sions of law. Raymond v. Blancgrass, 93 · Pac. 648, 653, 36 Mont. 449, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 976. Code 1907, § 3765, provides that the surviving husband of a woman who dies intestate shall be entitled absolutely to half the personalty of her separate estate. Section 4486 provides that all property of a wife, held by her previous to her marriage, is her separate property. Section 2486, giving to the administrator a right of action for negligence causing death, provides that the damages recovered shall not be liable for the debts of the deceased, and shall be distributed according to the statute of distributions. Held, the right of action being expressly vested in the administrator alone, so as not to be assignable, which right is inseparable from the idea of property, and the action by the administrator being more as an agent to effect the legislative policy to prevent homicide, and as trustee of any recovery, than as the representative of deceased in reducing property of the estate to possession, that, where a widow remarried and died pending a suit by the administrator of the first husband to recover for his death, the surviving second husband was not entitled to share in the subsequent recovery, the wife having had no "property" right in the cause of action, within the meaning of the statutes of distribution, her interest being merely personal, especially in view of Code 1907, § 2, defining "personal property" as money, goods, chattels, things in action, and evidences of debt; the use of the phrase "things in action," in connection only with assignable property, indicating the legislative intent that it shall have a similar meaning. Holt v. Stollenwerck, 56 South. 912, 913, 174 Ala. 213. Claim ex contractu or ex delicto A claim for damages for death by wrongful act is "personal property" within the meaning of Code 1899, c. 13, § 17, subsec. 16, providing that the words "personal property" include goods, chattels real and personal money credits, investments, and the evidences thereof. Richards v. Riverside Ironworks, 49 S. E. 437, 438, 56 W. Va. 510. A sale of the property of a corporation by a sheriff under a special writ of fieri facias, under the provisions of Act Pa. April 7, 1870 (P. L. 58), which authorizes the issuance of such writ on the return of an execution unsatisfied, and the sale thereunder of "any personal, mixed, or real property franchises and rights of such corporation" as such statute has been construed by the Supreme Court of the state, does not pass title to a claim for damages existing in favor of the corporation, and, on its subsequent adjudication as a bankrupt, a pending action on such a claim may be prosecuted to judgment by its trustee. International Coal Min. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 152 Fed. 551, 553. 3 WDS.& P.2D SER.-64 Clams When clams are reclaimed from nature and transplanted to a bed, so marked by stakes as to show that they are in the possession of a private owner, they are "personal property," and may become the subject of larceny. People v. Morrison, 86 N. E. 1120. 1121, 194 N. Y. 175, 128 Am. St. Rep. 552. Clearing house certificate Under Code 1907, § 7324, making felonious taking, etc., of personal property of a certain value grand larceny, an indictment alleging taking of clearing house certificates, personal property of another, sufficiently alleges taking of property subject to larceny, in absence of evidence of their nature; section 2 providing that "personal property" shall include money, evidences of debt, etc. Johnson v. State, 48 South. 792, 159 Ala. 113. Corporation stock Shares of stock in a corporation are "personal property." Gundry v. Reakirt, 173 Fed. 167, 169 (citing 2 Cook, Corp. [5th Ed.] $485); Wuller v. Chuse Grocery Co., 89 N. E. 796, 798, 241 Ill. 398, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 128, 132 Am. St. Rep. 216, 16 Ann. Cas. 522 (citing Cooper v. Corbin, 105 III. 224). The term "personal property" as used in the tax law includes the capital stock of corporations. Abrahams v. Medlicott, 119 Pac. 375, 376, 86 Kan. 106, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 137. Shares of stock in a corporation are regarded as "personal property" situated at the domicile of the owner, for the purposes of taxation. Darnell v. State, 90 N. E. 769, 772, 174 Ind. 143. "Stock" in a corporation is a right which a shareholder has by reason of his ownership of stock, and is a right to participate according to the amount of his stock in the surplus profits of the corporation on a division, and ultimately, on its dissolution, in the assets remaining after payment of debts, and this right is personal property. Osborne, 153 App. Div. 312, 138 N. Y. Supp. 18, 20. In re In jurisdictions possessing attachment it has been held that shares of stock are not laws with language similar to that of ours, included within the phrase "real and personal property." Fowler v. Dickson (Del.) 74 Atl. 601, 606, 1 Boyce, 113 (citing Foster v. Potter, 37 Mo. 525). Trover will lie for the wrongful conversion of shares of stock of a corporation. Herrick v. Humphrey Hardware Co., 103 N. W. 685, 687, 73 Neb. 809, 119 Am. St. Rep. 917, 11 Ann. Cas. 201. Shares of stock of a corporation are "personal property," within Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St. 1903, § 