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Quanstrom, 53 N. W. 165, 166, 93 Mich. 254, Dishonesty. 17 L R. A. 723.
The word "wrongfully," as used in an “Wrongs" are divided into two sorts: entry upon the records of a society which Private wrongs and public wrongs. The for- was printed and sent to its subordinate lodgmer are an infringement or privation of the es, ordering that a claim for the balance of private or civil rights belonging to the indi- salary be rejected, and that, if the claimant viduals, considered as individuals, and are should institute suit therefor, a cross-action therefore frequently termed “civil injuries.” be brought against him to recover the amount The latter are a breach and violation of pub- "wrongfully" obtained by him upon a claim lic rights and duties, which affect the whole of salary for a time subsequent to the termicommunity considered as a community, and nation of his office, does not impute dishonare distinguished by the barsher appellation esty, so as to make the matter libelous. The of "crimes and misdemeanors." Cullinan v. words "wrongfully obtained" import no more Burkhard, 84 N. Y. Supp. 825, 827, 41 Misc. than the words “illegally obtained” or “obRep. 321; McDonald v. Brown, 51 Atl. 213, tained without right.” The substance of the 214, 23 R. I. 546, 58 L. R. A. 768, 91 Am. St. statement is that after the termination of Rep. 659.
his office the person in question obtained
money on a claim of salary that should not Clearly, the word "wrong," in its broad have been paid to him. Keyer v. Rives (Ky.) sense, includes every injury to another, in- 56 S. W. 4. dependent of the motives causing the injury; yet, taken as used in an instruction that, if Knowledge and intention. the jury find from the evidence that the defendant has done wrong and caused an in conveyed away a slave" is not of the same
The phrase "wrongfully and illegally jury thereby, a prima facie case of compen import as the phrase "guilty of conveying sation is made out, unless they further find away such slave,” as it lacks the essential that the negligence of the plaintiff contrib- ingredients of knowledge and intention. uted directly to the injury complained of, it Boice v. Gibbons, 8 N. J. Law (3 Halst) 324, meant and could mean nothing but the kind
330. of wrong the court was defining to the jury. In defining "negligence" as the failure to ex
Negligence. ercise great or extraordinary care, or as a want of that care which an ordinarily pru
"Wrongful" is a more comprehensive dent man would ordinarily exercise, or as term than the word "negligence.” As used the want of slight diligence, and the failure in Const. § 241, giving a right to recover damto take this kind of care, where others are ages whenever the death of a person shall reliable to injury, was the wrong, the court sult from an injury inflicted by negligence or was charging the jury that as to an injury "wrongful act,” the words denote or embrace caused thereby there was a prima facie case all acts, other than those constituting mere of compensation made out. Union Pac. Ry. negligence, which are wrong and inflict an Co. v. Henry, 14 Pac. 1, 3, 36 Kan. 565.
injury resulting in death. Clarke's Adm'r v.
Unauthorized. The term "wrongdoer" embraces every one who violates an express statute. In re
Where the board of equalization increas-
es an assessment without authority, such un-
in the meaning of Rev. St. 1881, $ 3813, proWRONGFUL-WRONGFULLY.
viding that, where a person shall make it apWhere one heedlessly, recklessly, and pear to the board of commissioners that any carelessly injures trees of another, the act
taxes were assessed wrongfully, the board is wrongful, within the meaning of the stat
shall order the same refunded. Cleveland, ute allowing prosecution for wrongful injury C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Marion County to property. Daily v. State, 37 N. E. 710, Com’rs, 49 N. E. 51, 53, 19 Ind. App. 58. 713, 51 Ohio St. 348, 24 L. R. A. 724, 46 Am.
Laws 1873, c. 263, § 1, fixing the rule of St. Rep. 578.
damages in actions brought to recover the An allegation that an arrest was "wrong- value of logs "wrongfully” cut from the lands ful" states but a conclusion of law. Con
of another at the highest market value of nelly v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 69 such logs or timber between the time of such S. W. 959, 961, 113 Ky. 903.
cutting and the trial of the action, means
any unlawful or unauthorized cutting of logs Three things are necessary to constitute or timber on the lands of another, or by any a "wrongful attachment,” viz.: want of prop- act of this description woich is a civil wrong er cause, malice in the defendant, and dam- or without right. Such cutting may be age to the plaintiff. Parmer v. Keith, 20 N. wrongful, and yet done by mistake. WebW. 103, 16 Neb. 91.
ber v. Quaw, 49 N. W. 830, 31, 46 Win 118.
