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3195, 34; Shannon's Code Tenn. 1896, § 64; Ky. St. 1903, § 452.

As crop year.

A year is a period of time, and it does not necessarily mean the period commencing with the 1st day of January and ending with the 31st day of the succeeding December. When the term is used in a contract, its meaning is to be determined from the connection in which it is used and the subjectmatter of the contract. As used in an agreement for the purchase of certain fruits, providing that portion of the purchase price was to be paid when the crop was taken off at the end of the "year," was meant the end of the fruit season, and not the end of the calendar year. Brown v. Anderson, 19 Pac.

487, 488, 77 Cal. 236.

As fiscal year.

Unless otherwise expressed, the word "year" is always intended to mean the calendar year; but, where applied to matters of revenue, the presumption is in favor of its referring to a fiscal year. Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479, 487.

As license year.

"Year," as used in 1 Rev. St. p. 679, § 5, prescribing the time during which license to sell liquors shall remain in force, refers to the license year, and not to the calendar year. Disbrow v. Saunders (N. Y.) 1 Denio, 149, 150.

As theatrical season.

"Years," as used in a contract whereby a party agreed to perform at another's the ater, and the latter agreed to engage her for three years, etc., according to the uniform usage of a theatrical profession, means simply the theatrical season; that is, the time when the theater is open for performance. Grant v. Maddox, 15 Mees. & W. 737, 745.

As 12 calendar months.

The word "year" is interpreted to mean 12 calendar months. Muse v. London Assur. Corp., 108 N. C. 240, 244, 13 S. E. 94.

The term "year" does not necessarily mean the period commencing with the 1st day of January and ending with the 31st day of the succeeding December. When the word "year" is used, 12 calendar months are usually intended, but not necessarily 12 months commencing with the first and ending with the twelfth month of the calendar arranged by St. Geo. II. When the word "year" is used, its meaning is to be determined from the subject-matter of the contract and the connection in which it is used, and which will carry into effect the intention of the parties. Knode v. Baldridge, 73 Ind. 54, 55 (citing Thornton v. Boyd, 25 Miss. 598; Inhabitants of Paris v. Inhabitants of Hiram, 12 Mass. 262).

YEAR

Const. art. 2, § 2, providing that no person should at any time be allowed to vote in the election of the city council of the city of Providence, or upon any proposition to impose a tax, or for the expenditure of money in any town or city, unless he shall "within the year next preceding" have paid a tax assessed upon his property therein, valued at least at a certain sum, does not mean the preceding calendar year, but only the preceding 12 months. In re Providence Voters, 13 R. I. 737, 740.

As year of office.

Although it is true that in ordinary dealings and discourse, when the period of a year is mentioned, it will be intended that a calendar year was spoken of, yet that signification is not necessary always and at all times to be given to the word. On the contrary, the period of time intended to be designated by the term "year" is to be determined by the subject-matter in the context, and that signification is to be given which accords with the intention of the party using it. Thus, in a statute fixing the termini of office of certain officers, the word "years" was construed to mean political years from the general election, including the time between one general election and the succeeding general election. Thornton v. Boyd, 25 Miss. 598, 604.

The expression "one whole year," as used in a statute, must be understood to be a political, or, rather, a municipal, year, which may sometimes exceed and sometimes fall short of a calendar year. As used in St. 1793, c. 34, art. 6, § 2, providing that any person, being chosen and actually serving "one whole year" in certain offices in any town or district, shall thereby gain a settlement therein. Inhabitants of Paris v. Inhabitants of Hiram, 12 Mass. 262, 263.

By charter the capital burgesses and common council of a borough were authorized every year, on Monday next before Michaelmas, to elect and nominate one of the capital burgesses to be mayor for one whole year thence next ensuing; and he, before he were admitted to execute that office, or in any way to intermeddle in the same office, was, on Friday next after the feast of St. Michael next ensuing such nomination and election, not only to take this corporal oath well and faithfully to execute the office, but also all the oaths appointed by a mayor to be taken; and after such oath so taken, he might execute the office of mayor of the borough for one whole year then next ensuing. It was then provided that none who should have once borne the office of mayor should be again elected and preferred to be mayor within the space of three years next ensuing the end and determination of his office of mayoralty. Held, that the words "three years," mentioned in the prohibitory clause, imported years of office, and not calendar years, and therefore a person who had

once served the office of mayor might be| YEAR TO YEAR.
again promoted to the same office as soon as
three mayoralties had intervened. King v.
Swyer, 10 Barn. & C. 486.