957, declaring that, when the capital stock of any corporation is divided into shares and certificates therefor are is L sued, the shares are personal property. Haynes v. Brown, 89 Pac. 1124, 1125, 18 Okl. 389. viding that, in a suit to quiet title to property in the state to which a nonresident claims title, such nonresident may be served by publication. An equitable petition alleged that by agreement with a stockholder and promot Under the act of 1903 (P. L. 1903, p. 394) exempting the personal property owned by citizens or corporations of this state situ-er of a domestic corporation plaintiff's intesate and being out of the state upon which taxes shall have been actually assessed and paid within 12 months, stock is "personal property." Trenton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 68 Atl. 1111, 1112, 76 N. J. Law, 79. Code 1899, c. 106, § 9, giving plaintiff in attachment a lien on personalty of his debtor on the levy of the attachment or service on garnishee on all choses in action and other securities of defendant from the suing out of the attachment, includes shares of stock in the terms "personal property, choses in action, and other securities." Lipscomb's Adm'r v. Condon, 49 S. E. 392, 393, 56 W. Va. 416, 67 L. R. A. 670, 107 Am. St. Rep. 938. Stock held by a resident in a foreign corporation whose property is all outside the state is not such "property" or "personal property" as is taxable under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 11,348, 11,415, 11,519; the last section defining property to include every tangible or intangible thing being the subject of ownership, whether animate or inaminate, real or personal. State ex rel. Koeln v. Lesser, 141 S. W. 888, 890, 237 Mo. 310. Shares of stock in a corporation are the property of the holder thereof, separate and distinct from the property of the corporation itself, and, in the absence of any more specific definition by the Legislature, would be held to be subject to taxation as "personal property." Hasely v. Ensley, 82 N. E. 809, 810, 40 Ind. App. 598. Under a statute providing that for the purpose of taxation "personal property" shall include all chattels belonging to inhabitants of the state unless permanently invested in another state and shares in foreign corporations owned by the citizens of the state, shares in a foreign corporation owned by a citizen of the state are taxable as "personal property," although corporate property is as sessed where situated. Thrall v. Guiney, 104 N. W. 646, 648, 141 Mich. 392, 113 Am. St. Rep. 528. tate was to have certain shares of stock, when paid for in the manner provided, that this had been done, and plaintiff's intestate became the real owner, but the executors of the other contracting party had refused to transfer, or have transferred, such stock. Held, that the shares of stock were "personal property," and for the purpose of a suit to quiet title their situs was the domicile of the corporation. Hamil v. Flowers, 65 S. E. 961, 962, 133 Ga. 216. Shares of stock in an incorporated company held and claimed by a nonresident of the district where the company has its domicile or is engaged in business cannot be considered "personal property within the district," so as to authorize the court, in a suit in which complainant sets up title to the stock, to order the holder to be constructively served in the manner provided by stat ute. McKane v. Burke, 132 Fed. 688, 689 (citing Kilgour v. New Orleans Gaslight Co., 14 Fed. Cas. 468; 2 Woods, 144). Under Civ. Code, § 324, declaring that shares of stock in a corporation are "personal property" and may be transferred by indorsement and delivery of the certificate, and providing that such transfer is not valid, except as to the parties thereto, until the same is entered on the books of the corporation, etc., a bona fide transfer of corporate shares, though unregistered, takes precedence over a subsequent attachment or execution levied on the stock for the debt of the vendor, in whose name the shares stand on the corporation books. National Bank of Pacific v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 108 Pac. 676, 677, 157 Cal. 573, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 987, 21 Ann. Cas. 1391. Shares of stock in a corporation are personal property belonging to the respective shareholders, and are within the scope and operation of Const. art. 3, § 51, which declares that the personal property of residents in the state shall be subject to taxation in the county or city where the resident bona fide resides for the greater part of the year for which the tax may be levied, and not elsewhere, ex which shall be taxed in the city or county where they are so located. City of Baltimore v. Allegany County Com'rs, 57 Atl. 632, 636, 99 Md. 1. "Personal property" defined by Gen. St. Kan. 1909, § 9215, relating to taxation, to include every tangible thing which is the sub-cept goods and chattels permanently located, ject of ownership not forming a part or parcel of real property, includes shares of stock in a corporation organized in another state where its principal office is located, and this though practically all of the capital of the corporation was invested in real and personal property in Kansas which was itself taxed. Hunt v. Board of Com'rs of Allen County, 109 Pac. 106, 107, 82 Kan. 824. Shares