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uidation cannot escape liability for breach of, in bankruptcy, an excepted liability need not the bank's warranty in a deed because the be reduced to judgment. Bever v. Swecker, warranty was not broken when the liabili. 116 N. W. 704, 706, 138 Iowa, 721. ties were assumed. McLean v. Moore (Tex.) 145 S. W. 1074, 1075 (citing 5 Words and word is used in Bankr. Act (Act July 1, 1898,
The character of the "liability," as that Phrases, p. 4112).
c. 541, 30 Stat. 550) $ 17, şubd. 2, as amended Debt
by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 798, The word “liability” is much more com- specifying certain debts of a bankrupt not prehensive than the term "debt"; "liability" affected by a discharge, is not changed by meaning the state or condition of one who the fact that the liability has been reduced to is under obligation to do at once or at some judgment. Peters v. United States, 177 Fed. future time something which may be enforc-885, 887, 101 C. C. A. 99. ed by action. Hyatt v. Anderson's Trustee The change made in Bankr. Act July 1, (Ky.) 74 S. W. 1094, 1096 (citing White v. 1898, c. 541, $ 17a (2), 30 Stat. 550, which as Green, 74 N. W. 929, 105 Iowa, 181).
originally enacted provided that a discharge The provisions of Pub, St. N. H. c. 140, should release a bankrupt from all of his relative to the execution and record of chat provable debts except such as “are judgments
for willful and malitel mortgages, must be fully complied with to in actions render them valid against any one except the cious injuries to the person or property of parties thereto. Under section 6 requiring another,” and which was amended Feb. 5, the parties to swear that the mortgage is 1903, c. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 798, by substituting made for the purpose of securing the debt for the words “judgments in actions” the specified in the condition and for no other word “liabilities," did not have the effect of purpose, and section 9 providing that if the removing judgments for such causes from the mortgage is executed to secure the mort- excepted class, but of including such liability, gagee for a liability other than a debt due whether judgment has been rendered upon from the mortgagor, the form of the oath it or not. Thompson v. Judy, 169 Fed. 553, shall be so varied as truly to describe the 554, 95 C. C. A. 51. "liability"; if the mortgage is given to se- As obligation cure a debt, the condition and oath must
See Obligation. describe it as a debt; if to secure a liability, it must be described as such, and a liability As all obligations is not covered by the term "debt." Sherman An order of the federal court directing v. Estey Organ Co., 38 Atl. 70, 71, 69 Vt. 355. its receiver of a railroad to restore to the
railroad its property in his hands on the Franchise
agreement of the railroad to assume "all lawThe relation between a city and the own- ful liabilities and obligations of the receiver er of an existing telephone franchise being existing on a designated date and save the quasi contractual for the performance of a receiver harmless against the payment of service, an ordinance modifying the terms of liabilities incurred by him, imposes on the the franchise for the purpose of securing railroad the payment of liabilities incidental more effective service in competition with the to the receiver's operation of the road, inowner of another franchise is not invalid as cluding that for injuries to a passenger releasing an “indebtedness" or "liability” to through the negligence of the receiver's servthe municipality in violation of Const. § 52.ants; the word "obligations" meaning duties Louisville Home Tel. Co. v. City of Louis- arising out of a contract or from an actionville, 113 S. W. 855, 856, 860, 130 Ky. 611.
able tort, and the word "liabilities" includJudgment
ing any form of legal obligation measured by The term "liability" generally includes money valuation, whether arising from conevery kind of legal obligation and is used in tract, express or implied, from duty imposed Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 41, § 17, 30 Stat. by law or judgment of court, or in conse550, as amended in 1903 (Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 91 N. E. 173, 175, 46 Ind. App. 353 (quoting
quence of a tort. Vandalia Ry. Co. v. Keys, 487, 32 Stat. 798), providing that a discharge 6 Words and Phrases, p. 4878). in bankruptcy releases a bankrupt from his debts, except such as are liabilities for ob- Ordinance taining property by false pretenses or repre “Liability," within Milwaukee Charter, c. sentations as including every obligation to 4, 88 2, 4, requiring the vote on ordinances pay money whether evidenced by judgment creating "liability" against the city or any or not, and every unsatisfied judgment is a fund thereof to be taken by ayes and noes, liability. Woehrle v. Canclini, 109 Pac. 888, means more than a naked undertaking in889, 158 Cal. 107; In re United Button Co., volving no expense, covering a claim or ob140 Fed. 495, 505.
