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expressed in print or writing, or pictures, or error to leave to the jury the question whethsigns, tending to injure the reputation of an er it was libelous, as there was no ambiguity individual and exposing him to public hatred, in the language. State v. Cooper, 116 N. W. contempt, or ridicule. To falsely publish of 691, 692, 138 Iowa, 516. another that there are criminal cases pending
The Kansas statute (section 2271, Gen. against him is libelous per se. Witham y. Atlanta Journal, 53 S. E. 105, 107, 124 Ga. St. 1901) defines a “libel" as a malicious def
amation of a person made public by any 688, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 977. .
printing, writing, sign, picture, representaCr. Code, § 177 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. tion, or effigy, tending to provoke him to 38), defines libel as a malicious defamation, wrath or expose him to public hatred, conexpressed either by printing or by signs or tempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the pictures, tending to impeach the honesty, in- benefits of public confidence and social intertegrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish the course, or any malicious defamation made natural defects of one who is alive and there- public as aforesaid, designed to blacken and by expose him to public hatred, contempt, vilify the memory of one who is dead, and ridicule, or financial injury. A newspaper tending to scandalize or provoke his survivarticle published by accused charging pros- ing relatives and friends. To say of a man ecutor with improper and dishonest actions that he is a eunuch is actionable per se. Eckas state's attorney, and with having prosti- ert v. Van Pelt, 76 Pac. 909, 910, 69 Kan. tuted his office for private interests and po- 357, 66 L. R. A. 266. litical purposes, and that he was in collusion
It is libelous per se to write of a clergywith violators of the liquor law, that he was actuated by improper motives with reference have anything to do with him or touch bim
man, an applicant for a pulpit, “I would not to an alleged bridge trust, and that there with a ten-foot pole,” if the words would exwas no doubt but that such trust had “prov
pose the person written of to hatred or conen a fat goose to some one,” that there was also good ground to suspect something dis- tempt, or injury to his business or occupation honest and crooked in the matter, and that within the definition of “libel” in the Minne
sota statute (Rev. Laws 1905, § 4916). Cole it was not prosecutor's purpose to enforce the law, was libelous per se. People v.
v. Millspaugh, 126 N. W. 626, 111 Minn. 159,
28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 152, 137 Am. St. Rep. 546, Strauch, 93 N. E. 126, 130, 247 Ill. 220.
20 Ann. Cas. 717. At common law any publication is a "li
The Missouri statute (Rev. St. 1899, 8 bel" which degrades and injures another person, or brings him into contempt, hatred, 2259) defining libel as a malicious defamation or ridicule, or which accuses him of a crime of a person made public by any printing, punishable by law, or of an act odious and him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred,
writing, sign, picture, etc., tending to provoke disgraceful in society. It is defined by the Penal Code of Indiana to be a malicious contempt, and ridicule, etc., and section 2260 publication of any false charge of and con- making the circulation of a libel a misdecerning another, accusing such other of any
meanor, made all classes of libels misdemean
ors and actionable per se, but did not make degrading or infamous act. Cronin v. Zimmerman, 88 N. E. 718, 719, 44 Ind. App. 118; publications libelous that were not so at comId., 90 N. E. 339, 45 Ind. App. 712.
mon law. Kenworthy v. Journal Co., 93 S.
