occupancy was a mere incident of his carry- | Rep. 529, 5 Ann. Cas. 963 (quoting and adopting on the farm, and an action would not lie ing definition from Bishop). against him to recover possession of the house under V. S. 1560, providing that, when a lessee holds possession without right, the person entitled to possession may have a writ to restore him thereto. Mead v. Owen, 67 Atl. 722, 724, 80 Vt. 273, 13 Ann. Cas. 231. LANDOWNER LAP another, occasioning what is called a "lap" Where one grant conflicts in part with grant acquires at once constructive seisin in or "interlock," the elder patentee under his deed of all the land embraced within its boundaries, although he has taken no actual possession of any part thereof. The junThe county named in the preliminary report of the surveyor as a landowner affect-ior grantee under his grant acquires similar ed by a proposed drainage is not a "land-constructive seisin in deed of all the land owner" within the provision of the drainage tion within the interlock, the seisin of which embraced by his boundaries, except that poract requiring the dismissal of the petition had already vested in the senior grantee. upon remonstrance of two-thirds of the Green v. Pennington, 54 S. E. 877, 878, 105 "landowners" affected. Honnold v. Endicott, Va. 801 (citing Koiner v. Rankin's Heirs [Va.] 11 Grat. 427). 83 N. E. 502, 170 Ind. 16. The word "landowner," in the statute giving a company power to condemn land, and providing that it shall be liable for all such damages as may be established by any landowner, embraces not only the owner of the fee, but a lessee for years and any other person who has an interest in the property affected by the condemnation. Woodstock Hardwood & Spool Mfg. Co. v. Charleston Light & Water Co., 66 S. E. 194, 196, 84 S. C. 306. LANGUAGE LAP POSITION In the railway automatic quick action brake system, the position known as the "lap position" was, where the engineer thought that the train pipe pressure had been sufficiently reduced by the resultant brake application, he moved the handle back a short distance so as to close all the ports and hold the brakes at the point at which they had been set. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. New York Air Brake Co., 119 Fed. 874, 875, 56 C. C. A. 404. See Doubtful Language; Ordinary Lan- LAPPINGS guage. English language, see English. Profane language, see Profane-Profan- "Language" is the expression of thought by means of spoken or written words which are but signs of ideas. United States v. One Car Load of Corno Horse and Mule Feed, 188 Fed. 453, 462. "Language" is a generic term, and includes any words or speech by which thought may be conveyed, and language may be obscene and vulgar when used in the presence of a female without the use of a single word which could be intrinsically classified as being obscene and vulgar. Morris v. State, 65 S. E. 58, 59, 6 Ga. App. 395. 'Language' is the offspring of the past, but its life is in and for the ever opening and progressive future. Its principal mission is to convey from one mind to another the new thoughts as they arise; for the old is continually dying, while the new is being born. If each word had a single fixed and unchanging meaning, and if there simply were certain established collocations of words, each with one signification, the powers of language would be very limited, and it could never express a new idea." State v. Stuart, 92 S. W. 878, 881, 194 Mo. 345, 112 Am. St. "Lappings" consist of a woven fabric composed of a flax warp and a wool filling and is dutiable under paragraph 346 of the Tariff Act of 1897. United States v. E. De F. Wilkinson Co., 154 Fed. 751, 752. LAPSE LAPSE OF TIME The phrase "lapse of time," as used in a constitutional provision giving the Legislature power to revive any remedy which may have been barred by "lapse of time" or "by any statute of limitations," means a period of time limiting the action, and relates alone either to an express statute of limitations or to a "lapse of time" dealt with either under the statute or the general law, as a limita tion of time. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. of London & Edinburgh v. Edwards, 37 South. 748, 85 Miss. 322. "Larceny" is taking personal property by stealing by theft. Cox v. Territory, 104 Pac. 378, 379, 2 Okl. Cr. 668. "Larceny" is predicated on the wrongful taking of property with intent to convert it. Axtell v. State, 91 N. E. 354, 355, 173 Ind. 711. "Larceny" is the felonious taking of the property of another. State v. Wasson, 101 N. W. 1125, 1126, 126 Iowa, 320. "Larceny" is the taking of another's personal property without the owner's consent, accompanied by an intent to wholly deprive him of its value. State v. Hinton, 109 Pac. 24, 27, 56 Or. 428. "Larceny" is the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of another, with the intent to convert it to the use of the taker without the consent of the owner. State v. De Luca (Del.) 77 Atl. 742, 743, 2 Boyce, 158; State v. Stewart (Del.) 67 Atl. 786, 788, 6 Pennewill, 435. "Larceny" is the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods of another, with intent to deprive