17

the injury, if they are spontaneous and undesigning and explain the facts which are under investigation, may be proved, and are exceptions to the general rule excluding hearsay evidence.16 But statements by a person injured which are in the nature of a narration of bodily feelings rather than exclamations caused by present pain are not generally admissible. The question whether such declarations or exclamations are real or feigned is for the jury; the lapse of time after the accident affects their weight and not their admissibility.18 In most jurisdictions this class of proof can be made by any person who heard the exclamation or declaration, and it is not required that it be testified to by an expert witness. 19 The right to introduce evidence of this character was not taken away by a statute making a party to an action a competent witness. 20

§ 7735. Declarations of Injured Person to Physician.-It follows from the foregoing that a physician who attended the person injured

16 Lange V. Schoettler, 115 Cal. 388; s. c. 47 Pac. Rep. 139; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Spilker, 134 Ind. 380; s. c. 33 N. E. Rep. 280; 32 Am. L. Reg. 763; 34 N. E. Rep. 218; Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. Prewitt, 134 Ind. 557; s. c. 33 N. E. Rep. 367; 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 198; Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264; s. c. 1 West. Rep. 890; Louisville &c. Co. v. Miller, 141 Ind. 533; s. c. 37 N. E. Rep. 343; Island Coal Co. v. Risher, 13 Ind. App. 98; s. c. 40 N. E. Rep. 158; Jackson Co. V. Nichols, 139 Ind. App. 611; s. c. 47 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 198; 38 N. E. Rep. 526; Girard v. Kalamazoo, 92 Mich. 610; s. c. 52 N. W. Rep. 1021; Geiler v. Manhattan R. Co., 1 Misc. (N. Y.) 413; s. c. 65 N. Y. St. Rep. 437; 32 N. Y. Supp. 254; Hagenlocher v. Coney Island &c. R. Co., 99 N. Y. 136; Kelly v. Cohoes Knitting Co., 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 156; s. c. 40 N. Y. Supp. 477; Lewke v. Dry Dock &c. R. Co., 46 Hun (N. Y.) 283; s. c. 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 510; Roche v. Brooklyn City &c. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 294; s. c. 11 N. E. Rep. 630; Smith v. Dittman, 34 N. Y. St. Rep. 303; s. c. 11 N. Y. Supp. 769; State v. Hargrave, 97 N. C. 457; s. c. 1 S. E. Rep. 774; Galveston v. Barbour, 62 Tex. 172; s. c. 50 Am. Rep. 519; Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Zwiener (Tex. Civ. App.), 38 S. W. Rep. 375 (no off. rep.); Shearer v. Buckley, 31 Wash. 370; s. c. 72 Pac. Rep. 76; Bridge v. Oshkosh, 67 Wis. 195; s. c.

29 N. W. Rep. 910; McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50; s. c. 31 N. W. Rep. 298. Statements by an injured person indicating present pain and suffering, and of such a character as to be admissible if made before suit was brought, are not rendered inadmissible because made while suit is pending: Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Stoner, 51 Fed. Rep. 649; s. c. 10 U. S. App. 209; 2 C. C. A. 437; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 462.

Roche v. Brooklyn City &c. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 294; s. c. 11 N. E. Rep. 630; Kennedy v. Rochester &c. R. Co., 130 N. Y. 654; s. c. 41 N. Y. St. Rep. 329; 29 N. E. Rep. 141; Ryan v. Porter Man. Co., 57 Hun (N. Y.) 253; s. c. 32 N. Y. St. Rep. 621; 10 N. Y. Supp. 774; Keller v. Gilman, 93 Wis. 9; s. c. 66 N. W. Rep. 800.

18 Texas &c. R. Co. v. Barron, 78 Tex. 421; s. c. 14 S. W. Rep. 698.

19 Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Johns, 36 Kan. 769; Lake Shore &c. R. Co. V. Yokes, 12 Ohio C. C. 499; s. c. 1 Ohio C. D. 599; Bennett v. Northern &c. R. Co., 2 N. D. 112; s. c. 13 L. R. A. 465; 10 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 243; 48 Am. & Eng, R. Cas. 182; 49 N. W. Rep. 408. But see Roche v. Brooklyn City &c. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 294; Uransky v. Dry Dock &c. R. Co., 44 Hun (N. Y.) 119.