W. 882, 885, 117 Mo. App. 327. Under the The Iowa statute (Code, $ 5086), defines statute of this state (Rev. St. 1899, $8 2260, libel as the malicious defamation of a person, 2863; Ann. St. 1906, pp. 1426, 1637), declarmade public by any printing, etc., tending to ing that one publishing a libel shall be guilty provoke hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to of a misdemeanor, and providing that it is deprive him of the benefit of public confi-actionable to publish falsely that any person dence and social intercourse. In a criminal has been guilty of adultery, it is libel to alprosecution for libel, the information alleged lege in a circular printed and published that that defendant charged the prosecutor with one has committed adultery. State v. Santscheming to disbar certain attorneys, because huff, 110 S. W. 624, 626, 131 Mo. App. 620. they acted as attorneys for a temperance or- The statute of this state (Rev. St. 1909, $ ganization, and that he was guilty of grossly 4818) defining a libel as the malicious defunprofessional conduct by testifying as a amation of a person by printing so as to witness while acting as prosecutor in the expose him to public hatred, contempt, or disbarment cases, and that the prosecution ridicule, though a part of the Criminal Code, was an attempt to cover the record of prose- is applicable to civil actions, and, under it, a cutor as county attorney for unprofessional newspaper article stating that plaintiff was conduct before the grand jury, and that he served with a summons in an alleged frauduattempted to falsify the court record in the lent cattle transaction, and that he had takdisbarment proceedings, and suppressed cer- en advantage of the bankruptcy law to estain affidavits in the investigation, which cape liability, is libelous per se. Sotham v. charges defendant published in a temperance Drovers' Telegram Co., 144 S. W. 428, 431, paper edited by him. Held, that the publica- 239 Mo. 606. Under this statute the publication charged was libelous per se, and it was ' tion, without consent, of the picture of a
child five years old, with the false statement, able that they shall make the charge in dithat “Papa is going to buy mamma an Elgin rect terms. Lauder v. Jones, 101 N. W. watch for a present, and some one (I must 907, 911, 13 N. D. 525. not tell who) is going to buy my big sister a
The statute (Rev. Codes 1905, $ 8877) dediamond ring, so don't you think you ought fines "criminal libel" as "the malicious defto buy me something?" as an advertisement amation of a person made public by any printin aid to business, is libelous, as exposing ing, writing, sign, picture, reputation or effigy the child to ridicule. Munden v. Harris, 134 tending to expose him to public hatred, conS. W. 1076, 1081, 153 Mo. App. 652.
tempt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the Under the Montana statute defining "li- benefits of public confidence or social interbel” as a false and unprivileged publication course.
And the following section in writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other provides that: “Every person who makes or fixed representation to the eye which exposes i composes, dictates or procures the same to any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or be done or who willfully publishes or circuobloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or lates such libel or in any way knowingly or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure willfully aids or assists in making, publishhim in his occupation, the existence of malice ing or circulating the same is guilty of a is not a necessary ingredient to entitle plain- felony." The gist of the crime is the malitiff to recover. Paxton v. Woodward, 78 Pac. ' cious defamation of a person made public in 215, 217, 31 Mont. 195, 107 Am. St. Rep. 416, one or more of the modes prescribed and 3 Ann. Cas. 546.
tending to expose such person to public haThe Penal Law of New York (Consol. ley, 136 N. W. 784, 785, 23 N. D. 284.
tred, contempt, or ridicule, etc. State v. TolLaws, c. 40) $ 1346, provides that an indictment for a libel contained in a newspaper It is not necessary, in order to render a published in the state against a resident publication libelous, that it should charge thereof may be found in the county where any crime or public offense, inasmuch as the the paper was published or in the county South Dakota statute (Civ. Code, $ 29) defines where the person libeled resided when the “libel" as a false and unprivileged publicaoffense was committed, and section 1347 pro- tion, by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or vides that in libel against a nonresident the other fixed representation to the eye, which indictment shall be found and the trial had exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridiat the place where the paper containing the cule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be libel purports on its face to be published, or, shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency if no county is indicated thereon, in any to injure him in his occupation. Barron v. county where the paper is circulated. Code Smith, 101 N. W. 1105, 1106, 19 S. D. 50; Cr. Proc. & 138, contained substantially simi- Nichols v. Smith, 102 N. W. 1135, 19 S. D. lar provisions relating to the place of indict- 159. ment and trial where the person libeled is a The Texas statute (Acts 1901, p. 30, C. resident and nonresident. Penal Law, § 26) defining a "libel" as a defamation tending 1340, defines libel as a malicious publication to blacken the memory of the dead or to inby writing, printing, etc., which exposes any jure the living, or expose him to public haliving person to contempt, etc. Heid, that tred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury, the purpose of sections 1346 and 1347 was to or to impeach his honesty and integrity, etc., designate the place of indictment and trial, includes any case which, in the absence of and not to define libel; and hence do not statute, was libelous at common law, and limit the operation of section 1340 by exclud- a publication directly impeaching one's ining books or writings other than newspapers, tegrity and truthfulness is libelous per se. and, under the latter section, as well as at Fleming v. Mattinson, 114 S. W. 650, 652, 52 common law, one could be prosecuted for a Tex. Civ. App. 476. In view of this statute, libel published in a book in this state, though words libelous per se and from the publicacommitted against a nonresident. People v. tion of which damages are implied as a matFornaro, 119 N. Y. Supp. 746, 748, 65 Misc. ter of law are such words as tend to expose Rep. 457.
