105 Ill. 534; Anderson v. Fruitt, 108 id. 378; Jones v. Fortune, 128 id. 518; Linington v. Strong, 111 id. 152; Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Andrews, 148 id. 27.

The status of the board of trade has been determined by this court in numerous cases, and it has been held to be merely a voluntary organization, although incorporated under an act of the General Assembly. It is averred in the petition that it owned a building and rented out rooms as offices, from which it derived an income; that this income was insufficient for its expenses and an assessment was required each year, and that the present value of a membership is about $800. This does not change, in any respect, the character of the association, which must be determined by its charter. Any club or voluntary association, whether incorporated or unincorporated, may rent out rooms and derive income therefrom, but the character of the association is not changed by that fact. The right to pursue a business, as a member of such an organization, in the hall of the building devoted to that purpose may be a thing of value, but its value is incidental to the membership, and a determination of such membership destroys the rights under it. This corporation is not bound to admit any person to membership, nor was the relator in any way forced into such association. He voluntarily became a member, and by his contract is bound to abide by the rules and regulations of the board. The courts will never interfere to control the enforcement of by-laws of such associations, but they will be left to enforce their rules and regulations by such means as they may adopt for their government. (People ex rel. Rice v. Board of Trade, 80 Ill. 134.) When the relator became a member of the board of trade he voluntarily submitted himself to the operation of all laws enacted for its government, and agreed to be bound by them so far as within the corporate authority. The bylaw in question was not unreasonable, immoral, contrary to public policy nor in contravention of the laws of the

land. A by-law of this board providing that if a member failed to comply with a business contract made with another member he should be expelled, was held to be valid in People ex rel. Page v. Board of Trade, 45 Ill. 112, and the validity of this by-law is unquestionable. The court has repeatedly refused to interfere with the disciplinary powers of this board, in equity as well as at law. Fisher v. Board of Trade, 80 Ill. 85; Baxter v. Board of Trade, 83 id. 146; Sturges v. Board of Trade, 86 id. 441; Pitcher v. Board of Trade, 121 id. 412.

In the case of Ryan v. Cudahy, 157 Ill. 108, which was unlike the other cases in this court in not involving the disciplinary powers of the board, but where the board constituted a committee for the trial of disputes as to property rights between members of the board, this court held a member not bound by a proceeding not according to the rules and regulations provided for the action of such committee. In that case the complainant was held to be entitled to the relief because the committee refused to hear any evidence in his behalf and turned him away without a hearing. In that case it was said that the complainant, when he became a member of the board, agreed to abide by its rules, regulations and by-laws, and it was held that having selected his tribunal he was estopped from denying the jurisdiction of the committee, either as to the person or the subject matter, and the court expressly disclaimed any intention to interfere with the disciplinary power of the board over its members. No such question is involved in this case as in that. There is no question that the judgment of the board of directors was arrived at in accordance with the rules and regulations of the board. The relator was suspended by a tribunal which he had voluntarily chosen to determine the question and according to the rules to which he assented in becoming a member, and he had due notice of the proceedings. Such a judgment cannot be collaterally reviewed by the courts. So far as the

courts are concerned the judgment of the board of directors is conclusive, like that of any other tribunal.

It is argued that the charge made was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. It expressly charged the relator with bad faith and dishonorable conduct in not carrying out a certain agreement of the corporation of which he was president, and a copy of that agreement was attached to the charge. Being the chief officer of the corporation he was presumably authorized to carry out its lawful contracts. This paper is not to be tested by the strict rules of criminal pleading. The accused was informed in what the bad faith and dishonorable conduct consisted, and his communication to the board, set up in his petition, showed that he was fully informed as to its nature. Anything further would be matter of mere form, affording neither security nor information to him.

Whether the evidence before the board of directors was sufficient to authorize its finding cannot be examined into by the courts. The relator stands convicted by the sentence of a tribunal of his own choice. With the question whether that judgment was correct upon the facts the courts have nothing to do. Having given him notice and made due inquiry, where there is no question of the jurisdiction or legality of the proceedings, the courts will not sit as courts of appeal and re-examine the facts. To do that would be to usurp an authority in cases of this kind for which there is no justification in the law.

It is urged that the judgment of suspension was invalid. But the by-law provided for such suspension, and the enactment of such a by-law was within the powers of the corporation. The charter provided that the corporation might admit or expel members, but it also provided for such rules, regulations and by-laws as the members might think necessary or proper for the government of the corporation, and the enactment of the by-law for suspension was within the power thereby given. The petition showed a case with which the court was powerless

to interfere, and the demurrer should have been carried back to it.

The judgments of the Appellate Court and Superior Court will be reversed, and the cause will be remanded to the latter court with directions to dismiss the petition. Reversed and remanded.

THE MEDINAH TEMPLE COMPANY

v.

ARTHUR L. CURREY, Assignee.

Filed at Ottawa May 12, 1896- Rehearing denied October 13, 1896.

1. LANDLORD AND TENANT-forfeiture of lease upon assignment— effect of voluntary assignment. A lease providing for its forfeiture if the lessee assigns it without the written consent of the lessor, may be forfeited for a voluntary assignment by the lessee for the benefit of creditors, as such assignment transfers the interest of the lessee by his voluntary act, and not by operation of law.

2. SAME-effect of receiving rent upon right to forfeit lease for broken condition. The right to declare a forfeiture of a lease because of a voluntary assignment for creditors by the lessee, is not waived by receiving rent from the assignee, after the assignment, for a period during which the assignee occupies the premises without making an election to accept or refuse the lease.

Medinah Temple Co. v. Currey, 58 Ill. App. 433, reversed.

APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District:-heard in that court on appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. O. N. CARTER, Judge, presiding.

M. B. & F. S. LOOMIS, for appellant.

ELA, GROVER & GRAVES, for appellee:

Weatherall v. Geering, 12 Ves. 513, holds that, notwithstanding a covenant against assignment of the lease, the covenant is not violated by a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors. This covenant only applies to

162 441

176 309

voluntary sales by the lessee.

Jackson v. Corliss, 7 Johns.

534; Jackson v. Silvernail, 15 id. 279.

An assignee is not regarded as a purchaser, in this State. Union Trust Co. v. Trumbull, 137 Ill. 146; Hardin v. Osborne, 94 id. 571; Jack v. Weiennett, 115 id. 105; O'Hara v. Jones, 46 id. 288.

Conditions subsequent having effect, in case of a breach, to affect estates already vested, are not favored in law, and hence always receive a strict construction. Devlin on Deeds, sec. 970.

The condition is not broken, in any parting with the possession of the lease, when no transfer is executed, so as to make the party receiving it liable upon the covenants of the lease. 1 Wood on Landlord and Tenant, 717; 1 Taylor on Landlord and Tenant, sec. 408.

A lease passes to executors, and can be sold by them without leave of the lessor, unless the provisions against assignment are expressly extended to executors in terms. 1 Wood on Landlord and Tenant, (2d ed.) 719.

Mr. JUSTICE WILKIN delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellant leased to the F. Halbe Baking Company certain property in the city of Chicago for the term of five years. The lease contained this condition: "The said lessee shall not assign this lease, or let or underlet said premises or any part thereof, without the written consent of the lessor," and provided for a forfeiture if the condition was broken. After the term had run some ten months the lessee made a general voluntary assignment for the benefit of its creditors, naming Arthur L. Currey as assignee, who took possession of the leased premises and afterwards claimed to hold the same under said lease. Appellant filed its petition in the county court of Cook county, where the assignment proceeding was pending, praying that court to declare the lease forfeited. under the above condition. This petition was denied, and it appealed to the Appellate Court, where the order