As used in Act April 20, 1818, c. 118, relating to the compensation of the receivers of public moneys, providing that the whole amount which any such officer shall receive shall not exceed for any one year a certain sum, means a year commencing from the date of his appointment, instead of calculating it by the fiscal year, which commences with the calendar year on the 1st day of January in every year. United States v. Dickson, 40 U. S. (15 Pet.) 141, 160, 10 L. Ed. 689.

As year of our Lord.

The word "year," when used in any statute, is equivalent to the expression, "year of our Lord." Rev. St. Utah, 1898, § 2498; V. S. 1894, 12; Code Va. 1887, § 5 [Va. Code 1904, p. 6]; Hurd's Rev. St. Ill. 1901, p, 1719, c. 131, § 1, subd. 10; Horner's Rev. St. Ind. 1901, § 240, subd. 5; Rev. St. Wyo. 1899, § 2724; Rev. St. Wis. 1898, § 4971; Rev. St. Me. 1883, p. 59, c. 1, § 6, subd. 11; Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, p. 88, c. 8, § 5, subd. 11; Rev. Code Del. 1893, p. 43, c. 5, § 1, subd. 8; Code W. Va. 1899, p. 132, c. 13, § 14; Code Iowa 1897, § 48, subd. 11; Code N. C. 1883, § 3765, subd. 3; Gen. St. Kan. 1901, § 7342, subd. 11; Comp. Laws Mich. 1897, § 50, subd. 10; Pub. St. N. H. 1901, p. 63, c. 2, § 8; Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 4160; Ky. St. 1903, § 452; Gen. St. Minn. 1894, § 225, subd. 9.

Under Rev. St. c. 1, § 4, cl. 11, providing that the word "year," when used for a date, means "year of our Lord," an indictment alleging that the crime was committed in the year 1859 was not defective for failure to state in what era the year occurred. State v. Bartlett, 47 Me. 388, 393.

See "Tenant from Year to Year."

YEARLING.

See "Short Yearling."

"Yearling," as used by dealers in cattle has a well-defined meaning, viz., cattle from 10 months to 18 months of age. Vassau v. Campbell, 81 N. W. 829, 830, 79 Minn. 167.

Any animal in the second year of its growth is a yearling. Stollenwerk v. State, 55 Ala. 142.

In defining the word yearling, Webster uses as an illustration the term "yearling heifer." In Montana, when an animal of the bovine species has reached the age of one year, it is usually called a yearling. Milligan v. Jefferson County, 2 Mont. 543, 546.

YEARLY.

As used in a lease at the rate of a "yearly" rent of £42, followed by the provision that the first payment should be for the period from April 19th to June 24th, being the proportion of rent to that date, followed by the regular habendum clause, "until one of the said parties shall give unto the other six calendar months' notice in writing to quit," the word "yearly" was only a word of calculation, and did not fix the term. Doe v. Grafton, 18 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 496, 501.

A power under which a lease was granted, providing that a rent should be reserved and "made payable yearly," did not require that there should be one entire yearly payment, but the words were the same as "payable every year." Doe v. Wilson, 5 Barn. & Ald. 363.

YEARLY INCOME.

"It is a fact, historically known, that Christian nations have generally adopted the "Yearly income," within the meaning of Gregorian calendar, numbering the years St. 1793, c. 34, § 2, cl. 4, giving a settlement from the birth of Christ. This is a Chris- to persons having a freehold of the clear tian state, and has adopted the same, and yearly income of £3 and taking the rents when the year is mentioned in our legisla- and profits thereof three years successively, tive or judicial proceedings, and no mention means not the sum actually received annualis made of the Jewish, Mohammedan, or oth-ly by the owner of the estate as rents and er system of reckoning the time, all under-profits, but the yearly value thereof as a stand the Christian calendar to be used." rentable estate. Inhabitants of Pelham v. Engleman v. State, 2 Ind. (2 Cart.) 91, 92. Inhabitants of Middleborough, 70 Mass. (4 52 Am. Dec. 494. Gray) 57, 59.

YEAR OF OUR LORD.

