Sess. Laws 1901, p. 116, c. 67, providing for the examination and registration of horseshoers, is unconstitutional, as depriving citizens of their liberty and property without due process of law. "One may be deprived of his liberty, and his constitutional rights thereto may be violated, without the actual imprisonment or restraint of his person. 'Liberty,' in its broad sense, as understood in this country, means the right not only of freedom from actual servitude, imprisonment, or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways. to live and work when he will, to earn his livelihood in a lawful calling, and to pur"The word 'liberty,' as used in the Con- sue any lawful trade or avocation. All laws, stitution of the United States and the sev- therefore, which impair or trammel these eral states, has frequently been construed, rights, which limit him in his choice of a and means more than mere freedom from | trade or profession, are infringements of his restraint. It means, not merely the right fundamental rights of liberty, which are to go where one chooses, but to do such under constitutional protection." In re Au

bry, 78 Pac. 900, 902, 36 Wash. 308, 104 Am. [ proving Crowley v. Christensen, 11 Sup. Ct. St. Rep. 952, 1 Ann. Cas. 927 (citing People 13, 137 U. S. 86, 34 L. Ed. 620). ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden of City Prison, 39 N. E. 686, 144 N. Y. 529, 27 L. R. A. 718).

"Liberty," as understood in this country, is not license but liberty regulated by law. The personal liberty of every man is subject to such reasonable regulations as in the wisdom of the Legislature are regarded as necessary to promote, not only the peace and good order of society, but its wellbeing. Rev. St. § 4234, prohibiting generally the keeping open on Sunday of any place of business for the purpose of transacting business therein, is not, as applied to a barber's shop, unconstitutional, as being an undue restraint of personal liberty, and depriving a person of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, but is a proper exercise of the police power of the state. State v. Sopher, 71 Pac. 482, 484, 25 Utah, 318, 60 L. R. A. 468, 95 Am. St. Rep. 845 (quoting and adopting State v. Powell, 50 N. E. 900, 58 Ohio St. 324, 41 L. R. A.

"The term 'liberty,' as used in the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution, is not dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, as by incarceration, but is deemed to embrace the right of a man to be free in the employment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. Liberty, in its broad sense, as understood in this country, means the right not only of freedom from servitude, imprisonment, or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation," so that Laws 1901, c. 128, amending 854). Pen. Code, § 640, by making it an offense, in The industrial insurance law (Laws 1911, cities of the first and second classes, for any c. 74), which undertakes, by requiring contriperson to offer real property for sale with-butions from employers to an accident or inout the written authority of the owner, or his attorney in fact, appointed in writing, or of the holder of a written contract with the owner for the purchase of such property, is unconstitutional. Grossman v. Caminez, 79 N. Y. Supp. 900, 902, 79 App. Div. 15 (quoting and applying People v. Gillson, 17 N. E. 343, 345, 109 N. Y. 389, 399, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465).

Right to labor

St. 1903, p. 33, c. 10, providing an eighthour day for workmen in mines, smelters, and mills, does not contravene the constitutional provision relating to deprivation of "liberty." Belknap, C. J., dissenting, quotes to the effect that the term "liberty," in the Constitution, is not dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person, but embraces the right to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which the citizen has been endowed by his Creator, and that "liberty," in its broad sense, as understood in this country, means the right not only of freedom from servitude or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation. In re Boyce, 75 Pac. 1, 17, 27 Nev. 299, 65 L. R. A. 47, 1 Ann. Cas. 66.

Restraint by law implied

"Even 'liberty' itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is, then, 'liberty' regulated by law." McLaury v. Watelsky, 87 S. W. 1045, 1047, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 394 (quoting and ap3 WDS.& P.2D SER.-8

surance fund, to provide fixed and certain relief for workmen injured in extrahazardous work, and for families and dependents, regardless of questions of fault or negligence, to the exclusion of every other remedy or compensation, and which, by section 11, provides that no employer shall exempt himself from the burden or waive the benefits of the act by any contract, agreement, or regulation, and that any such contract or regulation shall be pro tanto void, is not an interference with the right to contract, since there is no absolute right to do as one wills, pursue any calling one desires, or contract as one chooses, and since the term "liberty" means absence of arbitrary restraint, and not immunity from reasonable regulations and provisions imposed in the interests of the community. State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 117 Pac. 1101, 1112, 65 Wash. 156, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466.

LIBERTY OF CONTRACT

Liberty of contract does not imply liberty in a corporation or individuals to defy the national will when legally expressed; nor does it involve a right to deprive the public of the advantages of free competition in trade and commerce. The enforcement of AntiTrust Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, declaring illegal every combination or conspiracy in restraint of interstate or foreign commerce, and forbidding attempts to monopolize such commerce, or any part of it, does not infringe on liberty of contract. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 24 Sup. Ct. 436, 462, 193 U. S. 197, 48 L. Ed. 679.

