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of the same name. International Silver Co. | may kill dogs attacking them in the close v. Rogers, 63 Atl. 977, 980, 71 N. J. Eq. 560. season, since wild game belongs to the people of the state in their collective and sovereign capacity, and not in their individual and pri

Trade secret

Equity recognizes a trade secret as "property," and will protect the same by in-vate capacity, except so far as private ownerjunction as against those who seek to dis- ship may be acquired therein under the Constitution, authorizing inhabitants, in seasonclose or use it by a violation of confidential able time, to hunt on their lands and other relations or contract stipulations, express or lands not inclosed, under proper regulations implied. Elaterite Paint & Mfg. Co. v. S. E. by the Legislature, and, as an inhabitant may Frost Co., 117 N. W. 388, 389, 105 Minn. 239. not hunt deer on his land in the close season, Trading stamp he has no "property" in them then. Zanetta v. Bolles, 67 Atl. 818, 80 Vt. 345 (citing Payne v. Sheets, 55 Atl. 656, 75 Vt. 335). PROPERTY ACTUALLY RECEIVED See Actually Receive.

A trading stamp is not ordinarily "property." Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., 135 Fed. 833, 834.

Trust certificates

"Trust certificates," issued by a railroad company to the stockholders of another railroad company in payment for their stock under an agreement to pay semiannual dividends thereon, and a specified sum at a designated future date for each share, were "property," and could be bought and sold. Kissel v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co., 111 N. Y. Supp. 937, 955, 126 App. Div. 852.

Trust property

A trust fund provided to secure the support of a woman and her family is "property," in the true sense of the term, though it be in such form that the beneficiary cannot assign or convey or devise it or use it in any manner otherwise than that specified in the terms of the trust. Meyer v. Meyer, 102 N.

W. 52, 55, 123 Wis. 538.

The term "property" suggests some unrestricted or exclusive right to that which has been created or acquired. It is an inherent right to the dominion over and the beneficial enjoyment of some valuable right or interest, which cannot be predicated of the estate of a trustee. Metcalfe v. Union Trust Co. of New York, 73 N. E. 498, 500, 181 N. Y. 39.

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PROPERTY ALLEGED TO BELONG TO
ESTATE

The expression "property alleged to belong to the estate," found in Code Civ. Proc. § 2731, providing that where a contest arises between the accounting parties and any of the other parties respecting property alleged to belong to the estate, but to which the accounting party lays claim, either individually or as a representative of the estate, the contest mentioned, except where the claim is made in a representative capacity, may be tried and determined in the same manner as any other issue arising in the Surrogate's Court, means property which is deemed assets, as defined in section 2712, and which

may be inventoried under section 2714. In re Thompson, 76 N. E. 870, 872, 184 N. Y. 36. PROPERTY BELONGING TO ESTATE IN BANKRUPTCY

If a bankrupt has parted with all dominion over property, if the title is gone out of him and is beyond recall, it is not his property, and therefore is not "property belonging to his estate in bankruptcy," and hence cannot be concealed. In re Hammerstein,

Water mains, hydrants, and electric 189 Fed. 37, 39, 110 C. C. A. 472. light fixtures of municipality

The water mains, hydrants, and electric light fixtures of a city are "private property" owned by it in its corporate capacity. They have a permanent situs, within a drainage district, and constitute "property" and "other property liable to assessment," within the meaning of Laws 1909, c. 80. State v. Board of Com'rs of Shawnee County, 110 Pac. 92, 93, 95, 83 Kan. 199.