ligation presented to the council for audit Under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 and allowance against some fund, and hence Stat. 544, as amended by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. the section does not apply to an ordinance 487, $ 17, 32 Stat. 800, excepting certain "lia- requiring street railway companies to sprinbilities” from those released by a discharge) kle the part of streets occupied by their
tracks on the city furnishing the necessary Temporarily unenforceable obligation water. State ex rel. City of Milwaukee v.
• 'Liability,' in a legal sense, is the state Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 129 N. or condition of one who is under obligation W. 623, 629, 144 Wis. 386, 140 Am. St. Rep. to do at once, or at some future time, some1025.
thing which may be enforced by action. It Tax
may exist without the right of immediate The word "liability” is of large signifi- enforcement.” Hyatt v. Anderson's Trustee cance, but, as used in the statute limiting the (Ky.) 74 S. W. 1094, 1096 (quoting and adopttime for bringing actions founded on con- ing definition in White v. Green, 74 N. W, tracts or liabilities, express or implied, it re- 929, 105 Iowa, 181, and citing Fisse v. Einfers plainly to liabilities of a contractual stein, 5 Mo. App. 78; Home Ins. Co. of New nature, and not to taxes. Bradford v. Sto-York v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 52 N. E.
862, 178 Ill. 64; Pittsburgh & C. R. Co. v. rey, 75 N. E. 256, 257, 189 Mass. 104.
Clarke, 29 Pa. 146; Cochran v. United States, Liability for tort
15 Sup. Ct. 628, 157 U. S. 296, 39 L. Ed. 704). The word “liability," in the absence of anything limiting its scope, includes obli- LIABILITY CREATED BY LAW gations arising out of torts as well as out
See also, Legally Liable. of contracts. Thus where, on the dissolution of a firm engaged in the insurance and The liability of a stockholder for his brokerage business, the continuing partner proportion of a corporate debt is a "liability gave a bond to the outgoing partner, condi- created by law," as that term is used in the tioned to pay all “liabilities” of the firm, statute of limitations. O'Neill v. Quarnembraced a claim against the firm for dam- strom, 92 Pac, 391, 392, 6 Cal. App. 469. ages caused by false representations made
An action against a railroad company to in a sale by the firm of certain securities. Price v. Parker, 83 N. E. 323, 197 Mass. 1, been caused by the violation by defendant of
recover for personal injuries alleged to have 125 Am. St. Rep. 326.
Safety Appliance Act, is one "upon a liabilThe limitation of a shipowner's liabili-ity created by statute" within the meaning ty for maritime torts not the result of his of Ky. St. 8 2515, limiting the time for bringown fault, provided by Rev. St. $8 4283-4285, ing such actions to five years, and, in abwas extended to nonmaritime torts by Act sence of any federal statute of limitations, June 26, 1884, 23 Stat. 57, c. 121, $ 18, limit- is governed by that section where the action ing the individual liability of a shipowner is in that state. Nichols v. Chesapeake & for “any or all debts and liabilities” except 0. Ry. Co., 195 Fed. 913, 916, 115 C. C. A. wages and liabilities incurred prior to such 601. Yenactment, to his share in the vessel, and the aggregate liabilities of all the owner of
Though the master's liability for injury a vessel on account of the same to the value to an employé in a mine through negligence of the vessel and freight pending. Richard- of a fellow servant did not exist prior to son v. Harmon, 32 Sup. ct. 27, 29, 222 U. S. Rev. Codes, $ 5248, yet such statute is to be
regarded not as creating a new cause of ae96, 56 L, Ed. 110.
tion, but as merely carrying forward the The exemption of lands, acquired under right of the injured party, and removing a the homestead laws, from "liability” for any defense theretofore available in such class of debt contracted by the parties does not ex- cases; so that as regards the statute of limempt them from liabilities for torts. Brun v. itations, the action for personal injuries is Mann, 151 Fed. 145, 155, 80 C. C. A. 513, 12 founded on actionable negligence, and not on L. R, A. (N. S.) 154.