The expression "year of our Lord" has a well-settled meaning, and indicates a year of the Christian calendar, which begins January 1st and ends the 31st of the succeeding December. Garfield Tp., Finney County, v. Dodsworth, 58 Pac. 505, 567, 9 Kan. App. 752.

"Yearly income," within the meaning of St. 1793, c. 34, giving a settlement to persons having an estate of inheritance or freehold of the clear yearly income of £3 and taking rents and profits thereof three years successively, means an actual annual income of a designated amount in each and every year for three years. Inhabitants of Western v Inhabitants of Leicester, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.)

198.

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A "yearly income," within Settlement Act Mass. 1793, c. 34, providing that the occupant of a freehold estate by a clear yearly income of $10 has a settlement, etc., is to be ascertained by deducting all expenses to which the income might necessarily or legally be subjected, and must be valued as if the property had been subject to taxation, when forbearance to tax it has been on account of the poverty of the occupants. Inhabitants of Freeport v. Inhabitants of Sidney, 21 Me. (8 Shep.) 305, 306.

YEARLY MEETING.

"Yearly meeting," as used in a will givIng land to the yearly meeting of people called "Quakers," means the assemblage composed of representatives from the quarterly meetings, and such other members of the society within its limits as might be present and the individuals composing it. The devise was not to any certain individuals, but to the members of an assembly, meeting together annually, and to such other members of this variable body in endless succession as by delegation should compose it. Greene v. Dennis, 6 Conn. 293, 299, 16 Am.

Dec. 58.

YEARLY PRODUCE.

"Yearly produce," as used in a demise of a farm, whereby it was agreed to furnish the owner with one-half of the yearly produce of such farm, did not comprehend the wood and timber of the farm cut thereon, but only such crops as are annually gathered. Ladd v. Abel, 18 Conn. 513, 518.

YEARLY VALUE.

See "Clear Annual or Yearly Value." The "yearly value of a widow's dower" in real estate, when it is not susceptible of division, and when she is to take an annual sum in lieu of dower, under Rev. Code, p. 435, §§ 28, 29, is net annual product, without the expenditure of money or labor upon it, after deductions have been made from its gross income, of all the charges to which it is subject, such as taxes and repairs. Riley V. Clamorgan, 15 Mo. 331, 334.

YEARS.

Estate or tenancy for years, see "Estate for Years."

YIELD.

YOKE OF OXEN

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The expression "yielding and paying rent," in a lease, expresses the thing to be done, and in that sense the contract is express; but the words, being introduced in form as a condition of the demise, are susceptible of such construction, and the covenant arising out of the words "yielding and paying" is an implied one, and the lessee is

not liable on it for rents accruing after an assignment of his term. Kimpton v. Walker, 9 Vt. 191, 198.

As used in a lease of land, the lessee "yielding and rendering" therefor a certain amount of rent, and providing that, if not paid at the day appointed, it should be recovered as an action of debt, import a coveDe Lancey v. nant, and not a condition. Ganong, 9 N. Y. (5 Seld.) 9, 20 (citing Jackson v. McClallen [N. Y.] 8 Cow. 295; 2 Bac. Abr. 556; Boone v. Eyre, 2 W. Bl. Rep. 1314).

some authorities

In case of an indenture or deed executed by both the lessor and lessee, or grantor and grantee, a covenant to pay the rent therein reserved arises on the words "yielding and paying," and there are which hold that the words create an express covenant to pay the rent. It is a covenant which runs with the land, and will be binding on the assignee without his being specially named, and as long as he continues to be assignee he is liable for the rent in the same

manner as the lessee or original grantee was. Royer v. Ake (Pa.) 3 Pen. & W. 461, 464.

YOKE OF OXEN.

Single ox.

"Yoke of oxen," as used in Gen. St. p. 474, § 3, cl. 5, providing that two cows, ten hogs, one yoke of oxen, etc., shall be exempt The word "yield," used in the sense of from sale on execution, when owned by a yielding up the possession of an estate, person engaged in farming and who is head means to give as claimed of right, to resign, of a family, includes a steer which is only to surrender, or to give place to. Drake v. 20 months old and has never yet been workCurtis, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 395, 405. ed, or broke to work, and does not neces

sarily relate only to cattle already broke to sons whom he is attempting to arrest, is a work. Mallory v. Berry, 16 Kan. 293, 294. sufficient notice of his character as a police “Yoke of oxen,” as used in Acts 1833, Cing Roscoe, Cr. Ev. 755; 1 Russ. Crimes, 627; officer. People v. Pool, 27 Cal. 572, 578 (cit80, exempting from execution a horse, mule, or yoke of oxen in the hands of the head of a family, should be construed to include a single ox. Wolfenbarger v. Standifer, 35 Tenn. (3 Sneed) 659, 660.