"While it may be conceded that, generally speaking, among the inalienable rights of the citizen is that of the liberty of contract, yet such liberty is not absolute and univer

sal. It is within the undoubted power of government to restrain some individuals from all contracts, as well as all individuals from some contracts. It may deny to all the right to contract for the purchase or sale of lottery tickets, to the minor the right to assume any obligations, except for the necessaries of existence; to the common carrier the power to make any contract releasing himself from negligence, and, indeed, may restrain all engaged in any employment from any contract

in the course of that employment which is

against public policy." Frisbie v. United States, 15 Sup. Ct. 586, 588, 157 U. S. 160, 39

L. Ed. 657.

The "liberty of the press" is not guaranteed by the Constitution against the publication of deliberate falsehood and misrepresentation in regard to decisions of courts, even though the publishers may think that public and political interests would be subserved by such falsehood and misrepresentation. McDougall v. Sheridan, 128 Pac. 954, 963, 23 Idaho, 191.

"Liberty of speech and of the press" im

plies not only liberty to publish but complete

immunity from legal censure and punishment for the publication, so long as it is not harmful in its character, when tested by such standards as the law affords. People ex rel.

"Liberty of the press" is not synonymous with license, nor does it give a newspaper any greater license to publish libelous matter than the ordinary citizen may have. Lowe v. News Pub. Co., 70 S. E. 607, 9 Ga. App. 103.

"Liberty to contract" is one of the in- Attorney General v. News-Times Pub. Co., alienable rights of man, guaranteed to every 84 Pac. 912, 948, 35 Colo. 253 (adopting defincitizen by the Bill of Rights (Const. art. 1, §ition in Cooper v. People ex rel. Wyatt, 22 1), subject only to such restrictions as clearly Pac. 790, 13 Colo. 337, 373, 6 L. R. A. 430). appear to be for the general welfare. The mere fact that the General Assembly has enacted a law which narrows the liberty of contract as to the whole people or to a class of citizens is not decisive. Where an act relating to the giving of surety bonds makes security by surety companies exclusive and compulsory, it is not promoted by consideration of the public necessity or public welfare, and hence it follows that it is an unconstitutional restriction on the liberty to contract, guaranteed by the Constitution. State v. Robins, 73 N. E. 470, 471, 71 Ohio St. 273, 69 L. R. A. 427, 2 Ann. Cas. 485.

Act Dec. 10, 1906, No. 117, requiring certain corporations to pay their employés each week in lawful money, is not invalid as restricting the rights of employés to contract with their employer; such restriction not being direct, but resulting from the employer's right, and that restriction being valid as to the employer. Lawrence v. Rutland R. Co., 80 Vt. 370, 67 Atl. 1091, 1096, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 350, 13 Ann. Cas. 475.

LIBERTY

The "liberty of the press," as the law now stands, is only a more extensive and improved use of the liberty of speech which prevailed before printing became general, and is the right belonging to every one, whether the conductor of a newspaper or not, to publish whatever he pleases without the license, interference, or control of the government;

the publisher being responsible only for the abuse of the privilege. Williams v. Black, 124 N. W. 728, 732, 24 S. D. 501 (citing 25 Cyc. pp. 406, 407).

Liberty and freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean the unrestricted right to do and say what one pleases at all times and under all circumstances. Act Cong. Sept. 26, 1888, c. 1039, 25 Stat. 496, forbidding deposit in the mails OF SPEECH AND THE of anything upon the exposed surface of PRESS which appears language scurrilous, defamaThe "freedom of the press" consists in a tory, threatening, or calculated and obviousright to print what he chooses without pre-character or conduct of others, is not objecly intended to reflect injuriously on the vious license, but subject to be held responsible therefor. Levert v. Daily States Pub. Co., 49 South. 206, 211, 123 La. 594, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 726, 131 Am. St. Rep. 356.

The phrase "liberty of the press" means, in the language of the Bill of Rights, that any citizen may write or publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible only for the abuse of that right. Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 73 S. E. 472, 477, 113 Va. 156, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 578.

The press has only the same privilege as to publications as private individuals; the phrase "liberty of the press" merely meaning that newspaper publications shall not be subject to censorship. Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 73 S. E. 472, 477, 113 Va. 156, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 578.

tionable as denying or abridging freedom of speech. Warren v. United States, 183 Fed. 718, 721, 106 C. C. A. 156, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 800.