one to public hatred or disgrace or vilify him The North Dakota statute (Rev. Codes. (Tex.) 145 S. W. 1101, 1103.
or injure his character. Allen v. Earnest 1899, § 2715) defines "libel" as "a false and" umprivileged publication by writing, printing, Under Pen. Code, art. 721, declaring that picture, effigy, or other fixed representation he is guilty of "libel” who, with intent to to the eye, which exposes any person to ha- injure, makes, publishes, or circulates any tred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which malicious statement affecting the reputation causes him to be shunned or avoided, or of another as to any matter or thing pointed which has a tendency to injure him in his out in the chapter, and article 727 declaring occupation.” If the language of an alleged that the written, printed, or published statelibel is fairly susceptible of a construction ment, to come within the definition of “libel," which renders it defamatory, the complaint must convey the idea that the person to states a cause of action. It is not necessary whom it refers has been guilty of some penal to render the words defamatory and action- offense, etc., it was held that an indictment
for libel, alleging that defendant published | malicious publication exposing any person a malicious statement concerning complain to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or injuring ant, reciting that he was a United States fed- him in his business, must allege facts to eral guard, that he was a highwayman and show that the publication produced such recowardly assassin, and the murderer of a cer- sults. State v. Darwin, 115 Pac. 309, 311, tain person who on the morning of March 19, 63 Wash. 303, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1026. 1906, was cowardly assassinated on a public
Injury to business or trade highway, etc., sufficiently charged complainant with a penal offense, and was therefore in his business or profession, the words must
To be libelous, as tending to injure one sufficient. Gonzalez v. State, 124 S. W. 937, have a direct tendency to hurt, as in the case 938, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 141.
of a charge of incapacity, dishonesty or inThe Texas statute (Rev. Civ. St. 1911, solvency. To publish concerning a lawyer art. 5595), defining a libel as a defamation that he was thrown into jail by a magistrate expressed in printing or writing tending to without a chance to tell his side of the injure the reputation of a person and expose case on the complaint of a woman for whom him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, he had collected a debt, and from which or to impeach his honesty, integrity, or vir- amount of money collected he had deducted tue, modifies the common-law rule as to only the legal percentage for collection, was libel and slander, and a publication is libelous not "libelous," since the only fair import whether it is libelous per se or not; it being was that the lawyer was wrongfully thrown sufficient if it can be shown by innuendo that into jail which could not reflect upon his the matter imputed had the tendency de- previous conduct, capacity, or character and scribed in the statute and had reference to did not tend to injure him in his profession. the plaintiff. Guisti v. Galveston Tribune, Hughes v. New York Evening Post, 100 N. Y. 150 S. W. 874, 876, 105 Tex. 497.