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PROPERTY BENEFITED

Rem. & Bal. Code, § 7785, provides that when an ordinance under which a municipal improvement is ordered shall not provide that such improvements shall be made wholly by special assessment, upon the property benefited, the whole amount of such damage and costs, or such part thereof as shall not be assessed on property benefited thereby, shall be paid from the general fund of the city or town. Held, that the term "wholly by special assessment on property benefited" refers to private property, as distinguished from property of the city. City of Spokane v. Curtiss, 120 Pac. 70, 72, 66 Wash. 555. PROPERTY CONSUMED IN ITS USE See Consumable Articles. PROPERTY CROSSING

The term "property crossings," in a municipal ordinance, providing for the construc

tion of sidewalks with necessary crossings of the property in controversy does not exfor the use of property owners, means that part in the line of the sidewalk over which the owner will travel with vehicles in going from the street on his property or leaving the same, and the ordinance is not void for failure to designate the location, number, or method of construction of such crossings. People ex rel. Rice v. Burke, 69 N. E. 45, 46, 206 Ill. 358.

PROPERTY GROWING OUT OF MAR

RIAGE RELATION

The expression "property growing out of marriage relation," which a court in a divorce proceeding is authorized to distribute, has reference only to that class of property, the interest in which of either husband or

wife attaches by operation of law, as dower, curtesy, tenancy by the entirety, or, in case of divorce, provision for division of which is made in B. & C. Comp. § 511, and does not apply to property belonging to the wife. Taylor v. Taylor, 103 Pac. 524, 529, 54 Or. 560. PROPERTY HOLDER

Code Supp. 1907, § 622, declares that, when the inhabitants of any part of a city desire to have such part severed therefrom, a majority of the resident "property holders" of that part of the territory may petition in writing to the district court, describing the territory proposed to be severed, etc., but where the property has not been subdivided, and there are no owners residing on any portion of the same, the petition may be signed and the proceedings maintained by a majority of the owners of the property sought to be severed. Held, that the term "property holders," as used in such section, contemplated resident landowners of the territory sought to be severed, and did not require that the petition be signed by holders of both real and personal property within the territory. Stason v. City of Albia, 129 N. W. 809, 810, 150 Iowa, 207.

Under Const. art. 19, § 27, providing that the General Assembly shall not be prohibited from authorizing assessments for local improvements, on the consent of a majority in value of the "property holders owning property" adjoining the locality to be affected, the Legislature may amend Kirby's Dig. § 5665, requiring a city to make a street improvement when any 10 "resident" owners of real property petition therefor, by striking out the quoted word "resident." Boles v. Kelley, 117 S. W. 1073, 1074, 90 Ark. 29. PROPERTY IMMOVABLE BY DESTINATION

See Immovable by Destination. PROPERTY IN CONTROVERSY

The words "property in controversy," within the Constitution providing that the Legislature may give to justices of the peace jurisdiction of civil actions wherein the value

ceed $50, and the statute giving jurisdiction to justices in like terms, mean, when applied to an action in tort, the value of the injury complained of and involved in the litigation, and a justice of the peace has jurisdiction of an action for personal injuries negligently inflicted, where the amount demanded is $50 or less. Houser v. W. R. Bonsal & Co., 62 S. E. 776, 777, 149 N. C. 51.

As used in Revisal 1905, § 1420, providing that justices of the peace shall have concurrent jurisdiction of a civil action, not founded on contract, wherein the value of the property in controversy does not exceed $50, the term "property in controversy" means the value of the injury complained of Mull, 55 S. E. 850, 851, 143 N. C. 461. and involved in the litigation. Duckworth v. PROPERTY IN POSSESSION

A remainder interest is not "property in possession," within the meaning of the term

as used in a statute authorizing the sale of a vested estate for division, if the estate be

in possession, etc. Berry v. Lewis, 82 S. W. 252, 253, 118 Ky. 652. PROPERTY LINE

The term "lot line" or "property line"has a well-known and understood meaning. The fee to the streets and the sidewalks is in the city. The "property line" or "lot line" extends only to the inner edge of the sidewalk. If the walks were to be constructed one foot from the "lot line" or "property line," that description definitely defines the location. Gage v. City of Chicago, 79 N. E. 294, 295, 223 Ill. 602.