a "liability created by statute" within secConst. art. 12, $ 7, declares that "no cor- tion 6449, subd. 1; which phrase has come poration shall lease or alienate any franchise to have a fixed application to a class of casso as to relieve the franchise or property es quite distinct from those elsewhere menheld thereunder from the liabilities of the tioned or referred to in the chapter on limlessor or grantor, lessee or grantee, contract. itations. Beeler v. Butte & London Copper ed or incurred in the operation, use, or en- Development Co., 110 Pac. 528, 530, 41 Mont. joyment of such franchise or any of its 465. privileges.” Held, that a corporation exer
City taxes on omitted property are a cising the right to occupy and use the streets "liability imposed by statute,” within the and public places for the operation of an meaning of that term as used in the statute electric light and power plant, and a street of limitations, and are barred in five years. railway, under a franchise granted by the Muir's Adm’r v. City of Bardstown, 87 S. city, cannot convey such franchise so as to w. 1096, 1100, 120 Ky. 739. relieve the property used in the exercise thereof from liability for a judgment ob- Taxes are a "liability created by stattained for personal injuries to an employé ute,” within Ky. St. § 2515, limiting an ac. in the operation of such property. Cooper v. tion on a liability created by statute. ChatUtah Light & R. Co., 102 Pac. 202, 206, 35 terson v. City of Louisville, 140 S. W. 647, Utah, 570, 136 Am. St. Rep. 1075.
145 Ky. 485.
LIABILITY OF COUNTY
v. Bradstreet Co., 41 S. E. 763, 704, 63 S. C.. The state may authorize drainage dis- 525, 530). tricts to incur indebtedness for which they “Libel," in the criminal law, is "a maalone are liable and to issue evidence of in- licious defamation, expressed either in printdebtedness for which lands within the dis- ing or writing, or by signs or pictures, tendtricts are alone liable, and where such bonds ing to blacken the memory of one who is are issued they are not a "liability of the dead, with intent to provoke the living; or county," within Const. art. 12, § 5, prohibit- the reputation of one who is alive and to exing the loan of credit by any county to any pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicorporation or association. Lee Wilson & cule." State v. Kiernan, 41 South. 55, 116 Co. v. Wm. R. Compton Bond & Mortgage La. 739 (quoting and adopting the definition Co., 146 S. W. 110, 113, 103 Ark. 452. in Bouv. Law Dict, and Black, Law Dict.).
"A libel' is the malicious defamation of LIBEL
a person, made public by any printing or
writing which tends to provoke him to wrath See Criminal Libel.
or expose him to public hatred, contempt, Malice in libel and slander, see Malice.
or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits See, also, Actionable Per Se; Jactita- of public confidence and social intercourse.
tion; Privileged Communication. A libel is a tort, and, generally speaking,
"Libel" is the invasion of the reputation neither the intention with which a tort feasof private persons. State ex inf. Crow v. or acted, nor the state of his feelings toward Shepherd, 76 S. W. 79, 92, 177 Mo. 205, 99 the person injured or mankind at large, lesAm. St. Rep. 624. See, also, Brown v. Pub- sens his responsibility for injuries actually lishers: George Knapp & Co., 112 S. W. 474, caused by his wrongful act. He must make 485, 213 Mo. 655.
recompense, although he was free from mor
al delinquency. Any false or defamatory A “libel" is a malicious defamation ex- publication which is not privileged gives rise pressed in printing or writing, or by signs, to a case for damages sustained from it. pictures, etc., tending to injure the reputa- This is true of libel, notwithstanding the tion of another, thereby exposing such per- formula so often reiterated that malice is son to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. the gist of the action. The essential facts Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 Atl. 97, 99, 30
are the falsity of the charge, and its pubR. I. 13, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, 136 Am. St. lication and libelous nature. If true, no deRep. 928, 18 Ann. Cas. 1006; State v. O'Ha- gree of malice in the publisher will make it gån, 63 Atl. 95, 73 N. J. Law, 209 (quoting libel, nor, if false, will rectitude of purpose 4 Black. Com. 150; Ogders on Libel and exonerate him." Farley v. Evening ChroniSlander); Horton v. Binghamton Press Co., cle Pub. Co., 87 S. W. 565, 567, 113 Mo. App. 106 N. Y. Supp. 875, 876, 122 App. Div. 332; 216. Hughes v. New York Evening Post Co., 100 N. Y. Supp. 982, 984, 115 App. Div. 611.
