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LIABILITY OF COUNTY

The state may authorize drainage districts to incur indebtedness for which they alone are liable and to issue evidence of indebtedness for which lands within the districts are alone liable, and where such bonds are issued they are not a "liability of the county," within Const. art. 12, § 5, prohibiting the loan of credit by any county to any corporation or association. Lee Wilson & Co. v. Wm. R. Compton Bond & Mortgage Co., 146 S. W. 110, 113, 103 Ark. 452.

LIBEL

See Criminal Libel.

Malice in libel and slander, see Malice. See, also, Actionable Per Se; Jactitation; Privileged Communication. "Libel" is the invasion of the reputation of private persons. State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 76 S. W. 79, 92, 177 Mo. 205, 99 Am. St. Rep. 624. See, also, Brown v. Publishers: George Knapp & Co., 112 S. W. 474, 485, 213 Mo. 655.

A "libel" is a malicious defamation expressed in printing or writing, or by signs, pictures, etc., tending to injure the reputation of another, thereby exposing such person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 Atl. 97, 99, 30 R. I. 13, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, 136 Am. St. Rep. 928, 18 Ann. Cas. 1006; State v. O'Hagan, 63 Atl. 95, 73 N. J. Law, 209 (quoting 4 Black. Com. 150; Ogders on Libel and Slander); Horton v. Binghamton Press Co., 106 N. Y. Supp. 875, 876, 122 App. Div. 332; Hughes v. New York Evening Post Co., 100 N. Y. Supp. 982, 984, 115 App. Div. 611.

A "libel" is a malicious publication, expressed either in printing or in writing, or by signs and pictures, tending either to blacken the memory of one dead, or the reputation of one who is alive, and expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. Watson v. Detroit Journal Co., 107 N. W. 81, 84, 143 Mich. 430, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 480, 8 Ann. Cas. 131 (quoting and adopting definition of Chief Justice Parsons in Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 168, 3 Am. Dec. 212); Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co.,

197 Fed. 982, 985.

"A libel' is malicious defamation, expressed either by writing or printing, or by signs, pictures, effigies, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty or integrity or reputation, or publish the natural or alleged defects, of one who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided, or to injure him in his office, business, or occupation." Hubbard v. Furinan University, 57 S. E. 478, 76 S. C. 510 (quoting and adopting the definition in Smith

v. Bradstreet Co., 41 S. E. 763, 764, 63 S. C. 525, 530).

"Libel," in the criminal law, is "a malicious defamation, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs or pictures, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, with intent to provoke the living; or the reputation of one who is alive and to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." State v. Kiernan, 41 South. 55, 116 La. 739 (quoting and adopting the definition in Bouv. Law Dict. and Black, Law Dict.).

"A libel' is the malicious defamation of a person, made public by any printing or writing which tends to provoke him to wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse. A 'libel' is a tort, and, generally speaking, neither the intention with which a tort feasor acted, nor the state of his feelings toward the person injured or mankind at large, lessens his responsibility for injuries actually caused by his wrongful act. He must make recompense, although he was free from moral delinquency. Any false or defamatory publication which is not privileged gives rise to a case for damages sustained from it. This is true of libel, notwithstanding the formula so often reiterated that malice is the gist of the action. The essential facts are the falsity of the charge, and its publication and libelous nature. If true, no degree of malice in the publisher will make it libel, nor, if false, will rectitude of purpose exonerate him." Farley v. Evening Chronicle Pub. Co., 87 S. W. 565, 567, 113 Mo. App. 216.

A "libel" is a malicious publication, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs or pictures, tending either to injure the memory of one dead or the reputation of one living, and exposes him to public ridicule or contempt; the injury to reputation in the case of one living being the gist of the action. Cohen v. New York Times Co., 138 N. Y. Supp. 206, 209, 153 App. Div. 242.

A "libel" is a malicious publication expressed either in printing or writing or by signs or pictures, tending to blacken the memory of the dead, or the reputation of one who is alive, and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. As the falsity of the publication is essential to render a publication a libel, which may be defined as any publication injurious to the reputation of another, an instruction in an action upon a libel which, in purporting to define a libel, failed to mention the element of falsity, is erroneous. Words written of a person's trade or business may be libelous when they might not be so if spoken of the individual personally, for every publication, written or printed, which as a necessary or natural consequence will occasion pecuniary loss to a business man, is a libel. Dobbin v. Chicago,

R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 138 S. W. 682, 685, 157, ardson v. Thorpe, 63 Atl. 580, 73 N. H. 532 Mo. App. 689 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, (citing Giles v. John B. Clarke Co., 36 Atl. 876, 69 N. H. 92; Palmer v. City of Concord, p. 4116). 48 N. H. 211, 97 Am. Dec. 605; Newell, Slander & Libel [2d Ed.] 43–45).