of corporate stock are personal property within Civ. Code 1895, § 4976, pro Tax Act April 11, 1866, § 5, provided that all real and personal estate should be taxable, except stocks and other personal estate owned by citizens of the state and being out of the state, upon which taxes should have been paid within 12 months. Tax Act April 8, 1903, in revision of Tax Act 1866, provides for the taxation of all property not "express- | purchaser has possession sufficient to susly exempted," and contains the exact words of exemption, save that the words "personal property" are substituted for "stocks and other personal estate" in the older act. Held, that stock in a foreign corporation owned by a resident is exempt, under Tax Act April 8, 1903, where taxes have been paid on the corporation's property in its own state within 12 months. Inhabitants of City of Trenton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co. of New Jersey, 73 Atl. 606, 607, 77 N. J. Law, 757. Credits For purposes of taxation, "personal property" includes bonds, notes, choses in action, and other evidences of credit within the domestic state. Buck v. Beach, 71 N. E. 963, 967, 164 Ind. 37, 108 Am. St. Rep. 272. As used in Rev. St. Wis. 1849, c. 15, § 1, providing for the assessment of personal property, and declaring that the term should be construed to mean all debts due from solvent debtors, whether on account, note, contract, bond, mortgage, or other security, whether due or to become due, all credits constituted "personal property" subject to taxation. Kingsley v. Merrill, 99 N. W. 1044, 1045, 122 Wis. 185, 67 L. R. A. 200, 2 Ann. Cas. 748. Crop Growing crops are "personalty" which pass by deed as appurtenant to the realty, but may be severed therefrom by reservation, either by parol agreement or instrument in writing. Cooper v. Kennedy, 124 N. W. 1131, 1132, 86 Neb. 119, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 761, 136 tain trespass, though he is not the owner of the land, or the tenant thereof." Where the tenant of a farm, on leaving the state, sold to plaintiffs the right to graze their stock on grass and stalks growing on the farm, plaintiffs to care for the leased premises during the tenant's absence, it did not convert the stalks and grass into "real estate," and hence the landlord, in turning out the stock and | locking the gates of the premises, was guilty of a conversion of the stalks and grass, which were "personal property." Leidy v. Carson. 90 S. W. 754, 755, 115 Mo. App. 1 (quoting and adopting definition in Avitt v. Farell, 68 Mo. App. 665). Possessory warrant lies only for the recovery of personalty, and immature growing crops are not "personal property," but realty, so that a landlord cannot bring possessory warrant against his cropper for such crops, under Civ. Code 1910, § 3706, giving a landlord the right to repossess crops by such proceeding. Gainous v. Martin, 72 S. E. 1100, 10 Ga. App. 210. Debts Where two parties contract for the sale of real estate, and the purchaser makes a partial payment and is to pay the remainder in installments, and the seller is to convey the legal title on payment in full of the price, it creates a debt from the purchaser to the seller, which is "personal property" within Gen. St. 1909, § 9215, defining personal property as including every tangible thing which is the subject of ownership; "tangible" being defined as something capable of being possessed or realized; real; substantial; eviCorn standing in the field on the home-dent-and is subject to taxation under Gen. stead of a bankrupt and which had fully matured at the date of the bankruptcy is "personal property" and cannot be held exempt as a part of the realty. In re Sullivan, 142 Fed. 620, 621. Am. St. Rep. 701. Where there was a sale of all the strawberry plants growing on a certain tract of land, the property falls clearly within the classification of fruits of industry and not natural products, and must be treated as "personal property" and the subject of replevin. Cannon v. Mathews, 87 S. W. 428, 430, 75 Ark. 336, 69 L. R. A. 827, 112 Am. St. Rep. 64, 5 Ann. Cas. 478. St. 1909, § 9214, providing for taxation of all property real and personal. Williams v. Board of Com'rs of Osage County, 114 Pac. 858, 84 Kan. 508, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1221. Domestic animal Under Pen. Code 1895, art. 867, which provides that, within the meaning of "persontheft" are included all domesticated animals al property which may be the subject of or birds, when they are proved to be of any specific value, on a prosecution for the theft sitates a reversal of a judgment of convicof a chicken, failure to prove its value necestion. Hasley v. State, 94 S. W. 899, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 45. The common products of the soil which are treated like "personal property" are the usual annual crops, such as cereals, maize, felonious stealing, etc., of personal property Pen. Code, § 484, defines larceny as the vegetables, and the annual products of per- of another. Held, that the phrase "personal ennial plants and shrubs, but personal property does not include ginseng, of which the root alone has commercial value, and which requires from seven to fifteen years to mature. Kuehn v. City of Antigo, 120 N. W. 823, 824, 139 Wis. 132, 131 Am. St. Rep. 1043. "Grass