shall not be disturbed or the proprietary rights of the owner divested" seem to mean that possession thereof shall not be taken, nor his property taken, nor shall the title thereof be divested, until compensation therefor has been first paid to the owner or into court for the owner. Edwards v. Thrash, 109 Pac.

832, 837, 26 Okl. 472, 138 Am. St. Rep. 975.

"Proprietary medicines," within a statute, making it an offense to practice medicine without having secured a certificate from the state board of medical examiners, but providing that it shall not prevent the advertising and sale of patent and proprietary medicine, means medicines which some person or company, other than a person indicted for prescribing certain medicines without a license, manufactured, advertised, and sold. State v. Kendig, 110 N. W. 463, 465, 133 Iowa, 164.

PROPRIETOR

See Riparian Proprietor.

An information charging that accused was a druggist and the "proprietor of a drug store" and a pharmacist, and that he sold intoxicating liquors without a prescription, charges a violation of Rev. St. 1899, § 3047, making it an offense for a druggist, proprietor of a drug store, or pharmacist to sell intoxicating liquors except on a written prescription, and providing that any druggist who shall violate the act shall be punished as prescribed, and it is not duplicitous or multifarious, since the terms "druggist," "proprietor of a drug store," and "pharmacist" are synonymous, for the business of pharmacist or apothecary, or druggist, is one. State v. Clinkenbeard, 125 S. W. 827, 829, 142 Mo. App. 146.

PROPRIETOR OF RAILROAD

Rev. St. 1895, art. 3017, provides that an action for death may be brought where it is caused by the negligence of the "proprietor or owner of any railroad," or by the unfitness or negligence of his servants. Subdivision 2 provides for a recovery when the death is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, or

default of another. A railroad maintained a hospital for the care of employés, and a surgeon employed by the road hired an incompetent nurse to care for a servant afflicted

with smallpox, and the nurse went on the public streets without disinfecting himself, intestate, from which he died. and communicated the disease to plaintiff's the railroad company was not liable for the Held, that not be regarded as the negligence of the road death, as the negligence of the surgeon could itself, under subdivision 2 of the statute, and the maintenance of the hospital was not pethe first subdivision was not applicable, since culiar to the carrier's business, but merely collateral thereto. When death is caused by

the negligence of the "proprietor, or owner, of any railroad," the conveyance of goods or passengers limits liability to deaths caused in a business that is peculiar to the owner of a railroad. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Freeman, 79 S. W. 9, 15, 97 Tex. 394, 1 Ann. Cas. 481.

PROPRIETOR OF RESTAURANT
As person, see Person.
PROPRIETOR OF THEATER

"The 'proprietor of a theater' is a private individual, engaged in a strictly private business, which, though for the entertainment of the public, is always limited to those whom he may agree to admit to it. There is no duty, as in the case of a common carrier, to The word "proprietor" signifies one who admit every one who may apply and be willhas the legal right or exclusive title in any- ing to pay for a ticket, for the theater prothing, whether in possession or not; an own-prietor has acquired no peculiar rights and er; the proprietor of a farm or mill. El- privileges from the state, and is therefore dridge v. Finnegar, 105 Pac. 334, 335, 25 under no implied obligation to serve the Okl. 28, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227. public. When he sells a ticket, he creates

contractual relations with the holder of it, fender to justice and punishment by due proand, whatever duties on his part grow out of cess of law. It is also defined as the instithese relations, he is bound to perform, or re- tution or commencement and continuance of spond in damages for the breach of his con- a criminal suit; the process of exhibiting tract, if it is of that only that complaint can formal charges against an offender before a be made." Buenzle v. Newport Amusement legal tribunal, and pursuing them to final Ass'n, 68 Atl. 721, 723, 29 R. I. 23, 14 L. R. A. | judgment on behalf of the state or govern(N. S.) 1242 (quoting and adopting definition ment, as by indictment or information. State in Horney v. Nixon, 61 Atl. 1088, 213 Pa. 20, v. Bowles, 79 Pac. 726, 728, 70 Kan. 821, 69 1 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1184, 110 Am. St. Rep. 520, L. R. A. 176. 5 Ann. Cas. 349).

