for libel, alleging that defendant published | malicious publication exposing any person a malicious statement concerning complain- to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or injuring ant, reciting that he was a United States federal guard, that he was a highwayman and cowardly assassin, and the murderer of a certain person who on the morning of March 19, 1906, was cowardly assassinated on a public highway, etc., sufficiently charged complainant with a penal offense, and was therefore sufficient. Gonzalez v. State, 124 S. W. 937, 938, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 141. The Texas statute (Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 5595), defining a libel as a defamation expressed in printing or writing tending to injure the reputation of a person and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach his honesty, integrity, or virtue, modifies the common-law rule as to libel and slander, and a publication is libelous whether it is libelous per se or not; it being sufficient if it can be shown by innuendo that the matter imputed had the tendency described in the statute and had reference to the plaintiff. Guisti v. Galveston Tribune, 150 S. W. 874, 876, 105 Tex. 497. to A "libel," as defined by the Washington statute, is the defamation of a person made public by any words, printing, writing, sign, picture, representation, or effigy tending to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse, or any defamation, made public as aforesaid, designed blacken and vilify the memory of one who is dead, and tending to scandalize or provoke his surviving relatives or friends. Reynolds v. Holland, 90 Pac. 648, 650, 46 Wash. 537; Chambers v. Leiser, 86 Pac. 627, 628, 43 Wash. 285, 10 Ann. Cas. 270; State v. Mays, 107 Pac. 363, 365, 57 Wash. 540. And where a newspaper published an article stating that plaintiff's father had been charged with using the mails to defraud in selling land, and would be arrested, giving the details of the fraudulent operations, and published a photograph of the members of his family, including plaintiff, his young daughter, the publication of plaintiff's photograph in connection with the article concerning her father was not a "libel," within this statute. Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 117 Pac. 594, 596, 64 Wash. 691, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 595. As this statute does not expressly make malice an ingredient of libel, a publication which tends to expose a person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule is libelous, without regard to the existence of actual malice. Byrne v. Funk, 80 Pac. 772, 774, 38 Wash. 506, 3 Ann. Cas. 647. And so, where there has been an unwarranted publication in a newspaper of a list of conditional sales made by a retail dealer taken from memoranda legally filed by him with the county auditor, the dealer to charge a criminal libel under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2424, defining libel as a him in his business, must allege facts to show that the publication produced such results. State v. Darwin, 115 Pac. 309, 311, 63 Wash. 303, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1026. Injury to business or trade To be libelous, as tending to injure one in his business or profession, the words must have a direct tendency to hurt, as in the case of a charge of incapacity, dishonesty or insolvency. To publish concerning a lawyer that he was thrown into jail by a magistrate without a chance to tell his side of the case on the complaint of a woman for whom he had collected a debt, and from which amount of money collected he had deducted only the legal percentage for collection, was not "libelous,", since the only fair import was that the lawyer was wrongfully thrown into jail which could not reflect upon his previous conduct, capacity, or character and did not tend to injure him in his profession. Hughes v. New York Evening Post, 100 N. Y. Supp. 982, 984, 115 App. Div. 611. In Any written words are "libelous" which in any manner are prejudicial to another in the way of his employment or trade. a publication referring to plaintiff twice as a detective, and stating that, when plaintiff was attacked by robbers, he showed great cowardice and attempted to hide under the seat of the vehicle, the tendency of the words was to hold him up to scorn as a Holland v. detective, and was "libelous.” Flick, 61 Atl. 828, 829, 212 Pa. 201. Construction of language The fact that an alleged libelous article character depends does not render the aruses a slang word upon which its libelous ticle any the less libelous, provided the word used has a well-recognized meaning, or by the article itself is given a meaning which conveys to the reader the understanding that the word is used so as to impeach the honesty or reputation of the person named and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. State v. Sheridan, 93 Pac. 656, 657, 14 Idaho, 222, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 497. In a published statement, referring to plaintiff, a candidate for public office, that "no man in the community has any interest in seeing the county disgraced by sending a 'social leper' to speak and act for her in public councils," the term "social leper" may mean that his moral traits of character are such as to require his banishment from society, and, if there is an inducement and innuendo, which, fairly interpreted, would give meaning, may be "libelous." Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158, 193. 31 Am. Rep. 757. this Defendant wrote and published a letter to the mayor of New York, stating that defendant had written a letter to the Governor to get redress "for the scoundrelism" herein- [dicative of feeling, rather than of conviction, after mentioned through the power of re- and therefore not so much gravity is almoval of city officials, but on second thought lowed to it as to words deliberately written concluded to seek redress from the mayor. down and published; the latter justifying He then proceeded to make complaint against the inference that they are the expression of plaintiff as police commissioner for alleged settled conviction and affect the public mind incompetency and lawlessness in the admin- correspondingly. So, too, an oral charge istration of the police force of New York; merely falls upon the ear, and the agency the scoundrelism referred to being plaintiff's of the wrongdoer in inflicting injury comes refusal as police commissioner to remove the to an end when his utterance has died on photograph and record of a certain boy from the ear, but not so with the written or the Rogues' Gallery; plaintiff being the only printed charge, which may pass from hand one defendant was complaining of, and his to hand indefinitely, and may renew its removal from office being the only redress youth, so to speak, as a defamation as long sought. Held, that the word "scoundrelism" as the libel itself remains in existence, and referred to plaintiff with sufficient certainty, | hatch a new crop of slanders, to be blown and was libelous per se. Bingham v. Gaynor, 126 N. Y. Supp. 353, 360, 141 App. Div. 301. Imputation of crime hither and yon like thistledown at every sight of the libel, so that a printed slander, when published, takes a wider and more mischievous range than mere oral defama tion, and is more reprehensible in the eye of L. & Sland. (2d Ed.) 3; Dexter v. Spear, the law. Cooley, Torts (2d Ed.) 240; Odgers, 7 Fed. Cas. 624, 4 Mason, 115. Thus, for instance, to publish of a man that he is a "skunk" (Massuere v. Dickens, 35 N. W. 349, 70 Wis. 83), a "swine" (Solverson v. Peterson, 25 N. W. 14, 64 Wis. 198, 54 Am. Rep. (Giles v. State, 6 Ga. 276), “I look on him 607), a "drunkard," a "cuckold," a "tory" as a rascal" (Williams v. Karnes, 4 Humph. When a newspaper published a news article stating that, within 15 minutes after the discovery of the body of plaintiff's wife, plaintiff had a quarrel with the undertaker, who had been called by her sister, and threatened to kill the undertaker unless he left the house, since the publication represented, in effect, that plaintiff threatened to kill another in a passion, without just cause, it would necessarily bring him into contempt and hatred so as to make the publication actionable libel. Gordon v. New York Evening Journal Pub. Co., 111 N. Y. [23 Tenn.] 9), “an imp of the devil and a Supp. 574, 575, 127 App. Div. 353. Imputation of death It is libelous per se to publish of a living person that he is dead, because, exposing | him to ridicule; a libel being a malicious publication tending to expose one to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Cohen v. New York Times Co., 132 N. Y. Supp. 1, 74 Misc. Rep. 618. Malice A publication tending to expose one to contempt, ridicule, hatred, and derogation of character, if malicious, is "libelous." Mulderig v. Wilkes-Barre Times, 64 Atl. 636, 637, 215 Pa. 470, 114 Am. St. Rep. 967. As misdemeanor See Misdemeanor. As personal injury See Personal Injury. Slander distinguished Included in slander by writing or speaking, see Slander by Writing or Speak ing. A "libel" differs from a "slander" in that a publication may be libelous when, if spoken orally, it would not be slanderous. This distinction is said by the books to be based upon the grounds that a vocal utterance does not import the same quality of deliberation, and is more prone to be the ebullition of mere effervescence or lack of mental equipoise, and to be accepted as in cowardly snail" (Price v. Whitely, 50 Mo. 439), or that he has been "in collusion with ruffians" (Snyder v. Fulton, 34 Md. 128, 6 Am. Rep. 314), are each and all libelous. Ukman v. Daily Record Co., 88 S. W. 60, 64, 189 Mo. 378 (citing Nelson v. Musgrave, 10 Mo. 648; Hermann v. Bradstreet Co., 19 Mo. App. 227; Manget v. O'Neill, 51 Mo. App. 35). "Libel" is a published writing, picture, or similar production of such a nature as to immediately tend to do mischief to a party, or injure the character of an individual. Slander of title is a false and malicious statement, whether by word of mouth or in writing, in reference to a person's title to some right or property belonging to him, as where a person alleges that the plaintiff has a defective title to land. A written slander of title is sometimes called a libel in the nature of slander of title. Words, though not slanderous in themselves, yet if published in writing, tending in any way to the discredit of a man, are "libel." Macurda v. Globe Newspaper Co., 165 Fed. 104, 107 (citing Bacon's Abridgement and Rapalje). Written or printed matter which is communicated to third persons stands on a different footing from spoken words, and is often actionable when it would not be if spoken, and if it is of a character conducive to blacken the reputation of the person referred to, or excite ridicule or wrath against him, or destroy public confidence in him, it is actionable without proof of special damages, ! 763; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 30 Am. because written or printed injurious state- Rep. 289; Gilman v. Tucker, 28 N. E. 1040, ments about a person imply a deliberate pur- | 128 N. Y. 190, 200, 13 L. R. A. 304, 26 Am. St. pose to do harm, whereas detrimental words Rep. 464; Frank L. Fisher Co. v. Woods, 79 are often spoken thoughtlessly or in a pas- N. E. 837, 187 N. Y. 90, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) sion. Weight is allowed, also, to the more 707. enduring character and wider vogue of published statements. Farley v. Evening Chronicle Pub. Co., 87 S. W. 565, 568, 113 Mo. App. 216 (citing Odgers, L. & Sland. [4th Ed.] p. 4). As trespass See Trespass. LIBERAL LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION Strict construction distinguished, see LIBERALITY See Salvage. LIBERTIES See Indecent Liberties. LIBERTY "Liberty," in its broad sense, means the right not only of freedom from actual restraint of the person but the right of such use of his faculties in all lawful ways to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation. All laws, therefore, which impair or trammel those rights or restrict his freedom of action or his choice of methods in the transaction of his lawful business are infringement upon his fundamental right of "liberty" and are void. People v. Lochner, 69 N. E. 373, 386, 177 N. Y. 145, 101 Am. St. Rep. 773. The "liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution against deprivation without due process of law is a liberty of natural, not artificial, persons. Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 27 Sup. Ct. 384, 386, 204 U. S. 359, 51 L. Ed. 520. "Liberty" includes not only the right to be out of prison, free to come and go, if the See Abuse of Liberty; Civil Liberty; law is not violated in so doing, but to enConstitutional Liberty; Individual Lib- | gage in all lawful pursuits, earn a livelihood, erty; Life, Liberty, and Property; and own and enjoy property. To exclude Life, Liberty, and Pursuit of Happiness; Personal Liberty; Restrained and Deprived of Liberty. Restrained of Liberty, see Restrain. The term "liberty" includes the individual rights of citizenship and its privileges. State ex rel. Guion v. Miles, 109 S. W. 595, 610, 210 Mo. 127. One definition of "liberties" is privileges or licenses taken in violation of the laws or propriety. Dekelt v. People, 99 Pac. 330, 331, 44 Colo. 525 (adopting definition in Webst. Dict.). from entry into the United States, or to deport therefrom, a citizen of the United States deprives him of liberty in the constitutional sense. In re Sing Tuck, 126 Fed. 386, 394. Const. U. S. Amend. 14, and Const. R. I. art. 1, § 10, providing that no person shall be deprived of "liberty" without due process of law, were borrowed from the thirty-ninth article of the Great Charter, declaring that no free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed or punished or in any ways destroyed, nor "will we pass upon him, or send upon him, unless by legal judgment "Liberty," in its broad sense, means the of his peers, or by the law of the land"; the right, not only of freedom from servitude, words corresponding to "liberty" in the first imprisonment, or restraint, but the right of pronouncement being "taken," "imprisoned," one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to "outlawed," and "punished," which are not live and work where he will, to earn his live-confined to mere freedom from incarceration lihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue 73 Atl. 97, 107, 30 R. I. 13, 24 L. R. A. (N. or imprisonment. Henry v. Cherry & Webb, any lawful trade or avocation. Wyatt v. S.) 991, 136 Am. St. Rep. 928, 18 Ann. Cas. 1006. James McCreery Co., 111 N. Y. S. 86, 88, 126 App. Div. 650 (quoting and adopting definition in Fisher Co. v. Woods, 79 N. E. 836, 187 The word "liberty," as used in Const. N. Y. 90, 12 L. R. A. [N. S.] 707); Health De- art. 2, providing that no person shall be department of City of New York v. Rector, etc., prived of life, liberty, or property except by of Trinity Church, 39 N. E. 833, 145 N. Y. due process of law, means not only the right 32, 27 L. R. A. 710, 45 Am. St. Rep. 579; to freedom from actual servitude, imprisonPeople v. Gillson, 17 N. E. 343, 109 N. Y. ment, or restraint, but the right of one to use 389, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465; Colon v. Lisk, 47 his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and N. E. 302, 153 N. Y. 188, 60 Am. St. Rep. 609; | work where he will, to earn his livelihood Lawton v. Steele, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. Ed. 385; People ex rel. Tyroler v. Warden of City Prison, 51 N. E. 1006, 157 N. Y. 116, 43 L. R. A. 264, 68 Am. St. Rep. in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or vocation. State ex rel. Galle v. City of New Orleans, 36 South. 