Unbroken oxen.

Gen. St. 1878, § 310, subd. 6, exempting from execution a "yoke of oxen," should be construed to include a pair of two-year-old steers, fit to be used for light work, though not yet broken. The general tendency of the courts is to hold that, where a statute exempts oxen, young animals of the species and description, that by time and subsequent growth would become such within a popular sense, are within the meaning and import of these terms as used in the statute. Berg v. Baldwin, 18 N. W. 821, 822, 31 Minn. 541 (citing Dow v. Smith, 7 Vt. 465, 29 Am. Dec. 202; Freeman v. Carpenter, 10 Vt. 433, 33 Am. Dec. 210; Mundell v. Hammond, 40 Vt. 641; Carruth v. Grassie, 77 Mass. [11 Gray]

211, 71 Am. Dec. 707; Mallory v. Berry, 16

Kan. 293).

"Yoke of steers," as used in Gen. St. c. 47, 13, exempting from execution a “yoke of steers" such as the debtor may select, should be construed to include a yoke of steer calves less than a year old; the words of the statute not being limited in meaning to steers of the age when they are usually put to service, or to such as were actually put to use as a team. Mundell v. Hammond, 40 Vt. 641, 642.

In Mundell v. Hammond, 40 Vt. 641, two calves less than a year old were held to be exempt under a statute exempting a "yoke of oxen" or steers. The only distinction between this statute and ours is that

1 Hale, P. C. 461; Mackalley's Case, 9 Coke, 68b, 69a).

YOU SHALL HAVE YOUR MONEY.

A statement by a person, when asked about the settlement of certain books, that the matter ought to have been settled long ago, and "you shall have your money" within 10 days, means no more than the words, "I will pay you all I owe you," and are insufficient to remove the bar of the statute of limitations. Ward v. Jack, 33 Atl. 577, 172 Pa. 416, 51 Am. St. Rep. 744.

YOUR ACCOUNT.

"Your account," as used in a letter re

citing, "As there was no time set for the payment of your account, and J. thought it will be surety for the payment," are amwould be an accommodation to him, etc., I biguous, and may mean either a past or future account. Walrath v. Thompson (N. Y.) 4 Hill, 200, 201.

YOUR UNDERWRITERS.

"Your underwriters," as used in a contract for the equipment of a certain factory with automatic sprinklers, providing that the sizes of pipe should conform "to the schedule required by your underwriters," means the insurance companies to whom the owners of such factory might apply for insurance, or those companies who should furnish such inUnited States Sugar Refinery v. surance. Providence Steam & Gas Pipe Co. (U. S.) 62 Fed. 375, 379, 10 C. C. A. 422.

they use the term "yoke of oxen," while ours YOUNG. uses the term "yoke of work oxen." We think they both mean the same. A yoke of The expression "young person," as used oxen means a pair of cattle used for work, in the article relating to factories, means a suitable for work, and that are fit for work-person of the age of 14 years and under the ing together. A yoke of work oxen means age of 18 years. Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 10,104. the same thing. Nelson v. Fightmaster, 44 Pac. 213, 215, 4 Okl. 38,

YOU.

"You have got my money on your shelves," as spoken and published of a plaintiff who was a merchant, implied clearly an act of fraud, if not a flagrant act of dishonesty, committed by such plaintiff in regard to the procurement of his goods. Davis v. Davis (S. C.) 1 Nott & McC. 290, 291.

YOU ARE MY PRISONERS.

The use of the words, "You are my prisoners. Surrender!"-by an officer to per

The term "young person," as used in all laws relative to the employment of labor, shall mean a person of the age of 14 years and under the age of 18 years. Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, p. 917, c. 106, § 8.