A "libel" is a malicious publication, ex
pressed either in printing or writing, or by A “libel” is a malicious publication, ex- signs or pictures, tending either to injure pressed either in printing or in writing, or the memory of one dead or the reputation of by signs and pictures, tending either to one living, and exposes him to public ridicule blacken the memory of one dead, or the repor contempt; the injury to reputation in utation of one who is alive, and expose him the case of one living being the gist of the to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. action. Cohen v. New York Times Co., 138 Watson v. Detroit Journal Co., 107 N. W. 81, N. Y. Supp. 206, 209, 153 App. Div. 242. 84, 143 Mich. 430, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 480, 8
A "libel" is a malicious publication exAnn. Cas. 131 (quoting and adopting definition of Chief Justice Parsons in Common pressed either in printing or writing or by wealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 168, 3 Am. Dec. 212); signs or pictures, tending to blacken the Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., who is alive, and expose him to public ha
memory of the dead, or the reputation of one 197 Fed. 982, 985.
tred, contempt, or ridicule. As the falsity "A libel is malicious defamation, ex- of the publication is essential to render a pressed either by writing or printing, or by publication a libel, which may be defined as signs, pictures, effigies, or the like, tending any publication injurious to the reputation to blacken the memory of one who is dead, of another, an instruction in an action upon or to impeach the honesty or integrity or a libel which, in purporting to define a libel, reputation, or publish the natural or alleged failed to mention the element of falsity, is defects, of one who is alive, and thereby to erroneous. Words written of a person's expose him to public batred, contempt, ridi-trade or business may be libelous when they cule, or obloquy, or to cause him to be shun- might not be so if spoken of the individual ned or avoided, or to injure him in his office, personally, for every publication, written or business, or occupation." Hubbard v. Fur- printed, which as a necessary or natural coninan I'niversity, 57 S. E. 478, 76 S. C. 510 sequence will occasion pecuniary loss to a (quoting and adopting the definition in Smith business man, is a libel. Dobbin v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 138 S. W. 682, 685, 157, ardson v. Thorpe, 63 Atl. 580, 73 N. H. 532 Mo. App. 689 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, (citing Giles v. John B. Clarke Co., 36 Atl. P. 4116).
876, 69 N. H. 92; Palmer v. City of Concord, Since, under the statute, the truth of an
48 N. H. 211, 97 Am. Dec. 605; Newell, alleged libelous article may be shown in jus-Slander & Libel [20 Ed.] 43-45). tification, the word "false" must be added to Any publication in writing which holds the definition of libel as any publication in- one up to ridicule, contempt, hatred, or jurious to the reputation of another. Julian obloquy is "libelous, even though it charge V. Kansas City Star Co., 107 S. W. 496, 500, no criminal offense. Gordon v. New York 209 Mo. 35.
Evening Journal Pub. Co., 111 N. Y. Supp. "A ‘libel is anything written or printed 574, 575, 127 App. Div. 353. which from its terms is calculated to injure It is not necessary, to constitute a libel, the character of another by bringing him that the publication charge one with the cominto hatred, contempt, or ridicule, and which mission of a crime or with having a contais published without lawful justification or gious disease, but any words which impute to excuse." "Scandalous matter is not neces- him conduct or qualities tending to injure sary to make a libel. It is enough if the his character, or to degrade him or which defendant induces an ill opinion to be had expose him to contempt, ridicule, or public of the plaintiff or to make him contemptible hatred, are libelous per se. Weeks v. News and ridiculous." Cranfill y. Hayden, 80 S. Pub. Co., 83 Atl. 162, 164, 117 Md. 126. W. 609, 612, 97 Tex. 544.
