186, expressly depriving justices of the peace of jurisdiction of an action for slander, such action was for an "injury to the person" within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, provided the amount claimed did not exceed $300; the phrase "injury to the person" not being limited to those injuries which would support an action for trespass vi et armis at common law. McKenzie v. Doran, 104 Pac. 677, 678, 39 Mont. 593. "In modern parlance the words 'personal injury' are often used to designate a physical injury to the party. But usually, when there is any attempt to put the matter into legal phraseology, these and equivalent words are understood to import the meaning in which they have long been used by recognized authorities, whether in legal text-books and commentaries or precise definition by courts, in classifying the rights of individuals. In 1 Bl. Comm. 129 et seq., the author classifies and distinguishes those rights which are annexed to the person, jura personarum, and acquired rights in external objects, jura rerum; and in the former he includes personal security, which consists 'in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.' And he makes the corresponding classification of remedies. The idea expressed is that a man's reputation is a part of himself, as his body and his limbs are, and that detraction of it is an injury to his personality, and Chancellor Kent in his twenty-fourth lecture shows that the same classification of rights was ex pressed in our colonial legislation and has always been observed, and, on page *16 of the second volume of his Commentaries, he says: 'As a part of the rights of personal security, the preservation of every person's good name from the vile arts of detraction is justly included. The laws of the ancients, no less than those of modern nations, made private reputation one of the objects of their protection.'" A judgment for libel is for an "an injury to the person" and is not released by a discharge in bankruptcy. Thompson v. Judy, 169 Fed. 553, 555, 556, 95 C. C. A. 51. juries" are used in the statutes of the United States, and of the several states, they are generally held to include libel. Times-Democrat Pub. Co. v. Mozee, 136 Fed. 761, 763, 69 C. C. A. 418 (citing 3 Bl. 119; Cooley, Torts [2d Ed.] 23, 24; Bouv. Law Dict. verbo "Injury"; McDonald v. Brown, 51 Atl. 213, 23 R. I. 546, 58 L. R. A. 768, 91 Am. St. Rep. 659; Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 13 S. E. 250, 87 Ga. 79, 80; Sanderson v. Hunt, 76 S. W. 179, 116 Ky. 435, 3 Ann. Cas. 168; Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, 359, 16 Am. Rep. 270; Ott v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 72 N. W. 833, 70 Minn. 50, 54; Calloway v. Laydon, 47 Iowa, 458, 29 Am. Rep. 489; Smith v. Sherman, 4 Cush. [58 Mass.] 408; State v. Clayborne, 45 Pac. 303, 14 Wash. 622). Mental injury The words "personal injuries," as used in a statute providing that actions for personal injuries to a wife shall be brought in her name, extend to injuries to her feelings, resulting from abuse, slander, or libel. Martin v. Derenbecker, 40 South. 849, 850, 116 La. 495. Mental suffering is included in the term "personal injuries," as used in Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 3353a, providing that causes of action upon which suit has or may be brought by the injured party for personal injuries other than those resulting in death, whether such injuries be to the health, the reputation, or the person of the injured party, shall not abate by reason of his death, but shall survive in favor of his heirs, etc. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kauffman (Tex.) 107 S. W. 630, 631. Seduction An action for seduction is an action for "personal injuries," within Pub. Acts 1890, No. 155, barring actions for personal injuries, unless brought within three years from the occurrence; a "personal" wrong or injury being an invasion of a personal right and pertaining to the person. May v. Wilson, 128 N. W. 1084, 1085, 164 Mich. 26, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 654. PERSONAL LIBERTY See, also, Right of Privacy. "Personal liberty consists,' says Blackstone, 'in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to whatever places one's own inclination may direct, without restraint, unless by due course of law." Civil Rights Cases, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 109 U. S. 3, 39, 27 L. Ed. 835. Injuries to character and mental suffering resulting from a libelous publication are "personal injuries," within the meaning of Act La. No. 68, p. 95, of 1902, amendatory of Rev. Civ. Code La. 1870, art. 2402, which provides, inter alia, that "damages resulting from personal injuries to the wife shall not form part of this community, but shall always be and remain the separate property of the wife and recoverable by herself alone," "Personal liberty" is the power of locoand under such provision a wife may main- motion, of changing situation, of removing tain an action to recover damages for a libel one's person to whatever place one's inclinaaffecting herself. At common law, libel and tion may direct, without imprisonment or reslander were regarded as injuries to the per-straint, except by course of law. It includes, son, or "personal injuries." Where the terms not only the right to go where one pleases, "injury to the person" and "personal in- but to maintain himself in a lawful manner PERSONAL LUGGAGE while there, to live and work where he choos- [ping or exposure. People ex rel. Gow v. es, to earn his livelihood by a lawful calling, | Bingham, 107 N. Y. Supp. 1011, 1014, 57 Misc. to enter into contracts essential to carry out Rep. 66. his avocation, as well as mere freedom from imprisonment. It also includes the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways. Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 Atl. 97, 107, 30 R. I. 13, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, 136 Am. St. Rep. 928, 18 Ann. Cas. 1006. "Personal liberty" includes not only freedom from physical restraint, but the right to be let alone to determine one's own mode of life, whether it shall be one of publicity or of privacy, and to order one's life and manage one's affairs in a manner that will be most agreeable to him, so long as he does not violate the rights of others or of the public. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S. E. 68, 70, 122 Ga. 190, 69 L. R. A. 101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104, 2 Ann. Cas. 561. "The right of 'personal security' is not fully accorded by allowing an individual to go through life in possession of all of his members, and his body unmarred; nor is his right to 'personal liberty' fully accorded by merely allowing him to remain out of jail, or free from other physical restraints. The liberty which he derives from natural law, and which is recognized by municipal law, embraces far more than freedom from physical restraint. The term 'liberty' is not to be so dwarfed, 'but is deemed to embrace the right of a man to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare.' 'Liberty,' in its broad sense, as understood in this country, means the right not only of freedom from servitude, imprisonment, or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation." "The right of one to exhibit himself to the public at all proper times, in all proper places, and in a proper manner, is embraced within the right of personal liberty.' The right to withdraw from the public gaze at such times as a person may see fit, when his presence in public is not demanded by any rule of law, is also embraced within the right of 'personal liberty. Publicity in one instance, and privacy in the other, are each guaranteed. If 'personal liberty' embraces the right of publicity, it no less embraces the correlative right of privacy." Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S. E. 68, 70, 122 Ga. 190, 69 L. R. A. 101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104, 2 Ann. Cas. 561 (citing Brannon, Fourteenth Amendment, 111). The "right to personal liberty," which exists independent of any express provision of law, includes not only absolute freedom of travel, but the preservation of the person inviolate against attack or compulsory strip See, also, Personal Baggage. "Whatever a passenger takes with him for his personal use or convenience either with reference to immediate necessities or the ultimate purposes of the journey, must be considered 'personal luggage.'" The term would include money for expenses and diamond rings suitable for the passenger's station in life. Hasbrouck v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 118 N. Y. Supp. 735, 739, 742, 64 Misc. Rep. 478 (quoting and adopting definition in Ray, Neg. Imp. Duties, p. 561). PERSONAL MORTGAGE A "personal mortgage" is more than mortgaged, and operates as a transfer of the a mere security. It is a sale of the thing whole legal title to the mortgagee subject only to be defeated by the full performance of the condition. In re Riggs Restaurant Co., 130 Fed. 691, 693, 66 C. C. A. 48 (citing Butler v. Miller, 1 N. Y. 500). PERSONAL NOTICE "Personal notice" to an absent defendant of an attachment of his real estate implies more than casual information of the suit or of the seizure of his property, but it relates to his receiving or learning of the copy of the writ that he is entitled to have left for him. Wade v. Wade's Adm'r, 69 Atl. 826, 827, 81 Vt. 275. PERSONAL OBLIGATION A contract giving D. exclusive right to drill in defendant's land with a view of finding commercial substances, and in case of success within 90 days thereafter to pay defendant $100 per arpent for a conveyance of the land, did not impose a "personal obligation" on D. within Civ. Code, art. 2000, declaring an obligation personal when the obligor undertakes to perform anything that requires his personal skill and attention; and hence the contract was assignable. Anse La Butte Oil & Mineral Co. v. Babb, 47 South. 754, 755, 122 La. 415. PERSONAL ORNAMENTS As goods and chattels, see Goods. All personal property, see All. Personal property is the right or interest which a person has in things personal. State ex rel. Louisiana Imp. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 36 South. 91, 97, 111 La. 982. Ordinarily the term "personal property" includes money, goods, chattels, etc. Brom berg v. McArdle, 55 South. 