PROPRIETY

The term "propriety" of the amount of damages, within Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 5645, providing that an appeal in condemnation proceedings shall bring before the Supreme Court the propriety and justness of the amount of damages, means the proper amount of the damages. State ex rel. McCormick v. Superior Court for Walla Walla County, 86 Pac. 205, 207, 43 Wash. 91.

PRORATING

"Prorating" means according to the measure which fixes proportions. It has no meaning unless referable to some rule or standard. State v. Boston & P. Exp. Co., 61 Atl. 697, 699, 100 Me. 278 (quoting Brombacher v. Berking, 39 Atl. 135, 56 N. J. Eq. 253).

PROSECUTE

See Duly Prosecuted; To Be Prosecuted. To "prosecute" an action includes the bringing, as well as the carrying on, of the action. Inhabitants of Great Barrington v. Gibbons, 85 N. E. 737, 199 Mass. 527.

The word "prosecute," within Gen. St. 1909, § 8906, providing that the Attorney General shall appear for the state in certain cases, implies the commencement, as well as the continuance, of a proceeding; and the term is so used in common speech, as well as in legal parlance. State ex rel. Stubbs v. Dawson, 119 Pac. 360, 364, 86 Kan. 180, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 993.

Ordinarily an attorney's contract to "prosecute" an action includes the commencement thereof, and is not confined to the pursuit of the remedy thereafter. Cheshire v. Des Moines City R. Co., 133 N. W. 324, 325, 153 Iowa, 88.

One who aids, abets, or procures the burning of a building may be charged in the indictment and tried as a principal offender, the word "prosecuted" in Rev. St. § 6804, being broad enough to cover all the proceedings. Hutchinson v. State, 28 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 595, 599.

To "prosecute" is to proceed against judicially, and a "prosecution" is the act of conducting or waging a proceeding in court; the means adopted to bring a supposed of

The word "prosecuted," as used in Pub. Acts 1905, No. 89, includes the institution of a suit, and is not confined to the mere pursuit of a remedy after proceedings have been instituted. It provides that in all actions for negligent injury to persons hereafter prosecuted by the executor or administrator of the injured person, under the statute declaring that such action shall survive, the measure of damages shall be fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury, etc. It does no violence to the language used in the act to construe the word "prosecuted" as meaning the complete prosecution, including the institution of the suit. Davis v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 111 N. W. 76, 77, 147 Mich..479.

Rev. St. 1908, § 904, provides that no foreign corporation may do any business or prosecute or defend in any suit in this state until the fee prescribed has been paid to the Secretary of State, and section 910 provides that no foreign corporation shall do any business or prosecute or defend in any suit in this state until it receives from the Secretary of State a certificate that full payment of fees required has been made by it. Held, that an attempted suit by a foreign corporation doing business within the state without having paid the fee required would not suspend the running of limitations, since a corporation not complying with the statutes cannot institute suit in this state; the word "prosecute," as used, meaning to bring suit against in a court for redress of wrong, to carry on a judicial proceeding against, or to seek to enforce a claim or right by legal process. Western Electrical Co. v. Pickett, 118 Pac. 988, 990, 51 Colo. 415, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 702, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1322. PROSECUTE TO OR WITH EFFECT

Where the defendant, in a suit to foreclose a contract for the purchase of real estate by an appeal, secured a modification of the decree below, allowing him a substantial extension of time within which to make the deferred payments and protect his rights under the contract, his appeal was "prosecuted to effect," within the meaning of the condition of his supersedeas bond. Crane v. Buckley, 138 Fed. 22, 70 C. C. A. 452 (citing Buckley v. Crane, 123 Fed. 29, 33, 59 C. C. A. 109).

Under Gen. St. 1902, § 1004, providing that no temporary injunction shall issue until the applicant therefor shall give bond to

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