rooted to the ground is, for the purpose of sale, 'personal property'; and the property of another," as so used, means property in the possession of another who is entitled, as bailee or otherwise to retain possession, for some benefit or profit to himself to the exclusion of all others, and not absolute ownership as defined by Civ. Code, § 679, so that a taking of a heifer by the general owner thereof from the possession of an agister entitled to hold the same under a lien for pasturage, with the intent to deprive the latter thereof, constituted larceny. People v. Cain, 93 Pac. 1037, 1039, 7 Cal. App. 163. Same-Dog which may be the subject of ownership. The term chattels includes goods and chattels." Rev. St. p. 4, c. 1, tit. 7, § 33; Code Proc. § 463; Code Civ. Proc. (1880) § 3343, subd. 7. Where a foreign insurance company doing business in the state under the laws thereof company's consent, assigned it to another issued a policy to a resident, who, with the Dogs are personal property, for the neg ligent killing of which a railroad company is liable. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Rhod-resident as collateral security for advanced en, 123 S. W. 798, 800, 93 Ark. 29, 137 Am. of the state, and his trustees held the polpremiums, and the assignee died a resident St. Rep. 73, 20 Ann. Cas. 915. icy as an asset of his estate, the subjectA dog is "personal property" within the matter of an action by the trustees against statute providing that "larceny" is the fe- the company and the beneficiaries to recover lonious stealing, taking and carrying, riding the amount of premiums advanced is “peror driving away personal property of anoth-sonal property" within the state, within Code er, and that it shall embrace every theft Civ. Proc. § 438, subd. 5, authorizing the which unlawfully deprives another of his money or other personal property. State v. Soward, 103 S. W. 741, 742, 83 Ark. 264, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1117, 119 Am. St. Rep. 136, 13 Ann. Cas. 79. Laws 1892, p. 1486, c. 677, § 4, defines "personal property" as including everything, except real property, which may be the subject of ownership, and hence the good will of a business firm is taxable under the Transfer Tax Law. In re Dun's Estate, 82 N. Y. Supp. 802, 803, 40 Misc. Rep. 509. service of summons on a nonresident defendant by publication, where the complaint demands judgment that defendant be excluded from an interest in "personal property" within the state, and the nonresident beneficiaries may be served by publication. N. E. 438, 440, 189 N. Y. 447; Morgan v. Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 82 Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 116 Pac. 385, 388, 16 Cal. App. 85. Judgment 7 A judgment is "personal property," subject to levy and sale on execution, under Rev. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 336, 340. Acme Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Hinkley, 122 N. W. 482, 23 S. D. 509, 21 Ann. Cas. 743. Land certificate An unlocated land certificate is "personal property." Phillips v. Palmer, 120 S. W. 911, 913, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 91; McLain v. Pate (Tex.) 124 S. W. 718, 720. Leasehold A lease for a term of years is "personal property," a chattel real, so that a judgment is not a lien on a leasehold estate acquired by the debtor under a lien executed subsequent to the judgment, under Code Civ. Income and income producing invest- Proc. § 671, making a judgment a lien on all ments the real property of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution owned by him at the time, or any which he may afterwards acquire. Summerville v. Stockton Milling Co., 76 Pac. 243, 246, 142 Cal. 529. The term "personal property," as used in a will directing the executors to convert all personal property into money, is not limited to personal property of a tangible nature, but includes income-producing investments. Curtis v. Osborn, 65 Atl. 968, 970, 79 Conn.ises 555. Insurance policy Laws 1892, p. 1486, c. 677, § 4, provides as follows: "The term 'personal property' includes chattels, money, things in action, and all written instruments themselves, as distinguished from the rights or interests to which they relate, by which any right, interest, lien, or incumbrance in, to or upon property, or any debt or financial obligation is created, acknowledged, evidenced, transferred, discharged or defeated, wholly or in part, and everything, except real property, An unexpired three-year lease on premcondemned was "personal property," and not "real estate," within the constitutional provision conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in cases involving title to real estate. Springfield S. W. Ry. Co. v. Schweitzer, 151 S. W. 128, 131, 246 Mo. 122; Ellis v. Bingham (Tex.) 150 S. W. 602. An unexpired lease of real property for 20 years or any longer term is "personal property," both at common law and under the statutes of Missouri, and therefore, on the death of the lessee, passes to his administrator, except as to the interest of the widow, under Rev. St. 1899, § 2933, giving her dower in a leasehold. Orchard v. WrightDalton-Bell-Anchor Store Co., 125 S. W. 486, 492, 225 Mo. 414, 20 Ann. Cas. 1072. to each of her daughters, and all her household goods, wearing apparel, and personal