Since, under the statute, the truth of an alleged libelous article may be shown in justification, the word "false" must be added to the definition of libel as any publication injurious to the reputation of another. Julian V. Kansas City Star Co., 107 S. W. 496, 500, 209 Mo. 35.

"A 'libel' is anything written or printed which from its terms is calculated to injure the character of another by bringing him into hatred, contempt, or ridicule, and which is published without lawful justification or excuse." "Scandalous matter is not necessary to make a libel. It is enough if the defendant induces an ill opinion to be had of the plaintiff or to make him contemptible and ridiculous." Cranfill v. Hayden, 80 S. W. 609, 612, 97 Tex. 544.

"Libel" is that which is written and published to injure the reputation of another, by bringing him into ridicule, hatred, or contempt. Petitioners, as members of a society, published an article charging a majority of their fellow members with unjust and stupid attacks and low and vile insinuations against petitioners, causing them to resign from a celebration committee. It was also alleged that the "new brave committee" were inefficient to conduct a contemplated celebration by reason of illiteracy, etc., and charged the president with being "more unreasonable still and childishly ambitious," bringing to the society dishonor, and that petitioners, representing a minority, did not recognize the celebration of the majority as a celebration of the society, for the purpose of safeguarding the dignity of its members. Held, that such article was defamatory, and warranted petitioners' expulsion from the society under a by-law authorizing such expulsion for defamation of the association. Del Ponte v. Societa Italiana Di M. S. Guglielmo Marconi, 60 Atl. 237, 240, 27 R. I. 1, 70 L. R. A. 188, 114 Am. St. Rep. 17.

Any publication in writing which holds one up to ridicule, contempt, hatred, or obloquy is "libelous," even though it charge Gordon v. New York no criminal offense. Evening Journal Pub. Co., 111 N. Y. Supp. 574, 575, 127 App. Div. 353.

It is not necessary, to constitute a libel, that the publication charge one with the commission of a crime or with having a contagious disease, but any words which impute to him conduct or qualities tending to injure his character, or to degrade him or which expose him to contempt, ridicule, or public Weeks v. News hatred, are libelous per se. Pub. Co., 83 Atl. 162, 164, 117 Md. 126.

A letter, to be libelous, must be defamatory, and communicated to bring another Dickininto contempt, ridicule, or hatred. son v. Hathaway, 48 South. 136, 137, 122 La. 644, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33.

To make a writing actionable as being libelous, it must impute something which tends to disgrace a man, lower him in or exclude him from society, or bring him into It is not intended by contempt or ridicule. this that to make a publication libelous it must contain a direct and open charge. The publication must be judged by its general tenor, and if, taking the terms in their ordinary acceptation, it conveys a degrading imputation, however indirectly, it is a "libel." If the article complained of represents a person as a dishonest or dishonorable man, it Todd v. Every Evening would be a libel. Printing Co. (Del.) 66 Atl. 97, 99, 6 Pennewill, 233 (citing Rice v. Simmons [Del.] 2 Har. 429, 31 Am. Dec. 766).

A false and malicious printed or written publication, which imputes conduct or qualities tending to disparage or degrade the plaintiff, or exposes him to contempt, ridicule, or public hatred, or prejudice his pri"Any false and malicious writing pub-vate character, or credit, is "libelous per se." lished of another is 'libelous per se' when its tendency is to render him contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or expose him to public hatred or contempt, or hinder virtuous men from associating with him." Williams v. Fuller, 94 N. W. 118, 119, 68 Neb. 354 (citing Cooley, Torts, 206; World Pub. Co. v. Mullen, 61 N. W. 108, 43 Neb. 126, 47 Am. St. Rep. 737).

A publication stating that the vestryman of a church "relentlessly turned his back on moral and legal obligations to the detriment of a rector, who had suffered himself to become debilitated while plodding along the path of duty to the congregation," or that the vestryman had violated a promise he had made to the members of the church whereby objections to his election as vestryman were prevented, was libelous per se. Any written words which directly or Goldborough v. Orem & Johnson, 64 Atl. 36, indirectly charge a person with crime, or which tend to injure his reputation in any other way, or to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, if published without legal excuse or justification, constitute a "libel," and the person in respect to whom they are written may sue therefor, without alleging or proving special damages.

