CHAPTER CLXXXVII. QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS FOR DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT. Notice as a Condition Precedent to Action, §§ 7110-7111. ART. I. ART. II. ART. III. Evidence, §§ 7129–7140. ARTICLE I. NOTICE AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ACTION. 7110. Notice not necessary unless 7111. By whom notice may be given. required by statute. § 7110. Notice Not Necessary Unless Required by Statute.-Notice to the persons sought to be held liable for the wrongful death, as a condition to the commencement of the action, may be required by statute; but where this procedure is not expressly directed by statute, it is not to be inferred from the mere fact that such a notice is required by another statute as a condition precedent to an action for a personal injury.' The New York constitutional provision against abrogating the action for wrongful death is held not to have been violated by a statute of that State making the service of notice of injury a condition precedent to an action for wrongful death;2 and a complaint in that State is defective which fails to allege the giving of the notice.3 § 7111. By Whom Notice may be Given.-The notice may be given by the attorney of the claimant. In Massachusetts, the notice in a case of instantaneous death may be given by some one in the plaintiff's behalf within thirty days of the occurrence of the acci 1 Mitchell v. Colorado Milling &c. Co., 12 Colo. App. 277; s. c. 55 Pac. Rep. 736; Orth v. Belgrade, 87 Minn. 237; s. c. 91 N. W. Rep. 843; French v. Mascomd Flannel Co., 66 N. H. 90; s. c. 20 Atl. Rep. 363. ? Gmaehle v. Rosenberg, 80 N. Y. Supp. 705; s. c. aff'd, 83 App. Div. (N. Y.) 339; 82 N. Y. Supp. 366. 3 Gmaehle v. Rosenberg, 83 Apn. Div. (N. Y.) 339; s. c. 82 N. Y. Supp. 366; aff'g s. c. 80 N. Y. Supp. 705. 4 Gustafsen v. Washburn &c. Man. Co., 153 Mass. 468; s. c. 27 N. E. Rep. 179; Hupfer v. National Distilling Co., 119 Wis. 417; s. c. 96 N. W. Rep. 809. dent, or by the executor or administrator within thirty days after his appointment." ARTICLE II. PLEADING. SECTION 7114. Existence of beneficiaries. 7115. Whether particular acts of SECTION 7120. Pleading the fact that deceased was unmarried. negligence must be pleaded. 7121. Averment of survival, or of 7116. Averment of damages and pecuniary interest in life of deceased. 7117. Dependency of beneficiaries. 7118. Pleading statute - Averment that deceased could have maintained action if death had not ensued. 7119. Loss of services. immediate or instantaneous death. 7122. Custody of children in care of another. 7123. Joinder of causes of action. 7124. Exemplary damages must be demanded. 7125. Amendments. 87114. Existence of Beneficiaries.-The complaint in an action for wrongful death should show the existence of the beneficiaries entitled to the recovery under the statute.1 In some cases it has been 'Mass. Rev. Laws 1902, ch. 106, § 75. See Jones v. Boston &c. R. Co., 157 Mass. 51; s. c. 31 N. E. Rep. 727; Daly v. New Jersey &c. R. Co., 155 Mass. 1; s. c. 29 N. E. Rep. 507. 'Webster v. Norwegian Min. Co., 137 Cal. 399; s. c. 70 Pac. Rep. 276; Davidow v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 85 Fed. Rep. 943; Sorensen v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 45 Fed. Rep. 407; Assumption v. Campbell, 95 Ill. App. 521; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Logue, 47 Ill. App. 292; Chicago v. Scholten, 75 Ill. 468; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Helbreg, 99 Ill. App. 563; Foley v. Suburban R. Co., 98 Ill. App. 108; Foster v. St. Luke's Hospital, 191 Ill. 94; s. c. 60 N. E. Rep. 803; aff'g s. c. 86 Ill. App. 282; Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546; 8. c. 37 N. E. Rep. 905; aff'g s. c. 50 Ill. App. 685; Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Keely, 23 Ind. 132; State v. Walford, 11 Ind. App. 392; s. c. 39 N. E. Rep. 162; Stewart v. Terre Haute &c. R. Co., 103 Ind. 44; Walker v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 104 Mich. 606; s. c. 2 Det. Leg. N. 34; 62 N. W. Rep. 1032; Barnum v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 30 Minn. 461; Schwarz V. Judd, 28 Minn. 371; McIntosh