999, 1001, 113 La. 371, 67 L. R. A. 70, 2 Ann. Cas. 92 (cit ing In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. | Utah, 387, 65 L. R. A. 308, 101 Am. St. Rep. 636). 971, 1 Ann. Cas. 550. "By the term 'liberty,' as used in the provision [Fourteenth Amendment], something more is meant than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose, and to act in such manner, not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness; that is, to pursue such callings and avocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and give to them their highest enjoyment." Powell v. Pennsylvania, 8 Sup. Ct. 992, 1259, 127 U. S. 678, 32 L. Ed. 253 (Field, J., dissenting). The word "liberty," as used in the constitutional guaranty against deprivation of liberty, means the right, not only to freedom from actual servitude, imprisonment, or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or vocation. City of New Orleans v. Smythe, 41 South, 33, 36, 116 La. 685, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 722, 144 Am. St. Rep. 566 (citing In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Marx, 2 N. E. 29, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 99 N. Y. 386; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676). ment. "The liberty of which the fourteenth amendment forbids a state from depriving By the term "liberty," as used in the any one without due process of law is some- fourteenth amendment to the federal Constithing more than freedom from the enslave- tution, something more is meant than mere or the ment of the body or from physical restraint. freedom from physical restraint bounds of a prison. In my judgment the words 'life, liberty or It means freedom to property' in the fourteenth amendment should go where one may choose, and to act in such be interpreted as embracing every right that manner, not inconsistent with the equal may be brought within judicial cognizance, rights of others, as his judgment may dictate and therefore no right of that kind can be for the promotion of his happiness; that is, taken in violation of 'due process of law.'" to pursue such callings and avocations as Taylor v. Beckham, 20 Sup. Ct. 890, 1016, 178 may be most suitable to develop his capacU. S. 548, 44 L. Ed. 1187 (Harlan, J., dissent-ities and give to them their highest enjoying). Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Haskell, 172 Fed. 545, 566 (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 "The term 'liberty,' as protected by the U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77). Constitution, is not cramped into a mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, as by incarceration, but it is deemed to embrace the right of man to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare." MacMullen v. City of Middletown, 98 N. Y. Supp. 145, 149, 112 App. Div. 81 (quoting Rapallo, J., in People v. Marx, 2 N. E. 29, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34). ""Liberty,' in the sense in which the term is employed in the Constitution, is not restricted to mere freedom from imprisonment, but it embraces the right of a person to use his God-given powers, employ his faculties, exercise his judgment in the affairs of life, and to be free in the enjoyment and disposal of his acquisitions, subject only to such restraints as are imposed by the law of the land for the public welfare. The word 'liberty,' as thus employed in the Constitutions and understood in the United States, is a term of comprehensive scope. It embraces not only freedom from servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint of person, but also all our religious, civil, political, and personal rights, including the right in each subject to purchase, hold, and sell or dispose of property in the same way that his neighbor may; and of such liberties no one can be deprived except by due process of law." Block v. Schwartz, 76 Pac. 22, 25, 27 The "liberty" mentioned in the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the employment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling. It is a part of every man's civil right that he be left at liberty to refuse business relations with any person whomso ever, whether the refusal rests upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice. Ex parte Drayton, 153 Fed. 986, 989 (quoting and adopting definition in Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana, 17 Sup. Ct. 431, 165 U. S. 589, 41 L. Ed. 832; Cooley, Torts, p. 278). "The term 'liberty,' as used in the Constitution, is not dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, as by incarceration, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare." It is not every equal law which is a just law, but, within limits, it may be said that equality is an attribute of liberty. McKinster v. Sager, 72 N. E. 854, 857, 163 Ind. 671, 68 L. R. A. 273, 106 Am. St. Rep. 268 (quoting and adopting definition in People v. Gillson, 17 N. E. 343, 345, 109 N. [stitute a misdemeanor subject to fine or Y. 389, 398, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465). imprisonment or both, are unconstitutional as depriving persons or