40, 103 Md. 671.

Any language written of another that tends to degrade him or to bring him into ill repute or to destroy the confidence of his neighbors in his integrity, or to cause other Stewart v. like injury, is libelous per se. Rich- Codrington, 45 South. 809, 812, 55 Fla. 327,

To constitute a publication respecting a person libelous per se, it must reflect on the character of such person by bringing him into ridicule, hatred, or contempt, or affect him injuriously in his trade or profession, and a statement in a newspaper concerning a woman that she had hysterics, the same not containing any imputation upon her as an individual or in respect to her profession, is not, though untrue, per se libelous, and cannot be ground of recovery of damages in the absence of proof of special damage. Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 95 N. E. 735, 737, 84 Ohio St. 118, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 978.

A publication is "libelous per se" where it has a tendency to injure a person in his business or occupation or exposes him to pub

lic hatred, contempt, ridicule, or disgrace. Bergstrom v. Ridgway-Thayer Co., 103 N. Y.

Supp. 1093, 1094, 53 Misc. Rep. 95.

A written or printed publication, false, defamatory, and tending to expose one to ridicule or contempt, or to render him odious, or injure him in his business or calling or in his social standing, is a libel. Register Newspaper Co. v. Worten, 111 S. W. 693, 697. A writing is libelous if it subjects the person referred to to odium or ridicule, or

tends to subject him to obloquy. Kentucky Journal Pub. Co. v. Brock, 131 S. W. 1, 140 Ky. 373.

The test whether a newspaper article is "libelous per se" is whether to the mind of an intelligent man, the tenor of the article and the language used naturally import a criminal or disgraceful charge. It is libelous per se to charge a person with but a single commission of an act, if the act itself amounts to or imports moral delinquency or disreputable conduct. Church v. Tribune Ass'n, 119 N. Y. Supp. 885, 886, 135 App. Div. 30.

An article designed and calculated to exhibit plaintiff as a shallow, ridiculous, and contemptible person, dishonest and undeserving of confidence, is libelous per se. Morse v. Times-Republican Printing Co., 100 N. W. 867, 869, 124 Iowa, 707.

Statutory definitions

The California statute (Civ. Code, § 45) defines "libel" which may be the subject of a civil action for damages as a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or has a tendency to injure him in his occupation. Under this definition, malice is not an ingredient of a cause of action for a civil libel, and a recovery of full and compensatory damages may be had, though absence of malice is proved. Another provision (Pen. Code, § 248) defines "libel," the basis of a criminal prosecution, to consist by writing, printing, signs, pictures, or the of a malicious defamation, expressed either like, tending to blacken the memory of one

who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish the natural or alleged defects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. While malice is an essential element of the offense of libel so defined, prima facie proof of such malice is made by evidence that an injurious publication concerning another has been made without justifiable motive, whereupon the law presumes malice sufficient to support a criminal charge, as provided by section 250. Davis v. Hearst, 116 Pac. 530, 531, 160 Cal. 143.

The Idaho statute (Rev. St. 1887, § 6737) defines "libel" as a malicious defamation, expressed either by writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish the natural or alleged defects, of one who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. It is sufficient that the defamation tends to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, and thereby to expose such person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. To constitute libel, it is not necessary that the alleged libelous matter charge the person State v. Sheridan, 93 named with a crime. Pac. 656, 657, 14 Idaho, 222, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 497.

Under the Colorado Statute (Mills' Ann. St. § 1313), defining "libel" as a malicious defamation expressed either by printing, or signs, or pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish the natural defects of

A written or printed statement or article published of or concerning another, which is false, and tends to injure his reputation and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, scorn, obloquy, or shame, is "libelousy Woolworth v. Star Co., 90 N. Y. Supp. 147, 148, 97 App. Div. 525 (citing Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publishing Co., 71 N. E. 739, 742, 179 N. Y. 144, 153, 66 L. R. A. 612, 103 Am. St. Rep. 841, 1 Ann. Cas. 326.

per se."

To call a white man a negro is a "libel," since it tends to interfere with his social relation with his fellow white men. Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S. E. 637, 639, 71 S. C. 112, 4 Ann. Cas. 685.

one who is alive, and thereby to expose him or her to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, a publication to be libelous must be malicious. Rocky Mountain News Printing Co. v. Fridborn, 104 Pac. 956, 958, 46 Colo. 440, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 891.