Supp. 982, 984, 115 App. Div. 611. A "libel," as defined by the Washington
Any written words are "libelous" which statute, is the defamation of a person made in any manner are prejudicial to another public by any words, printing, writing, sign, in the way of his employment or trade. picture, representation, or effigy tending to a publication referring to plaintiff twice as provoke him to wrath, or expose him to pub- a detective, and stating that, when plaintiff lic hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to de
was attacked by robbers, he showed great prive him of the benefits of public confidence cowardice and attempted to hide under the and social intercourse, or any defamation, seat of the vehicle, the tendency of the made public aforesaid, designed to words was to hold him up to scorn as a blacken and vilify the memory of one who detective, and was "libelous.” Holland v. is dead, and tending to scandalize or provoke Flick, 61 Atl. 828, 829, 212 Pa. 201. his surviving relatives or friends. Reynolds
Construction of language v. Holland, 90 Pac. 648, 650, 46 Wash. 537 ;
The fact that an alleged libelous article Chambers v. Leiser, 86 Pac. 627, 628, 43 Wash. 285, 10 Ann. Cas. 270; State v. Mays, character depends does not render the ar
uses a slang word upon which its }ibelous 107 Pac. 363, 365, 57 Wash. 540. And where ticle any the less libelous, provided the word a newspaper published an article stating used has a well-recognized meaning, or by that plaintiff's father had been charged with the article itself is given a meaning which using the mails to defraud in selling land, and would be arrested, giving the details of the word is used so as to impeach the hon
conveys to the reader the understanding that the fraudulent operations, and published a photograph of the members of his family, expose him to public hatred, contempt, or
esty or reputation of the person named and including plaintiff, his young daughter, the ridicule. State v. Sheridan, 93 Pac. 656, 657, publication of plaintiff's photograph in con- 14 Idaho, 222, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 497. nection with the article concerning her father was not a "libel,” within this statute.
In a published statement, referring to Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 117 Pac. 594, 596, plaintiff, a candidate for public office, that 64 Wash. 691, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 595. As “no man in the community has any interest this statute does not expressly make malice in seeing the county disgraced by sending an ingredient of libel, a publication which a 'social lepers to speak and act for her in tends to expose a person to public hatred, public councils,” the term "social leper” may contempt, or ridicule is libelous, without re- mean that his moral traits of character are gard to the existence of actual malice. such as to require his banishment from soByrne v. Funk, 80 Pac. 772, 774, 38 Wash. ciety, and, if there is an inducement and 506, 3 Ann. Cas. 647. And so, where there innuendo, which, fairly interpreted, would has been an unwarranted publication in a give this meaning, may be "libelous." newspaper of a list of conditional sales made Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158, 193, 31 by a retail dealer taken from memoranda Am. Rep. 757. legally filed by him with the county auditor, Defendant wrote and published a letter the dealer to charge a criminal libel under to the mayor of New York, stating that deRem. & Bal. Code, $ 2424, defining libel as a 'fendant had written a letter to the Governor
to get redress "for the scoundrelism" herein- , dicative of feeling, rather than of conviction, after mentioned through the power of re- and therefore not so much gravity is almoval of city officials, but on second thought lowed to it as to words deliberately written concluded to seek redress from the mayor. down and published; the latter justifying He then proceeded to make complaint against the inference that they are the expression of plaintiff as police commissioner for alleged settled conviction and affect the public mind incompetency and lawlessness in the admin- correspondingly. So, too, an oral charge istration of the police force of New York; merely falls upon the ear, and the agency the scoundrelism referred to being plaintiff's of the wrongdoer in inflicting injury comes refusal as police commissioner to remove the to an end when his utterance has died on photograph and record of a certain boy from the ear, but not so with the written or the Rogues' Gallery; plaintiff being the only printed charge, which may pass from hand one defendant was complaining of, and his to hand indefinitely, and may renew its removal from office being the only redress youth, so to speak, as a defamation as long sought. Held, that the word "scoundrelism" as the libel itself remains in existence, and referred to plaintiff with sufficient certainty, hatch a new crop of slanders, to be blown and was libelous per se. Bingham v. Gaynor, hither and yon like thistledown at every 126 N. Y. Supp. 353, 360, 141 App. Div. 301. sight of the libel, so that a printed slander, Imputation of crime
when published, takes a wider and more
mischievous range than mere oral defamaWhen a newspaper published a news article stating that, within 15 minutes after tion, and is more reprehensible in the eye of the discovery of the body of plaintiff's wife, L. & Sland. (2d Ed.) 3; Dexter v. Spear,
the law. Cooley, Torts (2d Ed.) 240; Odgers, plaintiff had a quarrel with the undertaker, 7 Fed. Cas. 624, 4 Mason, 115. Thus, for who had been called by her sister, and instance, to publish of a man that he is a threatened to kill the undertaker unless he “skunk” (Massuere v. Dickens, 35 N. W. 349, left the house, since the publication repre- 70 Wis. 83), a "swine” (Solverson v. Petersented, in effect, that plaintiff threatened to kill another in a passion, without just son, 25 N. W. 14, 64 Wis. 198, 54 Am. Rep. cause, it would necessarily bring him into 607), a "drunkard," a "cuckold," a "tory." contempt and hatred so as to make the pub- (Giles v. State, 6 Ga. 276), “I look on him
as a rascal" (Williams v. Karnes, 4 Humph. lication actionable libel. Gordon
v. New York Evening Journal Pub. Co., 11i N. Y. (23 Tenn.) 9), “an imp of the devil and a Supp. 574, 575, 127 App. Div. 353.
