WARRANT 7833 WATERS OF THE STATE an order for the payment of money. State, the freehold or inheritance, or the neglect or V. Woods, 36 South, 626, 627, 112 La. 617. The word "warranted," as used in Code, art. 81, § 146 (Acts 1898, p. 819, c. 275), obliging a person loaning money on a mortgage on property in the state to make affidavit that he has not required, and will not require, the mortgagor to pay the taxes on the interest warranted to be paid in advance, etc., was intended to mean "covenanted," and the section, as amended by Acts 1902, P. 33, c. 26, uses the word "covenanted." The inheritance. omission to do those acts which are required to prevent lasting damage to the freehold or The term is not an arbitrary one, to be applied inflexibly, without regard to the quality of the estate, or the relation to it of the person charged to have committed the wrong, but the question as to whethto be determined in view of the particular er it has been committed in a given case is case." A mortgagor removed from the mortfacts and circumstances appearing in that section does not apply to a mortgage to se-gaged premises, giving notice of such fact cure the purchase money of the mortgaged article, interest not being covenanted for, or, so far as appears, secretly or indirectly provided for. Salabes v. J. Castelberg & Sons (Md.) 57 Atl. 20, 22, 64 L. R. A. 800. See "Affirmative Warranty"; "Express Warranty"; "Promissory Warranty." "Warranties in insurance law are of two kinds-affirmative and promissory. Affirmative warranties consist of a representation in the policy of a fact. Promissory warranties are those that require that something shall be done or not done after the policy takes effect." Rosenthal Clothing & Dry Goods Co. v. Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. (W. Va.) 46 S. E. 1021. A warranty in insurance is "a stipulation or agreement on the part of the insured party, in the nature of a condition." A stipulation in a fire policy that the insurance company should not be liable for loss caused, directly or indirectly, by order of any civil authority, is not a "warranty," within Civ. Code Cal. §§ 2607, 2008, providing that a statement in a policy of a matter relating to the thing insured or to the risk as a fact, and a statement which imports that it is intended to do or not to do a thing which materially affects the risk, is a warranty; the statute not creating any new definition of warranty in insurance. Conner v. Manchester Assur. Co. (U. S.) 130 Fed. 743, 744 (quoting Bouv. Law Dict.). WASTE. "Waste" may be defined as the "doing of those acts which cause lasting damage to rented the premises. At that time the buildto the mortgagee, and he took possession and ings, fences, etc., were out of repair, and while the mortgagee was in possession he made no repairs, but on an accounting between the parties it did not appear that the premises had been in any way permanently injured owing to failure to make repairs. Since the mortgagor was credited on the accounting with any sum that might have been spent for repairs, she was not damaged, and a finding that the mortgagee had not been guilty of permissive waste was correct. Chapman v. Cooney, 57 Atl. 928, 929, 25 R. I. 657. WATER. See "Appropriation of Water"; "Inland Waters"; "Percolating Water"; "Public Water." WATER COURSE. The elements of a water course are definite banks, and with an obvious bed or channel showing the presence of running water at times, anyway. Erwin v. Erie R. Co., 90 N. Y. Supp. 315, 317. "A stream does not cease to be a water course, and become mere surface water, because at a certain point it spreads over a level meadow several rods in width, and flows for a distance without defined banks before flowing again in a definite channel." Harrington v. Demaris (Or.) 77 Pac. 603, 606 (citing Gould, Waters [3d Ed.] § 264). WATERPROOF CLOTH. Woolen or worsted fabrics known as "cravenette cloths," which have been subjected to a process to render them nonabsorbent, are dutiable under Tariff Act Oct. 1, 1890, c. 1244, § 1, Schedule J, par. 369 (26 Stat. 593), as "waterproof cloth." & Eadie v. United States (U. S.) 126 Fed. 446. Brown WATERS OF THE STATE. In Pen. Code, § 636, providing that every person who shall set any net for catching fish in waters of the state shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, the words "waters of the state" refer to the waters coming within the [Appendix.] regulating power of the state concerning the fish therein. People v. Miles, 77 Pac. 666, 669, 143 Cal. 636. WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES. See "Navigable Water of the United WATERWORKS COMPANY. may also have a technical meaning to the botanist or the chemist. It is a nuisance to the farmer, the gardener, or the owner of a well-kept lawn, notwithstanding that some weeds may contain valuable medicinal properties, which, when extracted, may be of benefit and profit to mankind. But it is a fact of common information, of which courts may properly take judicial notice, that a high, rank growth of weeds in a populous As quasi