things, all questions pertaining to its issu- | paid for permission to erect or maintain poles ance should be determined before the privi- in the streets and alleys of the city, for the lege is exercised and as early in the current purpose of defraying the expenses of regutax year as is practicable. Like an assess-lating and controlling the use of the same ment, a license apportionment once made and under the police power of the city. City of returned cannot be changed without express Ft. Smith v. Hunt, 82 S. W. 163, 165, 72 Ark. legislative authority." A social club is not 556, 66 L. R. A. 238, 105 Am. St. Rep. 51. subject to license taxation, except in so far as it engages in the sale of intoxicating liquors to its members. Where such club has for five successive years paid license taxes based on sworn returns, which were accepted as correct by the taxing officers, no action will lie in behalf of the state to recover additional license taxes for the same year. State v. New Orleans Chess, Checkers & Whist Club, 40 South. 526, 528, 116 La. 46. A tax on the net receipts of an insurance company is not a "license" to do busiPeople v. Cosmopolitan Fire Ins. Co., 92 N. E. 922, 927, 246 Ill. 442. ness. An ordinance, requiring a fee to be paid by milk and meat dealers to the inspector of milk and meats solely to defray the cost of inspection, is not in the nature of a "license" as that word is used in Acts 1911, p. 347, § 1, making it unlawful for any city council to impose a tax or license upon any person in the selling of any farm products including meats; the statute being intended to prohibit the issuance of a license as a condition to carrying on the business. Carpenter v. City of Little Rock, 142 S. W. 162, 164, 101 Ark. 238. a Acts 1905, p. 253, c. 129, authorizing any A "license to practice medicine" is a priv-city to tax, license, or regulate junk stores, ilege or franchise granted by the government, etc., authorizes the enactment of ordinances and a refusal to grant such franchise, what- | regulating the general business of junk dealever the reason may be for such refusal, does ers, and not merely the places where junk not constitute a penalty. Morse v. State is dealt in, in view of the purposes of the act Board of Medical Examiners, 122 S. W. 446, and the granting of authority to license; 448, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 93. "license" being a privilege granted to a person, and not to an inanimate object, to pursue some occupation or exercise some right declared unlawful, except upon compliance Grossman v. City of Indianapolis, SS N. E. 945, 947, 173 Ind. 157. A "license" to sell intoxicating liquors is the authority of the state to carry on the business, and Act March 21, 1906, making it unlawful for any person to bring into any county, etc., where the sale of intoxicating liquors is prohibited, or may be prohibited, any intoxicating liquors, does not apply to liquor destined for one whose "license" to sell liquor has not expired. Sheehan V. Louisville & N. R. Co., 101 S. W. 380, 381, 125 Ky. 478. with such conditions. The $2 on each $100 of premiums paid by foreign insurance companies doing business in the state, which is required to be paid into the state treasury, is no part of the 22 cents on each $100 valuation of property or corporate franchises directed to be assessed for taxation for the school fund by Ky. St. 1903, § 4370, subd. 5, nor is it a "fine," "forfeiture," or "license," within subdivision 6, providing that a portion of such revenues be paid into the school fund. Fuqua v. Hager, 84 S. W. 325, 119 Ky. 407. Act March 12, 1909 (100 Ohio Laws, p. 89), providing that no person shall engage in the sale of intoxicating liquors without having properly answered certain specified questions, was not objectionable as thereby licensing those who answered the questions correctly in violation of Const. Schedule, § The word "licenses," as used in the Illi18, providing that no license to traffic in in-nois act relating to the Chicago City Railtoxicating liquors shall be granted in the state, but that the General Assembly may by law provide against the evils resulting therefrom; the term "license" as so used meaning permission to do something which without the license would not be allowed, to confer a right that did not exist without it, the granting of a special privilege to one or more persons not enjoyed by citizens generally, or the class to which the license belongs. Bloomfield v. State, 99 N. E. 309, 310, 86 Ohio St. 253, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 726, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 629 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4133). The word "license," as used in an ordinance requiring every person and corporation erecting and using poles on the public streets of a city to pay as a license therefor a certain sum for each pole, means the sum ways, and providing that any deeds of transfers of rights, privileges, or franchises between railway corporations, or any two of them, and all contracts, stipulations, licenses, and undertakings made, entered into, or given, and as made or amended by and between the common council of the city and any one or more of the railway corporations