The right given by Rev. St. §§ 6134, 6135, | Duckworth v. Mull, 55 S. E. 852, 143 N. C. to prosecute an action for damages for 466). wrongfully causing the death of another, is not such species of "property" as will pass to the heirs or next of kin of those to whom the right is given. Doyle v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 90 N. E. 165, 166, 81 Ohio St. 184, 135 Am. St. Rep. 775.

The word "property," within the meaning of the rule authorizing the grant of ancillary administration when necessary in respect to any unadministered property that may be found in the state, means either specific property found or a right of action for Under a statute providing that, when debt or unliquidated damages to which the the guardian and ward are both nonresidents, estate may be entitled. A claim for damages the ward's property may be removed on ap for the death of a decedent under a statute plication by the guardian to the judge of authorizing such recovery for the exclusive the superior court, who shall grant leave to benefit of the widow and next of kin does remove the property, which order shall be not constitute assets of the estate so as to authority to the guardian to sue for and re- justify the appointment of an ancillary adceive it in his own name, the word "prop-ministrator in another state. Cooper v. Gulf, erty" is used in its comprehensive sense and C. & S. F. R. Co., 93 S. W. 201, 205, 41 Tex. includes choses in action as well as tangible Civ. App. 596. property. In re Crosby, 85 Pac. 1, 2, 42 Wash. 366.

A vested cause of action for damages is "property" which cannot be taken or destroyed without due process of law, being a chose in action. Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 69 S. E. 402, 403, 153 N. C. 360.

Plaintiff's intestate, while a laborer in O. county, was injured, and died intestate in the state of Ohio where he resided, and an administrator was appointed in the county of O., who sued his employer in such county. At the time of his death intestate had no residence nor any property in West Virginia, except the claim for damages against his employer. Held, that such claim was property, authorizing the county court of O. to appoint the sheriff administrator of his estate. Richards v. Riverside Iron Works, 49 S. E. 437. 438, 56 W. Va. 510 (citing Marvin V. Maysville St. Railroad & Transfer Co., 49 Fed. 438; Hartford & N. H. R. Co. v. Andrews, 36 Conn. 215; 2 Woerner, Adm'n, § 306; Perry v. St. Joseph & W. R. Co., 29 Kan. 420; Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Swayne's Adm'r, 26 Ind. 477, 484; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Cragin, 71 Ill. 177; 1 Woerner, Adm'n, 8 205; Hutchins v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 46 N. W. 79, 44 Minn. 5; Brown's Adm'r V. Louisville & N. R. Co., 30 S. W. 639, 97 Ky. 228, 232; Findlay v. Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co., 64 N. W. 732, 106 Mich. 700; Morris v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 23 N. W. 143, 65 Iowa, 727, 728, 54 Am. Rep. 39; Sargent v. Sargent, 47 N. E. 121, 168 Mass. 420).

A vested right of action is "property" in the same sense that tangible things are property. While, in ordinary transactions, the term "property" is not supposed to include a right of action, yet in constitutions and public statutes, where the words permit, and the spirit and intent of the law require, a vested right of action, is frequently considered and treated as property. The right of action conferred by Revisal 1905, § 59, making those causing negligent deaths liable to decedent's personal representatives, and providing that the recovery shall not be applied to the payment of debts or legacies, but that it shall be distributed as intestate property, is property as a part of intestate's estate, and, for the purpose of devolution and transfers, the rights of the claimants are to be determined as of the time when intestate died, and hence under section 4, providing that, when a married woman dies intestate, the surviving husband may administer upon her personalty and hold the same subject to the claims of her creditors and others having rightful demands against her, to his own use, etc., and providing that if the husband dies after his wife, but before administering, his personal representative or assignee shall receive the personalty of the wife as a part of the husband's estate, subject as aforesaid, where intestate's daughter died after his negligent death and before re-ed according to the statute of distributions. covery therefor, and her husband becante insane after becoming administrator, her administrator de bonis non is entitled to her share of the recovery for the husband's benefit, subject to the claims of her creditors and others having rightful demands against her estate. Neil v. Wilson, 59 S. E. 674, 675, 146 N. C. 242 (quoting and adopting definition in Cooley, Const. Lim. [7th Ed.] p. 577;

Code 1907, § 3765, provides that the surviving husband of a woman who dies intestate shall be entitled absolutely to half the personalty of her separate estate. Section 4486 provides that all property of a wife, held by her previous to her marriage, is her separate property. Section 2486, giving to the administrator a right of action for negli gence causing death, provides that the damages recovered shall not be liable for the debts of the deceased, and shall be distribut

Held, the right of action being expressly vested in the administrator alone, so as not to be assignable, which right is inseparable from the idea of property, and the action by the administrator being more as an agent to effect the legislative policy to prevent homicide, and as trustee of any recovery, than as the representative of deceased in reducing property of the estate to possession, that,

Running water in natural streams is not | lingsly v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 107 S. "property," and never was, and a riparian W. 173, 174, 84 Ark. 617, 120 Am. St. Rep. owner has no right to interfere with the 95. rights of other riparian owners by a dam, so as to discontinue the flow of water, without the consent of the lower riparian owners.

