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tance that objects could be seen along the track is admissible on the question of the ability of the engineer to see stock in time to avoid a collision. Where cattle lawfully upon a highway are killed by an engine at the crossing of a railway and a highway, evidence that the employés of the railway company neglected to blow the whistle or ring the bell before reaching the crossing, as required by statute, is competent.5 57 Where the plaintiff's evidence tends to prove that the train was running at a high and unusual rate of speed, the defendant should be allowed to show the usual rate of speed at which the train was run, and that the engineer could not, with safety to his train and passengers, stop the same in time to avoid the injury after discovering the danger.58

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§ 7807. Frightening Animals by Methods of Operation.-In the case of animals frightened by the escape of steam, an ordinance of the city forbidding the letting off of steam unnecessarily from an engine within the city limits is admissible.59 Evidence that engines standing at the same point frequently blew off steam and frightened horses is admissible to show knowledge by the defendant of the danger of the practice. Evidence that there were no obstructions between the point from which a locomotive started and the place where it overtook a driver on a parallel road near the track is admissible on the question whether the engineer and fireman saw the driver before emitting the steam from the engine by which his horse was frightened.61 In an action for damages resulting from a horse taking fright at a car placed on a railroad bridge over a public street, evidence that another horse was frightened the day before the accident, by such car, is competent both on the issue whether the car was calculated to frighten horses, and whether it was negligence to permit it to remain in that place. 62

Croddy v. Chicago R. Co., 91 Iowa 598; s. c. 60 N. W. Rep. 214.

56 Sheldon v. Chicago R. Co., 6 S. D. 606; s. c. 62 N. W. Rep. 955; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Ogg, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 285; s. c. 28 S. W. Rep. 347. Railroad employés having testified that the locomotive headlight would not cast its light so that an obstruction on the track, the size of a bull killed by a train, could be seen, it is competent to prove in rebuttal that on a former occasion on the same road the engineer, under the same or less favorable conditions, saw and signaled the witness at a much greater distance: Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Moody, 92 Ala. 279; s. c. 9 South. Rep. 238.

57 Palmer v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 38 Minn. 415; s. c. 38 N. W. Rep. 100; Hohl v. Chicago R. Co., 61 Minn. 321; s. c. 63 N. W. Rep. 742; Frazier v. Wabash R. Co., 75 Mo. App. 253.

58 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Bunker, 81 Ill. App. 616.

50 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Bailey, 66 Kan. 115; s. c. 71 Pac. Rep. 246.

01

o Presby v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 66 N. H. 615; s. c. 22 Atl. Rep. 554. 61 Texas &c. R. Co. v. Syfan (Tex. Civ. App.), 43 S. W. Rep. 551 (no off. rep.); s. c. aff'd, 91 Tex. 562; 44 S. W. Rep. 1064.

2 Harrell v. Albemarle &c. R. Co., 110 N. C. 215; s. c. 14 S. E. Rep. 687.

§ 7808. Fires Set Out by Locomotives.-We have already seen that, the plaintiff being ordinarily unable to identify the particular engine emitting the sparks which set fire to his property, he may show that sparks were thrown from other engines of the defendant passing the spot, or in the immediate vicinity upon other occasions, either before or after the fire in question. And such evidence would seem especially relevant in rebuttal of testimony for the defendant that the spark-arresters and other equipment of the locomotives in use on the line were in good order. But evidence of this character is plainly irrelevant where the locomotive setting out the fire has been identified. The evi