The Georgia Statute defines "libel" as a false and malicious defamation of another,

expressed in print or writing, or pictures, or signs, tending to injure the reputation of an individual and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. To falsely publish of another that there are criminal cases pending against him is libelous per se. Witham v. Atlanta Journal, 53 S. E. 105, 107, 124 Ga. 688, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 977..

error to leave to the jury the question whether it was libelous, as there was no ambiguity in the language. State v. Cooper, 116 N. W. 691, 692, 138 Iowa, 516.

The Kansas statute (section 2271, Gen. St. 1901) defines a "libel" as a malicious defamation of a person made public by any printing, writing, sign, picture, representation, or effigy, tending to provoke him to wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse, or any malicious defamation made public as aforesaid, designed to blacken and vilify the memory of one who is dead, and tending to scandalize or provoke his surviving relatives and friends. To say of a man that he is a eunuch is actionable per se. Eckert v. Van Pelt, 76 Pac. 909, 910, 69 Kan. 357, 66 L. R. A. 266.

Cr. Code, § 177 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 38), defines libel as a malicious defamation, expressed either by printing or by signs or pictures, tending to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish the natural defects of one who is alive and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury. A newspaper article published by accused charging prosecutor with improper and dishonest actions as state's attorney, and with having prostituted his office for private interests and political purposes, and that he was in collusion with violators of the liquor law, that he was actuated by improper motives with reference to an alleged bridge trust, and that there was no doubt but that such trust had "prov-pose the person written of to hatred or conen a fat goose to some one," that there was tempt, or injury to his business or occupation also good ground to suspect something dishonest and crooked in the matter, and that within the definition of "libel" in the Minnesota statute (Rev. Laws 1905, § 4916). Cole it was not prosecutor's purpose to enforce v. Millspaugh, 126 N. W. 626, 111 Minn. 159, the law, was libelous per se. People v. 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 152, 137 Am. St. Rep. 546, Strauch, 93 N. E. 126, 130, 247 Ill. 220. 20 Ann. Cas. 717.

At common law any publication is a "libel" which degrades and injures another person, or brings him into contempt, hatred, or ridicule, or which accuses him of a crime, punishable by law, or of an act odious and disgraceful in society. It is defined by the Penal Code of Indiana to be a malicious publication of any false charge of and concerning another, accusing such other of any degrading or infamous act. Cronin v. Zimmerman, 88 N. E. 718, 719, 44 Ind. App. 118; Id., 90 N. E. 339, 45 Ind. App. 712.

The Iowa statute (Code, § 5086), defines libel as the malicious defamation of a person, made public by any printing, etc., tending to provoke hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence and social intercourse. In a criminal prosecution for libel, the information alleged that defendant charged the prosecutor with scheming to disbar certain attorneys, because they acted as attorneys for a temperance organization, and that he was guilty of grossly unprofessional conduct by testifying as a witness while acting as prosecutor in the disbarment cases, and that the prosecution was an attempt to cover the record of prosecutor as county attorney for unprofessional conduct before the grand jury, and that he attempted to falsify the court record in the disbarment proceedings, and suppressed certain affidavits in the investigation, which charges defendant published in a temperance paper edited by him. Held, that the publication charged was libelous per se, and it was

It is libelous per se to write of a clergyman, an applicant for a pulpit, "I would not with a ten-foot pole," if the words would exhave anything to do with him or touch him

The Missouri statute (Rev. St. 1899, § 2259) defining libel as a malicious defamation of a person made public by any printing, writing, sign, picture, etc., tending to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule, etc., and section 2260 making the circulation of a libel a misdemeanor, made all classes of libels misdemeanors and actionable per se, but did not make

publications libelous that were not so at common law. Kenworthy v. Journal Co., 93 S. W. 882, 885, 117 Mo. App. 327. Under the statute of this state (Rev. St. 1899, §§ 2260, 2863; Ann. St. 1906, pp. 1426, 1637), declaring that one publishing a libel shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and providing that it is actionable to publish falsely that any person has been guilty of adultery, it is libel to allege in a circular printed and published that one has committed adultery. State v. Santhuff, 110 S. W. 624, 626, 131 Mo. App. 620. The statute of this state (Rev. St. 1909, § 4818) defining a libel as the malicious defamation of a person by printing so as to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, though a part of the Criminal Code. is applicable to civil actions, and, under it, a newspaper article stating that plaintiff was served with a summons in an alleged fraudulent cattle transaction, and that he had taken advantage of the bankruptcy law to escape liability, is libelous per se. Sotham v. Drovers' Telegram Co., 144 S. W. 428, 431, 239 Mo. 606. Under this statute the publication, without consent, of the picture of a

