[Appendix.] is made through the post office, the time as being a conveyance, and there has been a within which such adverse party is required continuous occupation, the premises shall be to do an act is double the time specified. Bucklin v. Buffalo, A. & A. R. Co., 85 N. Y. Supp. 114, 115, 41 Misc. Rep. 557. ADVERSE POSSESSION. See, also, "Substantial Inclosure." "An adverse possession ought to be such as to challenge the right of all the world; but when an occupant evacuates the place, and suffers it to go to wreck, he hauls down his colors, and the challenge is withdrawn." Adverse possession "is to be made out by acts which are open, visible, notorious, and continuous, and does not depend upon the secret purpose and intention of the intruder that he will return at his convenience, sooner or later, and reoccupy the land." Continuous possession for five years, and after an abandonment for several years a possession for six months, followed by occupancy of a storehouse for several years, but less than seven, did not make out that continuous adverse possession sufficient to create title by prescription under color. Clark v. White, 48 S. E. 357, 358, 120 Ga. 957 (quoting and adopting definitions in Stephens v. Leach, 19 Pa. 262; Denham v. Holeman, 26 Ga. 183, 71 Am. Dec. 198). Before possession lawfully taken by a co-tenant can become adverse to the parties jointly interested in the property, so as to set in motion the statute of limitations, there must be an actual ouster, and notice or knowledge of the hostile intention in pursuance of which the exclusive possession has been held. Beers v. Sharpe, 75 Pac. 717, 719, 44 Or. 386. The use of the word "adverse," in an instruction that plaintiff or his vendors must have held land in controversy in actual adverse possession, to a well-defined boundary line, continuously, for 15 years prior to an alleged trespass, requires a finding that the land was held in hostile opposition by plaintiffs to the claim of defendants and all othVincent v. Willis (Ky.) 82 S. W. 583, ers. 584. deemed to have been held adversely, the essential requirement seems to be that the party shall enter under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, founding such claim upon a written instrument. A tax deed under which possession is taken is sufficient color of title, though invalid. Murphy v. Dafoe (S. D.) 99 N. W. 86, 88. Good faith is no element of adverse possession. Dawson v. Falls City Boat Club (Mich.) 99 N. W. 17, 18. Prescription distinguished. "Prescription" is the term usually applied to incorporeal hereditaments; "adverse possession" to lands. Hindley v. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co., 85 N. Y. Supp. 561, 564, 42 Misc. Rep. 56. ADVISE. The word "advise," as used in a statute authorizing city councils of certain cities to appoint a city attorney whose duty it shall be to advise the board as to all legal matters, etc., means that such city attorney shall be the legal adviser of the council in all matters of litigation and legal proceedings; and in defining the duties which are required of him in his department the council may properly include attention to litigation as to which it is his duty to advise it. City of Ludlow v. Richie (Ky.) 78 S. W. 199, 200. AFFAIR. See "Municipal Affair." AFFIDAVIT. See "Appear by Affidavit"; "False Afidavit"; "Fraudulent Affidavit." An affidavit is defined by Bouvier as a statement or declaration reduced to writing, and sworn or affirmed to before some officer who has authority to administer an oath. The signature of the affiant is not necessary, in the absence of a rule of court or statute requiring it. In re Shannahan-Wrightson Hardware Co. (Del.) 58 Atl. 1023. The possession of the vendee under an executory contract for the purchase of land is not adverse to the vendor so long as the purchase money is not paid, or at least not AFFIRMATIVE WARRANTY. before the vendee is entitled to demand a deed. Johnson v. Peterson, 97 N. W. 384, 385, 90 Minn. 503 (citing Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Miller, 115 Mo. 158, 21 S. W. 915). To constitute the adverse possession described in Code Civ. Proc. § 47, providing that when it shall appear that an occupant entered into possession under claim of title, founding such claim on a written instrument "Warranties in insurance law are of two kinds-affirmative and promissory. Affirmative warranties consist of a representation in the policy of a fact. Promissory warranties are those that require that something shall be done or not done after the policy takes effect." Rosenthal Clothing & Dry Goods Co. v. Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. (W. Va.) 46 S. E. 1021. AFFRAY. AFFRAY 7569 AGGRIEVED PARTY paid by a commission on the amount of sales, is an agent or servant of the company, which is liable for acts of negligence in the conduct of the business on the part of the agent or others employed by him. Riggs v. Standard Oil Co. (U. S.) 130 Fed. 199, 201. The word "agent," as used in a statute and telephone companies, is not intended to providing for service of process on telegraph be understood in any unusual, limited, or restricted sense, or otherwise than was justified in its ordinary signification. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Parker, 47 S. E. 194, 197, 119 Ga. 721. While a bookkeeper may be, and often is, the agent of his employer, the word does not ex vi termini import that relation, and, in the absence of averment that it exists, the courts cannot by intendment enlarge the ordinary signification of the word so as to bring it within a class to which it may or may not belong. Code 1887, § 3286 [Va. Code 1904, p. 1730], provides that when, in assumpsit, an affidavit is filed with a declaration that the amount claimed is justly due, a plea in bar shall not be received unless shall be for plaintiff. An affidavit by plainverified, in the absence of which judgment is insufficient to authorize judgment in favor tiff's bookkeeper, filed with the declaration, of plaintiff, though the statute permits the filing of the affidavit by plaintiff or his agent. Merriman Co. v. Thomas & Co. (Va.) 48 S. E. 490, 492. AGGRAVATE. Increase synonymous, see "Increase." AGGRIEVED. As determining right to appeal, see "Ag. grieved Party." Where it appears that a corporation has no personalty subject to taxes, it sufficiently appears that it was aggrieved, so as to entitle it to a cancellation of a tax. Feitner, 87 N. Y. Supp. 304, 307, 92 App. Div. People v. 518. The word "agent," as used in the statute of Missouri providing that foreign corporations doing business in the state shall file their articles of incorporation, establish an office or agency, and subject themselves in prescribed respects to the laws of the state, but exempting corporations entirely nonresident, soliciting business through drummers or traveling salesmen, and further providing that service shall be authorized to The passenger to whom a transfer is debe made, in an action against a corporation nied must necessarily be the "aggrieved parhaving no office or agency, by serving an agent of the company, wherever found, does not include one merely soliciting orders for goods which are sent to the nonresident principal, a corporation, to be filled, the solicitor receiving a commission on such orders, and having no other relation to the corporation, and having no relation to the matter out of which an action against the corporation arose. Strain v. Chicago Portrait Co. (U. S.) 126 AGGRIEVED PARTY. Fed. 831, 832. One employed by a refining company to sell and distribute oil to customers, being ty," in the language of Railroad Law, § 104 (Laws 1890, p. 1082, c. 565, as amended by Laws 1892, p. 1406, c. 676), providing that, for every refusal to comply with the act, the corporation so refusing shall forfeit $50 to the aggrieved party. Fox v. Interurban St. R. Co., 86 N. Y. Supp. 64, 65, 42 Misc. Rep. 538. A defendant is truly "aggrieved" only when by appropriate pleadings, or pleadings and proofs, he has become an active party [Appendix.] to an issue or a controversy which is adjudg- | taxation of costs by the clerk may have the ed against him. New Jersey Building, Loan same retaxed, and section 4749, providing & Investment Co. v. Lord (N. J.) 58 Atl. 185, that the party commencing the action shall 187. be known as the "plaintiff" and the opposite In legal acceptation a party is "aggriev-party as the "defendant," the witnesses in ed" by a judgment or decree when it operates on his rights of property, or bears directly upon his interest. Ruff v. Montgomery, 36 South. 