PROPERTY NOT WITHIN THE STATE

See, also, Property Within the State.

Bates'

The expression "property not within the within the state, but also property not withstate" includes not only property not in fact in the state in contemplation of law. Ann. St. Ohio, § 2781, which provides for the listing for taxation by the county auditor for previous years of property which was omitted in such years, and the collection of taxes thereon by the treasurer, was intended to apply only to property which was properly taxable in such years, but which was not returned or properly returned for taxation. All property within the state and not exempt by law is taxed by section 2731, and it was not the purpose of section 2781 to tax exempted property or property not within the state. Section 2781a is therefore constitutional. Western Assur. Co. of Toronto v. Halliday, 127 Fed. 830, 838.

PROPERTY OF THE COMMON

WEALTH

The words "the property of the commonwealth," as used in Rev. Laws, c. 12, § 5, subd. 2, providing that "the property of the commonwealth, except real estate of which

the commonwealth is in possession under a mortgage for condition broken," shall be exempt from taxation, “mean the same as 'all the property of the commonwealth'; and the fact that only one exception is made shows that no other exception could have been intended." Land held under a bond for a deed from the commonwealth, on which a private individual has erected buildings and engaged in manufacturing business thereon, is exempt. Corcoran v. City of Boston, 70 N. E. 197, 185 Mass. 325.

PROPERTY OF THE COUNTY

Lands acquired by a park commission established under "An act to establish public parks in certain counties in this state and to regulate the same" (P. L. 1895, p. 169; Gen. St. p. 2618, § 48) are the "property of the county" in which the park is situate. Essex County Park Commission v. Town of West Orange, 67 Atl. 1065, 1066, 75 N. J. Law, 376 (citing Freeholders of Essex County v. Essex County Park Commission, 41 Atl. 957, 62 N. J. Law, 376; Ross v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Essex County, 55 Atl. 310, 69 N J. Law, 291; State v. Crowley, 39 N. J. Law, 264, 270; Herman & Grace v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Essex County, 64 Atl. 742, 744, 71 N. J. Eq. 541).

PROPERTY OF THE STATE

A mortgage held by the Regents of the University of California is "property belonging to the state" within Const. art. 13, § 1, which exempts state property from taxation, and hence where land is mortgaged to the Regents and the mortgagor's interest is sold to the state at a tax sale, and a resale and deed is made by the state to an individual under Pol. Code, § 3897, the deed to such purchaser remains subject to such mortgage, though Const. art. 13, § 4, makes both the interests of mortgagors and mortgagees subject to a tax levy upon either interest; that provision not applying to public property. Webster v. Board of Regents of University of California, 126 Pac. 974, 975, 163 Cal. 705.

The indictments against a person are "records or documents filed in a public office under authority of law." Code Cr. Proc. § 272; Code Civ. Proc. § 866. They are the "property of the state," and a willful and unlawful removal of them constitutes a crime, under Pen. Code, § 94. People v. Mills, 70 N. E. 786, 789, 178 N. Y. 274, 67 L. R. A. 131. PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES

The phrase "money or property of the United States," in the federal statutes, relating to embezzlement, does not include fees and emoluments received by the clerk of a federal district court, and the duty of a clerk of a federal district court to pay over to the United States the surplus fees and emoluments of his office, which is half-yearly returned. or the audit thereof shown to exist over and above the compensation and allow

ances authorized by law to be retained by him, is not governed by the statutes relating to the embezzlement of money or property of the United States. United States v. Mason, 31 Sup. Ct. 28, 34, 218 U. S. 517, 54 L. Ed. 1133.

