vested remainder, but a contingent one, and hence no partition could be had during the daughter's life. Ruddell v. Wren, 70 N. E. 751, 753, 208 Ill. 508.

"A vested remainder is where a present interest passes to a certain and definite person, but to be enjoyed in futuro.

*

It is a rule of law that an estate shall be held to vest at the earliest possible period, unless there be a clear manifestation of the intention of the testator to the contrary. Where there is a devise to a class of persons to take effect in enjoyment at a future period, the estate vests in the persons as they come in esse, subject to open and let in others as they are born afterwards." Where a testator who died in March, 1902, by his will bequeathed his residuary estate in trust, the income to be paid to his wife for life, and after her death to be divided between his children then living, the children of any deceased child to take in place of their parent, all children and the heirs of any deceased took a vested interest on the testator's death, which became subject to the legacy tax imposed by section 29 of the war revenue act of 1898, Act June 13, 1898, c. 448, 30 Stat. 464 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2307]. Land Title & Trust Co. v. McCoach (U. S.) 127 Fed. 381, 385 (quoting Doe v. Considine, 73 U. S. [6 Wall.] 458, 474, 18 L. Ed. 869).

""The true criterion of a vested remainder is the existence in an ascertained person of a present, fixed right of future enjoyment of the estate, limited in remainder, which right will take effect in possession immediately on the determination of the precedent estate, irrespective of any collateral event, provided the estate in remainder does not determine before the precedent estate.' 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) 389. Mr. Washburn, in his work on Real Property, says: "The broad distinction between vested and contingent remainders is this: In the first, there is some person in esse, known and ascertained, who, by the will or deed creating the estate, is to take and enjoy the estate upon the expiration of the existing particular estate, and whose right to such remainder no contingency can defeat. In the second, it depends upon the happening of a contingent event whether the estate limited as a remainder shall ever take effect at all. The event may either happen, or it may not happen until after the particular estate upon which it depended shall have determined, so that the estate in remainder will never take effect.' A vested remainder is one 'when there is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a fixed right of future enjoyment.' 4 Kent, Comm. 194. "That a remainder cannot be vested unless there be some certain person or persons in being in whom it can be regarded as vested is a proposition as to which, upon principle, it would seem that there could be little doubt, and that such is

the law is recognized by the most authoritative writers and by numerous decisions.' 1 Tiffany's Modern Law of Real Prop. 120." Testator devised real estate to his wife for life with remainder to J., adding that, on the latter dying before distribution of the property, his issue, if he left any, otherwise his heirs, should receive his share. Held, that J. took a vested remainder, so that he and the life tenant could give a perfect title. Callison v. Morris, 98 N. W. 780, 781, 123 Iowa, 297.

The distinction between vested and contingent remainders is clearly stated in the case of Faber v. Police, 10 S. C. (10 Rich.) 376, as follows: "According to the elementary writers, a vested remainder is one which is limited to an ascertained person in being, whose right to the estate is fixed and certain, and does not depend on the happening of any future event, but whose enjoyment and possession is postponed to some future time. A contingent remainder, on the other hand, is one which is limited to a person not in being or not ascertained, or, if limited to an ascertained person, it is so limited that his right to the estate depends upon some contingency in the future. So that the most marked distinction between the two kinds of remainders is that in one case the right to the estate is fixed and certain, though the right to the possession is deferred to some future period, but is dependent upon the happening of some future contingency. As it has been well expressed, 'It is not the uncertainty of the estate in the future, but the uncertainty of the right to such enjoyment, which marks the difference between a contingent and a vested remainder.'" A trust deed granted a fee to the trustee for the benefit of the grantor for life, and provided that after her death the trustee should convey the property to certain named children and grandchildren, or, if any of them died before conveyance, leaving children, such children should take the share of their parents. The parties named took a vested, and not a contingent, remainder. Woodley v. Calhoun, 48 S. E. 272, 273, 69 S. C. 285.