20 Hancock Co. v. Leggett, 115 Ind. 544; s. c. 18 N. E. Rep. 53; 15 West. Rep. 504.

in respect of his injury, may testify as to what the patient said to him with reference to his existing condition or suffering, but he cannot testify as to any statement which the patient may have made to him. touching the circumstances of the injury;22 neither is an expert opinion, based upon such latter statement, competent evidence, though circumstances may exist in which the admission of such evidence will not work a reversal of a judgment in conformity with it.23 Very plainly a physician cannot testify to exclamations and statements made upon an examination of an injured person to enable him to testify as a witness for the plaintiff and not for the purpose of treatment, as such expressions are "made under a strong temptation to feign suffering if dishonest, and a hardly less strong tendency, if honest, to imagine or exaggerate it."24

§ 7736. Statements of Physician to Patient.-While the plaintiff may prove the nature of a dangerous surgical operation to which he was subjected in consequence of the injuries received by him, as a circumstance to be considered in determining his anxiety and suffering, he cannot be allowed to testify as to what the surgeon said to him at the time, such declarations being mere hearsay.25

21

Birmingham &c. R. Co. v. Hale, 90 Ala. 8; s. c. 8 South. Rep. 142; Broyles v. Prisock, 97 Ga. 643; s. c. 25 S. E. Rep. 389; Globe &c. Ins. Co. v. Gerisch, 163 Ill. 625; s. c. 45 N. E. Rep. 563; Railroad Co. v. Sutton, 42 Ill. 438; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544; s. c. 12 West. Rep. 311; 14 N. E. Rep. 572; Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264; s. c. 54 Am. Rep. 312; Aryman v. Marshalltown, 90 Iowa 356; s. c. 57 N. W. Rep. 867; Armstrong v. Ackley, 71 Iowa 76; s. c. 32 N. W. Rep. 180; Fleming v. Springfield, 154 Mass. 520; s. c. 28 N. E. Rep. 910; Heddle v. City Electric R. Co., 112 Mich. 547; s. c. 4 Det. L. N. 104; 70 N. W. Rep. 1096; Brusch v. St. Paul City R. Co., 52 Minn. 512; s. c. 55 N. W. Rep. 57; Link v. Sheldon, 136 N. Y. 1; s. c. 48 N. Y. St. Rep. 820; 32 N. E. Rep. 696; Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Sanders, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 5; s. c. 33 S. W. Rep. 245; Wheeler v. Tyler &c. R. Co., 91 Tex. 356; s. c. 43 S. W. Rep. 876; rev'g s. c. 41 S. W. Rep. 517; Taylor v. Railroad Co., 48 N. H. 304; Towle v. Blake, 48 N. H. 92; Fort v. Brown, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 366; Block v. Milwaukee St. R. Co., 89 Wis. 371; s. c. 27 L. R. A. 365;

61 N. W. Rep. 1101; Bridge v. Oshkosh, 67 Wis. 195; s. c. 29 N. W. Rep. 910; Earl v. Tupper, 4 Vt. 275; Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall (U. S.) 397; s. c. 19 L. ed. 437; Northern &c. R. Co. v. Urlin, 158 U. S. 271; s. c. 39 L. ed. 799; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 840.

22 Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Frazier, 27 Kan. 463; Heald v. Thing, 45 Me. 392; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Sutton, 42 Ill. 438; Rowell v. Lowell, 11 Gray (Mass.) 420.

23 Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Frazier, 27 Kan, 463.

24 Grand Rapids &c. R. Co. v. Huntley, 38 Mich. 537; Rowland v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 63 Conn. 415; s. c. 28 Atl. Rep. 102; Delaware &c. R. Co. v. Roalefs, 70 Fed. Rep. 21; s. c. 28 U. S. App. 569; Jones v. Portland, 88 Mich. 598; s. c. 16 L. R. A. 437; Consolidated Traction Co. v. Lambertson, 60 N. J. L. 452; s. c. 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 355; 38 Atl. Rep. 638; aff'g s. c. 59 N. J. L. 297; 36 Atl. Rep. 100; Davidson v. Cornell, 132 N. Y. 228; s. c. 43 N. Y. St. Rep. 887: 45 Alb. L. J. 459; 30 N. E. Rep. 573.

25 Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Arnold, 80 Ala. 600.

§ 7737. Dying Declarations.-The general rule in civil actions is that dying declarations are inadmissible, unless they are made so near in point of view to the happening of the event to which they relate as to form a part of the res gesta.26 Accordingly, it has been held that statements made by the deceased after he had been taken from under a railway train and carried to a hotel, in answer to the interrogatories of bystanders as to the manner in which the accident happened, were not competent evidence, although the deceased was conscious of impending death at the time he made them.27

§ 7738. Admissions Against Interest.-Admissions of a party against his interest are competent in negligence cases as in other cases. Thus, an admission in the case of one subsequently deceased that an accident was caused by his own fault or negligence is admissible against his administrator in an action for damages caused by his death, under the Ohio practice.29 These admissions against interest, though admissible, are not conclusive.30 Thus, it has been held that the declarations of a person mortally injured that he did not blame any one but himself, should not be regarded as conclusive as to whether or not he exercised ordinary care, as the statement may have been intended as self censure for not exercising a higher degree of care than the law requires.31

7739. Admissions and Declarations Competent for Purpose of Impeachment.-Admissions not otherwise competent are admissible on the question of the credibility of a witness whose testimony on the trial differs from admissions and declarations previously made.32

20 Marshall v. Great Eastern R. Co., 48 Ill. 475; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Howard, 6 Ill. App. 569.