v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 103 Mo. 131; S. c. 15 S. W. Rep. 80; Burlington &c. R. Co. v. Crockett, 17 Neb. 570; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Oyster, 58 Neb. 1; s. c. 78 N. W. Rep. 359; Kenney v. New York &c. R. Co., 49 Hun (N. Y.) 535; s. c. 18 N. Y. St. Rep. 441; Pizzi v. Reid, 36 Misc. (N. Y.) 123; s. c. 72 N. Y. Supp. 1053; Safford v. Drew, 3 Duer (N. Y.) 627; Halloran v. Cleveland &c. R. Co., 4 Ohio Dec. 14; s. c. 1 Cleve. L. Rec. 11; Nohdren v. Northeastern R. Co., 51 S. C. 492; s. c. 32 S. E. Rep. 524; Railroad Co. v. Pitt, 91 Tenn. 86; s. c. 18 S. W. Rep. 118; Houston &c. R. Co. v. Moore, 49 Tex. 31; Geroux v. Graves, 62 Vt. 480; s. c. 19 Atl. Rep. 987; Westcott v. Central &c. R. Co., 61 Vt. 438; s. c. 17 Atl. Rep. 745; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Gettle, 3 W. Va. 376; Topping v. St. Lawrence, 86 Wis. 526; s. c. 57 N. W. Rep. 365. So held in Maine, where the remedy is by indictment: State v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 60 Me. 145. Under the Pennsylvania statute, providing that an action for the death of а father is properly brought in the name of all the children, it is held that there can be a joint recovery without showing a joint damage: North Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Robinson, 44 Pa. St. 175; and the words "parents" and "children" in the statute are used to indicate the family relation, in point of fact, as the foundation of the action, without regard to age: Penn held sufficient to allege that there are persons who are entitled to damages, without naming them in the declaration.2 Where the fact of the existence of these beneficiaries is sufficiently alleged, it is not necessary to go farther and describe such beneficiaries and set out specifically the rights of the respective distributees; nor is it necessary expressly to negative the existence of beneficiaries other than those named.* The Connecticut and North Carolina courts take the view that there is a presumption of the existence of beneficiaries of one negligently killed, and hold that it is unnecessary expressly to aver their existence. The complaint need not allege that the deceased left a wife or children, in States where the statute makes the recovery a part of the personal estate of the deceased." § 7115. Whether Particular Acts of Negligence must be Pleaded. -Generally, it is held that the particular acts of negligence causing the death of the party injured need not be set out." But under a statute giving an action for the killing of a person by the use of deadly sylvania R. Co. v. Adams, 55 Pa. St. 499. The fact that the deceased left surviving next of kin being a substantial and material allegation, and essential to the right of action for wrongful death, its omission from the declaration is not cured by verdict: West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Mabie, 77 Ill. App. 176. Contra: Keller v. New York &c. R. Co., 24 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 172; Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Waller, 48 Ala. 459; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Wightman, 29 Gratt. (Va.) 431; Madden v. Chesapeake &c. R. Co., 28 W. Va. 610. 2 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Morris, 26 Ill. 400; Conant v. Griffin, 48 Ill. 410; Jeffersonville &c. R. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48; Hamilton v. Bordentown Electric Light &c. Co., 68 N. J. L. 85; s. c. 52 Atl. Rep. 290; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Younger, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 141; s. c. 29 S. W. Rep. 918; Woodward v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 23 Wis. 400. Under Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 377, providing that the heirs of a person whose death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another may recover damages, a complaint alleging that plaintiff, at the time of the injury to, and the death of, such person, was his wife, and is his surviving widow, states a cause of action, as the widow is an heir of the deceased husband, and under certain conditions may be his sole heir: Knott v. McGilvray, 124 Cal. 128; s. c. 56 Pac. Rep. 789. Where the original writ describes the person for whose death the action is brought as deceased, leaving a widow and one minor child, it may be referred to in order to help out the want of a material averment in the declaration: Westcott v. Central Vermont R. Co., 61 Vt. 438; s. c. 17 Atl. Rep. 745. 