“Liberty of the press' consists in the right to publish, with impunity, truth with good motives and for justifiable ends, whethindividuals." Laws 1889, p. 66, c. 20, forbider it respects the government, magistries, or ding the publication by newspapers of de

tailed accounts of the execution of criminals convicted of murder, is not in conflict with Const. art. 1, § 3, which preserves the liberty of the press. State v. Pioneer Press Co., 110 N. W. 867, 868, 100 Minn. 173, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 480, 117 Am. St. Rep. 684, 10 Ann. Cas. 351 (quoting and adopting definition of Chancellor Kent).

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS 115 LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS

"Liberty of the press" is still an undefined term, and, like some other familiar phrases of constitutional law, must remain undefined. Certain boundaries are fairly discernible within which the liberty must be displayed, but precise rules cannot be formulated in advance to govern its exercise on particular occasions. In the decision of controversies, the character, the organization, the needs, and the will of society at the present time must be given due consideration. The press, as we know it to-day, is almost as modern as the telephone and the phonograph. The functions which it performs at the present stage of our social development, if not substantially different in kind from what they have been, are magnified many fold, and the opportunities for its influence are multiplied many times. Generally publication should be no wider than the moral or social duty to publish. If it be designedly or unnecessarily or negligently excessive, privilege is lost. But, if a state newspaper, published primarily for a state constituency, have a small circulation elsewhere, it is not deprived of its privilege in the discussion of subjects of state-wide concern because of that fact. Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 Pac. 281, 283, 78 Kan. 711, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 361, 130 Am. St. Rep. 390.

"The Constitution of this state declares what is meant by 'liberty of speech' and 'liberty of the press' in the following words: 'Any person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.' Civ. Code 1895, § 5712. The right preserved and guaranteed against invasion by the Constitution is therefore the right to utter, to write, and to print one's sentiments, subject only to the limitation that in so doing he shall not be guilty of an abuse of this privilege, by invading the legal rights of others. The Constitution uses the word 'sentiments,' but it is used in the sense of thoughts, ideas. opinions. To make intelligent, forceful, and effective an expression of opinion, it may be necessary to refer to the life, conduct, and character of a person; and, so long as the truth is adhered to, the right of privacy of another cannot be said to have been invaded by one who speaks or writes or prints, provided the reference to such person, and the manner in which he is referred to, is reasonably and legitimately proper in an expression of opinion on the subject that is under investigation. It will therefore be seen that the right of privacy must in some particulars yield to the right of speech and of the press. It is well recognized that The "liberty of the press," guaranteed by and that a libel is an abuse of the liberty slander is an abuse of the liberty of speech, Const. art. 1, § 7, guaranteeing to every per to write and print, but it is nowhere exson the liberty to speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, but holding pressly declared in the law that these are him responsible for the abuse of that right, the law makes the truth in suits for slanthe only abuses of such rights. And that has never been held to mean that the pub-der and in prosecutions and suits for libel lisher of a newspaper shall be any less re- a complete defense may not necessarily

make the publication of the truth the legal right of every person, nor prevent it from

The

being in some cases a legal wrong.
truth may be spoken, written, or printed
about all matters of a public nature, as well
as matters of a private nature in which the

sponsible than any other person would be for publishing otherwise the same libelous matter. The contrary rule has been affirmed by the courts of this country and England with great uniformity. Morse v. Times-Republican Printing Co., 100 N. W. 867, 873, 124 Iowa, 707 (citing Jones v. Townsend's Adm'x, 21 Fla. 431, 58 Am. Rep. 676; Sheckell v. Jack-public has a legitimate interest. The truth son, 10 Cush. [64 Mass.] 25; Aldrich v. Press Printing Co., 9 Minn. 138 [Gil. 129] 86 Am. Dec. 84; Root v. King [N. Y.] 7 Cow. 628; Tillson v. Robbins, 68 Me. 295, 28 Am. Rep. 50; Smart v. Blanchard, 42 N. H. 137; Foster v. Scripps, 39 Mich. 376, 33 Am. Rep. 403; Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385, 30 Am. Rep. 367; Eviston v. Cramer, 3 N. W. 392, 47 Wis. 659; Edwards v. San Jose Printing & Pub. Soc., 34 Pac. 128, 99 Cal. 431, 37 Am. St. Rep. 70; McAllister v. Detroit Free Press, 43 N. W. 431, 76 Mich. 338, 15 Am. St. Rep. 318; Upton v. Hume, 33 Pac. 810, 24 Or. 420, 21 L. R. A. 493, 41 Am. St. Rep. 863; Smith v. Tribune Co., 22 Fed. Cas. 689; Davis v. Sladden, 21 Pac. 140, 17 Or. 259; Barnes v. Campbell, 59 N. H. 128, 47 Am. Rep. 183; Mallory v. Pio-ty aggrieved may not be without a remedy. neer Press Co., 26 N. W. 904, 34 Minn. 521; Delaware State Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Croasdale [Del.] 6 Houst. 181; Palmer v. City of Concord, 48 N. H. 216, 97 Am. Dec. 605).