cowardly snail" (Price v. Whitely, 50 Mo.
439), or that he has been “in collusion with Imputation of death
ruffians" (Snyder v. Fulton, 34 Md. 128, 6 It is libelous per se to publish of a living Am. Rep. 314), are each and all libelous. person that he is dead, because, exposing Ukman v. Daily Record Co., 88 S. W. 60, 64, him to ridicule; a libel being a malicious 189 Mo. 378 (citing Nelson v. Musgrave, 10 publication tending to expose one to public Mo. 648; Hermann v.' Bradstreet Co., 19 Mo. hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Cohen v. New App. 227; Manget v. O'Neill, 51 Mo. App. 35). York Times Co., 132 N. Y. Supp. 1, 74 Misc. Rep. 618.
"Libel" is a published writing, picture,
or similar production of such a nature as Malice
to immediately tend to do mischief to a A publication tending to expose one to party, or injure the character of an incontempt, ridicule, hatred, and derogation of dividual. Slander of title is a false and character, if malicious, is "libelous." Mul- malicious statement, whether by word of derig v. Wilkes-Barre Times, 64 Atl. 636, mouth or in writing, in reference to a person's 637, 215 Pa, 470, 114 Am. St. Rep. 967. title to some right or property belonging to As misdemeanor
him, as where a person alleges that the See Misdemeanor.
plaintiff has a defective title to land. A
written slander of title is sometimes called As personal injury
a -libel in the nature of slander of title. See Personal Injury.
Words, though not slanderous in themselves, Slander distinguished
yet if published in writing, tending in any Included in slander by writing or speak- way to the discredit of a man, are “libel.”
ing, see Slander by Writing or Speak- Macurda v. Globe Newspaper Co., 165 Fed. ing.
104, 107 (citing Bacon's Abridgement and
Rapalje). A "libel" differs from a "slander" in that a publication may be libelous when, if Written or printed matter which is comspoken orally, it would not be slanderous.municated to third persons stands on a difThis distinction is said by the books to be ferent footing from spoken words, and is often based upon the grounds that a vocal utter- actionable when it would not be if spoken, ance does not import the same quality of and if it is of a character conducive to deliberation, and is more prone to be the blacken the reputation of the person referred ebullition of mere effervescence or lack of to, or excite ridicule or wrath against him, mental equipoise, and to be accepted as in- or destroy public confidence in him, it is actionable without proof of special damages, \ 763; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 30 Am. because written or printed injurious state Rep. 289; Gilman v. Tucker, 28 N. L. 1040, ments about a person imply a deliberate pur- 128 N. Y. 190, 200, 13 L. R. A. 304, 26 Am. St. pose to do harm, whereas detrimental words | Rep. 464; Frank L. Fisher Co. v. Woods, 79 are often spoken thoughtlessly or in a pas. N. E. 837, 187 N. Y. 90, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) sion. Weight is allowed, also, to the more 707. enduring character and wider vogue of pub- "Liberty," in its broad sense, means the lished statements. Farley v. Evening Chron- right not only of freedom from actual reicle Pub. Co., 87 S. W. 565, 568, 113 Mo. straint of the person but the right of such App. 216 (citing Odgers, L. & Sland. [4th use of his faculties in all lawful ways to Ed.] p. 4).
live and work where he will, to earn his live
lihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue As trespass
any lawful trade or avocation. All laws, See Trespass.
therefore, which impair or trammel those
rights or restrict his freedom of action or his LIBERAL
choice of methods in the transaction of his
lawful business are infringement upon his LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
fundamental right of "liberty” and are void. Strict construction distinguished, see People v. Lochner, 69 N. E. 373, 386, 177 N. Strict Construction.
