On

the owner incurred in a bona fide attempt to cure the animal.64 The value is the market value at the time and place of the accident.65 the question of value of the animal the plaintiff may show the amount expended by him for hiring other animals to take the place of those injured.

66

§7247. Injury to Horse Not Physical in Its Nature. The owner of an animal may recover for an injury to his horse not physical in its nature,—as where it was caused to run away by the injury, in which case the court held that the owner was entitled to recover for the vicious habit thus created; "for common experience and common sense," said the court, "teach mankind that the market value of a horse is greatly lessened by its habit of taking fright at any object and running away." It is therefore competent to show the value of the horse before and soon after the accident, based on a change in his disposition.68

§ 7248. Injuries to Animals from Fright.-Under a rule most frequently applied to personal injuries, and more fully presented in another place, there can be no recovery for injuries to an animal resulting solely from fright caused by the negligence of another, where no immediate personal injury is received. Thus, where the negligent operation of a street roller frightened a horse and caused it to rupture a blood vessel in its heart, which resulted in its death, it was held that there could be no recovery therefor from the city.70

§ 7249. Injuries to Vessels.-The measure of damages for the negligent destruction of a vessel is her value,71 and the test is not

value after the extent of his injury was ascertained," and were therefore not objectionable: Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Radford (Ky.), 23 Ky. L. Rep. 886; s. c. 64 S. W. Rep. 511.

Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Calumet Stock Farm, 194 Ill. 9; s. c. 61 N. E. Rep. 1095; Watson v. Lisbon Bridge, 14 Me. 201; Streett v. Laumier, 34 Mo. 469; Overpeck v. Rapid City, 14 S. D. 507; s. c. 85 N. W. Rep. 990; Hughes v. Quentin, 8 Car. & P. 703; Plunkett v. Minneapolis &c. R. Co., 79 Wis. 222; s. c. 48 N. W. Rep. 519.

46 Atl. Rep. 185; Chaperon v. Portland General Electric Co., 41 Or. 39; s. c. 67 Pac. Rep. 928.

67 Oleson v. Brown, 41 Wis. 413, per Cole, J.

68 Montgomery St. R. Co. v. Hastings, 138 Ala. 432; s. c. 35 South. Rep. 412.

See post, § 7323.

TO Lee v. Burlington, 113 Iowa 356; s. c. 85 N. W, Rep. 618.

"Ft. Pitt Gas Co. v. Evansville Contract Co., 123 Fed. Rep. 63. Full compensation for the loss of a vessel which has been remodeled by experimental building is not to be measured by the cost, but by what it would cost to replace her: The City of Alexandria, 40 Fed. Rep. 697

75

73

76

what the vessel would bring if sold in the market, but what was her value to the owners as a going concern at the time of her destruction.72 The loss may also include the freight which would have been earned by the charter party for the return voyage, which had already been executed, and the cargo for such voyage engaged; but not the value of the use of the vessel during the time required to repair her," nor the probable profits of a charter unperformed. Where the vessel is injured and not destroyed, the owner is entitled to have the damage occasioned by such negligence completely repaired, though the effect of the repairs is to make the vessel better and stronger than she was before; and there may be no deduction on account of the substitution of new for old materials in making these repairs.78 The owner is also entitled to recover for the use of his vessel during the time of making the repairs until ready for the resumption of business,79 though the place of the vessel was supplied by another vessel kept by the owner in reserve for such emergencies,s0 but not where the expense of the substituted vessel was borne by the owner of the vessel at fault.81 The amount for which the vessel could have been chartered for hire is the amount which the owner can recover for her use pending repairs, and not merely the interest on her cost,82 although she was kept for the personal use of her owner, with no intention to use her for profit.s 88 The net amount of charters is not the measure of damages for the laying up of a steamer for repairs occasioned by collision through the fault of another, where for part of the time a

72 The Harmonides, [1903] Prob.

1; s. c. 87 L. T. Rep. 448.

73 The Iberia, 46 Fed. Rep. 301. "Ft. Pitt Gas Co. v. Evansville Contract Co., 123 Fed. Rep. 63.

492.

76

The North Star, 44 Fed. Rep.

7 The Alaska, 46 Fed. Rep. 498; The City of Chester, 34 Fed. Rep. 429.

"The Alaska, 44 Fed. Rep. 498; H. M. Loud &c. Lumber Co. v. Peter, 11 Ohio C. D. 155; s. c. 20 Ohio C. C. 73.

78 Collins Bay Rafting &c. Co. v. Kaine, 29 Can. S. C. 247.

79 H. M. Loud &c. Lumber Co. v. Peter, 11 Ohio C. D. 155; S. C. 20 Ohio C. C. 73; Missouri River Packet Co. v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 1 McCrary (U. S.) 281. A vessel responsible for a collision by which a schooner's jib-boom is broken off. is also liable for demurrage caused by the schooner's going into a port

of repair, if there is any increase of risk in continuing the voyage without a jib-boom, although the voyage might possibly have been successfully made, but no additional delay caused by want of skill in making the repairs can be charged against the vessel: Comerford v. The Malvina, 43 Fed. Rep. 77.

