north line of Pierson, street 1250 feet; at the center of Chicago avenue 1370 feet; at the north line of Ohio street 1330 feet; at the north line of Indiana street 850 feet. The entire area reclaimed or to be reclaimed, from Oak street to Indiana street, taking the shore line of 1888 and the outer face of the breakwater as outer and inner boundaries, is 93.14 acres, of which 31 acres lie between the south line of Oak street and the north line of Pierson street, 10.44 acres between the north line of Pierson street and the center of Chicago avenue, and 51.70 acres between the center of Chicago avenue and the north line of Indiana street. This large tract of land, containing 93 acres, held by the State in trust for the people, is taken and transferred to the adjacent shore owners, to be by them used for such purpose as they may think best, for their own personal interest.

If the question of policy were one to be considered. by the court in the decision of this case, we would have no hesitation in condemning the action of the legislature in passing the act as unwise and detrimental to the best interests of the people of the State. But our legislature is chosen by the people and clothed and entrusted with power to enact laws for the people, and the propriety or impropriety of legislation is a matter solely with the legislative department of the State, and unless an act passed by the legislature infringes upon some provision of our organic law it is not the province of the courts to declare such legislation invalid. The question before us is not one of policy or expediency, but one of power. Was the legislature clothed with power to convey reclaimed lands which were originally covered by the waters of Lake Michigan?

In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, supra, in speaking on this question of power, the court said: “The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor, and of the lands under them, is a subject of public concern to the whole people of the State. The trust with which they

are held, therefore, is governmental, and cannot be alienated, except in those instances mentioned of parcels used in the improvement of the interest thus held, or when parcels can be disposed of without detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters remaining." In the case cited the court recognizes the power of the State to convey parcels of the lands held by the State under navigable waters when such conveyance will not impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.

In Weber v. Harbor Comrs. 18 Wall. 57, where the question arose in regard to the conveyance of certain land covered by the waters of the bay of San Francisco, the court, among other things, said: "Upon the admission of California into the Union upon equal footing with the original States, absolute property in and dominion and sovereignty over all soils under the tide-waters within her limits passed to the State, with the consequent right to dispose of the title to any part of said soils in such manner as she might deem proper, subject only to the paramount right of navigation over the waters, so far as such navigation might be required by the necessities of commerce with foreign nations or among the several States, the regulation of which was vested in the general government."

In Hoboken v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 104 U. S. 688, the question arose in regard to the validity of an act of the State of New Jersey, under which certain companies paid the State a certain sum of money for the privilege of filling up and reclaiming for their own use submerged land under public waters of the State in front of lands owned by said parties. The act of the legislature was sustained, and the court, among other things, said: "In the examination of the effect to be given to the riparian laws of the State of New Jersey by the act of April 11, 1864, in connection with the supplementary act of March 31, 1869, it is to be borne in mind that the lands below high-water mark, constituting the shores and submerged

lands of the navigable waters of the State, were, according to its laws, the property of the State as sovereign. Over these lands it had absolute and exclusive dominion, including the right to appropriate them to such uses as might best serve its views of the public interest, subject to the power conferred by the constitution upon Congress to regulate foreign and inter-State commerce."

In Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 9, the correctness of the rulings of the Supreme Court of Oregon arose. The rulings, as given in the report of the case, were as follows: "Second, the Supreme Court of Oregon decided that said State was the absolute owner of all rights in front of the high land granted by the United States to said grantee, with said Columbia river as a boundary, below the meander line, out to the channel of said Columbia river, to the exclusion of all rights of the grantee aforesaid of the United States under the said act of Congress of September 27, 1850. Third, the Supreme Court of Oregon decided that said State had the absolute power to dispose of the soil of said river, and of all wharfage rights in front of the high land granted by the United States to said grantee, the predecessor of the plaintiff in error, with the said Columbia river as a boundary, to a private person for a private beneficial use, and had so disposed of the same to the defendants in error." The court, after reviewing many decisions of different courts in regard to the control of the State over submerged lands, said: "The foregoing summary of the laws of the original States shows that there is no universal and uniform law upon the subject, but that each State has dealt with the lands under the tide-waters within its borders according to its own views of justice and policy, reserving its own control over such lands or granting rights therein to individuals or corporations, whether owners of the adjoining upland or not, as it considered for the best interests of the public. Great caution, therefore, is necessary in applying precedents in one State to cases arising in another."

In Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, the disposition of submerged lands was held to be a question for the several States to determine for themselves, and if they chose to resign to the riparian proprietor rights which properly belong to them it was not for others to object.

Under the authorities the law seems to be well settled that the legislature was clothed with power to enact a law authorizing the extension of the driveway over and upon the waters of the lake, so long as the extension did not interfere with navigation, commerce and the right 'of fishery upon the lake, and we see no reason why the submerged lands reclaimed by the extension of the driveway may not, as provided in the act, be appropriated for the payment of the improvement. The legislature represents not only the State, which holds the title which at common law was vested in the crown, but the legislature also represents the public, for whose benefit the title is held, and in that capacity it possesses the sovereign power of parliament over the waters of the lake and the submerged lands covered by the waters. In providing for the construction of the drive over and upon the shoal waters of the lake and placing the control in the hands of the park commissioners for park purposes, no attempt has been made by the legislature to relinquish its governmental powers or place them beyond the power of future legislation. The rights of navigation and of fishery remain substantially in the public as before. If these rights were taken away or materially infringed upon by the act or the action of the commissioners under the act, the action of the commissioners could not be sustained, as the legislature has no power to dispose of the waters of Lake Michigan, or the lands under the waters, contrary to the trust under which they are held for the people.

But it is said in argument that the king of Great Britain did not, at common law, have the power to dispose of the title to lands covered by navigable waters, and

as the common law has been adopted in this State the legislature has no such power. The common law in this State owes its existence to an act of the legislature, and it is subject to alteration, modification or absolute repeal by the legislature at any time it may choose. The powers of the legislature are in no manner limited or restricted by the common law. The first section of the fourth article of our constitution confers the legislative power of the State on the General Assembly, and the General Assembly is clothed with all power of legislation in regard to all matters pertaining to the State, except so far as it is prohibited by the constitution of the State or of the United States. This question is discussed at considerable length in Longdon v. New York City, 93 N. Y. 155, where it is said: "From the earliest times in England the law has vested the title to and the control over the navigable waters therein in the crown and parliament. A distinction was taken between the mere ownership of the soil under water and the control over it for public purposes. The ownership of the soil, analogous to the ownership of dry land, was regarded as jus privatum, and was vested in the crown, but the right to use and control both the land and water was deemed a jus publicum, and was vested in parliament. The crown could convey the soil under water so as to give private rights therein, but the dominion and control over the waters in the interest of commerce and navigation, for the benefit of all the subjects of the kingdom, could be exercised only by parliament. (Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53; People v. N. Y. etc. Co. 68 N. Y. 71.) * * * In this country each State, subject to limitations to be found in the Federal constitution, has the absolute control of all the navigable waters within its limits. As said by the chancellor in Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, (21 Am. Dec. 89,) the State, through its legislature, 'may exercise the same powers which, previous to the Revolution, could have been exercised by the king alone, or by him in conjunction with parliament, subject