respecting the location, use, or exclusion of railways in or upon the streets, or any of them, of the city, etc., refers to the designation by the council of the streets to be occupied by the companies. Govin v. City of Chicago, 132 Fed. 848, 857. Where a city ordinance regulating automobiles required registration and numbering thereof at a cost to the owner of $1 to cover the value of figures furnished by the city to form the number, such provisions are not ob act should not authorize the licensing of the sale of intoxicating liquors. Fitzpatrick v. Weaver, 111 N. W. 163, 164, 147 Mich. 382. As a contract See Contract. As written document The word "license," in Gen. St. 1902, tit. 16, entitled "Intoxicating Liquors," providing for the issuance of liquor licenses, and prohibiting the sale of liquor without a license, etc., signifies an intangible right granted to the licensee and signifies the writing signed by the county commissioners, which is the instrument, and evidence of that grant, but the grant of such right can only be had by writing signed by the county commissioners in which the town and the particular building jectionable as a "license"; it being at most a mere means of regulation and not a license for revenue. The court said: "If the provision for registration and numbering, which involved no discrimination, and requires the payment of nothing more than is necessary to pay for the number which the municipality furnishes, can be regarded as a license (for conflicting definitions of license,' see Cooley, Tax. [3d Ed.] p. 1137; Adler v. Whitbeck, 9 N. E. 672, 44 Ohio St. 539) it is not a license for the purpose of raising revenue. If it were, it might well be contended that it did not pass as an incident to the power to regulate. See Cooley, Tax. (3d Ed.) p. 1141; The Laundry License Case, 22 Fed. 703. It is a license (if a license at all) as a mere means of regulation; indeed, we might say, as already shown, as a necessary means of regu-in which the sales licensed are to be made lation. This proposition is self-evident, viz., that the grant of authority to accomplish a certain purpose carries with it authority to use any proper and lawful means without which that purpose cannot be accomplished. If, therefore, the speed of automobiles cannot be effectually regulated without licensing them, the grant of the power to regulate confers upon the city power to license, unless some other provision of law forbids the exercise of that power." People v. Schneider, 103 N. W. 172, 173, 139 Mich. 673, 69 L. R. A. 345, 5 Ann. Cas. 790. Buffalo City Charter (Laws 1891, p. 137, c. 105, § 17, subd. 6, as amended by Laws 1904, p. 83, c. 31), empowering the city to enact an ordinance imposing a "tax" on automobiles "for the privilege" of operating the same on its streets, and to prohibit such use in case of nonpayment of the tax, and to provide a penalty for violation of the ordinance, is repealed by a later act, the Motor Vehicle Law (Laws 1904, p. 1316, c. 538, § 4, subd. 4), providing that the city shall have no power to pass, maintain, or enforce ordinances requiring from owners of automobiles "licenses" or permits to use the streets, or prohibiting them from the free use thereof; a tax for the privilege of operating automobiles on the streets being but a license. City of Buffalo v. Lewis, 108 N. Y. Supp. 450, 123 App. Div. 163. A city ordinance provided that it should be unlawful for any person to keep any saloon where intoxicating liquors were sold or drunk as a beverage without first paying a license fee of $300 per annum, and that the city treasurer, on payment of the fee, should give a receipt for the amount paid, which should constitute a license for the keeping of a saloon. Held, that the ordinance applied only to saloons where intoxicating liquors were sold, and hence was an attempt to "license" the sale of such liquors contrary to Comp. Laws 1897, § 3107, giving such city authority to license all taverns and houses of public entertainment, saloons, restaurants, and eating houses, but providing that such and person who is licensed to make them, as provided by sections 2669, 2672, 2675. Connecticut Breweries Co. v. Murphy, 70 Atl. 450, 452, 81 Conn. 145. The word "license," as used in Act March 11, 1903, relating to the appropriation of public waters, and regulating the issuance of a certificate and license after inspection by the state engineer, applies to the paper to be issued on proof of application to beneficial use of the waters. Idaho Power & Transportation Co. v. Stephenson, 101 Pac. 821, 823, 16 Idaho, 418. The word "license," in Acts 1905, p. 492, § 1, providing that no person shall be eligible to the office of county superintendent of schools unless he shall hold a 36 months' license, a 60 months' license, a life or professional license to teach in the schools of the state, means the written document by which permission or authority has been granted to the holder thereof to teach in the common schools for the period of time required by the act, and such a document, in the absence of fraud affecting it, is conclusive evidence that the person to whom it is issued has the legal qualifications of a teacher. State ex rel. Benham v. Bradt, 84 N. E. 1084, 1087, 170 Ind. 