Six blank checks, with stubs attached, each of the value of one cent, the personal property of the United States, constituted "property," the subject of larceny, under Rev. St. § 5456, making it a felony to steal any kind or description of property belonging to the United States. Keller v. United States, 168 Fed. 697, 94 C. C. A. 368. PROPERTY ON OR NEAR PREMISES The term "property on or near said premises," in a lease by a railway of part of its right of way to a compress company, stipulating that the compress company assumed all the risks of loss to any building, improvements, or property of any kind that might be on or near the premises occasioned by fire communicated from locomotives, was doubtless used so as to exempt the railway company from liability by reason of fire as to the property of the compress company adjacent to the right of way 'and likely to be involved in the same fire. W. A. Morgan & Bros. v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. of Texas, 110 S. W. 978, 985, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 420. PROPERTY OWNED

prop

St. 1898, §§ 1990 to 2001-20, provide for the incorporation of religious societies, and sections 1771-1791m provide for the formation of corporations for benevolent, charitable, or medical institutions, and for schools, hospitals, asylums, or other like institutions. The charter of the city of Superior (Laws 1891, c. 124, § 244) provides that no land benefited shall be exempt from assessment for sewers, "excepting only erty owned by some religious society" or corporation and not used for pecuniary profit. Held, that a corporation, incorporated under chapter 86, to maintain parochial schools, hospitals, and to help the poor, and not organized for profit, though authorized to acquire and hold property, its principal place of business being its hospital, in which religious services were conducted as a part of its administrative work was not exempt from sewer assessments, the term “religious corporation," in the charter, meaning the same as in chapter 91, and the words "property owned," as used in the charter, referring to a use in connection with religious purposes, and that defendant could not incorporate as a religious corporation, because it had no memhership maintaining regular religious worship as a church society, a "religious society" being a body of persons organized to maintain religious worship only, who usually meet in some stated place for worship of God and religious instruction. United States Nat. Bank v. Poor Hand Maids of Jesus Christ, 135 N. W. 121, 122, 148 Wis. 613.

PROPERTY RATIONE SOLI

"Property ratione soli' is the common-
law right which every owner of land has to
kill and take all such animals feræ naturæ
as may from time to time be found on his
land, and, as soon as this right is exercised,
the animals so killed or caught become the
absolute property of the owner of the soil."
State v. Mallory, 83 S. W. 955, 958, 73 Ark.
236, 67 L. R. A. 773, 3 Ann. Cas. 852.

PROPERTY RIGHTS

See, also, Right of Property.

Immunity from taxation is a "property
right." People ex rel. Interborough Rapid
Transit Co. v. Williams, 123 N. Y. Supp.
137, 141, 138 App. Div. 612.

The right to contract is a right of "prop-
erty" of which the legislative authority
could not deprive the individual. Glover v.
People ex rel. Raymond, 66 N. E. 820, 821,
201 Ill. 545.

A liquor tax certificate, if not "property"
in the strict sense in which that word is
used, constitutes a "property right." In re
Cullinan, 88 N. Y. Supp. 164, 166, 94 App.
Div. 445 (citing Niles v. Mathusa, 47 N. Y.
Supp. 38, 20 App. Div. 483; In re Lyman, 65
N. Y. Supp. 673, 53 App. Div. 330; Id., 69
N. Y. Supp. 309, 59 App. Div. 217).

Where the right to transfer a liquor li-
cense is recognized by statute, such license
or right to transact the liquor business be-
comes a valuable "property right," subject to
barter and sale. Deggender v. Seattle Brew-
ing & Malting Co., 83 Pac. 898, 899, 41 Wash.
385, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 626.

The right to teach white and negro chil-
dren in a private school at the same time
and place is not a "property right." Berea
College v. Commonwealth, 94 S. W. 623, 629,
123 Ky. 209, 124 Am. St. Rep. 344, 13 Ann.
Cas. 337.

The right which a person has to pursue
a lawful occupation or calling is a "property
right." A prosecution for violating Greater
N. Y. Charter (Laws 1901, p. 137, c. 466)
317, denouncing the refusal of a bond broker
to exhibit to a police officer certain property
bonds, does not involve such a "property
right." People v. Rosenberg, 112 N. Y. Supp.
316, 319, 59 Misc. Rep. 342 (citing Slaughter
House Cases, 16 Wall. [83 U. S.] 116, 122,
21 L. Ed. 394).