A testator who died in March, 1901, by his will bequeathed his residuary estate in trust, the income to be paid to his wife during her life, with remainder to his children living at the time of her death, and the lawful issue of any deceased child or children; such issue taking the share only their parent would have taken if living. Held, that the remainder so created was not vested, not being limited to "persons in esse and ascertained," but was contingent, being limited to persons who could not be ascertained until the death of the wife, and that such bequests were not subject to the legacy tax imposed by section 29 of the war revenue act of June 13, 1898, c. 448, 30 Stat. 464 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2307]; the wife being still living at the time of the taking effect of the amend

When the phrase "a vested right" or "a vested interest" is used in other relations, it may with reasonable precision be held to mean some right or interest in property that has become fixed or established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. Graham v. Great Falls Water Power & TownSite Co. (Mont.) 76 Pac. 808, 810 (citing Evans-Snider-Buel Co. v. McFadden, 105 Fed. 293, 44 C. C. A. 494, 58 L. R. A. 900).

VICE PRINCIPAL.

A vice principal is the representative of the master, for whose acts and negligence the master is responsible. Southern Ry. Co. v. Cheaves (Miss.) 36 South. 691, 697.

"Vice principal" is defined as one who performs personal duties of the master, which cannot be delegated, such as the duty to provide reasonably safe machinery and appliances and a reasonably safe place in which to work, to provide for inspection and repair of premises and appliances, and to inform immature, ignorant, or unskilled servants of the dangers of the situation. Baier v. Selke, 71 N. E. 1074, 1076, 211 Ill. 512

VIOLATION

If an employé has no authority from the master, then in the very nature of things he cannot be a vice principal. It he has authority, whether express or implied, his vice principalship depends upon whether the scope of such authority includes attention to or performance of any of the nondelegable duties of the master, and, if so, then whether the alleged negligent act is referable to any of those duties. Beresford v. American Coal Co. (Iowa) 98 N. W. 902, 904.

VICINAGE.

See "Jury of the Vicinage."

VICINITY.

Under a contract releasing a railroad from all liability for loss by fire of any property "situated or hereafter placed in the vicinity of such track, whether such loss result from negligence or other cause," it was error to submit to the jury the question whether the property destroyed by the fire, which started at a point about 40 feet from the track, and consumed lumber situated some 400 feet from that point and near the tracks, the ground being littered with shavings, which it was the duty, under the contract, of the property owner to clear away, was situated in the vicinity of the tracks, but the court should have so declared as a matter of law. Mann v. Pere Marquette R. Co. (Mich.) 97 N. W. 721, 724.

VICINITY CONTRACT.

By the terms of a contract plaintiff was

Ill. 78, 39 N. E. 590).

A superintendent or foreman is not necessarily a vice principal simply because he occupies that position. Title or rank has not of itself any special significance in this connection. When engaged with the other servants in the common employment of the master, the superintendent or foreman is a fellow servant, and for his personal negligence the master is not responsible; but when clothed with special authority in respect to the management and conduct of the master's business, a general supervision of it, the control and direction of the other servants under his charge, authority to direct them in the performance of their duties, he is, in respect to those absolute duties the master owes such other servant, a vice principal. He stands in the place of the master in the performance of those duties, whether in reference to the selection of safe instrumentalities, a safe place to work, or in giving proper warning of dangers and risks not known to the servant, or which he could not by the exercise of reasonable prudence discover; and his failure and neglect to perform such absolute duties render the master liable. Dixon v. Union Ironworks, 97 N. W. 375, 377, 90 Minn. 492.

sale of machinery at De Pere, such agent to have the privilege of making sales in the vicinity of De Pere. On the back of the printed form of contract was the following indorsement: "The design of a vicinity contract is to pay an agent the stipulated commission on whatever machinery he may sell under the provisions of the contract, not in the territory of another agent who had the exclusive right to sell in a defined territory." The agent's territory is not a "defined territory," within the meaning of the indorsement on the contract. The business of these agents is not to sit still at some place and sell machinery to those who come to the agent and want to buy it, but to canvass or work their territory; and these vicinity contracts are made rather than those of a definite territory on purpose to meet cases of this kind, where a locality may be more closely connected in a business way witn any one village than one near by, and to avoid conflict between different agents from broader territory. McGeehan v. Gaar, Scott & Co. (Wis.) 100 N. W. 1072, 1074.