In re Board of Water Supply of City of New
York, 109 N. Y. Supp. 1036, 1047, 58 Misc.
Rep. 581.

Shares of stock

Neither bank stock owned by a bank

rupt's wife, acquired by her before marriage, nor any share in the bank's accumulated, but undivided, profits are "property," within the bankruptcy statute, vesting in the trustee the title to property which, prior to the filing of his petition, the bankrupt might by any means have transferred, or which might have been levied on under judicial process against him, and the trustee could not recover dividends declared on the stock after the bankrupt's discharge. Bryan V. Sturgis Nat. Bank, 90 S. W. 704, 705, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 307.

Corporate stock is "property," within the meaning of the taxing laws. State ex rel. Weller v. Hinkel, 116 N. W. 639, 136 Wis. 66.

Under Civ. Code, § 14, providing that "property" includes property real and personal, and section 654, that anything of which there may be ownership is "property," water, and the right to its use as riparian to land, is "property," within Code Civ. Proc. § 1240, enumerating the classes of property which may be condemned, and section 1241 providing that before property can be taken, it must appear that the use is one authorized by law, etc. Code Civ. Proc. § 1238 prescribes the public uses in behalf of which the right of eminent domain may be exercised, and subdivision 12 authorizes the condemnation of The capital stock of a corporation is property for canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, "property," within Const. art. 9, § 1, proflumes, aqueducts, and pipes, and outlets nat-viding for the taxation of property in proConsolidated Coal Co. of ural or otherwise for supplying, storing, and portion to value. St. Louis v. Miller, 86 N. E. 205, 206, 236 III. discharging water for the operation of machinery to generate and transmit electricity 149. to supply mines, quarries, railroads, tramStock held by a resident in a foreign cor- • ways, mills, and factories with electric pow-poration whose property is all outside the er, and to apply electricity to light or heat state is not such "property" or "personal mines, quarries, mills, factories, incorporated property" as is taxable under Rev. St. 1909, cities and counties, villages or towns, and to §§ 11,348, 11,415, 11,519; the last section defurnish electricity for lighting, heating, or fining property to include every tangible or power purposes to individuals or corpora- intangible thing being the subject of ownertions, together with lands, buildings, and all ship, whether animate or inanimate, real improvements in or upon which to erect, inor personal. State ex rel. Koeln v. Lesser, stall, place, use or operate machinery to gen- 141 S. W. 888, 889, 237 Mo. 310. erate and transmit electricity for any of the uses set forth. Subdivision 13 authorizes

condemnation for electric light, heat, and

power lines. Held, that such subdivisions authorize a corporation organized to furnish electric light, heat, and power to condemn the water in a stream, and the riparian rights

of landowners, for its necessary requirements, and that such company is not limited to the acquisition of water by appropriation. Northern Light & Power Co. v. Stacher, 109 Pac. 896, 900, 903, 13 Cal. App. 404.

Services of attorney

Inducing the rendition of legal services by false representations is not the obtaining of "property" by false representations, within the meaning of Bankr. Act July 1898, c. 541, § 17a (2) 30 Stat. 550, as amended (32 Stat. 798), excepting liabilities for property so obtained from the provable debts dischargeable in bankruptcy. Gleason v. Thaw, 185 Fed. 345, 347, 107 C. C. A. 463, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 894; Gleason v. Thaw, 196 Fed. 359, 361, 116 C. C. A. 179.

Services of wife

The domestic services of the wife are purely personal to the husband and possess none of the attributes of "property." Bil3 WDS. & P.2D SER.-82

Stock of a railroad company, incorporated, doing business, and owning property, not

only in Massachusetts, but in neighboring states, but having only a single issue of stock, is "property," within the jurisdiction of the commonwealth, under Rev. Laws, c. 15, § 1, St. 1905, p. 481, c. 470, and St. 1906, P. 453, c. 436, authorizing taxation of collateral inheritance, so as to enable the state to subject it to taxation as against a non resi dent owner. Kingsbury v. Chapin, 82 N. E. 700, 701, 196 Mass. 533, 13 Ann. Cas. 738.

Corporate stock held by a corporation is not "property" due the stockholder, so that, in proceedings to attach stock, the corporation is not summoned, and does not answer, as garnishee. Fowler v. Dickson (Del.) 74 Atl. 601, 606, 1 Boyce, 113.