child five years old, with the false statement able that they shall make the charge in dithat "Papa is going to buy mamma an Elgin rect terms. Lauder v. Jones, 101 N. W. watch for a present, and some one (I must 907, 911, 13 N. D. 525. not tell who) is going to buy my big sister a diamond ring, so don't you think you ought to buy me something?" as an advertisement in aid to business, is libelous, as exposing the child to ridicule. Munden v. Harris, 134 S. W. 1076, 1081, 153 Mo. App. 652.

Under the Montana statute defining "libel" as a false and unprivileged publication in writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation, the existence of malice is not a necessary ingredient to entitle plaintiff to recover. Paxton v. Woodward, 78 Pac. 215, 217, 31 Mont. 195, 107 Am. St. Rep. 416, 3 Ann. Cas. 546.

*

The statute (Rev. Codes 1905, § 8877) defines “criminal libel" as "the malicious defamation of a person made public by any printing, writing, sign, picture, reputation or effigy tending to expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence or social intercourse. * And the following section provides that: "Every person who makes or composes, dictates or procures the same to be done or who willfully publishes or circulates such libel or in any way knowingly or willfully aids or assists in making, publishing or circulating the same is guilty of a felony." The gist of the crime is the malicious defamation of a person made public in one or more of the modes prescribed and tending to expose such person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, etc. State v. Tolley, 136 N. W. 784, 785, 23 N. D. 284.

159.

The Penal Law of New York (Consol. Laws, c. 40) § 1346, provides that an indictment for a libel contained in a newspaper It is not necessary, in order to render a published in the state against a resident publication libelous, that it should charge thereof may be found in the county where any crime or public offense, inasmuch as the the paper was published or in the county South Dakota statute (Civ. Code, § 29) defines where the person libeled resided when the "libel" as a false and unprivileged publicaoffense was committed, and section 1347 pro- tion, by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or vides that in libel against a nonresident the other fixed representation to the eye, which indictment shall be found and the trial had exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridiat the place where the paper containing the cule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be libel purports on its face to be published, or, shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency if no county is indicated thereon, in any to injure him in his occupation. Barron v. county where the paper is circulated. Code Smith, 101 N. W. 1105, 1106, 19 S. D. 50; Cr. Proc. § 138, contained substantially simi-Nichols v. Smith, 102 N. W. 1135, 19 S. D. lar provisions relating to the place of indictment and trial where the person libeled is a resident and nonresident. Penal Law, § 1340, defines libel as a malicious publication by writing, printing, etc., which exposes any living person to contempt, etc. Heid, that the purpose of sections 1346 and 1347 was to designate the place of indictment and trial, and not to define libel; and hence do not limit the operation of section 1340 by excluding books or writings other than newspapers, and, under the latter section, as well as at common law, one could be prosecuted for a libel published in a book in this state, though committed against a nonresident. People v. Fornaro, 119 N. Y. Supp. 746, 748, 65 Misc. Rep. 457.

The North Dakota statute (Rev. Codes 1899, § 2715) defines "libel" as "a false and" unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." If the language of an alleged libel is fairly susceptible of a construction which renders it defamatory, the complaint states a cause of action. It is not necessary to render the words defamatory and action

The Texas statute (Acts 1901, p. 30, c. 26) defining a “libel" as a defamation tending to blacken the memory of the dead or to injure the living, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury, or to impeach his honesty and integrity, etc., includes any case which, in the absence of statute, was libelous at common law, and a publication directly impeaching one's integrity and truthfulness is libelous per se. Fleming v. Mattinson, 114 S. W. 650, 652, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 476. In view of this statute, words libelous per se and from the publication of which damages are implied as a matter of law are such words as tend to expose one to public hatred or disgrace or vilify him or injure his character. Allen v. Earnest (Tex.) 145 S. W. 1101, 1103.

Under Pen. Code, art. 721, declaring that he is guilty of "libel" who, with intent to injure, makes, publishes, or circulates any malicious statement affecting the reputation of another as to any matter or thing pointed out in the chapter, and article 727 declaring that the written, printed, or published statement, to come within the definition of “libel,” must convey the idea that the person to whom it refers has been guilty of some penal offense, etc., it was held that an indictment

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