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constitute one an expert or render his opinion admissible in evidence.62 Thus, a chemist, who has had no experience with mill dust outside of his laboratory, cannot testify as an expert that if fire came in contact with it an explosion would occur.63 So, a school teacher who has done some work in mines, and occasionally lectured on mines and mining and given instruction in relation thereto, has been held not competent as an expert to testify as to the cause of the breaking in of the roof of a particular mine which he has never ex- › amined or worked in. So, one having no medical education or training as a nurse, or any knowledge of the cases to which she refers other than any other person of ordinary intelligence might have under similar circumstances, is not competent to give her opinion as an expert based on her experience, as to the effect of morphine and other drugs on the human system.65 It is not absolutely essential that the witness should be actively engaged in the particular branch of work at the time he gives his testimony. Thus, a conductor, who had previously been a brakeman, may state his opinion as to whether a train ought to have been stopped quicker than it was. So, a railroad engineer, who has been out of service for some years, may testify as to his experience and observation concerning the escape of sparks from a locomotive, although the weight of his testimony may be affected by his long absence from service and the change of conditions in the meantime.67 A witness who tes

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gaged in mining for about two years and a half, that he is familiar with the kind of work the superintendent was engaged in, had known him four and a half years, and had often seen him work, and the duties were, together with his laborers, to take down from the roof of the entry, and load, slate or rock in the mine: Buckalew v. Tennessee Coal &c. R. Co., 112 Ala. 146; s. c. 20 South. Rep. 606. A chemist who has had some experience in the ventilation of buildings cannot testify as an expert as to the collection of gases in the upper part of gas-works unless he has had experience in such buildings: Citizens' Gaslight &c. Co. v. O'Brien, 15 Ill. App. 400. One who has been engaged for thirteen years with one hundred employés in the manufacture of Paris green is competent to testify as to its effects in producing cutaneous diseases and paralysis: Fox v. Peninsular White Lead &c. Works, 92 Mich. 243; s. c. 52 N. W. Rep. 623. Testimony that a witness is an engineer by profession, and was at the

time in question and had been for some time a conductor working upon and having charge of a gravel train, is evidence of his qualification to testify as an expert as to the necessity of the employment of two brakemen upon such a train: Union &c. R. Co. v. Novak, 61 Fed. Rep. 573; s. c. 15 U. S. App. 400.

62 Goldstein v. Black, 50 Cal. 462; Fort Worth &c. R. Co. v. Thompson, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 170; s. c. 21 S. W. Rep. 137; Page v. Parker, 40 N. H. 59; State v. Barrett, 33 Or. 194; s. c. 54 Pac. Rep. 807.

63 Shufeldt v. Searing, 59 Ill. App. 341.

64 Lineoski v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 157 Pa. St. 153; s. c. 33 W. N. C. (Pa.) 204; 27 Atl. Rep. 577.

65 Osborne v. Troup, 60 Conn. 485; s. c. 23 Atl. Rep. 157.

66 Freeman v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 144 Mass. 572; s. c. 4 N. Eng. Rep. 621; 12 N. E. Rep. 372.

67 Martz v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 12 Ohio C. C. 144; s. c. 1 Ohio C. D. 451.

tifies that he is a mechanical engineer, is a graduate of a university, and has been engaged for several years in civil and mechanical engineering, and has investigated grindstones of different diameters and the safe rate of speed for such stones, and thinks that he can state what is a safe rate of speed, has been held qualified to testify as an expert on that question.68 The fact that a witness shown to be competent as an expert is a party to the action will not disqualify him; the fact of interest goes to the weight and not to the admissibility of the evidence. The qualification of an expert witness is a preliminary matter for the trial court, whose decision is usually conclusive.70

§ 7754. Non-Expert may Testify as to Speed of Trains.-The speed of trains is not ordinarily regarded by courts as a matter for scientific testimony, and any intelligent person, accustomed to observing moving objects, is competent to testify as to this matter, although the weight to be given to such an opinion will depend upon the opportunity the witness may have had to form a correct estimate."1 Thus, a witness may state that a car was running fast although he had not sufficient experience to enable him to state how fast.72 The