A letter, to be libelous, must be defama"Libel" is that which is written and tory, and communicated to bring another published to injure the reputation of another, into contempt, ridicule, or hatred. Dickinby bringing him into' ridicule, hatred, or son v. Hathaway, 48 South. 136, 137, 122 La. contempt. Petitioners, as members of a 644, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33. society, published an article charging a To make a writing actionable as being majority of their fellow members with un- libelous, it must impute something which just and stupid attacks and low and vile tends to disgrace a man, lower him in or exinsinuations against petitioners, causing clude him from society, or bring him into them to resign from a celebration committee. contempt or ridicule. It is not intended by It was also alleged that the "new brave this that to make a publication libelous it committee" were inefficient to conduct a con- must contain a direct and open charge. The templated celebration by reason of illiteracy, publication must be judged by its general etc., and charged the president with being tenor, and if, taking the terms in their ordi"more unreasonable still and childishly nary acceptation, it conveys a degrading ambitious," bringing to the society dishonor, imputation, however indirectly, it is a “libel.” and that petitioners, representing a minority, If the article complained of represents a perdid not recognize the celebration of the son as a dishonest or dishonorable man, it majority as a celebration of the society, for would be a libel. Todd v. Every Evening the purpose of safeguarding the dignity of its Printing Co. (Del.) 66 Atl. 97, 99, 6 Pennewill, members. Held, that such article was de- 233 (citing Rice v. Simmons [Del.] 2 Har. famatory, and warranted petitioners' expul- 429, 31 Am. Dec. 766). sion from the society under a by-law authorizing such expulsion for defamation of the
A false and malicious printed or written association. Del Ponte v. Societa Italiana Di publication, which imputes conduct or qualiM. S. Guglielmo Marconi, 60 Atl. 237, 240, 27 ties tending to disparage or degrade the R. I. 1, 70 L. R. A. 188, 114 Am. St. Rep. 17. plaintiff, or exposes him to contempt, ridi
cule, or public hatred, or prejudice his pri“Any false and malicious writing pub- vate character, or credit, is “libelous per se.” lished of another is 'libelous per se' when its A publication stating that the vestryman of a tendency is to render him contemptible or church "relentlessly turned his back ridiculous in public estimation, or expose moral and legal obligations to the detrihim to public hatred or contempt, or hinder ment of a rector, who had suffered himself virtuous men from associating with him." to become debilitated while plodding along Williams v. Fuller, 94 N. W. 118, 119, 68 the path of duty to the congregation," or Neb. 354 (citing Cooley, Torts, 206; World that the vestryman had violated a promise Pub. Co. v. Mullen, 61 N. W. 108, 43 Neb. he had made to the members of the church 126, 47 Am. St. Rep. 737).
whereby objections to his election as vestryAny written words which directly or
were prevented, was libelous per se. indirectly charge a person with crime, or
Goldborough v. Orem & Johnson, 64 Atl. 36, which tend to injure his reputation in any
40, 103 Md. 671. other way, or to expose him to public hatred, Any language written of another that contempt, or ridicule, if published without tends to degrade him or to bring him into ill legal excuse or justification, constitute a repute or to destroy the confidence of his "libel," and the person in respect to whom neighbors in his integrity, or to cause other they are written may sue therefor, without like injury, is libelous per se. Stewart y. alleging or proving special damages. Rich-Codrington, 45 South. 809, 812, 55 Fla. 327,
person libelous per se, it must reflect on the The California statute (Civ. Code, $ 45)
character of such person by bringing him into defines "libel” which may be the subject of a ridicule, hatred, or contempt, or affect him civil action for damages as a false and uninjuriously in his trade or profession, and a privileged publication by writing, printing, statement in a newspaper concerning a picture, effigy, or other fixed representation woman that she had hysterics, the same not to the eye, which exposes any person to containing any imputation upon her as an batred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or individual or in respect to her profession, is which causes him to be shunned or avoided, not, though untrue, per se libelous, and can- or has a tendency to injure him in his ocnot be ground of recovery of damages in the cupation. Under this definition, malice is absence of proof of special damage. Cleve- not an ingredient of a cause of action for a land Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 95 civil libel, and a recovery of full and comN. E. 735, 737, 84 Ohio St. 118, Ann. Cas. pensatory damages may be had, though ab1912B, 978.