480 (citing Elmore v. Overton, 4 N. E. 197, 104 Ind. 548, 54 Am. St. Rep. 343). As lawful act A "license" to carry on a business or trade has been defined to be an official permit to carry on the same, or perform other acts forbidden by law except to persons obtaining such permit. Bouvier's Law Dictionary. City of Savannah v. Cooper, 63 S. E. 138, 140, 131 Ga. 670. Franchise distinguished Permission given by a city ordinance for the exercise of a corporate franchise within the city is a "license" and not a franchise. People ex rel. Fitzhenry v. Union Gas & Electric Co., 98 N. E. 768, 771, 254 Ill. 395. The right to construct a street railway within any municipality comes from the state as a "franchise," while the power to consent and designate the streets to be occu- [ to be a grant from the state to a corporation pied comes from the municipality as a "license" or contract right. Potter v. Calumet Electric St. R. Co., 158 Fed. 521, 527 (citing Chicago City Ry. Co. v. People ex rel. Story, 73 Ill. 541). A gas "franchise" is property, a vested right protected by the Constitution, while a "license" is a mere personal privilege, and revocable, except in rare instances and under peculiar conditions. Elizabeth City v. Banks, 64 S. E. 189, 192, 150 N. C. 407, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 925. A "franchise" is a privilege which emanates from the sovereign power of the state or government. A power conferred upon a railroad company by ordinance to locate and maintain a railroad in the streets of a city is a "license," which, after the road is built, may be irrevocable, but such ordinance does not create or confer on the railroad company constructing the railroad in the street a "franchise." The "license" granted by the ordinance is no more a "franchise" than would be a grant of right of way by a private citizen to the company to construct its road over his lands, and it is as competent for the city as for a private owner to extend the time of performance or to amend, modify, or annul the contract by mutual agreement. City of Chicago v. Rothschild & Co., 72 N. E. 698, 699, 212 Ill. 590 (citing Chicago City Ry. Co. v. People ex rel. Story, 73 Ill. 541, 547; Metropolitan City Ry. Co. v. Chicago, W. D. Ry. Co., 87 Ill. 317; Board of Trade of Chicago v. People ex rel. Sturges, 91 Ill. 80; Mills v. Parlin, 106 Ill. 60; Chicago Municipal Gaslight & Fuel Co. v. Town of Lake, 22 N. E. 616, 130 Ill. 42; City of Belleville v. Citizens' Horse Ry. Co., 38 N. E. 584, 152 Ill. 171, 26 L. R. A. 681; People ex rel. City of Pontiac v. Central Union Tel. Co., 61 N. E. 428, 192 Ill. 307, 85 Am. St. Rep. 338; Rostad v. Chicago Suburban Water & Light Co., 71 N. E. 978, 211 Ill. 248; Davis v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York, 14 N. Y. 506, 67 Am. Dec. 186; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. [38 U. S.] 579, 10 L. Ed. 274; City of Bridgeport v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 36 Conn. 255, 4 Am. Rep. 63; Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217, 23 L. Ed. 860). A right not essential to the general purpose of a grantee, and such that a private party might grant over his property, such as a revocable permission to occupy a portion of some public ground, highway, or street, is a "license," and not a franchise. McPhee & McGinnity Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 158 Fed. 5, 10, 87 C. C. A. 619. of authority to occupy the city streets, “licenses" to be the designation by the city council of the streets to be occupied, and "contracts" the stipulated arrangements between the companies and the city as to the manner of occupancy. State on Inf. of Jones v. West End Light & Power Co., 152 S. W. 67, 75, 246 Mo. 618. Invalid license A dramshop license issued without compliance with an ordinance, requiring the application to be signed by a majority of the property owners according to frontage on both sides of the street in the block where the dramshop is to be kept, or by a majority of the bona fide householders and persons or firms living in or doing business on each side of the street in the block on which the dramshop has its entrance, is invalid, and a dramshop, operated under such a license is "operated without a license" within Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 43, § 7, providing that an unlicensed dramshop shall be a nuisance. Hoyt v. McLaughlin, 95 N. E. 464, 467, 250 Ill. 442. As a personal trust or privilege A license is a grant of special privilege to one or more persons, not enjoyed by citizens generally, or, at least, not enjoyed by a class of citizens to which the licensee belongs, and grants a permission to do something which, without a license, is not allowable. State v. Parker Distilling Co., 139 S. W 453, 466, 236 Mo. 219, 237 Mo. 103 (quoting 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4137). "A license' to deal in intoxicating liquors is in the nature of a personal trust, and the applicant for such privilege must be a person able, willing, and competent to carry out such trust, and not delegate it entirely to others, whose character may not be such as the law requires of the licensee." In re Krug, 101 N. W. 242, 244, 72 Neb. 576 (quoting and adopting