"The right to practice medicine is, like
the right to practice any other profession,
a valuable 'property right,' in which, under
the Constitution and laws of the state, one
is entitled to be protected and secured."
Hewitt v. State Board of Medical Examiners,
84 Pac. 39-41, 148 Cal. 590, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.)
896, 113 Am. St. Rep. 315, 7 Ann. Cas. 750.

The office of attorney at law is not a
"property right," but an extraordinary priv-
ilege, conferred on one in possession of cer-

tain moral and educational qualifications, and
after admission he stands as an officer of
the court, of which office he may not be de-
prived, except in the exercise of a sound
judicial discretion and on proof of profes-
sional unfitness. In re Thatcher, 190 Fed.
969, 974.

While the right to labor or to practice
a profession may be considered a "property
right" for the purpose of protection, services
already rendered by one person for another
are not "property" for the purpose of en-
larging or changing the ordinary remedies
by which the indebtedness therefor may be
recovered. Gleason v. Thaw, 185 Fed. 345,
347, 107 C. C. A. 463, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 894.

The membership in the New York Stock
Exchange is personal to the member, but the
inchoate right of sale, if it may be so termed.
and the right to the proceeds of the sale, if
the Stock Exchange authorities shall permit
that to be done, is a "property right" and
a valuable one, and hence the right is one
which, subject to the rules of the exchange
board, passes to a receiver or trustee in
bankruptcy during the member's lifetime.
though the membership is personal to the
member. Wrede v. Clark, 117 N. Y. Supp. 5,
7, 132 App. Div. 293.

Equity has no jurisdiction of a suit to
enjoin others from making out affidavits
against a merchant and arresting and fining
him for alleged disturbance of the peace in
using a megaphone to call attention to a
clearance sale; there being no "property
rights" involved in any proper sense of the
word "property," and his rights being de-
terminable by the law courts. Pleasants v.

Smith, 43 South. 475, 476, 90 Miss. 440, 9
L. R. A. (N. S.) 773, 122 Am. St. Rep. 317.

A landowner's right to take fish and
game on his own land, which inheres in him
by reason of his ownership in the soil, is a
"property right" subject to the state's owner-
ship and title held to preserve and regulate
State v. Mallory, 83 S.
for the public use.
W. 955, 959, 73 Ark. 236, 67 L. R. A. 773, 3
Ann. Cas. 852.

A priority to the use of water is a
"property right," which is the subject of pur-
chase and sale, and in its character and
method of use may be changed, provided
such change does not injuriously affect the
rights of others. Seven Lakes Reservoir Co.
V. New Loveland & Greeley Irrigation &
Land Co., 93 Pac. 485, 486, 40 Colo. 382, 17
L. R. A. (N. S.) 329.

A riparian owner's shore rights and
rights to access to and from his land and to
navigation of the part of the river adjoining
his land are "property rights," and subject
as such to condemnation for public use, with-
out appropriation of the land itself. State
ex rel. Burrows v. Superior Court for Che-
halis County, 93 Pac. 423, 425, 48 Wash.

277, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1005, 125 Am. St. Rep. 927.

Act Nov. 29, 1788, enabled owners of meadows already banked in to maintain A charter authorizing a corporation to such banks in repair at the expense of the organize subordinate councils of a beneficial owners. to be apportioned among them. Held, association to raise funds for relief of mem- that the act, being a proper exercise of legbers and their families and to defray funeral islative power, and the proceedings thereexpenses and other cases of distress gives under being completed and present owners rise to possible rights of the "property" which having acquired their holdings with knowlare within the protection of a court of equity. edge thereof, established such rights in such National Council, Junior Order United Amer- owners in the lands of each of the other ownican Mechanics, v. State Council, Junior Or-ers as amounted to property, and Act March der United American Mechanics, 51 S. E. 166, 170, 104 Va. 197.