VIOLATION.

See "Action for the Violation of a Law."

VULGAR.

A remark to a married woman, "Look me in the eye. Are you satisfied with the! man you married?" will not sustain a conviction for using obscene and vulgar language in the presence of a female, where there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the remark was intended to convey an obscene and vulgar meaning. Roberts v. State, 47 S. E. 511, 512, 120 Ga. 177.

WAGE-EARNER.

See "Independent Contractor."

WAGER.

A wager is "a contract by which two or more parties agree that a certain sum of money or other thing shall be paid or delivered to one of them on the happening of an uncertain event." "A wager is an agreement between parties differing as to an uncertain fact or forecast of a future event." In an action to recover money from defendants, obtained from the plaintiff by means of inducing him to believe that a foot race was "fixed," so that one party was sure to win, and persuading the plaintiff to participate to the extent of betting the money of one side to the simulated race as if it were his own, on the assurance that he should receive 20 per cent. of the sum won, he being ignorant at the time that the money all belonged to the parties on both sides of the pretended wager, held that, although he was in delicto, by consenting to act in such deceitful attitude, he was not in pari delicto with the conspirators, and is therefore entitled to recover back the sum of $5,000 which the conspirators persuaded him to intrust to the possession of one of them as a stakeholder, not to be bet on the race, but to be used to make a showing by the stakeholder in the event of a count of the stake money being called for by one of the feigned bettors. Wright v. Stewart (U. S.) 130 Fed. 905, 920 (quoting Black, Law Dict.; Bish. Cont. par. 530).

Where money is deposited with stockbrokers as a margin, with the understanding that there is to be no actual delivery of stock, though in case of a purchase there could be delivery if desired, and that the

WAIVER

contract was to be adjusted by the payment of the difference between the price named therein and the market price at the time of settlement, the contract is a wager. Wheeler v. Metropolitan Stock Exchange, 56 Atl. 754, 72 N. H. 315.

The essence of a wager is that each party stands to win or lose on the result, and that the gains depend on the event. Thompson v. Williamson (N. J.) 58 Atl. 602, 604.

WAGES.

See "Laborer for Wages."

Earnings synonymous, see "Earnings."
Salary synonymous, see "Salary."

The compensation received by a man who owned a team, wagons, and a plow, with which he worked by the day for different employers, as he could obtain work, earning usually from $9 to $15 per week, and working alone when he could not find work for his team, must fall within the meaning of either "wages," or "hire," as used in Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 1, cl. 27, 30 Stat. 545 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3420], defining a wage earner to be one who works for wages, salary, or hire, at a rate of compensation not exceeding $1,500 per year. In re Yoder (U. S.) 127 Fed. 894, 895.

WAGON.

The word "wagon" is synonymous with the word "carriage," and may be used to designate any wheeled vehicle intended to be drawn by horses. Luce v. Hassam (Vt.) 58 Atl. 725, 726.

The words "wagon" and "cart" are generic terms, and mean almost any vehicle, whether used for the transportation of persons or property. Luce v. Hassam (Vt.) 58 Atl. 725, 726.

WAIVE.

To "waive" means in law to relinquish intentionally a known right, or intentionally to do an act inconsistent with claiming it. Chamberlain v. City of Saginaw (Mich.) 97 N. W. 156, 157.

WAIVER.

of

See "Implied Waiver."

A waiver is a voluntary relinquishment the right that one party has in his rela

tions to another. Astrich v. German-American Ins. Co. (U. S.) 131 Fed. 13, 20.

"Waiver involves an intentional relinquishment of a known right." Griffith v. Newell, 48 S. E. 259, 260, 69 S. C. 300 (citing Carolina Grocery Co. v. Moore, 63 S. O. 184, 188, 41 S. E. 88).

"Waiver" has generally been defined by the courts as the voluntary relinquishment of