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See Vol. II, § 237. See also, Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Gilbert, 52 Fed. Rep. 711; s. c. 10 U. S. App. 375; 3 C. C. A. 264; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Johnson, 54 Fed. Rep. 474; s. c. 10 U. S. App. 629; Lesser Cotton Co. v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 114 Fed. Rep. 133; s. c. 52 C. C. A. 95; Evansville &c. R. Co. v. Keith, 35 Ind. App. 296; s. c. 35 N. E. Rep. 296; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Lange, 13 Ind. App. 337; s. c. 41 N. E. Rep. 609; Dunning v. Maine &c. R. Co., 91 Me. 87; s. c. 30 Atl. Rep. 352; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 574; Thatcher v. Maine &c. Co., 85 Me. 502; s. c. 27 Atl. Rep. 519; Annapolis &c. R. Co. v. Gantt, 39 Md. 115; Campbell v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 121 Mo. 340; s. c. 25 L. R. A. 175; 25 S. W. Rep. 936; Diamond v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 6 Mont. 580; Hoover v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (Mo.), 16 S. W. Rep 480 (no off. rep.); Field v. New York &c. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 339; O'Reilley v. Erie R. Co., 72 App. Div. (N. Y.) 228; s. c. 76 N. Y. Supp. 171 (similar construction of engine must be shown); Sheldon v. Hudson River R. Co., 14 N. Y. 218; s. c. 67 Am. Dec. 155; Martz v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 12 Ohio C. C. 144; s. c. 1 Ohio C. D. 451; Koontz v. Oregon R. &c. Co., 20 Or. 3; s. c. 43 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 11; 23 Pac. Rep. 820; Van Steuben v. Central R. Co., 178 Pa. St. 367; s. c. 34 L. R. A. 577; 35 Atl. Rep. 992; 39 W. N. C. (Pa.) 217; MacDonald v. New York &c. R. Co., 25 R. I. 40; s. c. 54 Atl. Rep. 795; Smith v. Old Colony &c. R. Co., 10 R. I. 22; Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Chittim, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 40; s. c. 71 S. W. Rep. 294; Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Hertzig, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 266; s. c. 22 S. W. Rep. 1013; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Richardson, 91 U.

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S. 454; s. c. 23 L. ed. 356; Hoskinson v. Central Vermont R. Co., 66 Vt. 618; s. c. 30 Atl. Rep. 24; Kimball v. Borden, 95 Va. 203; s. c. 28 S. E. Rep. 207; New York &c. R. Co. v. Thomas, 92 Va. 606; s. c. 24 S. E. Rep. 264; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 240; Abrams v. Seattle, 27 Wash. 507; s. c. 68 Pac. Rep. 27; Noland v. Great Northern R. Co., 31 Wash. 430; s. c. 71 Pac. Rep. 1098; Piggott v. Eastern Counties R. Co., 3 C. B. 229.

04 Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Clark, 136 Ala, 450; s. c. 34 South. Rep. 917; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Malone, 109 Ala. 509; s. c. 20 South. Rep. 33; East Tennessee &c. R. Co. v. Hesters, 90 Ga. 11; s. c. 15 S. E. Rep. 828; East Tennessee &c. R. Co. v. Hall, 90 Ga. 17; s. c. 16 S. E. Rep. 91; International &c. R. Co. v. Newman (Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. W. Rep. 854 (no off. rep.); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Scheible, 72 S. W. Rep. 325; 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1708 (no off. rep.).

Jacksonville &c. R. Co. V. Peninsular Land &c. Co., 27 Fla. 1157; s. c. 9 South. Rep. 661; Crissey &c. Lumber Co. v. Denver &c. R. Co., 17 Colo. App. 275; s. c. 68 Pac. Rep. 670; First Nat. Bank v. Lake Erie &c. R. Co., 174 Ill. 36; s. c. 50 N. E. Rep. 1023; aff'g s. c. 65 Ill. App. 21; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Gilmore, 22 Ind. App. 466; s. c. 53 N. E. Rep. 1078; Thatcher v. Maine &c. R. Co., 85 Me. 502; Ireland v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 79 Mich. 163; S. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 426; Campbell v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 121 Mo. 340; s. c. 25 L. R. A. 175; Henderson v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 144 Pa. St. 461; s. c. 16 L. R. A. 299; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454; s. c. 23 L. ed. 356; Gibbons v. Wisconsin Valley R. Co., 58 Wis.

dence of other fires should be limited and confined to a time and place not remote from the fire, and after plaintiff has given evidence tending to exclude the probability that the fire was communicated by any other means." 66 The courts generally regard a period in excess of two months as too remote in point of time.67 On the question whether a particular locomotive set out the fire, it may be shown that about the same time other fires were set from sparks thrown out by the same engine.68 However, evidence of other fires is only to be received where it has been clearly shown that the fire complained of was set out by a locomotive operated by the defendant. Thus, in an action to recover damages for a warehouse destroyed by fire communicated from cotton sheds near the defendant's railroad track, evidence that the defendant's locomotives had frequently set fire to cotton in the immediate vicinity was properly excluded where it appeared that no locomotive passed the cotton within about two hours before the fire occurred. Evidence

335; San Antonio &c. R. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 70 S. W. Rep. 999 (no off. rep.).