3 Howard v. Delaware &c. Canal Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 195; s. c. 6 L. R. A. 75; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 473; Westcott v. Central Vermont R. Co., 61 Vt. 438; s. c. 17 Atl. Rep. 745. 6 • East Tennessee Tel. Co. V. Simms, 99 Ky. 404; s. c. 18 Ky. L. Rep. 761, 764; 36 S. W. Rep. 171; 38 S. W. Rep. 131; Searle v. Kanawha &c. R. Co., 32 W. Va. 370; s. c. 9 S. E. Rep. 248. 'Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Waller, 48 Ala. 459; Orman v. Mannix, 17 Colo. 564; s. c. 17 L. R. A. 602; 30 Pac. Rep. 1037; 31 Am. St. Rep. 340; Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Keely, 23 Ind. 133; State v. Railroad Co., 52 N. H. 528; Oldfield v. New York &c. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310. But see Lexington v. Lewis, 10 Bush (Ky.) 677. weapons, "not in self-defense," it must be alleged that the killing was not done in self-defense. age $7116. Averment of Damages and Pecuniary Interest in Life of Deceased. It is not necessary directly to allege that pecuniary damhas been sustained, as such damages are presumed, particularly in the case of wife and children.10 The complaint must, however, show that the persons for whose benefit the suit is instituted had a pecuniary interest in the life of the deceased where, from the relationship of the survivors, the law would not presume that they had been deprived of pecuniary benefits.11 Where the plaintiff alleged that he would be 'Becker v. Crow, 7 Bush (Ky.) 198. 'Chapman v. Rothwell, 27 L. J. (Q. B.) 315; s. c. 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1180; Sorensen v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 45 Fed. Rep. 407. Manifestly impracticable in the case of numerous beneficiaries: Peers v. Nevada Power &c. Co., 119 Fed. Rep. 400. In an action for damages for causing the death of a person, a general averment that his widow and child, for whom the action is prosecuted, sustained damages in a specified sum, is sufficient in respect to their pecuniary loss, where the complaint alleges that deceased was in the employ of defendant, which was a railroad company, as a brakeman, and that he left a widow and one child four years old; as it is an unavoidable inference that he was in the vigor of manhood and at the time engaged in earning money for their support: Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Buck, 116 Ind. 566; s. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 453; 2 L. R. A. 520; 28 Am. L. Reg. 148. *Peden v. American Bridge Co., 120 Fed. Rep. 523; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Carey, 115 Ill. 115; s. c. 2 West. Rep. 73; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Thomas, 155 Ind. 634; s. c. 58 V. E. Rep. 1040; Korrady v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 131 Ind. 261; s. c. 29 N. E. Rep. 1069; Haug v. Great Northern R. Co., 8 N. D. 23; s. c. 77 N. W. Rep. 97; 42 L. R. A. 664. Averments showing that deceased was a laboring man, working for defendant (without alleging that he was receiving any compensation for his labor), and that he left no widow, but left a child three years old, were held, on demurrer, to show sufficiently that such child suf fered pecuniary damage by the father's death: Kelly v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 50 Wis. 381. Allegations in a complaint that the plaintiff's intestate was a widow, and had small children dependent upon her for support, nurture and education, are sufficient to show pecuniary loss to such children by her death: McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50; s. c. 31 N. W. Rep. 298. 