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section 4 ceased to have any application to the enactment of its ordinances.

Section 6 of article 1 of chapter 24 (1 Starr & Curtis, p. 454,) among other things provides: "From the time of such organization or change of organization the provisions of this act shall be applicable to such cities and villages, and all laws in conflict therewith shall no longer be applicable. But all laws or parts of laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this act shall continue in force and applicable to any such city or village, the same as if such change of organization had not taken place." The question then must be, is the law of 1863, in regard to the passage of city ordinances, as prescribed by the foregoing section 4, in conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of the act of 1872? If it is, the former law ceased to be applicable to the city upon its re-organization in April, 1875, by the express terms of said section 6.

What are the requirements of the general law on this subject? They are found in article 3 of the act, and nowhere else. Section 1 of article 3 (1 Starr & Curtis, p. 457,) provides that the city council shall consist of the mayor and aldermen. The following sections, including the fifth, relate to the number of aldermen, their terms of office, vacancies and qualifications. The sixth vests the power of determining the qualification of its members in the city council, and by section 7 it is provided "it shall determine its own rules of proceeding." Sections 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 relate to the attendance of members of the city council, its meetings, election of temporary chairman, sitting with open doors, and the keeping of a journal of its proceedings. Section 13 is as follows: "The yeas and nays shall be taken upon the passage of all ordinances, and on all propositions to create any liability against the city, or for the expenditure or appropriation of its money, and in all other cases at the request of any member, which shall be entered on the journal of its proceedings; and the concurrence of a majority of all the

members elected in the city council shall be necessary to the passage of any such ordinance or proposition: Provided, it shall require two-thirds of all the aldermen elect to sell any city or school property." Section 14 prohibits the reconsideration of a vote of the council at a special meeting, unless there are present as large a number of the aldermen as were present when such vote was taken. Section 15 requires any report of a committee of the council to be deferred for final action thereon to the next regular meeting after the report is made, upon the request of any two aldermen present. The remaining sections of the article relate to the territorial jurisdiction of the city council and board of trustees, special meetings of the council, approval or veto of ordinances, and passing the same, upon reconsideration, over such veto. Turning to the charter of 1863, we find that section 3 of chapter 4 provides, among other things, that "the council shall determine the rules of its own proceedings." Then follows section 4, as above quoted. Section 7 provides that upon the passage of all ordinances or resolutions appropriating money, imposing taxes or authorizing the borrowing of money, the yeas and nays shall be entered on the record of the common council, and a majority of all the aldermen entitled to seats in the board shall be necessary to their passage.

Is there not a plain conflict-a clear inconsistency-in the two acts? Under the general law the city council shall fix its own rules in the passage of ordinances, subject only to the manner of taking the vote and the requisite majority of its members, as required by section 13, and the right to reconsider the vote and act upon the report of a committee, as limited in sections 14 and 15; whereas under the old charter, when it came to determine the manner in which it would proceed, it was confronted at the outset by the section immediately following the one which gave it the power, which contained the qualification that, unless by unanimous consent, the ordinances

must be first referred to a particular committee, and only acted upon at a subsequent meeting, on such committee's report, which report might be referred to the next meeting and publication required by request of any two aldermen present. In other words, under the general law the power of the city council to say when an ordinance shall be put upon its final passage is unqualified, whereas under the act of 1863 it was not. Under the general law it may provide that it shall be finally acted upon at the meeting in which it is introduced, but under the act of 1863 it could not do so. There the power was qualified; here it is general.

The contention on behalf of appellee seems to be, that inasmuch as the rules of procedure prescribed in section 4 of the old charter are not in conflict with any mode of passing ordinances indicated in the general law, therefore those old rules are still in force. But the question is not whether the old rules are in conflict with the general law, but whether the charters of 1863 and 1872 are in conflict, in so far as they authorize the city council to adopt rules for the passage of ordinances. The city council of the city of Chicago, while acting under the charter of 1863, was bound, in fixing its rules of proceeding, to make them conform to the requirements of section 4; but after adopting the general law it could do so or not, as to it seemed best. The object in adopting the act of 1872 was to provide a uniform system of municipal government throughout the State. The law was made applicable to every city in the State, and the legislature must have contemplated that Chicago would, as it did, organize its city government under its provisions. Then, if the inquiry here were one of repeal by implication, it would be pertinent to inquire, why was complete provision for the enactment of ordinances made by article 3 of the general law adopting, in substance, many of the provisions of the special charter of the city of Chicago passed in 1863, and some of its sections literally, and

section 4 omitted entirely, if it was still intended that they could only be legally passed as therein directed? And we think the answer would necessarily be, that by omitting that section a clear intention on the part of the legislature is shown to no longer comply with its provisions.

We assume that it will not be claimed that article 3 does not contain all the provisions requisite to the passage of ordinances, and that it will not therefore be questioned that if the city of Chicago had been organized for the first time in April, 1875, its council could, under the several sections of that article, have lawfully provided that ordinances might be adopted at the first meeting without being referred to a committee. Its power to fix rules of procedure is the same whether the organization is an original one or only a change from a prior charter to the general law, and if, in case of change of organization, there is anything in the former charter which, continued in force, would limit or qualify that power, it is necessarily in conflict and inconsistent with the provisions of the general law. It cannot be said that a law is in conflict or inconsistent with the general law as applied to an original incorporation, but in harmony with it in case of a change of organization.

There is no view upon which the objection that the ordinance in question was not legally adopted can be sustained, and the earnestness with which the point is pressed and the able arguments presented in support of and against it, have, it seems to us, magnified it beyond its real proportions. It is, we think, clear, that when the city of Chicago adopted the act of 1872, by the express language of section 6 of article 1 thereof section 4 of chapter 4 of its old charter became wholly inapplicable to the passage of its ordinances, because in conflict and inconsistent with the act adopted.

The second objection, that the ordinance is void because it delegates to the legal voters of the territory

named the power to license dram-shops, is overruled in the late case of City of Chicago v. Stratton, (ante, p. 494,) in which the question was elaborately argued and fully considered. There are certainly no grounds upon which it can be fairly contended that the law is more favorable to the position of counsel for appellee in this case than that, and this, we understand, is conceded.

The third objection is also practically disposed of by the same decision. If, as contended, this ordinance permits arbitrary discrimination between applicants for license because one may "be able to get the requisite petition and another cannot," the same is true of the one held valid in the Stratton case. It is conceded that the city had the lawful right to prohibit the issuing of license to keep a dram-shop in the district named, and we presume it will not be denied that it might limit the number of saloons to be licensed in the district. The contention is, the requirement that the person applying for a license shall present with his application a petition signed by a majority of the legal voters of the district asking that the license be granted, is "a discrimination between different persons possessing the requisite good character." It is not contended that the ordinance on its face makes any such discrimination, or that it is unreasonable if fairly and honestly carried into effect, but the claim is, that through the partiality or corruption of the legal voters of the district one man may be able to get a majority of them to sign his petition, whereas another cannot. It is said: "Thus the rich applicant may secure his license while the poor one may not. Whim, fancy or prejudice may alone control the giving of assent." This is asking the court to hold the ordinance void upon an unwarranted presumption. When the city council creates a local option district, (as this properly is,) it must be presumed that the legal voters therein will petition for license or refuse to do so, as they believe best for the community in the way of regulating the liquor

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