sence of malice is proved. Another provi.
sion (Pen. Code, $ 248) defines "libel,” the A publication is "libelous per se" where it has a tendency to injure a person in his basis of a criminal prosecution, to consist business or occupation or exposes him to pub
of a malicious defamation, expressed either lic hatred, contempt, ridicule, or disgrace.
by writing, printing, signs, pictures, or the Bergstrom v. Ridgway-Thayer Co., 103 N. Y. like, tending to blacken the memory of one Supp. 1093, 1094, 53 Misc. Rep. 95.
who is dead, or to impeach the honesty,
integrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish A written or printed publication, false, the natural or alleged defects of one who defamatory, and tending to expose one to is alive, and thereby expose him to public ridicule or contempt, or to render him odi- hatred, contempt, or ridicule. While malous, or injure him in his business or calling ice is an essential element of the offense or in his social standing, is a libel. Register of libel so defined, prima facie proof of such Newspaper Co. v. Worten, 111 S. W. 693, 697. malice is made by evidence that an injuri
A writing is libelous if it subjects the ous publication concerning another has been person referred to to odium or ridicule, or
made without justifiable motive, whereupon tends to subject him to obloquy. Kentucky the law presumes malice sufficient to supJournal Pub. Co. v. Brock, 131 s. w. 1, 140 port a criminal charge, as provided by secKy. 373.
tion 250. Davis v. Hearst, 116 Pac. 530, 531,
160 Cal. 143. The test whether a newspaper article is The Idaho statute (Rev. St. 1887, $ 6737) "libelous per se” is whether to the mind of an defines "libel” as a malicious defamation, intelligent man, the tenor of the article expressed either by writing, printing, or by and the language used naturally import a signs or pictures, or the like, tending to criminal or disgraceful charge. It is libel- blacken the memory of one who is dead, or ous per se to charge a person with but a to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or single commission of an act, if the act itself reputation, or publish the natural or alleged amounts to or imports moral delinquency defects, of one who is alive, and thereby to or disreputable conduct. Church v. Tribune expose him to public hatred, contempt, or Ass'n, 119 N. Y. Supp. 885, 886, 135 App. ridicule. It is sufficient that the defamation Div. 30.
tends to impeach the honesty, integrity, virAn article designed and calculated to tue, or reputation, and thereby to expose such 'exhibit plaintiff as a shallow, ridiculous, person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. and contemptible person, dishonest and un
To constitute libel, it is not necessary that deserving of confidence, is libelous per se. the alleged libelous matter charge the person Morse v. Times-Republican Printing Co., 100 named with a crime. State v. Sheridan, 93 N. W. 867, 869, 124 Iowa, 707.
Pac. 656, 657, 14 Idaho, 222, 15 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 497. A written or printed statement or arti
Under the Colorado Statute (Mills' Ann. cle published of or concerning another, which St. $ 1313), defining “libel” as a malicious is false, and tends to injure his reputation defamation expressed either by printing, or and thereby expose him to public hatred, con- by signs, or pictures, or the like, tending to tempt, scorn, obloquy, or shame, is "libelous blacken the memory of one who is dead, or per se.” Woolworth v. Star Co., 90 N. Y. Supp. 147, 148, 97 App. Div. 525 (citing Triggs reputation, or publish the natural defects of
to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or v. Sun Printing & Publishing Co., 71 N. E.
one who is alive, and thereby to expose him 739, 742, 179 N. Y. 144, 153, 66 L. R. A.
or her to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, 612, 103 Am. St. Rep. 841, 1 Ann. Cas. 326.
a publication to be libelous must be maliTo call a white man a negro is a "libel," cious. Rocky Mountain News Printing Co. since it tends to interfere with his social v. Fridborn, 104 Pac. 956, 958, 46 Colo. 440, relation with his fellow white men. Flood 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 891. V. News & Courier Co., 50 S. E. 637, 639, The Georgia Statute defines "libel" as a 71 S. C. 112, 4 Ann. Cas. 685.
false and malicious defamation of another,