67, 68, 83 Miss. 185 (citing 2 Cyc. p. 633). a criminal case have no right to appeal from an order disallowing their fees for attendance and mileage as certified by the clerk, State v. Fair, 76 Pac. 731, 734, 35 Wash. 127. they not being parties to the proceeding. Upon principle, as to any judgment or AGREE TO LET. order of a court adverse to one in a suit or proceeding, who is the proper representative therein, of the interests of others prejudiced by the result, that one is a "party aggrieved," within the meaning of such term as used in appeal statutes. McKenney v. Minahan, 97 N. W. 489, 490, 119 Wis. 651. Where the probate of a will is denied, the executor therein named is a "party aggrieved," and consequently possesses sufficient interest to enable him to appeal under Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1294, 2568, authorizing appeals by any person aggrieved by the order appealed from. In re Rayner's Will, 87 N. Y. Supp. 23, 93 App. Div. 114. If the court entered a judgment which deprived complainant of any of its property rights, then it must be a "party aggrieved," within Rev. St. 1887, § 4802, providing that any party aggrieved may appeal. It is not necessary for a person or corporation to be named as plaintiff or defendant or intervener in the title to an action, or in the title to a judgment entered therein, in order to become a party to the action. Washington County Abstract Co. v. Stewart (Idaho) 74 Pac. 955, 956, 957. One not an heir, but merely a legatee under an alleged will of decedent antedating another alleged will of decedent, which was admitted to probate in the county court without first having procured the allowance of the will under which he claims in the county court, which has sole jurisdiction of the probate of wills, is a "party aggrieved," within Rev. St. 1898, § 3788, authorizing appeals from the county court on the probate of wills only by persons aggrieved. In re Hunt's Will (Wis.) 100 N. W. 874, 875. The words "agree to let" and similar phrases have been held to confer a leasehold, though a further writing or memorandum was called for in the document wherein those words were used. Ver Steeg v. Becker-Moore Paint Co. (Mo.) 80 S. W. 346, 351. AGREEMENT TO MARRY. "The agreement to marry partakes of the nature of a civil contract, as upon its violation the injured party may recover damages; but the contract or agreement to marry and the marriage relation itself are by no means one and the same. When the agreement to marry has been executed in a legal marriage, the relation thus formed becomes much more than a mere civil contract. The rights and duties incident to this relation are from a source much higher than a contract of which the parties are capable, and can never be restricted nor enlarged nor in any way controlled by any contract which the parties can make." Eikenbury v. Burns (Ind.) 70 N. E. 837, 838. AID. AIM. Any other aid, see "Any Other." The word "aim," as used in Burns' Ann. St. 1901, § 2073, which provides that it shall be unlawful for any person over the age of 10 years, with or without malice, purposely to point or aim any pistol or other firearm, either empty or loaded, towards any other person, is used in the disjunctive, and under such circumstances the statute may be vio den acts. Where the wife of a minor under guard-lated by doing either or both of the forbidianship had obtained a divorce, with a decree for alimony, prior to the settlement of the guardian's account on the husband's becoming of age, but she had neither brought suit against the guardian, attached the ward's estate, nor levied an execution, she was not a party aggrieved, so as to be entitled to appeal from a probate decree settling the guardian's accounts, though she be regarded as a creditor of the ward. Leyland v. Leyland, 71 N. E. 794, 795, 186 Mass. 420. Under Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 185, providing that any party aggrieved by the with having purposely pointed the pistol at The accused may be charged (1) and towards another, (2) with having purposely aimed the weapon at and towards another, and (3) with having purposely pointed and aimed the weapon at and towards another. Eaton v. State, 70 N. E. 814, 162 Ind 554. ALCOHOLIC COMPOUNDS. Fresh leaves of aconite and belladonna and fresh roots of bryonia, immersed in their natural condition in alcohol for preservation, | him on the return trip, and thereupon put are not "alcoholic compounds," as the term is used in paragraph 2, Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule A, 30 Stat. 151 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1627]. Boericke & Runyon Co. v. United States (U. S.) 126 Fed. 1018. ALIAS. Sometimes a man is known by several different names, and it was formerly the custom, in drawing indictments, to charge him under all the names by which he was known; connecting them with the words "alias dictus," or with simply "alias." These words mean "otherwise called" or "otherwise." State v. Howard (Mont.) 77 Pac. 50, 51. ALIEN. Proceeding to expel or exclude alien as criminal proceeding, see "Criminal Proceeding." Persons born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, the