11 Charlebois v. Gogebic &c. R. Co., 91 Mich. 59; s. c. 51 N. W. Rep. 812; Hurst v. Detroit City R. Co., 84 Mich. 539; s. c. 48 N. W. Rep. 44; Rouse v. Detroit Electric R. Co., 128 Mich. 149; s. c. 87 N. W. Rep. 68; 8 Det. Leg. N. 577; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Bond, 58 Neb. 385; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 58 Neb. 252; s. c. 78 N. W. Rep. 514; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Young, 58 Neb. 678; s. c. 79 N. W. Rep. 556; Orgall v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 46 Neb. 4; s. c. 64 N. W. Rep. 450; Tucker v. Draper, 62 Neb. 66; s. c. 86 N. W. Rep. 917; 54 L. R. A. 321; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Roeser, Neb. -; s. c. 95 N. W. Rep. 68; Regan v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 51 Wis. 599. No cause of action is set out in a declaration alleging the loss of the "financial value" of the life of the plaintiff's minor son, where the statute gives a right of action only for loss of services: Perry v. Georgia R. &c. Co., 85 Ga. 193; s. c. 11 S. E. Rep. 605. A petition under Lord Campbell's Act, in an action for negligently causing the death of plaintiff's intestate while a passenger on defendant's train, which alleges that such intestate left a widow and next of kin, who are described, on whom the law confers the right to be supported by such intestate, sufficiently compelled to pay a certain sum for medical attendance, funeral and other expenses, caused by the death of his son, it was held that such expenses, if it was shown that the plaintiff was liable for them, might be considered incurred, and it would have been a sufficient statement of the damages if the items had been given.1 12 § 7117. Dependency of Beneficiaries.-Where the right of next of kin to recover is based on dependency, the fact of such dependency must be pleaded,18 but not necessarily the circumstances on which the dependency is based.14 Thus the petition by a mother for the loss of the services of her minor son need not specifically set out the death of the father where it states that she is a widow and dependent on her son's services.15 A complaint which alleges that the deceased left a widow surviving him will be sufficient without an allegation that she was dependent on him, under the Indiana statute providing that the damages shall enure to the exclusive benefit of the wife and children.16 § 7118. Pleading Statute-Averment that Deceased could have Maintained Action if Death had Not Ensued. It is not necessary to refer to the statute in stating the cause of action;17 nor is it necessary expressly to aver that the act, negligence or default complained of, was such that if death had not occurred the party injured would have had a right to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, but the complaint need only show facts upon which the person killed could have maintained an action.18 § 7119. Loss of Services.-The complaint need not specifically aver the loss of services of the deceased to the beneficiary, as that is a natural and necessary consequence of the death.19 alleges pecuniary loss: Omaha &c. R. Co. v. Crow, 54 Neb. 747; s. c. 74 N. W. Rep. 1066. 12 Roeder v. Ormsby, 22 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 270; s. c. 13 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 334. 13 Winnt v. International &c. R. Co., 74 Tex. 32; s. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 907; International &c. R. Co. v. Knight, 91 Tex. 660; s. c. 45 S. W. Rep. 556; rev'g s. c. 45 S. W. Rep. 167 (evidence admissible without fact being specially pleaded). 14 Augusta R. Co. v. Glover, 92 Ga. 132; s. c. 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 269; 18 S. E. Rep. 406; District of Columbia v. Wilcox, 4 App. (D. C.) 90; s. c. 22 Wash. L. Rep. 623. 15 Goins v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 47 Mo. App. 173. 18 Salem Bedford Stone Co. v. Hobbs, 11 Ind. App. 27; s. c. 38 N. E. Rep. 538. 17 White v. Maxcy, 64 Mo. 552; Kennayde v. Pacific R. Co., 45 Mo. 255. 18 Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. State, 58 Md. 372; Gurney v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 59 Hun (N. Y.) 625; s. c. 37 N. Y. St. Rep. 557; 13 N. Y. Supp. 645; Lima Electric Light &c. Co. v. Deubler, 7 Ohio C. C. 185. 19 Morgan v. Southern Pac. Co., 95 Cal. 510; s. c. 17 L. R. A. 71; 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 101; 29 Am. St. Rep. 143; 30 Pac. Rep. 603; Erb v. Mor |