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rule will allow a witness of ordinary intelligence to compare the speed of a train at the time of the accident with the speed of the same train on previous days. There is authority for the doctrine that the rate of speed cannot be shown by the opinion of witnesses observing only from the inside, unless their experience and observation is such as to make their judgment reliable. A passenger, however, will be regarded as competent to testify where he states that he has ridden many times on the car and timed it to see how fast it was going. A witness is not incompetent because he cannot tell, in miles per hour, the rate of speed of a railroad train;76 or does not know how many feet or rods there are in a mile." Non-expert witnesses are incompetent to testify that a special rate of speed in a railroad train is dangerous, as such testimony would infringe on the prerogatives of the jury.78

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§ 7755. Medical Experts.-A physician who qualifies himself in other respects, will not be precluded from testifying as an expert, because he has not been examined by the State Board of Medical Examiners. It is not required that a physician engaged in the general practice of his profession should be a specialist in the particular malady or condition about which he testifies.80 If he is a specialist, however, and has no experience beyond his specialty, he is incompetent to express an opinion not within the bounds of his specialty.81 The testimony of physicians as experts is competent, although based upon learning gained from the study of standard med

employé injured by being thrown from a hand car, alleged to have been suddenly stopped by the foreman without warning while it was moving rapidly, that the car was running faster than a man could run, is admissible as the expression of an opinion based upon observation, and should not be excluded for indefiniteness: Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Crocker, 95 Ala. 412; s. c. 11 South. Rep. 262.

73 Gugenheim v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 66 Mich. 150; s. c. 9 West. Rep. 907; 33 N. W. Rep. 161.

4 Grand Rapids &c. R. Co. v. Huntley, 38 Mich. 537.

Kitay v. Brooklyn &c. R. Co., 23 App. Div. (N. Y.) 228; s. c. 48 N. Y. Supp. 982. A witness who once timed the running of electric cars on a road other than that in question, and has noticed the speed of steam cars and of trotting and run

ning horses, and knows the rate of speed at which they were going, and has made calculations of the speed, may express an opinion as to the speed at which a car which he observed was running: Strauss V. Newburgh Electric R. Co., 6 App. Div. (N. Y.) 264; s. c. 39 N. Y. Supp. 998.

70 Overtoom v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 80 Ill. App. 515.

"Ward v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 85 Wis. 601; s. c. 55 N. W. Rep. 771.

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Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Hall, 105 Ala. 599; s. c. 17 South. Rep. 176. 7 State v. Speaks, 94 N. C. 865. 80 Hardiman v. Brown. 162 Mass. 585; s. c. 39 N. E. Rep. 192; Cooper v. St. Paul City R. Co., 54 Minn. 379; s. c. 56 N. W. Rep. 42; 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 598; Seckinger v. Philibert &c. Man. Co., 129 Mo. 590; s. c. 31 S. W. Rep. 957.

81 Fairchild v. Boscomb, 35 Vt. 398.

ical works, instead of their experience in actual practice;s2 hence a question to a physician who made an examination of a person suing for personal injuries, as to whether the absence of external appearance of injury is inconsistent with his medical books, is not improper on the ground that the books are the best evidence of their contents, as the question calls for the witness's opinion as a medical man.83 The medical expert is generally allowed to state his opinion as to whether the injury for which the action is brought might have resulted from a particular cause.84 Thus, he may describe the symptoms which would necessarily and ordinarily follow an injury such as that which the plaintiff sustained, for the purpose of showing that his condition is the result of the injury.85 So, a surgeon who describes fully and minutely the character of an injury by which the plaintiff's leg was broken may give his opinion as to the position of the leg and the point from which the blow came.se Medical experts are permitted to testify as to the effects and extent of a personal injury,88—as, for

82 Fordyce v. Moore (Tex. Civ. App.), 22 S. W. Rep. 235; Jackson v. Boone, 93 Ga. 662; s. c. 47 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 54; 20 S. E. Rep. 46.