may be uttered and printed in reference to uals whenever it is necessary to the full exthe life, character, and conduct of individercise of the right to express one's sentiments on any and all subjects that may be proper matter for discussion. But there may arise cases where the speaking or printing of the truth may be considered an abuse of the 'liberty of speech and of the press,' as in a case where matters of purely private concern, wholly foreign to a legitimate expression of opinion on the subject under discussion, are injected into the discussion for no other purpose and with no other motive than to annoy and harass the individual referred to. Such cases might be of rare occurrence, but, if such should arise, the par

It

The right of privacy is unquestionably lim-
ited by the right to speak and print.
may be said that to give liberty of speech
and of the press such wide scope as has

and therefore a writ of error will lie to review the judgment. Dickinson v. Mankin, 56 S. E. 824, 825, 61 W. Va. 429.

been indicated would impose a very serious limitation upon the right of privacy, but, if it does, it is due to the fact that the law considers that the welfare of the public is better subserved by maintaining the liberty LIBRARY of speech and of the press than by allowing an individual to assert his right of privacy St. 1909, § 4260, obligates a county revin such a way as to interfere with the free enue agent to cause to be listed for taxaexpression of one's sentiments, and the pub- tion all property omitted by the assessor lication of every matter in which the public and other taxing officer, and provides that may be legitimately interested. In many he shall file a statement of property omitcases the law required the individual to sur-ted, and that such statement shall contain render some of his natural and private "a description and value of the property prorights for the benefit of the public, and this is true in reference to some phases of the right of privacy as well as other legal rights. Those to whom the right to speak and write and print is guaranteed must not abuse this right, nor must one in whom the right of privacy exists abuse this right. The law will no more permit an abuse by one than by the other. Liberty of the speech and of the press is and has been a useful instrument to keep the individual within limits of lawful, decent, and proper conduct; and the right of privacy may be well used within its proper limits to keep those who speak and write and print within the legitimate bounds of the constitutional guaranties of such rights. One may be used as a check upon the other, but neither can be lawfully used for the other's destruction." Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S. E. 68, 73, 74, 122 Ga. 190, 69 L. R. A. 101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104, 2 Ann. Cas. 561.

LIBERUM TENEMENTUM

The plea of "liberum tenementum" was at one time used only where plaintiff's declaration was very general in its description of the land, not specifying it, and this plea performed the office of compelling a new assignment or more definite description, but the plea has long since performed a wider function, and its office is to confess that the plaintiff had possession of the land at the time the act complained of was committed, and that such act was in fact committed by defendant, as set forth, but avoiding the allegation by the averment of a right to enter and do the act as alleged. In legal effect the plea admits possession in the plaintiff sufficient to enable him to maintain the action against the wrongdoer and asserts a freehold in the defendant, with right to immediate possession as against plaintiff. On the filing of this plea, defendant must prove his title either by deed or other documentary evidence, or by an actual adverse and exclusive possession for 20 years, since by the issue he undertakes to show a title in himself by which the presumption arising from plaintiff's possession will be avoided. Since the plea raises the question of title and boundary, a judgment on the plea is conclusive on the question of title to land,

posed to be assessed." A revenue agent acting under such statute filed a statement of property belonging to a person named omitted from taxation, and such statement specified, among other things, a "library" of a value specified. Held, that the statement was sufficient as to the library, as "library" means such books or works of literature, science, art, or business as one may have in his residence or office. Commonwealth v. Glover, 116 S. W. 769, 774, 132 Ky. 588.

As charity

See Charity.

As educational corporation
See Educational Corporation.
As public place

See Public Place.

LICENSE

See Exclusive License; Implied License;
Irrevocable License; Life License;
Mining License; Resident License;
Simple License.

thing.

N. Y.

A "license" is a permission to do some-
People ex rel. Moses v. Gaynor, 137
Supp. 196, 198, 77 Misc. Rep. 576.

A mere "license" is but an authority to do a particular act or series of acts upon another's land without possessing any estate therein. Dawson v. Western M. R. Co., 68 Atl. 301, 305, 107 Md. 70, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 809, 126 Am. St. Rep. 337, 15 Ann. Cas. 678.

"A license' is technically an authority given to do some one act or series of acts on the land of another without passing any estate in the land." Where an owner orally offered to give land to another, providing the latter would not construct a building in such a way as to cut off the light of a window in the owner's house, and the offer was accepted, and a building erected according to the plans agreed on, the owner merely gave a parol license for the erection of the building. Shipley v. Fink, 62 Atl. 360, 362, 102 Md. 219, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1002.

A "license" merely-a verbal license-is the right to do a particular act or series of acts, without any interest in the land. Such