corporations issuing such orders of their property without due process of law, in that they restricted their freedom, or "liberty," to contract. Missouri Tie & Timber Co., 80 S. W. 933, 941, 181 Mo. 536, 65 L. R. A. 588, 103 Am. St. 614, 2 Ann. Cas. 119 (citing 2 Story, Const. [5th Ed.] § 1950). The state may decline to confer official power on residents of other states without depriving such nonresidents of "liberty" or "property," within the meaning of those words as used in the Constitution. "Liberty," as the term is used in the constitutional provision, includes freedom from servitude and unlawful restraint, the right to pursue any ordinary calling, trade, or employment, and acquire property thereby, but does not include any supposed right of a nonresident to receive an appointment to a position created by the general laws of the state for the purpose of carrying into effect legislation affecting the state and its people. No nonresident enjoys the right of "liberty" or property in the fees or emoluments of the office of the executor or administrator. In re Mulford, 75 N. E. 345, 346, 217 Ill. 242, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 341, 108 Am. St. Rep. 249, 3 Ann. Cas. 986. Right to contract Freedom to contract is "liberty," within Const. art. 1, § 5, and Const. U. S. Amend 14, § 1. Sturgess v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. (S. C.) 60 S. E. 1135, 1141. The privilege of contracting is both a "liberty" and a property right, and is protected by the Constitution. People v. Steele, 83 N. E. 236, 237, 231 Ill. 340, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 361, 121 Am. St. Rep. 321. "It has been heid that the word 'liberty,' as used in the Constitution, was not to be confined to the mere liberty of person, but included, among others, a right to enter into certain classes of contracts for the purpose of enabling the citizen to carry on its business." Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 20 Sup. Ct. 96, 102, 175 U. S. 211, 44 L. Ed. 136. "Congress may restrain individuals from making contracts under certain circumstances and upon certain subjects." United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 19 Sup. Ct. 25, 33, 171 U. S. 505, 43 L. Ed. 259. and "The word 'liberty,' as used in the constitutional declarations, means more than freedom of locomotion. It includes comprehends, among other things, freedom of speech, the right to self-defense against unlawful violence, and the right to buy and sell as others may." Rev. St. 1899, § 8142, prohibiting any person or corporation from issuing, in payment of wages, any order or evidence of indebtedness not negotiable and redeemable at its face value in lawful money of the United States by the person issuing it, section 8143, requiring all persons issuing such orders during business hours to be ready to redeem the same in lawful money of the United States at the option of the holder, and section 8144, providing that a violation of the preceding sections shall con State v. The "liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution means, not only the right of the citizen to be free from mere physical restraint of his person, but the term embraces the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of his faculties in lawful ways, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood, and for that purpose to enter into contracts which may be proper, but the freedom of contract is a qualified right, and the freedom of contract is not unconstitutionally infringed by Code Iowa, § 2071, defining the liability of railway corporations for injuries from negligence, so that a railway company, when sued on such liability, is precluded from making the defense that a recovery is barred by the acceptance of benefits under a contract of membership in its relief department. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 31 Sup. Ct. 259, 262, 219 U. S. 549, 55 L. Ed. 328 (quoting and adopting definition in Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. Ed. 832). "The fourteenth amendment, however, does not guarantee the citizen the right to make within his state, either directly or indirectly, a contract, the making whereof is constitutionally forbidden by the state. The proposition that, because a citizen might make such a contract for himself beyond the confines of his state, therefore he might authorize an agent to violate in his behalf the laws of his state, within her own limits, involves a clear non sequitur, and ignores the vital distinction between acts done within and acts done beyond a state's jurisdiction." Hooper v. California, 15 Sup. Ct. 207, 211, 155 U. S. 648, 39 L. Ed. 297. Right to choose employment "Privileges and immunities" of a citizen, as well as his "liberty," within the guaranties of Const. U. S. Amend. 14, involve the right, not only to be free from physical restraint, but the right to follow any lawful business or avocation in life and to make all proper contracts in furtherance thereof. Ex parte Hollman, 60 S. E. 19, 30, 79 S. C. 9, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 242, 14 Ann. Cas. 1105. "Liberty," as guaranteed by the Constitution, is the right of a citizen to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any law |