the owner of his property therein, and to appropriate the same to the use of the taker. State v. Spencer (Del.) 53 Atl. 337, 338, 4 Pennewill, 92. "Larceny" is the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of another, with intent to convert it to the taker's use, and to deprive the owner of the same, without the owner's consent. State v. Palmer (Del.) 53 Atl. 359, 4 Pennewill, 126. "Larceny" is the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of another, with intent to convert it to the taker's use and deprive the owner of its use without his consent. State v. Dredden, 73 Atl. 1042, 1043, 6 Pennewill, 446. "Larceny" is the wrongful or fraudulent taking and carrying away by any person of the personal goods of another without the owner's consent, with a felonious intent to convert them to the taker's use. State v. James, 113 S. W. 232, 233, 133 Mo. App. 300. "Larceny" is the wrongful or fraudulent taking and carrying away of the personal goods or property of another, with the felonious intent to convert it to his own use and make it his own property without the consent of the owner. State v. Wolf (Del.) 66 Atl. 739, 741, 6 Pennewill, 323. At common law, as well as by statute, "larceny" is the wrongful taking and carrying away of the personalty of another, with a felonious intent to convert it to the taker's use without the owner's consent. State v. Brewington (Del.) 78 Atl. 402, 403, 2 Boyce, "Larceny" is a felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods or chattels of another with intent to deprive the owner of his property therein and to appropriate the same to the use of the taker. Asportation, nonconsent of the owner, and a felonious intent to thereby convert the stolen property to the defendant's own use are necessary elements of larceny. Ladeaux v. State, 103 N. W. 1048, 1049, 74 Neb. 19. A "larceny" has been defined as a felonious taking of the property of another, without his consent and against his will, with intent to convert it to the use of the taker, or "the wrongful or fraudulent taking or carrying away by any person of the personal goods of another with a felonious intent to convert them to his (the taker's) own use and make them his own property without the consent of the owner." Bassett v. Spofford, 45 N. Y. 387, 391, 6 Am. Rep. 101 (citing 2 Russ. Crimes, 1; Mowrey v. Walsh [N. Y.] 8 Cow. 238). The phrase "deemed guilty of larceny," as used in B. & C. Comp. § 1805, providing that, if any person shall embezzle or fraudulently convert any money belonging to another in his possession, he shall "be deemed guilty of larceny," and on conviction shall be punished accordingly, refers to statutory larceny and not larceny at common law. State v. Browning, 82 Pac. 955, 956, 47 Or. 470. Where one collects money for another and neglects or refuses to turn it over but uses the money himself, he commits a "larceny." Specifically, it is embezzlement and is punishable as "larceny." State v. Conklin, 84 Pac. 482, 484, 47 Or. 509. If the general bookkeeper of a bank, having no general or special custody or possession of the funds of the bank, secretly takes from the safe or drawer of the receiving or paying teller moneys of the bank, with the intent to appropriate the same to his own use, he commits an act of "larceny." United States v. Breese, 131 Fed. 915, 920. In a prosecution for larceny, the state must prove that the property taken was personal property of some value belonging to the owner named in the indictment and that it was taken feloniously by the defendant with intent to convert it to his own use within two years prior to the finding of the indictment, and in the county in which the case was being prosecuted. State v. De Luca (Del.) 77 Atl. 742, 743, 2 Boyce, 158. A bill of particulars, filed with an indictment for "larceny" of a receipt, which alleged that accused told prosecutor that he would occupancy secutor money and take from him ing on theteral a negotiable receipt of a third against for certain bonds, that accused falsehouse presented to prosecutor that he intended whether to keep the certificate in his possestsion or to place the same as collateral with a bank for a loan, that accused loaned to prosecutor money and received as collateral the receipt, that accused sold the receipt, that after the maturity of the debt prosecutor made demands on accused for the return of the receipt and tendered the amount of the debt, that accused declined to deliver the receipt or any receipt of the same amount, and that accused never intended to retain possession of the receipt, but at the time of making the representation and receiving the receipt he intended to dispose of the same, etc., permitted the commonwealth to prove common larceny, embezzlement, obtaining property by false pretenses, or larceny, defined by Rev. Laws, c. 208, § 26, making one who, with intent to defraud, obtains property by false pretense guilty of "arceny." Commonwealth v. Althause, 93 N. E. 202, 205, 207 Mass. 32, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 999. In a trial for "larceny," the gist of the offense is the unlawful taking and appropriating by the accused of the property of another, the name of the owner being a matter of secondary importance or consideration. Where the name of the owner is not known, it is sufficient to allege that fact. State v. McDuffy, 60 South. 