1, 1904, amending the original act by providing that any owner after 10 years desirous ings under the original act might apply to of being relieved from the effect of proceedthe commissioners appointed, who should make a new order relieving applicant's meadnal act, was violative of Const. U. S. Amend. ow from further obligations under the origi14, as divesting the other owners of property rights without compensation, and without due process of law. Cox v. American DredgCo., 77 Atl. 1025, 1026, 80 N. J. Law, 645.

A false certificate of the birth of a child to one holding a life estate, with remainder to his issue, and, in the event of failure of issue, to complainant, was liable to affect the interest to be acquired by the complainant in the future by its use as evidence in some suit or proceeding by the infant, and therefore a "property right" to be acquired in the future was threatened, for which injune-ing tive relief might be granted. Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 67 Atl. 103, 72 N. J. Eq. 927.

Const. art. 15, § 3, provides that the right Since a married woman's right to the af- to divert and appropriate unappropriated wafections of her husband is a "property right," ters of any natural stream for beneficial and the loss thereof constitutes an injury uses, shall never be denied, that priority of to the consortium, a married woman, though appropriation shall give the better right as living with her husband, may, without join- between those using water, but that when ing her husband, sue another married wo- the waters of such a stream are not suffiman for alienating the affections of plain- cient for the service of all those desiring to tiff's husband, under 14 Del. Laws, c. 550, use them, those taking the water for domesproviding that any married woman may pros- tic purposes shall, subject to limitations preecute and defend suits at law for the pres- scribed by law, have preference over those ervation and protection of her property as claiming for any other purpose but that the if unmarried. Eliason v. Draper (Del.) 77 usage by such subsequent appropriators shall Atl. 572, 576, 2 Boyce, 1. be subject to article 1, § 14, providing that An injunction will lie to restrain the un-private property may be taken for public and certain private uses but not until a just authorized use of one's name by another as a part of its corporate title, or, in connection compensation shall be paid therefor. Held with its business or advertisements, his pic-water to a beneficial use is a constitutional that, under the section, the appropriation of ture and his pretended certificate that a medicinal preparation, which such other is right that the first in time is the first in engaged in manufacturing, is compounded right, without reference to the particular use, according to the formula devised by him, and that an appropriation for domestic use though he is not a business competitor. The is superior to appropriations for other uses basis for an injunction in such case is al- when the waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for all those desiring it, and ways injury to property or to "property rights." It may at times have been a matter that the right to use for beneficial purposes of doubt whether what was called "property" is a "property right," subject to article 1, § was really such, and whether the injury 14. Montpelier Milling Co. v. City of Montthereto, actual or apprehended, forming the pelier, 113 Pac. 741, 743, 19 Idaho, 212. basis for injunctive relief, was not so shadowy as to be incapable of judicial cognizance. The insignificance of the right from a pecuniary standpoint does not always bar relief, and the term "property right" is not to be taken in any narrow sense, and the tendency of equity in cases of this character should be to extend rather than to restrict the jurisdiction. Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 67 Atl. 392, 394, 395, 73 N. J. Eq. 136 (citing New Jersey State Dental Soc. v. Dentacura Co., 41 Atl. 672, 57 N. J. Eq. 594; Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342; 2 Story, 100; Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 67 Atl. 103, 72 N. J. Eq. 927).

Where the benefit certificates of members of a fraternal insurance order, consisting of a supreme lodge and of subordinate lodges, were contracts between the Supreme Lodge and the individual members, and the subordinate lodges merely served as agencies through which members remitted their assessments, the suspension of a subordinate lodge did not affect property rights of members, who could continue their certificates by payment of assessments directly to the treasurer of the Supreme Lodge, and the suspension made without notice was not a violation of the Bill of Rights, declaring that no citizen shall be deprived of property except by

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