So The Mediana [1899] Prob. 127; s. c. 68 L. J. P. D. & A. (N. S.) 26. 81 The City of Peking, L. R. 15 App. Cas. 438.

82 The Lagonda, 44 Fed. Rep. 367. 83 The Lagonda, 44 Fed. Rep. 367. The allowance for demurrage while a vessel injured in a collision is disabled is the amount she is worth to her owner, and not what she could be let for in open market, where he did not keep her for hire, but for use in his business: The John C. Fisher, 50 Fed. Rep. 703; s. c. 22 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 122.

hired boat was substituted and for the remainder a boat belonging to the owners was used; but in the absence of proof of the market value of the services of the owner's boat so substituted, or that the hired boat was insufficient, allowance will be made for the whole time at the rate paid for the hired boat, although the owner's boat was larger, and this notwithstanding she would otherwise have been idle.84

88

92

85

89

87

91

86

§ 7250. Further of Injuries to Vessels.-The damages for injuries to vessels may include necessary towage, the cost of survey, the amount expended for the wages and provisions for the crew where their presence was necessary to care for the vessel, the expense of a new rating and certificate where necessary to obtain insurance on the vessel, the amount paid as salvage charges, the cost of raising a sunken vessel, and the value of an anchor and chain lost through the negligence of another vessel in dragging her anchor. It has been held that there can be no recovery for wages of the crew during the time the vessel was disabled where the cost of another boat to take her place is allowed, for salary paid a general superintendent in charge of the dredging work during the time the dredge was being repaired, where it appeared that he attended to his regular duties in addition to overseeing the repairs, for the pay of a watchman while the vessel is on the dry-dock and where the dry-dock company maintained sufficient force of watchmen, nor for the expenses of a convoy to the injured vessel, where the necessity for such convoy was not clearly shown.95 Neither may the damages include the expense of a witness while engaged in instructing counsel.96 The owners of a vessel cannot recover for freight, where the vessel was loaded entirely with their own goods. The measure of damages in a case of this character is the market value of the vessel and cargo at the port of sailing, with interest from the time of sailing, together with the interest on the equipment for the voyage and the interest from the time they were paid.97 The owners of a lighter capsized by the negligence of a ship in putting

94

$4 The Emma Kate Ross, 50 Fed. Rep. 845; modifying s. c. 46 Fed. Rep. 872.

86 The Bulgaria, 83 Fed. Rep. 312; The Benj. F. Hunt, Jr., 34 Fed. Rep. 816.

The Adella S. Hills, 47 Fed. Rep. 76; The Alaska, 44 Fed. Rep. 498; The Bulgaria, 83 Fed. Rep. 312.

"Fisk v. New York, 119 Fed. Rep. 256.

Gilkey v. The Beta, 44 Fed. Rep. 389.

689; Greenwood v. The Fletcher, 42 Fed. Rep. 504.

90 United States V. Harrah, 21 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) (Pa.) 393.

91 The Port Victoria [1902], Prob. 25; s. c. 71 L. J. Prob. 36; 86 L. T. 804; 50 Wkly. Rep. 383.

92 The Santee, 48 Fed. Rep. 126. 93 The Itasca, 117 Fed. Rep. 885. "Grubbs v. The John C. Fisher (Pa.), 22 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 122. 95 The Alaska, 44 Fed. Rep. 498. 96 The Santee, 48 Fed. Rep. 126. The Beatrice Havener, 50 Fed. Rep. 232.

cargo aboard without authority can recover for the injury to the lighter and the damage to the cargo which they had themselves received on board, but not for the damage to that portion of the cargo put on board without authority, since as to that they do not become responsible." Reasonable efforts to secure fresh cargo are required of a vessel which, in consequence of a collision, has lost freight, before she can recover dead freight as an item of her damages." The rent of a house and the expenses of an agent in gathering a cargo of fruit lost in a collision, have been held allowable as part of the damages sustained by a collision, where, to obtain the fruit, it was necessary to send an expedition in charge of such agent into a country where there were no accommodations.100

§ 7251. Injuries to Tow.-Like rules govern the measure of damages in a case of injury to a tow. Thus, a tug towing a raft of lumber, and by its negligence wrecking it, is liable not only for the lumber lost, but for the necessary expenses incurred by the owner of the lumber in saving the balance.101 Where the owners of a tug liavle for injuries to a tow, put the tow in as good a condition as before the accident, the recovery is limited to loss arising from the unnecessary delay.102 It has been held that the cost of floating a vessel stranded through the fault of a tug, and damages sustained thereby, cannot be recovered from the tug where the services of the tug and others. belonging to the same owners were refused by the officers in charge of the vessel, and these services would probably have been effective.103