Y. 145, 101 Am. St. Rep. 773. LIBERALITY
The "liberty" guaranteed by the fourSee Salvage.
teenth amendment of the federal Constitution against deprivation without due process
of law is a liberty of natural, not artificial, LIBERTIES
persons. Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, See Indecent Liberties.
27 Sup. Ct. 384, 386, 204 U, S. 359, 51 L. Ed.
"Liberty" includes not only the right to
be out of prison, free to come and go, if the See Abuse of Liberty; Civil Liberty; law is not violated in so doing, but to en
Constitutional Liberty; Individual Lib- gage in all lawful pursuits, earn a livelihood, erty; Life, Liberty, and Property; and own and enjoy property. To exclude Life, Liberty, and Pursuit of Happi- from entry into the United States, or to deness; Personal Liberty; Restrained port therefrom, a citizen of the United States and Deprived of Liberty.
deprives him of liberty in the constitutional Restrained of Liberty, see Restrain. sense. In re Sing Tuck, 126 Fed. 386, 394. The term "liberty" includes the individu
Const. U. S. Amend. 14, and Const. R. I. al rights of citizenship and its privileges. art. 1, § 10, providing that no person shall be State ex rel. Guion y. Miles, 109 S. W. 595, deprived of “liberty" without due process of 610, 210 Mo. 127.
law, were borrowed from the thirty-ninth arOne definition of "liberties” is privileges ticle of the Great Charter, declaring that no or licenses taken in violation of the laws or free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or propriety. Dekelt v. People, 99 Pac. 330, 331, disseised, or outlawed or punished or in any 44 Colo. 525 (adopting definition in Webst. ways destroyed, nor “will we pass upon him, Dict.).
or send upon him, unless by legal judgment “Liberty," in its broad sense, means the of his peers, or by the law of the land"; the right, not only of freedom from servitude, words corresponding to "liberty" in the first imprisonment, or restraint, but the right of pronouncement being “taken,” “imprisoned," one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to "outlawed,” and “punished,” which are not live and work where he will, to earn his live confined to mere freedom from incarceration lihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue 73 Atl. 97, 107, 30 R. I. 13, 24 L. R. A. (N.
or imprisonment. Henry v. Cherry & Webb, any lawful trade or avocation. Wyatt v. James McCreery Co., 111 N. Y. S. 86, 88, 126 S.) 991, 136 Am. St. Rep. 928, 18 Ann. Cas.
1006. App. Div. 650 (quoting and adopting definition in Fisher Co. v. Woods, 79 N. E. 836, 187 The word "liberty," as used in Const. N. Y. 90, 12 L. R. A. [N. S.] 707); Health De- art. 2, providing that no person shall be department of City of New York v. Rector, etc., prived of life, liberty, or property except by of Trinity Church, 39 N. E. 833, 145 Ņ. Y. due process of law, means not only the right 32, 27 L. R. A. 710, 45 Am. St. Rep. 579; to freedom from actual servitude, imprisonPeople v. Gillson, 17 N. E. 343, 109 N. Y. ment, or restraint, but the right of one to use 389, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465; Colon v. Lisk, 47 his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and N. E. 302, 153 N. Y. 188, 60 Am. St. Rep. 609; | work where he will, to earn his livelihood Lawton v. Steele, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 152 U. S. in any lawful calling, and to pursue any law133, 38 L. Ed. 385; People ex rel. Tyroler v. ful trade or vocation. State ex rel. Galle v. Warden of City Prison, 51 N. E. 1006, 157 City of New Orleans, 36 South. 999, 1001, 113 N. Y. 116, 43 L. R. A. 264, 68 Am. St. Rep. 'La. 371, 67 L. R. A. 70, 2 Ann. Cas. 92 (cit.