corporation, see "Quasi Cor- community has a strong tendency to produce poration." WAY. See "Private Way"; "Public Way." sickness and to impair the health of the inhabitants, and so may be a nuisance in such locality, notwithstanding they may be comparatively innocuous in the country, when far away from human habitation." A city ordinance made it a misdemeanor for any owner, lessee, etc., of any part of any lot to allow or maintain on any such lot any The character of a "way," whether it is growth of weeds to a height of over one foot, public or private, is determined by the ex- and defined the word "weeds," as therein tent of the right to use it, and not by the used, to include all rank vegetable growth extent to which that right is exercised. If which exhale unpleasant and noxious odors, all the people have the right to use it, it is and also high and rank vegetable growth that a public way, although the number who may may conceal filthy deposits. Held, that a have occasion to exercise the right is very conviction for the violation of such ordinance small. Railroad Commission of Texas v. St. was proper under evidence tending to prove Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas (Tex.) that, at the time the city gave defendant no80 S. W. 102, 104 (citing Phillips v. Watson, tice to cut down the weeds on his lot, there 63 Iowa, 28, 18 N. W. 659). were weeds on the lot from four to five feet high, about one-third of which were sunflowers, the notice to cut down the weeds having been given in July. City of St. Louis v. Galt, 77 S. W. 876, 877, 179 Mo. 8, 63 L. R. A. 778. WAYLEAVE. In 12 Ency. of Laws of England, 575, it is said: "The term 'wayleave' means a right of way. * In considering the extent to which a wayleave may be used, the very object of the grant or reservation to which it is ancillary must be borne in mind, and this may involve a user of a different kind from that which was actually in contemplation at the time of the grant or reservation." Jones & Co. v. Venable (Ga.) 47 S. E. 549, 551. WEAPON. See "Deadly Weapon." WEARING APPAREL. Neither a watch and chain, nor a sword and belt, constituting a part of Masonic regalia, are exempt to a bankrupt as “wearing apparel," under the Vermont statute. In re Everleth (U. S.) 129 Fed. 620. Lace neckwear is included in "wearing apparel made wholly or in part of lace," as that phrase is used in paragraph 339, Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule J, 30 Stat. 181 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1662]. Goldenberg Bros. & Co. v. United States (U. S.) 130 Fed. 108, 109. WEED. "The word 'weed' has a common, everyday meaning to the mind of every man. It | WEEK. See "Successive Weeks." WELL FOUNDED. In discussing the contention that the trial court erred in charging that a reasonable doubt must be "well founded" it is said: "The expression is certainly a loose one, and not to be commended. The term 'well founded' has a double significance. It may mean founded on good reasons, or it may be defined as not baseless or having no support. In the latter sense the instruction is not erroneous, for it is well settled that a doubt, to be reasonable, must have some basis either in the evidence, or from a lack of evidence on some material proposition. In other words, it is not a barely possible one, nor one sought after, not a capricious nor an imaginary one, nor one based upon a surmise or groundless conjecture. words, it must be a rational or substantial one, having some basis in reason, although it need not be such a one as the jurors may be able to give a reason for." State v. Mahoney, 97 N. W. 1089, 1091, 122 Iowa, 168. WEST HALF. See "Half." In other WILL. The words "when so made," in Gen. St. See "Found with the Will"; "Good Will." 496, 497. WHENEVER. "Whenever is an adverb of time. It is not the equivalent of in any case.' Its meaning, and the only meaning given to it by lexicographers, is 'at whatever time.'" As used in a constitutional provision that, whenever the requisite majority of the judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals sitting are unable to agree upon a decision, the case shall be reheard by a full bench, it does not mean in any case in which the requisite majority of the Judges sitting, etc., but means at whatever time it may happen that the requisite majority of the judges sitting, etc., the case shall be reheard. Funkhouser v. Spahr, 46 S. E. 378, 379, 102 Va. 306. WHERE. The term "willful," when applied to the intent with which an act is done, implies a purpose or willingness to do the act. State V. McGahey, 97 N. W. 865, 867, 12 N. D. 535. The word "willful," as used in Rev. St. U. S. § 5341 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3628], defining "manslaughter" as the unlawful and willful killing of another without malice, means done wrongfully, with evil intent. It means any act which a person of reasonable knowledge and ability must know to be contrary to duty; and, while the act must be done with evil design and knowingly, still a killing which takes place under circumstances