§ 7252. Loss of Time of Employés Through Obstruction of River. -Loss of time of employés caused by a wrongful act preventing the driving of logs on a river, may be allowed as an element in ascertaining the damages suffered by the wrongful obstruction.104

§ 7253. Injuries to Nets by Negligence of Vessels.-The measure of damages in an action against a shipowner to recover damages for his running his vessel upon and partially destroying a fishing net, is the cost of repairing the net and the value of the labor required to reset it, together with the value of its use during the time it is

as The Iniziativa, 50 Fed. Rep. 229. 30 The C. P. Raymond, 28 Fed. Rep. 765.

100 The Umbria, 46 Fed. Rep. 927. 101 The Henry Buck, 39 Fed. Rep. 211.

102 The James H. Brewster, 34 Fed. Rep. 77.

103 The Bronx, 86 Fed. Rep. 808.

104 Coburn v. Muskegon Booming Co., 72 Mich. 134; s. c. 40 N. W. Rep. 198.

necessarily idle; but prospective profits which might have been realized from a continued use of the net cannot be allowed as damages.105

§ 7254. Break-Down of County Bridge. The measure of damages in the case of a break down of a county bridge over which a loaded wagon is being drawn, causing the death of the horses, is the value of the horses killed and a sum equal to the amount of damages which the evidence shows to have resulted immediately to the wagon and contents from the accident, and any expenses necessarily incurred by the owner as a natural and immediate result of the accident.10

106

§ 7255. Damages for Injuries by Carrier to Subject of Shipment. -The measure of damages for the delivery of goods107 or animals108 in a damaged condition, is the difference between the value of the shipment in their damaged state and their value at the place of destination had they been delivered in good order. In all such cases the value is that at the place of delivery,109 unless, as we have already seen, another place has been agreed upon by a valid stipulation between the parties.110 In the absence of such a contract the point of destination will determine the place, though such destination is on the line of a connecting carrier not sued.111 It has been held that in the absence of proof of the value at the point of destination, the value will be

100 Wright v. Mulvaney, 78 Wis. 89; s. c. 9 L. R. A. 807; 46 N. W. Rep. 1045.

10 Ford v. Umatilla Co., 15 Or. 313; s. c. 16 Pac. Rep. 33.

17 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Elgin Condensed Milk Co., 74 Ill. App. 619; s. c. aff'd, 175 Ill. 557; 51 N. E. Rep. 911; Silverman v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 51 La. An. 1785; S. c. 26 South. Rep. 447; King v. Sherwood, 22 App. Div. (N. Y.) 548; s. c. 48 N. Y. Supp. 34; Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Breeding, 4 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. 217; s. c. 16 S. W. Rep. 184.

10 Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. Patton, 104 Ill. App. 550; s. c. aff'd, 203 Ill. 376; 67 N. E. Rep. 804; Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Radford (Ky.), 23 Ky. L. Rep. 886; s. c. 64 S. W. Rep. 511; Matney v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 75 Mo. App. 233; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Butler, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 494; S. c. 63 S. W. Rep. 650; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Butler (Tex. Civ. App.), 73 S. W. Rep. 84; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Houghton (Tex. Civ. App.), 68 S. W. Rep. 718; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Staton (Tex. Civ. App.), 49 S. W. Rep. 277; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Ware, Tex. Civ. App.; s. c. 78 S. W. Rep.

961; International &c. R. Co. v.
Young (Tex. Civ. App.), 72 S. W.
Rep. 68; Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Cobb
(Tex. Civ. App.), 36 S. W. Rep. 500; ·
Texas &c. R. Co. v. Arnold, 16 Tex.
Civ. App. 74; s. c. 40 S. W. Rep. 829;
Texas &c. R. Co. v. Murtishaw,
Tex. Civ. App. ; s. c. 78 S. W.
Rep. 953; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Reeves,
15 Tex. Civ. App. 157; s. c. 39 S. W.
Rep. 135; writ of error denied, 90
Tex. 499; s. c. 39 S. W. Rep. 564.

100 Hart v. Spaulding, 1 Cal. 213; Ringgold v. Haven, 1 Cal. 108; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Heilprin, 95 Ill. App. 402; Wilkinson v. Laughton, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 213; Edminson v. Baxter, 4 Hayw. (N. C.) 114; Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Efron (Tex. Civ. App.), 38 S. W. Rep. 639; Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Webb, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 431; s. c. 49 S. W. Rep. 526; Southern Pac. Co. v. D'Arcais, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 57; s. c. 64 S. W. Rep. 813.

110 Vol. V. § 6528. See also, Horner v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 70 Mo. App. 285.

111 Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Fales,

Tex. Civ. App. —; s. c. 77 S. W. Rep. 234.