6 Pennsylvania Co. v. Rossman, 13 Ohio C. C. 111; s. c. 7 Ohio Dec. 119; Peck v. New York &c. R. Co., 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 110; s. c. 55 N. Y. Supp. 1121.

67 Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Briggs, 2 Kan. App. 154; s. c. 43 Pac. Rep. 289 (two years afterward); Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Needham, 105 Ill. App. 25 (spark arresters defective the preceding winter-too remote); Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Tripp, 175 Ill. 251; s. c. 51 N. E. Rep. 833 (cinders thrown ten days thereafter not too remote); Henderson v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 144 Pa. St. 461; s. c. 28 W. N. C. (Pa.) 479; 22 Atl. Rep. 851; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 16; 44 Atl. L. J. 479 (two to six monthstoo remote); Dillingham v. Whitaker (Tex. Civ. App.), 25 S. W. Rep. 723 (no off. rep.) (five to seven years-too remote); Menominee River Sash &c. Co. v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 91 Wis. 447; s. c. 65 N. W. Rep. 176 (two months-too remote).

6s Jacksonville &c. R. Co. v. Peninsular Land Transp. &c. Co., 27 Fla. 1; s. c. 17 L. R. A. 33; Crissey &c. Lumber Co. v. Denver &c. R. Co., 17 Colo. App. 275; s. c. 68 Pac. Rep. 670; Brown v. Benson, 101 Ga. 753; s. c. 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 161; 29 S. E. Rep. 215; Lake Erie &c. R. Co. v. Middlecoff, 150 Ill. 27; s. c. 37 N. E. Rep. 660; aff'g s. c. 52 Ill. App. 175; Chicago &c. R. Co. v.

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Kreig, 22 Ind. App. 393; s. c. 55 N. E. Rep. 1033; Lake Erie &c. R. Co. v. Gould, 18 Ind. App. 275; s. c. 47 N. E. Rep. 941; Slossen v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 60 Iowa 215; Hockstedler v. Dubuque &c. R. Co., 88 Iowa 236; s. c. 55 N. W. Rep. 74; Lanning v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 68 Iowa 502; Coale v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 60 Mo. 227; Ireland v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 79 Mich. 163; Lake Side &c. R. Co. v. Kelly, 3 Ohio Dec. 319; s. c. 10 Ohio C. C. 322; Thomas v. New York &c. R. Co., 182 Pa. St. 538; s. c. 41 W. N. C. (Pa.) 144; 38 Atl. Rep. 413; 9 Am. & Eng, R. Cas. (N. S.) 132; 28 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 194; Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Pfluger (Tex. Civ. App.), 25 S. W. Rep. 792 (no off. rep.); Texas &c. R. Co. v. Scottish Union Nat. Ins. Co., 32 Tex. Civ. App. 82; s. c. 73 S. W. Rep. 1088; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Watson, 190 U. S. 287; s. c. 47 L. ed. 1057; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681; aff'g s. c. 112 Fed. Rep. 402; 50 C. C. A. 230; Brighthope R. Co. v. Rogers, 76 Va. 443; Gibbons v. Wisconsin Valley R. Co., 58 Wis. 335. Evidence of fires caused by an engine in the spring is inadmissible in an action for fire caused by it in September, where the engine had been thoroughly repaired and placed in excellent condition after the former and before the latter fire: Menominee River Sash &c. Co. v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 91 Wis. 447; s. c. 65 N. W. Rep. 176.

Martin v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 55 Ark. 510; s. c. 19 S. W. Rep. 314.

that the engineer in charge of the engine which set the fire is a careful and competent engineer does not tend to prove that the engine was carefully handled at the time in question and should be refused."

§ 7809. Further of Fires Set Out by Locomotives.-The distance to which the sparks were thrown by the locomotive may be shown;71 and the probability that the fire was set out by the locomotive is obviously strengthened where it is shown that the locomotive threw cinders a greater distance from the track than the property claimed to have been injured thereby.12 Along this line of inquiry it may be shown that the engine was obliged to labor hard at the place in question by reason of the grade and as a consequence emitted more sparks.73 Evidence that cinders the size of a hickory nut were thrown through the smoke-stack and that a spark-arrester permitting such cinders to escape must necessarily have been out of repair is admissible to show knowledge of the defects by the defendant." Where negligence in permitting the fire to escape from the right of way is charged, evidence is admissible to show that large masses of combustible and inflammable material had been allowed to accumulate on the right of way at the time of the fire in question,75 but not evidence of such accumulations thereafter.78

$7810. Failure to Observe Rules may be Shown.-Generally the rules of a railroad company regulating the movement of trains are admissible in an action for injuries where there is fair reason to believe that the accident would not have happened if the rules had

70 Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Hamilton, 6 Kan. App. 447; s. c. 50 Pac. Rep. 102.

