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only to those restrictions which have been imposed by the constitutions of the State and the United States."" See, also, Clark v. City of Providence, 16 R. I. 338, and Mowry v. City of Providence, id. 422, where the same doctrine is announced. In the latter case it is said: "In the case of Clark v. City of Providence, (ante, p. 337,) this court held the act to be constitutional. We held in that case that the State, or General Assembly as the organ of the State, is the representative of the public or people as to the public right, and as such has power to release the right, the General Assembly having in the matter the authority, not simply of the English crown, but of both crown and parliament, except so far as it has been limited by the constitution of the State or by the constitution and laws of the United States."

There is here no complaint on behalf of the Federal government, or of any of its officers, that the action of the legislature, and the extension of the driveway, in pursuance of the act, upon the waters of the lake, will in any manner interfere with commerce. The only complaint comes from the Attorney General, acting for and on behalf of the People. The People, however, have spoken through their representatives, who were clothed by them with full power to act. If the legislation is unwise or detrimental to the best interests of the State the people cannot complain, because they alone are to blame in selecting men to represent them who were unfit to discharge the duties with which they were clothed. The remedy is in the hands of the people by electing competent and honest men to represent them in the legislature. When the people have chosen their representatives, clothed with legislative power, they cannot complain of the action of their chosen representatives so long as the legislation does not conflict with the organic law of the State or of the United States, or so long as they do not undertake to part with governmental power.

But it is said, if the legislature has the power to dispose of the submerged lands in question under the pretense of constructing a boulevard two hundred feet wide, why could it not give away any indefinite quantity of the submerged lands of the lake? It is not claimed here that the legislature has the power to dispose of submerged lands of the lake in any case where the disposition would materially interfere with the navigation of the lake for the purposes of commerce and the right of fishery, and it may be conceded that such power is governmental and does not exist. Indeed, the first section of the act in question in direct terms prohibits an extension of the boulevard in such manner as to interfere with the navigation of the lake for the purpose of commerce. Upon looking into the evidence it will be found that the waters of the lake west of the driveway as constructed were not adapted to navigation and were not used to any great extent for that purpose. The learned judge before whom this case was tried, in speaking of the evidence on this branch of the case, said: "It is true that in some cases tugs, small craft for carrying passengers in a small way to and from the government breakwater and to other points near this drive along the lake, small sailing yachts and boats for pleasure, have, from time to time, passed over these waters, and that a very considerable portion of these waters were, before being filled, deep enough to be navigated by small vessels actually engaged in trade and commerce between the port of Chicago and other ports on the lake; but it is also a further fact, shown by the evidence, that all such small vessels are a very insignificant proportion of the whole number of vessels engaged in trade and commerce to and from the port of Chicago, and that these small vessels never have passed over these waters, because, in going to and from the harbor of Chicago, these waters are outside of the usual course, and are considered dangerous by sailors on the lake. Only a very small portion of all the vessels arriv

ing at and departing from Chicago ever come within the government breakwater off this shore, and when they do they invariably pass quite near the breakwater, which is about fifteen hundred feet easterly from the easterly line of said proposed drive, in order to avoid shoal water." From the foregoing it is apparent that the construction of the boulevard authorized by the act will not materially interfere with or obstruct the navigation of the lake.

But it is said the act is invalid because it conflicts with that provision of the constitution which provides that every act shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be expressed in its title. The title of the act is as follows: “An act to enable park commissioners having control of any boulevard or driveway bordering upon any public waters of this State, to extend the same." Section 1 provides for the extension of such driveway over and upon the bed of such public waters. Section 2 provides for an estimate of cost and the consent of a certain amount of the frontage abutting on such waters. Section 3 provides that the board may contract for the construction of such extension, and that the submerged lands lying between the shore and the inner line of such extension shall be appropriated to the purpose of defraying the cost of such extension, and to that end the board are authorized to sell and convey such lands, etc. Upon examination it will be found that the act has but one general object, and that is fairly indicated by the title, and under the rule laid down in People v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 565, we do not regard it in conflict with the constitution. The act conferred power on the board of park commissioners to extend a boulevard over and upon the waters of Lake Michigan. This was the main purpose of the act. But in order to facilitate the work it was proper to provide means to defray the cost of the work in the same act. In the prosecution of the work it was obvious that there would be submerged lands between the boulevard as constructed and the former shore, and these lands were by

the act appropriated to defray the cost of the improvement. These provisions are, as we think, germane to the real purpose of the law as expressed in the title. See Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 431; Larned v. Tiernan, 110 id. 173.

It is also claimed that the location of the boulevard is not an extension of the lake shore drive, within the meaning of the statute. The lake shore drive, as constructed by the Lincoln Park commissioners at the time the act of 1889 was passed by the legislature, commenced at North avenue and extended along Lake Michigan south to Oak street, where it connected with Pine street. Under an ordinance of the city of Chicago, Pine street, from Oak street south, had been turned over to the Lincoln Park commissioners as a boulevard. The extension of the boulevard as located by the commissioners of Lincoln Park leaves the old lake shore drive at its terminus at the south and extends east a certain distance, and then turns to the south-east, as shown by the map put in evidence. The argument is, that the boulevard as laid out is not an extension of the original lake shore drive because not joined to the end of such drive and does not run in the same direction as the old drive. The act of 1889 did not attempt to locate the extension of the driveway. It merely provided it should be over and upon Lake Michigan, thus leaving a large discretion in the hands of the commissioners, and in the exercise of the discretion vested in them there has been no such departure from the act as to render the action of the commissioners nugatory.

Section 3 of the act contains the following provision: "In all cases where any boulevard or driveway is extended under the provisions hereof, the submerged lands lying between the shore of such public waters and the inner line of the extension of such boulevard or driveway shall be appropriated by the board of park commissioners to the purpose of defraying the cost of such extension, and to that end such board of park commissioners are au

thorized to sell and convey such submerged lands in fee simple, by deeds duly executed." Under this statute it is claimed that the park commissioners were only authorized to sell the submerged lands for cash, and that the contracts entered into by the park commissioners with the shore owners, under which the lands were to be con'veyed to the shore owners upon the completion of the work called for by the contracts and upon the payment of $100 per foot, were not authorized by the statute. Under the statute supra the submerged lands lying between the shore of the lake and the inner line of the boulevard to be constructed were placed in the hands of the commissioners, to be used in payment of the cost of the improvement. If the park commissioners had sold the submerged lands to the shore owners for cash and used the money to defray the cost of the improvement it is not suggested that the statute would have been violated. If the work agreed to be performed by the shore owners was done as cheaply as if they had paid cash, and if the price given for the submerged lands was its full market value, in principle it made no difference whether or not the lands were sold for all cash or a part cash and a part in making the improvement. These submerged lands were set apart to be used in payment of the cost of the improvement, and until it has been shown that they have been disposed of in such a way that the commissioners have not received their full value on the improvement no one can properly object.

The right of a shore owner on Lake Michigan to fill up portions of the lake and thus extend his lands does not arise in this case and that question will not be considered.

The judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

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