805, 172 Ala. 270, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 855. Fishburn v. "Personal property' is any right or interest which a man may have in things movable and includes chattels, things in action, and evidence of debt." Londershausen, 92 Pac. 1060, 1062, 50 Or. 363, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1234, 15 Ann. Cas. 975 (quoting and adopting definition in 2 Bouv. Law Dict. p. 662). The term "personal property," as used in the statute relating to taxation, means and includes all property not included in the term "real estate." Copper Queen Consol. Min. Co. v. Territorial Board of Equalization, 84 Pac. 511, 518, 9 Ariz. 383. The words "personal property" as used in Rev. St. Wis. 1878, § 2317, providing that no contract for the sale of personal property by the terms of which the title is to remain in the vendor and possession in the vendee until the purchase price is paid shall be valid against any other person than the parties, without filing, is not limited to property sold to be used and not resold. Mishawaka Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 158 Fed. 885, 888. The provision of Comp. Laws 1897, 8 3834, that the. personal property of corporations organized for the purpose of maritime commerce and navigation shall be assessed only in the city or township which is stated in their articles of association, is not confined to vessel property so called, but extends to all the "personal property of corporations engaged in maritime commerce or navigation." Teagan Transp. Co. v. Board of Assessors of City of Detroit, 102 N. W. 273, 274, 139 Mich. 1, 69 L. R. A. 431, 111 Am. St. Rep. 391. Burns' Rev. St. 1901, § 8454, provides that "in entering personal property upon the proper tax books for the purpose of taxation it shall be a sufficient description of the same to use the words 'personal property,' and such phrase shall comprehend and embrace all species of personal property belonging to the person charged therewith on the tax books, and no more specific description or designation thereof shall be necessary." Brunson v. Starbuck, 70 N. E. 163, 165, 32 Ind. App. 457. Testatrix gave specific personal property and specified sums to beneficiaries and directed the executor to sell the remainder of household furniture, goods, chattels, and stock, and to convert "all other personal property" into money and divide the same equally between two beneficiaries. Held, that the term "personal property" was sufficiently comprehensive to include all goods, chattels, notes, bonds, mortgages, choses in action, and money possessed by testatrix at the date of her death, so that all her personal property was disposed of by the will. Skinner. v. Spann, 93 N. E. 1061, 1070, 175 Ind. 672... In Rev. Laws, c. 140, § 2, providing that such parts of the "personal property" as the probate court, having regard to all the cir cumstances of the case, may allow as necestaken as assets for the payment of debts, saries to the widow for herself, shall not be legacies, or charges of administration, the term "personal property" means the personal property left by the deceased at the time of his death, and as to this property, upon the appointment of an executor or administrator, jurisdiction of the court attaches for the purpose of allowing to the widow as necessaries whatever she ought to receive. It is not the personal property that is in the hands of the administrator at the time of filing the petition for an allowance which the law appropriates for payment of necessaries, but it is all that comes into his hands, so far as it may be needed under the decree of the court. Whitcomb v. Taylor, 78 N. E. 536, 537, 192 Mass. 555. * Rev. St. Ohio 1890-92, § 2731, providing that "all property, whether real or personal, in this state, and all money, credits, investments and bonds, stocks and otherwise, of persons residing in this state, shall be subject to taxation," when construed in connection with the related sections, which require the listing for taxation of property held by trustees or agents for others, includes, and subjects to taxation as "personal property," every form of such property having a situs in the state, including such forms as money, credits, bonds, or stocks, whether such situs is given by reason of the residence of the owner in the state, in which case such forms of property are taxed with out regard to the place of their deposit, or whether by reason of their being held within the state by an agent of a nonresident owner; and municipal bonds deposited with the state superintendent of insurance by a foreign insurance company for the protection of Ohio policy holders, as required by section 3660, are taxable, and when not returned by either the company or the superintendent of insurance may properly be listed by the auditor of the county in which they are held. Western Assur. Co. of Toronto v. Halliday, 126 Fed. 257, 265, 61 C. C. A. 271. Statutory definitions "Personal property" includes money, goods, chattels, things in action, and evidences of debt. Gibson v. Gibson, 43 Wis. 23, 33, 28 Am. Rep. 527 (quoting and adopting definition in Rev. St. c. 5). Statutory construction law defines the term personal property as follows:-"The term 'personal property' includes chattels, money, things in action, and all written instruments themselves, as distinguished from the rights or interests to which they relate, by which any