80, 81, 131 La. 695 (citing State v. Hanks, 1 South. 458, 39 La. Ann. 234; State v. Dominique, 1 South. 665, 39 La. Ann. 323; State v. Harris, 8 South. 530, 42 La. Ann. 980; State v. Southern, 19 South. 668, 48 La. Ann. 628). Statutory definitions "Larceny" is the felonious stealing or carrying away the personal property of another. People v. Devlin, 76 Pac. 900, 143 Cal. 128 (citing Pen. Code, § 484). Pen. Code, § 441, defines "larceny" as the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading, or driving away of the personal property of another. Buffehr v. Territory, 89 Pac. 415, 11 Ariz. 165. was not error for the trial court to give the jury the following definition of "larceny," to wit: "Larceny' is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, riding or driving away the property of another." It is the felonious taking; that is, wrongful and corrupt taking. Hendrix v. United States, 101 Pac. 125, 128, 2 Okl. Cr. 240. Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, c. 38, § 167, provides that larceny may be committed by feloniously taking and carrying away any bond, bill, receipt, or any instrument of writing of value to the owner. So an indictment charging the larceny of a bill of exchange must aver the value thereof. People v. Silbertrust, 86 N. E. 203, 204, 236 Ill. 144. Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 38, § 75, provides that if any agent embezzles or fraudulently converts to his own use, or takes with intent to do so, without the consent of the employer, any property of the employer which has come to his possession or to his office by virtue of such employment, is to be deemed guilty of "larceny." So an indictment, charging in the language of the statute that defendant was the agent of B., and as such agent collected and embezzled funds belonging to her in the amount of $7,000, was sufficient. People v. O'Farrell, 93 N. E. 136, 139, 247 Ill. 44. Pen. Code, § 484, defines "larceny" as the felonious stealing, taking, carrying away of the property of another. So an information charging that accused, from the immediate presence of prosecutor, by means of force and against prosecutor's will, did take, steal, and carry away certain property of the value of $1,026 of the personal property of prosecutor, was sufficient. People v. Ho Sing, 93 Pac. 204, 205, 6 Cal. App. 752. "A person who, with the intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property, or of the use or benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person, either: (1) Takes from the possession of the true owner, or of any other person, or obtains from such possession by color or aid of fraudulent or false representation or pretense, or of any false token or writing, or secretes, withholds, or appro"Larceny" is the felonious stealing, tak- priates to his own use, or that of any person ing, carrying, leading, or driving away the other than the true owner, any money, perpersonal property of another. State v. Da-sonal property, thing in action, evidence of vis, 76 Pac. 705, 706, 28 Utah, 10 (citing Rev. debt or contract, or article of value of any St. 1898, § 4355). kind; or (2), having in his possession, custody, or control, as a bailee, servant, attorney, agent, clerk, trustee, or officer or any person, association, or corporation or public officer, or as a person authorized by agreement, or by competent authority, to hold or take such possession, custody, or control, any money, property, evidence of debt or contract, article of value of any nature or thing in action or possession, appropriates the same to his own use, or that of any other person other than the true owner or person entitled to the benefit thereof, steals such property "Larceny" is to take, steal, and carry away. An instruction thus defining larceny in the words of the statute was sufficient, since the words employed are daily in common use and such as the jury were presumed to understand. State v. Carter, 121 N. W. 694, 695, 697, 144 Iowa, 280. Ann. St. 1899, Ind. T. § 965, defines "larceny" as follows: "Larceny' is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, riding or driving away the personal property of another." It People ex rel. | fraud. People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, SO N. E. 383, 387, 187 N. Y. 410, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 528, 10 Ann. Cas. 309. and is guilty of larceny." Perkins v. Moss, 100 N. Y. Supp. 427-429, 50 Misc. Rep. 198 (citing Pen. Code, § 528). Pen. Code, § 528, makes it "larceny" for a servant to appropriate to his own use any money which he has in his possession as such servant, with intent to deprive the true owner of his property or the use thereof. Section 548 provides that it is a sufficient defense that the property was appropriated openly under a claim of title preferred in good faith, but that the section shall not excuse the retention of the property of another to pay demands held against him. An employé collected over $900 for