93 Blair v. Madison Co., 81 Iowa 313; s. c. 46 N. W. Rep. 1093. But see Link v. Sheldon, 18 N. Y. Supp. 815.

84 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Treat, 75 Ill. App. 327; Pennsylvania Co. v. Frund, 4 Ind. App. 469; s. c. 30 N. E. Rep. 1116; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Spilker, 134 Ind. 380; s. c. 33 N. E. Rep. 280; 34 N. E. Rep. 218; 32 Am. L. Reg. 763; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Holsapple, 12 Ind. App. 301; s. c. 38 N. E. Rep. 1107; Lacas v. Detroit &c. R. Co., 92 Mich. 412; s. c. 52 N. W. Rep. 745; Donnelly v. St. Paul City R. Co., 70 Minn. 278; s. c. 73 N. W. Rep. 157; Joyce v. St. Paul City R. Co., 70 Minn. 339; s. c. 73 N. W. Rep. 158; Friess v. New York &c. R. Co., 67 Hun (N. Y.) 205; s. c. 51 N. Y. St. Rep. 391; 22 N. Y. Supp. 104; Griffith v. Utica &c. R. Co., 43 N. Y. St. Rep. 835; s. c. 17 N. Y. Supp. 692; Hunter v. Third Ave. R. Co., 21 Misc. (N. Y.) 1; s. c. 46 N. Y. Supp. 1010; aff'g. s. c. 20 Misc. (N. Y.) 432; 45 N. Y. Supp. 1044; Stouter v. Manhattan R. Co., 38 N. Y. St. Rep. 162; s. c. 27 N. E. Rep. 805; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Burnett (Tex.), 16 S. W. Rep. 320; Bowen v. Huntington, 35 W. Va. 682; s. c. 14 S. E. Rep. 217; Block v. Milwaukee St. R. Co., 89 Wis. 371; s. c. 27 L. R. A. 365; 61 N. W. Rep. 1101.

85 Cole v. Fall Brook Coal Co., 159 N. Y. 59; s. c. 53 N. E. Rep. 670; aff'g s. c. 87 Hun (N. Y.) 584; 34 N. Y. Supp. 572.

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Johnson v. Steam Gauge &c. Co., 146 N. Y. 152; s. c. 66 N. Y. St. Rep. 276; 40 N. E. Rep. 773.

87 Cunningham v. New York &c. R. Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 439; Springfield Consol. R. Co. v. Welsh, 155 Ill. 511; s. c. 40 N. E. Rep. 1034; aff'g s. c. 56 Ill. App. 196; Evansville &c. R. Co. v. Crist, 116 Ind. 446; s. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 310; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Weed, 113 Ind. 544; s. c. 12 West. Rep. 303; 14 N. E. Rep. 572; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Wright, 115 Ind. 378; s. c. 13 West. Rep. 798; 16 N. E. Rep. 145; Wilson v. American Bridge Co., 74 App. Div. (N. Y.) 596; s. c. 77 N. Y. Supp. 820; Forde v. Nichols, 36 N. Y. St. Rep. 729; s. c. 12 N. Y. Supp. 922; Austin &c. R. Co. v. McElmurry (Tex. Civ. App.), 33 S.. W. Rep. 249 (no off. rep.); Crites v. New Richmond, 98 Wis. 55; s. c. 73 N. W. Rep. 322. Medical testimony as to the possible effect of provoking language or vexatious circumstances on plaintiff's health is inadmissible in an action for a tort to which these are merely incidental: Hufford v. Grand Rapids &c. R. Co., 53 Mich. 118. But a medical expert may be asked as to whether fright would produce heart trouble: Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Latimer, 128 Ill. 163; s. c. 21 N. E. Rep. 7; Schlee v. New York &c. R. Co., 13

instance, as to the probability of the recovery of the injured person ;§o or whether it is a permanent injury.90 The opinion of a medical expert witness as to the nature and extent of an injury to a person, is admissible though based in part on the statements of the injured person during a professional examination by the witness; but not where the examination was solely for the purpose of qualifying the physician to testify as an expert,92 nor where the opinion as to the condition of the plaintiff is formed in part from the statements of third persons out of court.93 A medical expert cannot be asked whether the plaintiff is "shamming," as the jury are as well qualified as the witness to pass upon that subject. It has been held proper,