Though the constitutional provisions that all property not exempt shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as provided by law, and defining “property" as including corporate stock, are not selfexecuting, any deficiency was supplied by Pol. Code, § 3627, requiring property to be assessed at its full cash value, and section 3617 defining that cash value to be the amount at which the property would be tak

Stock transfer stamps

en in payment of a just debt from a solvent | sions of the anti-gambling law (Laws 1899, debtor. Cheeseborough v. City and County p. 390, § 4) is not "property" within the proof San Francisco, 96 Pac. 288, 289, 153 Cal. tection of Const. art. 1, § 13, providing that 559. no person shall be deprived of his propConst. art. 12, § 1, requires the Legisla-erty without due process of law. J. B. Multure to prescribe such regulations as shall len & Co. v. Mosley, 90 Pac. 986, 988, 13 secure a just taxation for all property ex- Idaho, 457. cept that particularly exempted. Section 7 provides that every corporation shall be subject to taxation on real and personal property owned and used by it, and not exempt. Section 2 prescribes exemptions from taxation. Section 17 provides that the word "property" includes moneys, credits, etc., but shall not be construed so as to authorize the taxation of the stock of a corporation when the property of such corporation represented by such stock is within the state, and has been taxed. Pol. Code, § 3670, provides that all property is subject to taxation except as provided in section 3671, which contains the exemptions mentioned in the Constitution. Section 3680 repeats the provisions of Const. art. 12, § 17. Section 3690 requires taxable property to be assessed at its full cash value. Held, that stock of a state bank or trust company is to be assessed to the owner at its full cash value except to the extent that that value is represented in property which is assessed to the bank or trust com

pany. Daly Bank & Trust Co. of Butte V. Board of Com'rs of Silver Bow County, 81 Pac. 950, 952, 33 Mont. 101.

Const. 1879, art. 13, § 1, required taxation of all nonexempt property in proportion to value and defined "property" to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises, and all other matters or things, capable of private ownership. Pol. Code, § 3607, provided that all property not exempt must be taxed, except that nothing therein contained should be construed to authorize double taxation, and section 3608 declared that shares of stock in corporations possessed no intrinsic value over the actual value of the property of the corporation, and that all such property should be assessed and taxed, but that no assessment should be made of shares of stock, nor should any holder thereof be taxed thereon. The section was subsequently amended to exclude national bank shares. Held, that since, under such provisions, all the elements of value contained in corporate stock were subject to taxation to the corporation, Pol. Code, §§ 3609, 3610, providing for the taxation of stock in national banks, did not constitute a discrimination against the latter, prohibited by Rev. St. U. S. § 5219. Crocker v. Scott, 87 Pac. 102, 105, 149 Cal. 575 (citing Mackay v. City and County of San Francisco, 45 Pac. 696, 113 Cal. 392, 397; Bank of California v. San Francisco, 75 Pac. 832, 142 Cal. 276, 285, 64 L. R. A. 918, 100 Am. St. Rep. 130).

Slot machine

A slot machine incapable of use for any purpose except in violation of penal provi

Tax Law, § 271a, as added by Laws 1911, c. 12, which provides that no person other than a corporation organized under the Banking Law of the state (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 2) or under the National Bank Act (Act June 3, 1864, c. 106, 13 Stat. 99), or a duly authorized agent of the Comptroller, shall sell any stamp issued pursuant to the article without first obtaining the Comptroller's written consent, and which makes a violation thereof a misdemeanor, does not deprive one who had a large quantity of stamps on hand at the time of the amendment of any "property" within the meaning of the constitutional provision prohibiting the deprivation of property without due process of law. People ex rel. Isaacs v. Moran, 134 N. Y. Supp. 931, 932, 150 App. Div. 226.

Street railroad's right to street together with ties, rails, etc.

A street railroad's right to occupy a

public street, together with its ties, rails, rolling stock, is "property" within Const. art. 4, § 31, providing that the General Assembly may pass laws permitting the owners of land to construct drains by special assessments on the property benefited thereby. Spring Creek Drainage Dist. v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 94 N. E. 529, 539, 249 Ill. 260.

Testator's property

Under the Transfer Tax Law, § 242, defining the word "property," that term means the property or interest of a testator passing or transferred to the successor thereof, when not exempted. In re Hellman's Estate, 79 N. Y. Supp. 201, 204, 77 App. Div. 355.

Laws 1896, p. 881, c. 908, defines "property" as meaning the interest therein of a testator passing or transferred to those not exempted. Hence, where a testator devised to his uncle a life interest in his farm, only the present value of the life interest is "property," within the purview of the Transfer Tax Law. In re Garland's Estate, 82 N. Y. Supp. 989, 40 Misc. Rep. 579.

Trade-name

A man's name is his own "property," as he has the same right to its use and enjoyment as he has to that of any other species of property. A manufacturer using his own name as a trade-name is not required to so use his name as to inform the public that his goods are not the goods of a prior manufacturer using the same name, for the prior manufacturer must know that he has no exclusive right in the name as against others