his employer, and deducted therefrom over $400, which he claimed was for arrears of salary and expenses and a certain other item, and sent his check to the employer for the balance, with a statement showing how it was arrived at. Held, that where the employer owed less than $100, and the claim of the employé was made with intent to avoid payment of certain sums due, the employé was guilty of larceny under the Code, for the appropriation was not under a claim of title, but under a claim of indebtedness, and was not made in good faith. J. W. Matthews & Co. v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 111 N. Y. Supp. 76, 77, 127 App. Div. 195. Penal Code, § 528, declares that a person who, "with intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property," etc., appropriates the same to his own use or benefit, or that of any other person other than the true owner, is guilty of larceny, and section 548 declares that on an indictment for larceny it shall be a defense that the property was appropriated openly under a claim of title made in good faith, even though such claim is untenable. The president of a life insurance company, having promised to contribute up to $50,000 to a political campaign, requested relator, a vice president, to make the payment personally, as that would make it easier to refuse the other demands, and that the president would see that the matter was taken care of later. Relator made the pay ment, after which the president brought the matter to the attention of the finance com Under the statutes of Oklahoma a person who takes personal property unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to deprive another thereof, is guilty of larceny; and it is immaterial whether the property is taken from the owner or another. State v. Clark, 128 Pac. 161, 163, 8 Okl Cr. 432. "Larceny" is defined by Snyder's St. § 2591, as the taking of personal property ac complished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another thereof. Section 2606 punishes any person who shall steal any stallion, mare, etc., creates a separate and distinct offense, and to support a conviction under it the state must prove a felonious intent on the part of accused to deprive the owner thereof, and to convert the same to his own use, which specific proof is not necessary to support a conviction under the general larceny statute. Crowell v. State, 117 Pac. 883, 884, 6 Okl. Cr. 148. Pen. Code, § 528, defines "larceny" as follows: "A person who, with the intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property, or of the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person, * * * haying in his possession, custody or control, as a bailee, servant, attorney, agent, clerk, trustee or officer of any person, association or corporation, * any money, property, evidence of debt or contract, article of value of any nature or thing in action or possession, appropriates the same to his own use, or that of any other person other than the true owner or person entitled to the benefit thereof, steals such property is guilty of larceny.'" People v. Burnham, 104 N. Y. Supp. 725, 727, 119 App. Div. 302. Section 880 et seq. of the Penal Code contains the definition of "larceny," which is, in substance, that every person who, with the intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property, or of the use and ben efit thereof, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person, mittee of the insurance company, and, it takes property from the possession of anbeing of the opinion that relator should be re- other, or, having in his possession property of imbursed from the company's funds, the another, appropriates the same to his own president, under his authority to pay out the use, or that of any other person other than the one entitled to it, is guilty of "larceny." company's money on executive order, caused such reimbursement to be made without fur- When the property taken is of a value exceeding $50, or when it is taken from the ther action on the part of the finance committee or trustees of the company. In pro- person of another, it is termed grand larceedings for relator's arrest for the larceny section what at common law constituted the ceny; otherwise, petit larceny. Under this of such fund, the proof showed that relator offenses of larceny and embezzlement are derived no personal advantage from the mon- merged in the one offense of larceny, and ey, and that it was paid by him in the honest thereby the distinction formerly recognized belief that he was benefiting the insurance between cases where the taking was unlawcompany. Held, that the facts did not estab-ful and those where the possession had been lish prima facie the commission of larceny; lawfully obtained is abolished. Property there being no evidence of an attempt to de- must have an owner before it is the subject of larceny, but this statute does not define the character of that ownership-whether it is general or special, joint or several, absolute or qualified, arises from title or from possession. The particular ownership of the property stolen does not fall within the definition, and is not of the essence of the