right, interest, lien or incumbrance in, to or upon property, or any debt or financial obligation is created, a knowledged, evidenced, transferred, discharg ed or defeated, wholly or in part, and everything except real property, which may be the subject of ownership." Morgan v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 104 N. Y. Supp. 185, 188, 119 App. Div. 645 (citing Laws 1892, p. 1486, c. 677, § 4). purpose of that section was not to exempt Bonds are "personal property." Wuller Bonds in which a foreign insurance company is required by Rev. St. Ohio, § 3660, as a condition of doing business in Ohio, to invest a portion of its capital stock, to be deposited with the superintendent of insurance for the protection of the local policy holders, are "personal property" within the meaning of section 2744, requiring insurance companies to list for taxation all their personal property, which, by the terms of that section, is to include moneys and credits within the state, and is also defined in section 2730 as including the capital stock, although the taxation of investments in bonds, provided for in sections 2730, 2731, extends only to such se Bates' Ann. St. Ohio, § 2781a, providing that the term "personal property" applies to all kinds of omitted property for the taxation of which, for any of the years in which it was omitted, provision was not made by law, considered in connection with other provisions for the listing, valuing, levyFor purposes of taxation "personal proping, and collection of taxes on taxable property" includes bonds. Buck v. Beach, 71 N. erty which is not returned to the taxing of- E. 963, 967, 164 Ind. 37, 108 Am. St. Rep. 272. ficers or has been omitted from tax duplicates, should be construed as if reading, "all kinds of omitted' property," etc., and as intended to apply only to property which was properly taxable in such years but which was not returned or properly returnable for taxation thereon. Western Assur. Co. of Toronto v. Halliday, 127 Fed. 830, 831, 837, 838. The term "personal property," as employed in a tax law, includes bonds, notes, credits, and choses in action. Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. Tex. 1897, art. 5063, providing that personal property shall, for the purposes of taxation, be construed to include goods, moneys, and evidences of debt, "owned by citizens of the state," does not, when considered in connection with all the provisions of the law relating to the subject of taxation, operate to exclude from taxation property owned by nonresidents that has a taxable situs within the state. It embraces a deposit of securities with the State Treasurer by a foreign guaranty company as required by Acts 25th Leg. p. 244, c. 165, approved June 10, 1897, as security for the performance of its obligations. State v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 80 S. W. 544, 553, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 214. "Gen. St. 1909, § 9215, provides the term 'personal property' shall include every tangible thing which is the subject of ownership, not forming part of real property; also the capital stock, undivided profits, and all other assets of every company, incorporated or unincorporated, and every share or interest in such stock, profit, or assets, by whatever name the same may be designated, provided the same is not included in other personal property subject to taxation or listed as the property of individuals." Hunt v. Board of Com'rs of Allen County, 109 Pac. 106, 107, 82 Kan. 824. curities as are in the hands of individual residents, owned by themselves or held by A dwelling house erected on a city street, though by mistake extending onto an adjoining lot, under a permit conditioned that the builder will remove it on 30 days' notice from the city, built on wooden shoes extending its entire width, and resting on wooden blocks laid on the ground, so that removal will not disturb the freehold, remains "personal property." Page v. Urick, 72 Pac. 454, 455, 31 Wash. 601, 96 Am. St. Rep. 924 (citing and adopting Cobbey, Replevin [2d Ed.] § 373; Jewett v. Patridge, 12 Me. 243, 27 Am. Dec. 173; Board of Com'rs of Rush County v. Stubbs, 25 Kan. 322). street to be widened, and, having previously Claimant purchased certain land along a acquired a building, which had been taken The object of the provision, "all goods, by the city and paid for in another street chattels, and effects belonging to inhabitants opening proceeding, moved the building to of this state, situated without this state, ex- the land so acquired after the commencement cept the property actually and permanently of the proceeding, and placed the same with invested in business in another state shall not reference to the prior existing street lines, be included," in Burns' Ann. St. 1901, § 8411, though the land purchased was sufficient in defining what the term "personal property" depth to have enabled him to have located shall include for the purpose of taxation, the building with reference to the proposed was not to avoid double taxation, since the line of the street. After this, claimant sold to his grantor the rear part of the lot, so as is chargeable for any personal property subto preclude a relocation of the building on ject to mortgage or other lien, the court