property to be divided between the daughters, and directed her executors to sell the remainder of her estate, and divide it “equally among my four children." Held, that the words "personal property" should be limited to articles of a personal character of the same species as those mentioned, and did not include cash in bank. In re Gibbons' Estate, Under Ky. St. 1903, § 458, providing that "the words 'real estate,' or 'land' shall be construed to mean lands, tenements, and heriditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein other than a chattel interest; and the words 'personal estate' shall'include chattels, real and other estate, such as, on the death of the owner intestate, would de- 73 Atl. 183, 224 Pa. 37. volve on his personal representatives," a leasehold interest in a store building is "personal estate" rather than "real estate" or "land." Combs Lumber Co. v. Chinn (Ky.) 90 S. W. 251. * * all "Personal property," defined by Acts 1905, c. 35, p. 309, to include things of value, movable and tangible which are the subject of ownership; all chattels, real and personal," etc., includes a lease of land for coal mining and coke manufacturing purposes for a period of 30 years, with the right to erect buildings, etc., upon payment of a rent or royalty of ten cents per ton for all coal mined, and with a clause for forfeiture-constituting a chattel real-so as to make it taxable as personal property to the lessee. Harvey Coal, etc., Co. v. Dillon, 53 S. E. 928, 936, 59 W. Va. 605, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 628. A lease granting oil and gas mining privileges for a term of years is a "chattel real." (a) A chattel real is "personalty." (b) A lease for such purposes, made by the guardian of a minor, permission of the court having first been obtained thereto, and such lease having been approved and confirmed by the court, though without the preliminary notices essential for the order of sale and confirmation of the same in case of the sale of real estate of minors by guardians, is valid against a collateral attack. Duff v. Keaton, 124 Pac. 291, 295, 33 Okl. 92, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 472. Money As money, see Money. "Personal property" includes money. certain personal property, and two saving deposits. She devised one of these houses Testatrix owned three houses and lots, to each of her three nieces, and by the second clause of her will bequeathed to her niece Q. all of her household furniture and "personal property of whatsoever kind" in her W. street house. The will disposed of all testatrix's property, and contained no residuary clause. After execution of will, she sold one of the houses, and deposited the proceeds with other money to the credit of her saving bank deposits. The passbooks for these deposits, together with certain other money, and jewelry, were in testatrix's possession at her W. street residence when she died. Held, that the proceeds of the property sold did not pass to the devisee of testatrix's residence under the description "peras to this testatrix died intestate. In re Desonal property of whatsoever kind," but that laney's Will, 117 N. Y. Supp. 838, 133 App. Div. 409. Code Civ. Proc. § 2713, subd. 5, provides that necessary household furniture or other personal property, to a value not exceeding $150, shall remain in the possession of a widow while she lives with and provides for minor children, and shall not be deemed assets; section 2514, subd. 13, declares that "personal property" signifies every kind of property which survives a decedent other than real property; General Construction Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 22) § 39, provides that the term "personal property includes chattels, money * and everything except real property"; and Poor Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. Gibson v. Gibson, 43 Wis. 23, 33, 28 Am. Rep. 42) §§ 84, 85, relating to burial of soldiers, 527; Bromberg v. McArdle, 55 South. 805, 172 Ala. 270, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 855. Under Rev. St. 1887, § 16, subd. 3, money is "personal property." Sencerbox v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 93 Pac. 369, 372, 14 Idaho, 95. Code 1907, § 2, which defines personal property and includes money in its classification, is limited with respect to such words to their use in the codification and has no application in the interpretation of the term "personal property" as used in a bequest or devise. Bromberg v. McArdle, 55 South. 805, 172 Ala. 270, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 855. Testatrix left her surviving two sons and two daughters, and gave articles of jewelry etc., provides that counties shall inter any honorably discharged resident soldier, whether dying in a state institution or not, who does not leave sufficient means to defray his funeral expenses, but such expenses shall not exceed $50. Deceased, an honorably discharged veteran, died in a state home, leaving $54, and no other money or property. Held, in a proceeding against the comptroller to pay funeral expenses claimed by undertakers, that the money left was exempt, belonged to the widow, and was not assets out of which to pay funeral expenses, and hence that the county was liable. People ex rel. Brown v. Prendergast, 131 N. Y. Supp. 441, 443, 146 App. Div. 713. |