crime. Neither the legal nor moral quality of the act is affected by the fact that the property stolen, instead of being owned by one, or by two or more jointly, is the several property of different owners. The gist of the offense is the felonious taking or appropriation. The grade of the offense is determined by the value of the property taken. State v. Mjelde, 75 Pac. 87, 29 Mont. 490. Where a territorial statute defined larceny as a taking with a felonious intent to deprive the owner of the property taken, and with intent to appropriate the same to the use and benefit of the taker, an instruction authorizing a conviction if the property was taken by defendant with the felonious intent to deprive the owner thereof was erroneous. Miller v. Territory of Oklahoma, 149 Fed. 330, 339, 79 C. C. A. 268, 9 Ann. Cas. 389. An indictment alleging that accused, doing business as the L. Company, misrepresented to a certain person the resources of such company, and induced such person, relying on the misrepresentations, to subscribe and pay for stock in an Arkansas corporation, thereby fraudulently obtaining of such person a certain amount of money, without showing that accused or the L. Company were in any manner connected with the Arkansas corporation, and without alleging that the L. Company was the Arkansas corporation, nor that accused owned any stock in the Arkansas corporation, nor was an officer or agent thereof, or authorized to represent it in the sale of its stock, did not charge an offense under Kirby's Dig. § 1689, making one guilty of "larceny" who with intent to defraud or cheat another shall designedly, by color of any false token or writing, etc., obtain from any person any money. State v. Lester, 126 S. W. 846, 847, 94 Ark. 242. Rev. St. 1899, § 1903, enacted in 1835, provides that if a person alter the marks of any animal the subject of larceny, being the property of another, with intent to steal or convert it to his own use, he shall be guilty of larceny, and punished in the same manner as if he had feloniously stolen such animal. Prior to the revision of 1879, grand larceny was the felonious stealing, taking, and carrying away of goods worth $10 or more or any horse, sheep, hog, etc., belonging to another and by the revision the act was amended by striking out the words "sheep" and "hog," and by increasing the value of the stolen property to $30. Held, that section 1903 does not limit the offense to the felonious marking of any animal the subject of grand larceny, but merely the subject of larceny, which includes petit larceny, and the fact that the amendment of the statute excluded hogs and sheep from the list of animals, the stealing of which constituted grand larceny, per se, did not operate to exclude such animals under the value of $30 from the operation of section 1903. State v. Zehnder, 128 S. W. 960, 962, 228 Mo. 310. An employé of a railroad company was required to make an independent check of the men employed by a construction company, which relied on the reports made by the employé in paying the men. The employé and the timekeeper of the construction company reported that a third person was entitled to receive compensation for work done, and they procured the presentation to the construction company of a check therefor, which it paid. They received the proceeds. The report was false. Held, that the employé was guilty of larceny under Pen. Code, § 528, punishing one who, with intent to defraud, obtains from another by aid of fraudulent representations any money, etc. People v. Eaton, 107 N. Y. Supp. 849, 853, 122 App. Div. 706. Animus furandi Intent is a necessary element of "larceny." Sutherland v. St. Lawrence County, 91 N. Y. Supp. 962, 966, 101 App. Div. 299. To constitute "larceny" the taking must be done with a felonious intent. Bailey v. State, 122 S. W. 497, 498, 92 Ark. 216. Criminal intent is the principal element of "larceny," whether of grand larceny which is a felony, or petit larceny which is a misdemeanor. State v. Claybaugh, 122 S. W. 319, 321, 138 Mo. App. 360. It is insufficient to constitute "larceny" that the taking was without color of right or authority, but it must have been with a felonious intent. State v. Peterson, 92 Pac. 302, 303, 36 Mont. 109. Where one has taken and converted ani mals to his own use, if at the time of the taking there was a felonious intent to deprive the true owner of the permanent use and benefit of his property, he is guilty of larceny. Blackshare v. State, 128 S. W. 549, 552, 94 Ark. 548, 140 Am. St. Rep. 144. It is essential to a conviction of "lar ceny" that the property be taken "animo furandi," and where it clearly appears that the taking was perfectly consistent with honest crime may have been mistaken he cannot be conduct, although the party charged with the convicted of "larceny." Bird v. State, 37 South. 525, 527, 48 Fla. 3. "Larceny" is the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of another, with intent to convert it to the taker's use and deprive the owner of its use without his consent. Felonious intent is a material element of the crime of larceny. State v. Dredden (Del.) 73 Atl. 1042, 1043, 6. Pennewill, 446. |