27 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Howard, 6 Ill. App. 569. Compare Lund v. Tynsborough, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 36.

25 28 3 Elliott Ev., § 2510. See also, Holman v. Boston Land &c. Co., 20 Colo. 7; s. c. 36 Pac. Rep. 797; Wabash R. Co. v. Farrell, 79 Ill. App. 508; s. c. 31 Chic. Leg. N. 199; Perigo v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 55 Iowa 326; Walker v. Brantner, 59 Kan. 117; s. c. 52 Pac. Rep. 80; Haynes v. Trenton, 123 Mo. 326; s. c. 27 S. W. Rep. 622.

2 Helman v. Pittsburg &c. R. Co., 58 Ohio St. 400; s. c. 40 Ohio L. J. 51; 50 N. E. Rep. 986; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 641; 41 L. R. A. 860. See also, Thompson Ohio Trial Ev., §§ 315, 990; Bond Hill v.

Atkinson, 16 Ohio C. C. 470; rev'g s. c. 1 Ohio N. P. 166; 2 Ohio Dec. 48.

30 Camden &c. R. Co. v. Williams, 61 N. J. L. 646; s. c. 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 600; 40 Atl. Rep. 634.

31 Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Calvert, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 297; s. c. 32 S. W. Rep. 246.

52

Tyler v. Old Colony R. Co., 157 Mass. 336; s. c. 32 N. E. Rep. 227; Eastman v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 101 Mich. 597; s. c. 60 N. W. Rep. 309; Webster Man. Co. v. Schmidt, 77 Ill. App. 49 (written statement of injured person purporting to show how injury occurred); Jamison v. Illinois &c. R. Co., 63 Miss. 33; De Jong v. Erie R. Co., 43 App. Div. (N. Y.) 427; s. c. 60 N. Y. St. Rep. 125; Quincy v. Warner,

§ 7740. Declarations and Admissions of Vice-Principal. The declarations made at the time the injury occurred, by a superior servant, to whom is delegated the duty to look after the machinery and appliances and who is empowered to employ and discharge servants, regarding the insufficiency of the appliances or incompetency of the servants causing the injury, may be received to charge the employer with negligence in using such appliances, or in keeping in his employment such servants;33 because, as already seen, the knowledge of such servant is imputed to his master, and his declarations are evidence of his knowledge.

S7741. Admissions of Agents and Servants.-An admission or statement made by an agent or servant after an accident has occurred in reference to the cause of the accident is not competent evidence against the employer of such agent or servant. Such declarations, in order to be admissible, must accompany the principal act and be a part of the res gesta.35 An ordinary contract of employment does not

78 Hun (N. Y.) 286; s. c. 60 N. Y. St. Rep. 248; 28 N. Y. Supp. 857. In a suit by a widow as administratrix, for injuries to an intestate causing his death, declarations of plaintiff during her husband's lifetime as to the circumstances of the accident are admissible for the defense to contradict her testimony at the trial, but not for the purpose of proving negligence of the deceased, plaintiff not having been the party interested adversely to defendant at the time of such declarations: Fitzgerald v. Weston, 52 Wis. 354.

33 Kansas &c. R. Co. v. Little, 19 Kan. 267; Laning v. New York &c. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 521; s. c. 2 Thomp. Neg. (1st ed.) 932; Chapman v. Erie R. Co., 55 N. Y. 579; aff'g s. c. 1 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 526; Mullan V. Philadelphia &c. S. S. Co., 78 Pa. St. 25; Huntingdon &c. R. Co. v. Decker, 82 Pa. St. 119; s. c. 84 Pa. St. 419.

Vol. IV, § 4961.

Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Hawk, 72 Ala. 112; St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Paup (Ark.), 22 S. W. Rep. 213 (no off. rep.); St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Sweet, 57 Ark. 287; s. c. 21 S. W. Rep. 587; Krogg v. Atlanta &c. R. Co., 77 Ga. 202; Smith v. Bibb Man. Co., 112 Ga. 680; s. c. 37 S. E. Rep. 861; Hannibal &c. R. Co. v. Martin, 11 Ill. App. 386; Grand Rapids &c.