definition in Watkins v. Grieser, 66 Pac. 332, 11 Okl. 302). A "license" for the sale of liquor is but a personal privilege and not assignable except as authorized by the Legislature and in the mode therein prescribed. Though a trustee in bankruptcy cannot sell a retail liquor license issued to a bankrupt, he can sell the unexpired lease of a licensed saloon with the furniture and fixtures, on condition that the license shall be transferred to the purchaser by the license court, and, where the purchaser abandons his purchase without any attempt to secure a transfer of the license, he is liable for loss on resale. Snyder v. Bougher, 63 Atl. 893, 894, 214 Pa. 453 (citing in support of definition, Blumenthal's Petition, 18 Atl. 395, 125 Pa. 412). The grant by a municipality of a franchise to use its streets is the exercise by delegation of a power which resides in the A "license" to sell intoxicating liquor is state, and which is by its nature governmen- a personal privilege, which may be valuable tal; hence, if grounds for forfeiture arise, the state may alone enforce it, and may alone waive it; for a franchise may be said as property, in a certain sense, for the personal use of the holder, but which is not assignable or transferable by him in any way. The word "license," in the Chicago Wheel Tax Ordinance, which requires owners of automobiles to obtain a license or permit to use a vehicle in the city in addition to the license or permit obtained from the Secretary of State, as required by the Motor Vehicle Law, is used in the sense of tax, and the issuance of the license thereunder amounts to no more than the giving of a receipt showing that the annual tax imposed by the ordinance has been paid. Ayres v. City of Chicago, 87 N. E. 1073, 1076, 239 Ill. 237. Under the statutes of Alabama all occu "A license fee' is understood to be a charge for the privilege of carrying on a business or occupation, and is not the equivalent or in lieu of a property tax." The contract arrangements for the payment to a municipality of a "license fee" on each street car, modified as to the amount of such fees under the authority of a statute accepted by the street railway company, stating that such fees should be taken "in full satisfaction for the use of the streets or avenues," does not exempt the company from the tax imposed, under Laws N. Y. 1899, c. 712, on its franchise. People of State of New York ex rel. Brooklyn City R. Co. v. State Board of Tax Com'rs, 25 Sup. Ct. 713, 714, 199 U. S. 48, 50 L. Ed. 79. The registration fee of $2, required by St. 1903, p. 507, c. 473, § 1, providing for the registration of automobiles, is a "license fee," and not a tax for revenue. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 74 N. E. 255, 256, 188 Mass. 79, 108 Am. St. Rep. 464. A tax on the gross receipts of a street railroad company imposed as a condition to the exercise of the special privileges granted it is not a property tax but is a "license North Jersey St. Ry. Co. v. Jersey City, 67 Atl. 33, 34, 74 N. J. Law, 761. pation taxes are evidenced by a receipt, Assignment distinguished As property See Property. Regulate distinguished To "license" means to permit, to give authority, to conduct or carry on. It differs from "regulate" in that regulate means to prescribe the manner in which a thing may be conducted. Pacific University v. Johnson, 84 Pac. 704, 706, 47 Or. 448. Tax distinguished See Tax-Taxation. As vested right See Vested Right. LICENSE FEE Under Tax Law, § 46, providing that where a city has assessed a tax upon the special franchise of a corporation, and it appears that the corporation has paid to the city any sum based on a percentage of gross earnings or other income or any license fee or any sum of money on account of such special franchise, which payment was in the nature of a tax, such payment shall be deducted from the franchise tax assessed, where a subway company, under the conditions of its franchise, was compelled to furnish free, to the city, space in its subways, the giving of this free space was not a "license fee"; the term "license fee" not meaning anything else than a payment in cash. Consolidated Telegraph & Electrical Subway Co. v. Metz, 104 N. Y. Supp. 922, 923, 119 App. Div. 835. See, also, Regulate and Restrain. A "license fee" is a sum demanded of an individual in return for the grant of a The grant of power to "license, regulate, privilege which he did not previously possess, and restrain" shops for the sale of intoxiand is not a tax, as ordinarily understood, cating liquors is sufficiently broad to waras a contribution demanded by a sovereign rant a city ordinance requiring applicants from his subjects in return for his protection. for such license to procure the written asThe power to enforce the terms of a treaty sent of a majority of the property owners with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians in the immediate district. City of Baton that no person shall expose goods for sale Rouge v. Butler, 42 South. 650, 653, 118 La. without a permit is a duty imposed on the executive department of the government, and in the discharge of that duty it is not within the jurisdiction of the courts to enjoin such action. Zevely v. Weimer, 82 S. W. 941, 943, 5 Ind. T. 646. 