showing a reckless disregard for the life of another, and the reckless and negligent use of means reasonably calculated to take the life of another, would be a killing done willfully. Roberts v. United States (U. S.) 126 Fed. 897, 902, 61 C. C. A. 427. The word "willful," used "in a statute creating a criminal offense, means something more than an intention to do a thing. It The word "where," as used in the statute providing that notice of the time and place of taking depositions shall be served on the adverse party or his attorney, where implies the doing the act purposely and desuch party or his attorney resides in the liberately; indicating a purpose to do it without authority; careless whether he has the state, is synonymous with "if," and assumes the condition of one or the other either ad-right or not; in violation of law; and it is verse party or litigant-residing in the state. Swink v. Anthony (Mo.) 81 S. W. 915, 916. WHEREUPON. The word "whereupon," as used in a municipal charter directing that, on ordinances being passed over his veto, the mayor shall cause them to be published, whereupon they shall be of force as law, means "after 8 WDS. & P.-66 which one cannot be brought within the this which makes the criminal intent, without meaning of a criminal statute." State v. Morgan (N. C.) 48 S. E. 670, 671 (quoting State v. Whitener, 93 N. C. 590). That the term "willfully," when applied to the intent with which an act is done, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law or injure another. [Appendix] Klenk v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 76 Pac. | trespasser." Resurrection Gold Min. Co. v 214, 215, 27 Utah, 428. Fortune Gold Min. Co. (U. S.) 129 Fed. 668, 679. The word "willfully," in Pen. Code, 639, subjecting to punishment any person who willfully or maliciously displaces, in- WINE. jures, or destroys any water main, means something more than a voluntary act, and more also than an intentional act which in fact is wrongful. It includes the idea of an act intentionally done with a wrongful purpose, or with a design to injure another, or one committed out of mere wantonness or lawlessness. McMorris v. Howell, 85 N. Y. Supp. 1018, 1021, 89 App. Div. 272 (citing Wass v. Stevens, 128 N. Y. 123, 28 N. E. 21). WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS INJURY. The phrase "willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another," as used in Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 17, subd. 2, 30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428], providing that a discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts except such as are judgments in actions for fraud or for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another, includes a judgment for damages for criminal conversation, and hence such a judgment is not discharged by a discharge in bankruptcy. Tinker v. Colwell, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 506, 193 U. S. 473, 48 L. Ed. 754. WILLFUL DEFAULT. The words "willful default" imply more than negligence or carelessness. The word "willful" means intentional, while the word "default" means transgression. Where a testator exempted his trustee from liability for losses occurring without his own willful de fault, it was evidently his intention to relieve the trustee from everything but his individual intentional transgression. In re Mallon's Estate, 89 N. Y. Supp. 554, 43 Misc. Rep. 569. WILLFUL DESERTION. Willful desertion is a breach of matrimonial duty, and is composed, first, of a breaking off of matrimonial cohabitation; and, second, an intent in the mind to desert. Both facts must be shown. Mere cessation of cohabitation is not enough. Tillis v. Tillis (W. Va.) 46 S. E. 926. WILLFUL TRESPASSER. One who takes the ore of another from his land without right either recklessly or with the actual intent so to do is a "willful trespasser"; but one who takes such ore without right, but inadvertently and unintentionally, or in the honest belief that he is exercising his own right, is not a "willful A Japanese alcoholic beverage made from rice by processes similar to those in making beer, which resembles still wine in its percentage of alcohol, which in quality is only remotely similar to wine, is not sufficiently similar to warrant its classification as such, under Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule H, par. 296, 30 Stat. 174 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1654]. Nishimiya v. United States (U. S.) 131 Fed. 650. WINNER. All those who have won more than they have lost during one sitting by playing at cards are "winners," within the meaning of Hurd's Rev. St. 1901, c. 38, § 132, which provides that any person who shall at any time or sitting by playing at cards lose to any person so playing any money amounting to $10, and shall pay the same, may sue and recover the money by action in assumpsit. Zellers v. White, 70 N. E. 669, 672, 208 III. 518, 100 Am. St. Rep. 243. WIRES. The word "wires," in Laws 1890, c. 566, p. 1148, § 65, providing that the occupant of any premises within 