Pub. Laws Me. 1885, c. 275, making it unlawful to fish for, catch, buy, sell, expose for sale, or possess, between certain days, any "young lobster" less than 10%1⁄2 inches in length, means any lobster under the prescribed length, without regard to its age. The inhibition is against taking anything under the prescribed length. The word "young" is used in a presumptive or assumptive sense merely. Thompson v. Smith, 8 Atl. 687, 688, 79 Me. 160.

YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASS'N 7557

YOUTH

YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIA- | of testator's children. Otterback v. Bohrer, 12 S. E. 1013, 1014, 87 Va. 548.

TIONS.

As public charity, see "Public Charity."

YOUNGER.

The addition of the word "younger" is no part of a name, and its being found in one case attached to the name, and not in another, raises no doubt of the identity of the person, when the change is readily accounted for on other grounds. Blake v. Tucker, 12 Vt. 39, 45.

The word "younger" or "2d" is affixed to a man's name to distinguish one individual from another whose names are the same, and the purpose may be supplied by any other description, or wholly dispensed with, when no other person of the same name resides in the same town or vicinity. Isaacs v. Wiley, 12 Vt. 674, 678.

YOUNGEST.

A testator devised his farm to the children of his son W. as a class, other children that W. might have to share equally in the benefits of the provision. He also desired that the farm should not be divided, but carried on under the direction of W., the executor, until W. should die, if that should occur before W.'s youngest child came of age, and, if not, the farm to be kept together until the youngest child came of age, when it should be divided equally among them. Held, that the term "youngest child" meant the youngest child named in the will or living at testator's death, and not the youngest child that might be born to W. Arnold v. Arnold, 19 S. E. 670, 674, 41 S. C. 291.

As used in a will providing that the

testator's interest in a business concern

should be continued, and the profits paid to his executors, until the majority of the youngest child, and should then be divided between the testator's wife and children,

does not mean that one of the testator's

By the words "youngest child," in a devise providing that no division of certain real estate should be made among testator's children until the youngest child should become of age, is meant, not the youngest child which shall live to majority, but the youngest child living when the will took effect, at the death of the testator. Simpson v. Cook, 24 Minn. 180, 186.

The term "youngest," as used in the chapter relating to homesteads, is construed to mean the decedent's child, whether by birth or adoption, last to attain majority. Rev. Codes N. D. 1899, § 3627.

"Youngest grandchild," as used in a will devising the estate of the testatrix to her executors in trust, to hold during the lives of her son-in-law and youngest grandchild then living, for the purpose of investing the rents and profits of the real estate for the benefit of her grandchildren living at her death or subsequently born, and providing that on the death of the son-in-law and the arrival of her youngest grandchild at the age of 21 the real estate so devised should go to her grandchildren then living, cannot be construed to mean a grandchild not yet born, but means the youngest grandchild mentioned in the will, since to construe it as meaning a grandchild not yet born would make sion of alienation beyond two lives in being. the trust invalid by extending the suspenRoe v. Vingut, 1 N. Y. Supp. 914, 917, 49 Hun, 607.

YOUTH.

"Youth," as used in a will bequeathing property for the establishment of a free English school for the instruction of youth,

wherever they may belong, should be construed to include children and youth of both sexes, and does not limit the school to the instruction of either to the exclusion of the other. The term "youth" often means "young men." When used with the indefinite article (a youth) that is its proper meaning; but, used by an inhabitant of Massachusetts

in reference to the establishment of a free

minor children which shall live to first reach majority, but means the youngest child living at the time of the testator's death, and the effect of the provision is simply to pre-school for the purpose of affording general vent a division of the estate until the child shall attain the age of 21 years or previously depart this life. In re Sands, 3 N. Y. Supp. 67, 69, 1 Con. Sur. 259.

The phrase, "youngest child of all my said children," in a will devising property to testator's children in trust "until the youngest child of all my said children shall have attained the age of 21 years," to apply the net proceeds of the property to the education of testator's grandchildren, means testator's youngest child, and not the youngest

instruction, the word "youth" includes youth of both sexes. This is the sense in which it is generally understood by educated men; a

sense not derived from any one source or authority or course of reasoning, but, as all our knowledge of the sense of vernacular language is derived, from good usage. The word "youth" differs from the word "children" only by referring to and embracing young persons of somewhat more advanced age and proficiency. Nelson v. Cushing, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 519, 533.

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