father at the time of their respective births not being a citizen of the United States, are born aliens. The status, as aliens, of children born in a foreign country of alien parents, is not changed by the naturalization of their father as a citizen of the United States by taking out his second papers while the children are detained in custody as immigrants at Ellis Island, and they remain subject to exclusion under the immigration laws for a dangerous contagious disease contracted before their embarkation; such children not being affected by Rev. St. § 2172 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1334], which provides that the minor children of persons duly naturalized, if dwelling in the United States, shall be considered as citizens thereof. United States v. Williams (U. S.) 132 Fed. 894, 895. ALIEN IMMIGRANT. A native of Porto Rico, who was an inhabitant of that island at the time of its cession to the United States by a treaty of April 11, 1899, 30 Stat. 1754, with Spain, is not, upon her arrival at the port of New York, an "alien immigrant," within the meaning of the act of Congress of March 3, 1891, c. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1294], providing for the detention and deportation of alien immigrants likely to become public charges. Gonzales v. Williams, 24 Sup. Ct. 177, 192 U. S. 1, 48 L. Ed. 317. When defendant's ship was anchored off shore at a Mexican port, a number of native peddlers came on board to sell their wares. When one of them came on deck to go ashore, he found that the vessel had started, and proceeded some distance. Defendant refused his request that he be taken back, and landed, but promised to stop and leave him at work, but without placing him on the crew list. On arriving at San Francisco an immigration officer notified defendant not to land the Mexican without permission, but the latter stated he did not wish to land, but wanted to be taken back home, and he was not confined. Just before the vessel sailed, however, he left it without the consent or knowledge of defendant or any of his officers, and had not returned when she left the port. Held, that such facts were not sufficient to warrant defendant's conviction for neglecting to detain an alien not entitled to land, as such Mexican was not an alien immigrant who left a foreign shore to come to the United States for the purpose of becoming a permanent resident here; all the acts and agreements affirmatively appearing to have been made in the utmost good faith, and not for the purpose of evading any law. Moffitt v. United States (U. S.) 128 Fed. 375, 379, 63 C. C. A. 117. ALIENATION. Alienation is the voluntary and complete transfer from one person to another, and if it be concerning the transfer of property it involves the complete and absolute exclusion, out of him who alienates, of any remaining interest, or particle of interest, in the thing transmitted. It involves the complete transfer of the property and possession of lands, tenements, or other things to another. Orrell v. Bay Mfg. Co., 36 South. 561, 563, 83 Miss. 800 (citing Stark v. Duvall, 7 Okl. 217, 54 Pac. 454). The word "alienation" means the transfer of the property and possession of land, tenements, or other things from one person to another, and is particularly applied to absolute conveyances of real property. Where a testator directs that his trustees have and exercise all requisite power, including that of alienation, necessary or convenient for the management of the estate and the division and distribution thereof, the use of the word "alienation" clearly imports an intention on the part of the testator to confer on the trustees the power to alienate or transfer the real estate if it should be necessary for the proper management of the estate or for the division and distribution thereof in the manner contemplated by the will. Dickson v. New York Biscuit Co., 71 N. E. 1058, 1063, 211 Ill. 468. ALIMONY. "Alimony' is a technical word, theoretically restricted to personalty, and practically to money. It is payable out of the husband's estate, real as well as personal. But the word never covers the estate itself." This is the meaning of the word "alimony," as used in Comp. St. 1901, c. 25, § 22, provid [Appendix.] ing that in case of a divorce the court may | clearly appears to have been contemplated decree to the wife such part of the personal by the Legislature; and, for ascertainment estate of the husband, and such alimony out of his estate, as it shall deem just and reasonable. Hence the district court, in a suit