100 feet of the wires of any electric light corporation may require it to supply him with electric light, was intended to designate the wire through which was distributed the electricity with which the houses were to be lighted. Moore v. Champlain Electric Co., 85 N. Y. Supp. 37, 39, 88 App. Div. 289. WISH. "Undoubtedly the word 'wish' may be equivalent to will or request or direct, if the context justifies that meaning." A testator left his property to his wife and daughter, the will reciting that his mother was living, and dependent upon her children, and therefore requested his wife to pay her such sums as might be requisite for her comfort. The will then added, "and it is my wish and expectation that when my wife, J., shall make her will, disposing of the property left her by me, that she will generously remember the children of my deceased brother, W., and such others as she may choose." The will did not create a trust in favor of the children of the deceased brother. Russell v. United States Trust Co. (U. S.) 127 Fed. 445, 447 (citing Bliven v. Seymour, 88 N. Y. 469; Phillips v. Phillips, 112 N. Y. 197, 19 N. E. 411, 8 Am. St. Rep. 737). WITH THE WILL WITH THE WILL. See "Found with the Will.” WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS. 7837 Where a street railroad company agreed to issue transfer tickets within the city limits, "within the city limits" was interpreted as not to apply only to limits as then fixed, as it must have had in contemplation that the city in the future might exercise the right to annexing territory and thereby extend its limits. Indiana R. Co. v. Hoffman, 69 N. E. 399, 401, 161 Ind. 593. WITHIN THE STATE. See "Property not within the State." WITHIN TEN DAYS. Notice was posted in a custom house that It would be closed June 17th-a holiday observed by local custom, but not established by law. Certain importers, having notice of the closing of the custom house on that day, which was the tenth day after the liquidation of their entry, filed a protest on the day following. Held, that the protest was filed in accordance with the requirements of section 2931, Rev. St., providing that protests shall be made "within ten days after the ascertainment and liquidation of the duties." Frost & Adams v. Saltonstall (U. S.) 129 Fed. 481. WITHIN THREE DAYS. See "Day." WITHOUT HER CONSENT. "Against her will" synonymous, "Against Her Will" WITHOUT ISSUE. See "Die Without Issue." WITHOUT NOTICE. WORK OF NECESSITY to mean that a third person who took goods from the possession of the bankrupt on a writ of replevin from a state court, after the petition in involuntary bankruptcy had been filed and a receiver appointed therein, shall be permitted to retain possession of the merchandise taken under the replevin suit. If any signification be attached to the phraseology of the order it must be that the words quoted were inserted for the protection of otherwise be defeated, and not for the benthe petitioning creditor's rights which might efit of the adverse claimant. In re Briskman (U. S.) 132 Fed. 201, 203. WITNESS. Any other witness, see "Any Other." WOOD. See "Logs of Wood." WORK. See "Public Work"; "Street Work." The word "work," as used in a city charter, providing that all work exceeding in cost a specified sum shall be let to the lowest reasonable and responsible bidder, includes structures such as buildings and bridges. Chippewa Bridge Co. v. City of Durand (Wis.) 99 N. W. 603, 606. "Work," as used in Batts' Ann. St. art. 4560e, protecting all persons while engaged in the work of operating cars against the negligence of any servant or employé of the company, is synonymous with "at," and in its connection means the doing of those things which constitute operating the locomotives, etc., and the person so engaged is protected against the negligence of any other employé during the time he is engaged in see the act of operating the machinery. A person employed about a locomotive roundhouse to take charge of engines was not, 'while on his way to take charge of a locomotive and before he began to perform the act of operating the machinery, a servant engaged in the work of operating the cars, locomotive, or trains of a railroad, so as to give him or his representatives a right to recover for his injury when caused through the negligence Bona fide purchaser without notice, see of a fellow servant. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. "Bona Fide Purchaser." WITHOUT PREJUDICE. See "Dismissal Without Prejudice." Co. v. Howard (Tex.) 80 S. W. 229, 230. WORK OF NECESSITY. Courts, in construing the term "necessity" as used in statutes relating to the stat The phrase, “without prejudice to inter-ute prohibiting work on the Sabbath exceptested parties," as used in an order consoli- ing work of necessity, is given a liberal rathdating with involuntary proceedings in bank-er than a literal interpretation, and it is "not ruptcy the proceedings on a voluntary peti- an absolute, unavoidable, physical necessity tion subsequently filed, cannot be construed that is meant, but rather an economic and |