administrations which operate to the concentration of industries and population are altogether to be commended. I doubt if they result in happier homes, better lives, greater social comfort."

A public board might not be willing to apply the equalization principle without limitation under competitive conditions. It might put the sash and door makers of Michigan and Vermont on an equality in New York City, and yet not think it best to enable the Vermont manufacturers to send sash to Michigan and Indiana points at the same rates the Michigan manufacturers pay, while the Michigan factories get the same rates to Vermont and Massachusetts points as the Vermont people; nor to arrange matters so that a train-load of bananas from the port of New York to Boston would pass a train-load of bananas going from the port of Boston to New York. It takes a lot of railroads working for profit, regardless of the waste of industrial force, to see the wisdom of such cross-hauling. A public board would be likely to recognize not merely the principles of profit, equalization, and development of traffic, but also the principles of economy from a national standpoint, the adaptation of special localities to special work, the value of diversification of industry, etc., etc.

It is entirely possible to avoid such mistakes as those attributable to the Commission in its geographical cases, and other mistakes that may come from lack of thorough acquaintance with practical transportation problems, by putting on the Commission two or three traffic men of high character and long experience in the business of making rates.

And as the business of the Commission would not be to make rates in the first instance, but only to revise them on complaint, much as the chief officers of railway departments do now, only with a public motive and point of view instead of a private one, there is every reason to believe that the work of revision could be intrusted to a well

selected commission, with great advantage to the public. The very existence of an effective power of revision ought to go a long way toward making the use of the power unnecessary. And it is wholly just and practicable that monopoly charges should be subject to the veto of a public board that is in a position to take a broad, disinterested view of rates and other transportation questions.

How superior the Commission's methods are in many ways to those in use on our railways can hardly be appreciated by one who is not familiar with the unscientific, chaotic rate-making practices everywhere in vogue in this country, and also with the breadth and system that marks the work of the Commission.

An illustration may help to make the contrast clear. Take the case of Kindel v. Boston & Albany, and other railroads, decided by the Commission, December 28, 1905. The railroads were charging $2.24 per hundred on cottonpiece goods from Boston, New York, and other eastern points to Denver, and $1.50 on the same goods from the East clear through to San Francisco. The local rate from Omaha or Kansas City to Denver was $1.25, the same as the rate on first-class goods, and the rate from the Atlantic to Denver was made by adding the said local rate to the rate from the East to the Missouri River. Kindel complained that the rate to Denver was unreasonable and unjust. The Commission carefully studied the facts, took into consideration the relation between cotton rates and first-class rates on various routes throughout the country, put the data on a chart, a facsimile of which accompanies this description, and came to the conclusion that "the exaction of first-class rates on cotton-piece goods between Missouri River points and Denver, in view of the long prevailing differentials in other parts of the country and other existing conditions, is unjust and unreasonable; and that the result of the excessive rate on cotton-piece goods between the Missouri River and Denver and the applica

tion of full locals in making up the through combination rate from New York, Boston and other eastern points taking the same rates to Denver is to make the through rate excessive, and that such through rate to Denver to be reasonable should not exceed $1.50 per hundred pounds." 16

If the reader will examine the chart he will see that the cotton figures (which are placed below the route-lines) are less than the first-class rates (which are printed above the route-lines) in every case except between the Missouri River and Denver, and in some cases the cotton rates are only half the first-class rates. In view of the practically universal custom of the railroads in this relation, the deviation in the case of Denver amounted to a practical discrimination against that city and any shippers who desired to lay down cotton goods in Colorado. The railroads carried the goods from Boston to Chicago for 55 cents, while charging $1.25 from Omaha to Denver, more than double the charge for half the distance.

16 11 I. C. C. Decis. 31.

Railroad rate-makers do not base their tariffs on broad considerations of justice, but get what they can out of the traffic for their own lines, while the Commission asks what rate will yield a fair profit, and will be just to the public and to the individuals and localities involved, considering all the circumstances and their relation to transportation conditions throughout the country.

At best, however, it cannot be denied that great inconvenience and some injustice might be inflicted upon the railroads by public rate revision. It seems to come down to the choice of the least of two evils. The President and the people say that if the railroads are left free to make the rates they do not deal fairly; experience shows that they discriminate unjustly between persons and places, and put some rates too high and others too low. The railroads say that if a public board should make the rates the companies might not be treated fairly. Both statements are true. But it is clear that somebody must make the rates. And it is equally clear that there is no system of rate-making that will do perfect justice. I know of no railway minister or traffic manager in Europe or America who even dreams he knows of any method of rate-making that will do justice all round under present industrial conditions. The postoffice principle may ultimately be applied to diffuse the burden of distance over the whole community, but it is not practicable at present. If then a certain amount of injustice is unavoidable, and we must choose between injustice to a small group of stockholders or to eighty millions of people, which alternative shall we accept? If there is no way to solve this problem that will not work injustice somewhere, shall it be to the little group of profit-makers or to the great public, the people of the United States?

Besides this quantitative comparison, there is a qualitative comparison that is still more weighty. Such injustice as may be done to the railways is merely a matter of diminished dividends on stocks, a very large part of which is

water; while the false rates and unfair discriminations made by the railway managers not only affect property interests many times greater than railway stocks, but deny equal opportunity and undermine morals, manhood, government, civilization, and progress, - values far higher than any financial items whatever. Moreover, it is not unlikely that a board constituted somewhat differently from the present one might eliminate most of the errors of the Interstate Commission as well as those of the railway. What are the causes at work in the case? The reason the Commission has made some injurious rulings is that they lack the thorough acquaintance with traffic conditions that the railway managers possess. And the reason the railway managers make rates that are contrary to public policy is that they are more or less influenced by motives that are antagonistic to the public interest. The Commission is disinterested; it has no wish or personal interest leading to unfairness either to the railroads or the public; its motive is right, but its knowledge is imperfect. The railway traffic managers, on the other hand, have much more perfect understanding of the transportation business, but their interest is not altogether in harmony with justice and the public good. Is it not possible to create a board that shall have the thorough knowledge of first-class railway experts, together with the high motives and unmixed interests of an honorable public commission or court, and so remove the chief causes that have worked injustice in the past?

It is possible that there may be another fair solution, that the rates may be made neither by the railroads themselves nor by a body representing the public alone. As there are three partners in the railroad business, as in every great industry, viz., labor, capital, and the public, it may be regarded as a case for arbitration, or for decision, not by any one partner alone, but by a board representing all three partners. Should there not

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