for divorce, has no jurisdiction to award real estate of the husband to the wife in fee as alimony. Cizek v. Cizek (Neb.) 99 N. W. 28, 30. The word "alimony," in Pub. Acts 1899, p. 360, No. 330, amending Comp. Laws, § 10,891, by inserting a provision allowing imprisonment for nonpayment of alimony, includes allowance for the support and education of children. Brown v. Brown (Mich.) 97 N. W. 396, 397. Alimony is "purely incidental to divorce proceedings, and is an allowance out of the divorced husband's estate, made to the divorced wife for her support and maintenance. In this state is has no existence as a separate and independent right. It must be adjudged, if at all, in the divorce proceedings, and cannot be the subject-matter of an independent suit." Rariden v. Rariden (Ind.) 70 N. E. 398, ALL. The word "all," as an adjective of number, means the whole number of; every one of. Encyclopædic Dictionary. In considering whether the statute of Merton, in which the words "omnes viduæ" were used, applied to each of the five kinds of dower, Lord Coke observed, "Qui omne dicit nihil excludit" who says all does exclude nothing. 2 Inst. 81. We would not be understood, however, as asserting that the word, as used in legislation, is always to be understood as an all inclusive one. As so used, it is a general term, which is to be understood as comprehending whatever is within the outmost circle of the meaning of the word, unless, after subjecting the statute to interpretation and construction, there is sufficient reason for holding that the term was not used in so broad a sense. Pittsburgh, C., O. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Lightheiser (Ind.) 71 N. E. 218, 222. All contracts of insurance. The words "all contracts of insurance," as used in Act Pa. May 1, 1876 (P. L. p. 66) § 48, declaring that the agent of any insurance company of any other state or government which does not comply with the laws of Pennsylvania shall be personally liable on all contracts of insurance made by or through him, directly or indirectly, for or on behalf of the company, applies only to contracts of insurance on property in Pennsylvania. Though the language is inclusive of all contracts, yet, as the liability it imposes is an extraordinary and penal one, it should not be held to embrace anything beyond what of the legislative intent, attention is not to be confined to the words employed, but the familiar rule must be applied, "that a thing may be within the letter of the statute, and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." Rothschild v. Adler-Weinberger S. S. Co. (U. S.) 130 Fed. 866, 867. All costs herein expended. The phrase "all costs herein expended," as used in a judgment reciting, "It is therefore considered and adjudged by the court that this cause be dismissed, and that defendant recover from the plaintiff all costs herein expended," meant "only such costs as were authorized by law, and could be properly taxed in favor of the defendant below." Casto v. Eigeman, 70 N. E. 807, 162 Ind. 506 (citing Wilson v. Jenkins, 147 Ind. 533, 46 N. E. 889; Mott v. State, 145 Ind. 353, 44 N. E. 548). All damages. The phrase "all damages," as used in a bond given to a sheriff to indemnify him against all damages sustained by a levy on personal property, is broad language, and must be construed to include every element of damages which may fairly be said to have been contemplated by the parties, and covers attorney's fees which the sheriff was compelled to pay in defending an action for conversion of the property levied on, after notice to the obligors to defend and their refusal to do so. Cousins v. Paxton & Gallagher Co., 98 N. W. 277, 278, 122 Iowa, 465. All expenses. Any and all necessary expenses, see "Any." The term "all expenses," as used in an agreement by a real estate agent to take charge of certain property and pay all expenses, must be deemed to include the annual taxes, and such other expenses or payof such a character for a term of years would ments as an agent in full charge of property reasonably be required to pay out of the income in the process of a good management. Seymour v. Warren, 71 N. E. 260, 261, 179 N. Y. 1. All of which one may die possessed. A gift of "all of which one may die possessed" carries only the net amount of the estate. Blakeslee v. Pardee, 56 Atl. 503, 505, 76 Conn. 263. All levies. The words "all levies," as used in Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 671, 30 Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3450], making void "all levies, judgments, attachments, or other |