71 Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Clark, 136 Ala. 450; s. c. 34 South. Rep. 917; Taylor v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 19 Ky. L. Rep. 717; s. c. 41 S. W. Rep. 551 (no off. rep.); Tribette v. Illinois &c. R. Co., 71 Miss. 212; s. c. 13 South. Rep. 899; Matthews v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 142 Mo. 645; s. c. 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 673; 44 S. W. Rep. 802; Brooks v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 98 Mo. App. 166; s. c. 71 S. W. Rep. 1083.

72 Knight v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 81 Iowa 310; s. c. 46 N. W. Rep. 1112; Hoskinson v. Central Vermont R. Co., 66 Vt. 618; s. c. 61 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 478; 30 Atl. Rep. 24.

73 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Tripp, 175 Ill. 251; s. c. 51 N. E. Rep. 833; Frier v. Delaware &c. Canal Co., 86 Hun (N. Y.) 464; s. c. 67 N. Y. St.

Rep. 541; 33 N. Y. Supp. 886; Brooks v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 98 Mo. App. 166; s. c. 71 S. W. Rep. 1083.

74 Knight v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 81 Iowa 310; s. c. 46 N. W. Rep. 1112. See also, Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. Scantland, 151 Ind. 488; s. c. 51 N. E. Rep. 1068.

75 Crissey &c. Lumber Co. v. Denver &c. R. Co., 17 Colo. App. 275; s. c. 68 Pac. Rep. 670; Northern &c. R. Co. v. Lewis, 51 Fed. Rep. 658; s. c. 7 U. S. App. 254; 2 C. C. A. 446; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. McBride, 54 Kan. 172; s. c. 37 Pac. Rep. 978; Gordon v. Grand Rapids &c. R. Co., 103 Mich. 379; s. c. 61 N. W. Rep. 549; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Rutherford, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 590; s. c. 68 S. W. Rep. 825,

76 Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Stafford (Tex. Civ. App.), 31 S. W. Rep. 319 (no off. rep.).

been observed." The rules of a railroad company requiring an employé to be stationed at the end of the car in front, or to move abreast of it when the train was running backwards, where he could be seen by the engineer, and could signal him in case of any obstruction on the track, were held admissible to show that the company regarded the moving of trains backwards as more dangerous and requiring more care than running in the usual manner, although such rules were not public rules, but only intended for the guidance of the agents and officers of the company.78

§ 7811. Evidence as to What Railroad Company was Responsible for the Wrong.-A railway company which holds itself out to the public as the operator of a railroad is liable for damages to third persons from the negligent management and operation of such road." In case the track on which cattle were killed was used by numerous railroad companies it has been held that the plaintiff should show that the train that killed his cattle belonged to the defendant.8°

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§ 7812. Admissible Scientific Works on Question of Stopping Trains. A scientific work treating of the mechanical appliances for stopping trains and the distance required therefor is inadmissible in a suit for the killing of a child upon a railroad track, in the absence of facts showing the conditions under which the trains spoken of in the work were stopped.81 The "Railway Age," containing editorials. on different subjects and devoted to the advertisement of mechanical devices, with recommendations thereof, though containing articles of historical value pertaining to science and art, is not regarded as a scientific authority upon the question whether the use of a certain style of brakes upon a railroad train is negligence upon the part of a railroad company.82

"Davis v. Concord &c. R. Co., 68 N. H. 247; s. c. 44 Atl. Rep. 388; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Kelly, 75 Ill. App. 490.

7 Georgia R. Co. v. Williams, 74 Ga. 723.

79 Jacksonville &c. R. Co. v. Garrison, 30 Fla. 557; s. c. 11 South. Rep. 929.

So Lake Erie &c. R. Co. v. Rooker, 13 Ind. App. 600; s. c. 41 N. E. Rep. 470.

81 Burg v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 90 Iowa 106; s. c. 57 N. W. Rep. 680.

82 Burg v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 90 Iowa 106; s. c. 57 N. W. Rep. 680.

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