may the lot with reference to the proposed line. appoint a receiver and dispose of it if more Held, that the building was not located in can be obtained for it than the claims upon good faith, and, having been once severed it. Musgrove v. Goss, 72 Atl. 371, 372, 75 N. from the soil, it became "personal property," H. 208 (citing Fling v. Goodall, 40 N. H. 208). and should be so considered in determining the question of damages for the part of the lot required for the street. In re Briggs Ave. in City of New York, 89 N. E. 814, 816, 196 N. Y. 255, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 273, 17 Ann. Cas. 1032. Chattel real A "chattel real" is personal property. Townsend v. Boyd, 66 Atl. 1099, 1101, 217 Pa. 386, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1148. Check A check drawn by the Treasurer of the United States in settlement of a claim against the government is "personal property" within Code, § 105 (21 Stat. 1206, c. 854), providing that publication may be substituted for personal service of process on nonresidents of this district in suits to enforce liens against real or personal property within the District of Columbia. Jones v. Rutherford, 26 App. D. C. 114, 119. Chose in action Generally speaking, a "chose in action" is personal property. In re Morace (Del.) 74 Atl. 375, 376, 1 Boyce, 67. For purposes of taxation "personal property" includes choses in action. Buck v. Beach, 71 N. E. 963, 967, 164 Ind. 37, 108 Am. St. Rep. 272. "Personal property" includes things in action and evidences of debt. Gibson v. son, 43 Wis. 23, 33, 28 Am. Rep. 527; Fishburn v. Londershausen, 92 Pac. 1060, 1062, 50 Or. 363, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1234, 15 Ann. Cas. 975 (citing Rev. St. c. 5; 2 Bouv. Law Dict. p. 662). "Choses in action" are "personal property" within the statute against fraudulent conveyances. Hall & Farley v. Alabama Terminal & Improvement Co., 39 South. 285, 288, 143 Ala. 464, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 130, 5 Ann. Cas. 363. Act Pa. June 7, 1870 (P. L. 58), providing for the issuance of a special writ of fieri facias on a judgment against a corporation after return of execution unsatisfied and the sale thereunder of "the personal, mixed or real property, franchises and rights of such corporation," as construed by the Supreme Court of the state, does not authorize the sale under such writ of a chose in action or claim in tort belonging to the corporation. International Coal Min. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 152 Fed. 554, 555. An assignment by one of several purchasers of real estate conveyed to a trustee with directions to sell and divide the proceeds among the several purchasers of his interest in the trust agreement to a bank in which he is depositor as security for a note is an assignment by way of a pledge of a chose in action constituting "personal property" within Code Civ. Proc. § 17, and the bank notwithstanding section 726 may off-set its matured claim on the note against the deposit without proceeding to collect the security. John M. C. Marble Co. v. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, 115 Pac. 59, 62, 15 Cal. App. 347. Civ. Code, § 4662, subsec. 3, provides that "personal property" includes things in action. Code Civ. Proc. § 1218, provides that all property or any interest therein of the Gib-judgment debtor not exempt by law is liable to execution, and all property not capable of manual delivery may be attached on execution in like manner as on writs of attachment. Section 1224 requires the sheriff to execute a writ by collecting or selling the things in action, etc. Section 1232 provides that the officer making the sale must execute and deliver to the purchaser of real (personal) property not capable of manual delivery a certificate of sale upon payment of the purchase money. Section 895, as amended by Laws 1899, p. 139, provides for attachment of debts, credits, and other personal property not capable of manual delivery by serving upon the debtor or person responsible a copy of the writ, etc. Held, that a wife who obtained a judgment against her husband for separate maintenance had a remedy against persons who had converted the husband's property by execution against her husband to collect amounts due under her judgment under which his claim against such persons might have been sold and bought in by her, whereupon she could sue them at law, and that she could not otherwise maintain an action against them in equity, since equity will aid only where an adequate remedy is not found in the provi In Hurd's Rev. St. 1903, c. 3, p. 125, § 122, providing that actions to recover damages for injury to real or "personal property" shall survive, the term "personal property" was not intended to be applied to a right of action occasioned by the malicious interfering by one person with the business of another, but was intended to apply only to actions for damages to tangible articles and things movable-to chattels-as distinguished from actions for damages to one's business. Jones v. Barmm, 75 N. E. 505, 506, 217 Ill. 381. Choses in action in the hands of a trustee subject to a lien or pledge are "personal property," within the purview of Pub. St. 1901, c. 245, § 28, providing that, if a trustee |