R. Co. v. Diller, 110 Ind. 223; s. c. 7 West. Rep. 244; Lafayette &c. R. Co. v. Ehman, 30 Ind. 83; Marion v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 64 Iowa 568; s. c. 21 N. W. Rep. 86; Verry v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 47 Iowa 549; Cherokee &c. Coal &c. Co. v. Dickson, 55 Kan. 62; S. c. 39 Pac. Rep. 691; Patterson v. Wabash &c. Co., 54 Mich. 91; s. c. 19 N. W. Rep. 761; Clapper v. Waterford, 131 N. Y. 382; s. c. 30 N. E. Rep. 240; Nebonne v. Concord R. Co., 67 N. H. 531; s. c. 38 Atl. Rep. 17; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. St. 339. In an action for injuries caused by collision of an engine with the plaintiff's wagon at a railroad crossing, declarations of the engineer and fireman as to failure to give the signals and their attempt to cross ahead of the wagon, made before the plaintiff was taken from the wreck, are admissible: East St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Allen, 54 Ill. App. 27. Declarations of the workmen of one employed in repairing a house which is burned during such employment, as to the cause of the fire, are admissible to charge him with liability, when made while the fire is in progress: Shafer v. Lacock, 168 Pa. St. 497; s. c. 29 L. R. A. 254; 25 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 430; 32 Atl. Rep. 44. Declarations of a train dispatcher and brakeman employed by a railroad company, as

usually include the power to bind an employer by declarations in the nature of historical statements made after an accident has occurred.36 The declarations of an agent or servant against his employer must have been made at a time when the agent was engaged in the discharge of a duty owing to his employer.37 Thus, statements as to the manner in which an accident occurred, made by the president of a construction company which, at the time of the wreck, was operating the railroad as agent of the railroad company, to a newspaper reporter several hours thereafter and while not in the vicinity where the accident occurred and when he was not in the performance of his duty to the company, were held inadmissible against the railroad company.38 So, the report of the foreman of a switch engine to the train master, giving the foreman's conclusions as to the cause of an accident, which occurred before he came upon the scene, has been held not admissible against the company in an action to recover for the injuries caused by the accident. So, where an employé of a railway company was injured while coupling two cars, one of which had been left in the yard for repairs, and an employé in the repair department stated, some minutes after the injury, that he knew the car was out of repair, and that they proposed to repair it when it had been switched back to the proper place,

39

to the cause of delay in the ship ment of cattle, made at the time, are admissible in evidence in an action to recover damages for the delay: International &c. R. Co. v. Lewis (Tex. Civ. App.), 23 S. W. Rep. 323 (no off. rep.).

36 Chewning v. Ensley R. Co., 100 Ala. 493; s. c. 14 South. Rep. 204; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Carl, 91 Ala. 271; s. c. 9 South. Rep. 334; Fort Smith Oil Co. v. Slover, 58 Ark. 168; s. c. 24 S. W. Rep. 106; Denver &c. R. Co. v. Watson, 6 Colo. App. 429; s. c. 40 Pac. Rep. 778; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Ashling, 34 Ill. App. 99; Gillingham v. Christen, 55 Ill. App. 17; Hopkins v. Boyd, 18 Ind. App. 63; s. c. 47 N. E. Rep. 480; St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Weaver, 35 Kan. 412; East Tennessee Tel. Co. v. Sims, 99 Ky. 404; s. c. 36 S. W. Rep. 171; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 761; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 764; 38 S. W. Rep. 131 (no off. rep.); Dietrich v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 58 Md. 347; Halverson v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 57 Minn. 142; s. c. 58 N. W. Rep. 871; McDermott v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 87 Mo. 285; Chapman v. Erie R. Co., 55 N. Y. 584; Huntingdon &c. Coal Co. v. Decker, 82 Pa. St. 119; Weideman v. Tacoma R. &c.

Co., 7 Wash. 517; s. c. 35 Pac. Rep. 414.

37 St. Louis &c. Co. v. McLelland, 62 Fed. Rep. 116; Wendt v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 4 S. D. 476; s. c. 57 N. W. Rep. 226; McCarthy v. Muir, 50 Ill. App. 510; Mobile &c. R. Co. v. Klein. 43 Ill. App. 63; Treager v. Jackson Coal &c. Co., 142 Ind. 164; s. c. 40 N. E. Rep. 907; Lahey v. William Ottmann &c. Co., 73 Hun (N. Y.) 61; s. c. 56 N. Y. St. Rep. 109; 25 N. Y. Supp. 897. In an action against a natural-gas company for damages from the escape of gas, a conversation with an employé of the company who, there is evidence to show, was its representative acting within the scope of his employment, in which he stated that a certain valve through which the gas escaped should remain closed, is admissible: Baker v. Westmoreland &c. Co., 157 Pa. St. 593; s. c. 33 W. N. C. (Pa.) 161, 164; 24 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 133; 27 Atl. Rep. 792.

38 Chattanooga &c. R. Co. v. Liddell, 85 Ga. 482; s. c. 8 Rail, & Corp. L. J. 296; 11 S. E. Rep. 853.

39 Wabash R. Co. v. Farrell, 31 Chic. Leg. N. 199; s. c. 79 Ill. App. 508.