73. LICENSE, REGULATE, AND TAX The new charter of the city of Baltimore (section 6), authorizing the mayor and council "to license, tax, and regulate all busi LICENSE TAX As tax, see Tax-Taxation. A "license tax" is one imposed on the privilege of exercising certain callings, professions, and avocations, and, when collected, is a part of the general funds of a city. State ex rel. Smith v. Berryman, 127 S. W. 129, 132, 142 Mo. App. 373. nesses, trades, avocations or professions," the license fee herein provided"; requires conferred on the city the power to impose a any person doing such act to procure a licharge on commission merchants for the priv- cense, paying therefor "a license fee of $150 ilege of selling in the city market; such per annum"; requires application for renewcharge being a tax for revenue, and not a als to be passed upon by the board of police license or regulation tax. Meushaw v. State, commissioners, and declares that the ordi71 Atl. 457, 459, 109 Md. 84. nance and "the license herein imposed" are enacted to regulate the business described. The charter of the city and county of San Francisco (article 2, c. 2, § 1) authorizes the board of supervisors to make all necessary thorizes it to impose "license taxes," but police regulations; and subdivision 15 auprovides that no license taxes shall be imposed upon one who, at any fixed place of business, sells goods, etc., except such as require permits from the board of police commissioners, as provided in this charter. Held, that the ordinance was enacted solely for regulation, and not for revenue, and the license imposed was a "license tax" within subdivision 15, so that the board had no power to impose it, since, while a "tax," technically, only includes charges imposed for producing revenue, and not for purposes of regulation under the police power, the term "license tax," as used in the statutes and by the courts, includes license charges of every character, whether imposed for revenue or police regulations, or both. John Rapp & Son v. Kiel, 115 Pac. 651, 652, 159 Every "license tax" is imposed for raising revenue or as a police regulation, or for both purposes. Johnson v. City of Great Falls, 99 Pac. 1059, 1060, 38 Mont. 369, 16 Ann. Cas. 974. A "license tax" is "either a license, strictly so called, imposed in the exercise of ordinary police power of the state, or it is a tax laid in the exercise of the power of taxation. City Council of Montgomery v. Kelly, 38 South. 67, 68, 142 Ala. 552, 70 L. R. A. 209, 110 Am. St. Rep. 43 (citing Tied. Lim. Police Power). The words "license tax," used with reference to corporations exclusively, mean no more necessarily than a charge of some kind imposed upon them solely for their corporate privilege. Kaiser Land & Fruit Co. v. Curry, 103 Pac. 341, 344, 349, 155 Cal. 638. The tax authorized by Sess. Laws 1902, p. 73, c. 3, § 65, called a "license tax," is, in form of an excise, a tax on the business of foreign corporations levied for the purpose of state revenue, and is not a property tax, and so does not violate the uniformity clause of the Constitution. American Smelting & Refining Co. v. People ex rel. Lindsley, 82 Pac. 531, 533, 34 Colo. 240. The tax imposed by Act Ky. March 28, 1906, upon persons engaged in compounding, rectifying, adulterating, or blending distilled spirits, is a "license or occupation tax," and not a property tax. Brown-Forman Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 30 Sup. Ct. 578, 580, 217 U. S. 563, 54 L. Ed. 883. upon persons * * malt An ordinance enacted by the board of supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco is entitled "An ordinance imposing a license for the purpose of regulation * selling or fermented liquors * * * in quan tities of one quart or more, less than five gallons, when the same is contained in sealed packages, and, not to be drunk on the premises where sold, * * requiring a permit therefor." The ordinance makes it unlawful to sell such liquors "without first having obtained a permit therefor from the board of police commissioners, and paying * Cal. 702. LICENSED See Duly Licensed. A "licensee" is one who goes onto the The terms "mere licensee" or "bare licensee" are often used as synonymous with "trespasser." Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Simons (Ind.) 76 N. E. 883, 886. A "mere licensee" is one who is clothed with no right and to whom no invitation has been extended but who is upon the premises of another by permission or acquiescence. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Denny's Adm'r, 56 S. E. 321, 328, 106 Va. 383. A person is a mere "licensee" where he was not on the premises by invitation expressed or implied, nor for any business connected with defendant nor in relation to any business for which the freight house in which he was injured was used, but went there of his own volition, uninvited, concerning a matter which was personal to himself in which the defendant had no interest. Means V. Southern Cal. R. Co., 77 Pac. 1001, 1002, 144 Cal. 473, 1 Ann. Cas. 206. A person is a "licensee" when he is on the land of others with their consent, expressed or implied. If a person is a licensee, he is rightfully on the landowners' premises, |