WROUGHT BY HAND
Under a statute providing that, when The words "wrongfully" and "unlawful- the death of one is caused by the wrongful ly" are not synonyms or equivalents of each act or omission of another, the personal repother, nor convertible terms; so that, under resentatives of the former may sue, etc., it a statute authorizing an action for personal is held that the word "wrongful” is not used property which has been wrongfully taken in the sense of “willful” or “malicious.” or unlawfully detained, it is held that an al- McLean v. Burbank, 12 Minn. 530, 533 (Gil. legation that the property was wrongfully 438, 443). detained was not sufficient. Louisville, E. &
The words "wrongful act," as used in St. L. Ry, Co. v. Payne, 2 N. E. 582, 584, 103 Const. § 241, and Ky. St. $ 6, giving a right Ind. 188.
of action for the death of a person resulting The phrase "wrongfully detained,” as from injury inflicted by wrongful act, are used in Gen. St. 1875, § 1, providing that an comprehensive enough to include negligent action of replevin may be maintained to re- acts, but they were intended primarily to cover goods "wrongfully detained in any cover cases where the act was wantonly or manner," is of a more extensive meaning intentionally committed, or where one may than the phrase "unlawfully detained,” bave counseled or procured another to do it, which phrase would only imply a detention when in contemplation of law the act of contrary to law, while the phrase "wrongful counseling or advising makes the wrongful ly detained in any manner" would include act his own; and hence a recovery for the any detention which does wrong to another, death of a servant, resulting from the maswhether or not it were under color of au- ter's breach of contract to furnish a guard thority, as the detention of goods under levy to protect him from assault by others, canof execution. Hilton v. Osgood, 49 Conn. 110, not be sustained. Lewis v. Taylor Coal Co., 112.
23 Ky. Law Rep. 2218, 2219, 66 S. W. 1044,
112 Ky. 845, 57 L. R. A. 447. Wanton or malicious. Const. § 241, provides that, when death
Without sufficient grounds. results from wrongful act, the damages shall Within Code Civ. Proc. $ 200, providing be prosecuted by the personal representative that plaintiff in attachment shall give an unof the deceased. Held, that the words dertaking conditioned to pay all damages by "wrongful act” applied only to acts from reason of the attachment, if the order be which negligence could arise, and hence did wrongfully obtained, an attachment will not not apply to Gen. St. c. 1, § 6, giving a right be held wrongful because dissolved on acof action for damages to the widow of the count of defects in the forms of proceeding, person killed by the wanton or malicious use or mere omissions, irregularities, or inforof firearms. McClure V. Alexander (Ky.) | malities which the officer may have commit24 S. W. 619.
ted in the issuance of the process, but that
the attachment was resorted to without sufThe word "wrongful,” as used in Code ficient ground. Storz v. Finklestein, 69 N. W. Tenn. $$ 3471, 4289, providing that plaintiff
856, 50 Neb. 177. in attachment shall give a bond conditioned that he will prosecute the attachment with effect, or, in case of failure to so prosecute
WROUGHT. it, he will pay such damages as the defendant sustains by the wrongful suing out of the
A railroad's classification and tarifi, ixattachment, means a mere failure to prose- ing a certain rate for marble "wrought," does cute with effect, and the court is not author- not necessarily mean worked or worked upized, in any suit for statutory damages, to
Marble sawed into slabs is never used import from the common law any element of in that condition for any purpose, but is malice or want of probable cause, for the suit sawed into slabs preparatory to being workdoes not require it, and its object is to cre- ed or fitted for some particular use or purate a right or remedy to prescribe its limita- pose, and is not "wrought” within the meantions and conditions; but, if there be malice ing of the tariff rate. Bancroft v. Peters, 4 and want of probable cause, the defendant Mich. 619, 625. may also recover punitive damages. Jerman v. Stewart (U. S.) 12 Fed. 266, 270.
WROUGHT BY HAND. The word "wrongful,” as used in a bond conditioned on the payment of all costs and Astrakban trimmings, with no evidence damages that plaintiff might sustain by of band work save the turning down of the wrongful suing out of a writ of ne exeat, is hem and the basting thereof, are not “dress not synonymous with the word "malicious," trimmings wrought by hand,” within Tariff and the writ may have been wrongfully sued Act Oct. 1, 1890, c. 1244, par. 398, 26 Stat out, though it was done without malice. 597, imposing a duty on such articles. In re Spivey v. McGebee, 21 Ala. 417, 422.
Downing (U. S.) 56 Fed. 815, 817.
intended to and does mean "bracket"; that
the character "x" is a substitute for and A complaint charged that the defendant means "by"; and
the abbreviation answered an inquiry to the plaintiff in fig. “mem.” stands for the word “member.” ures, words, signs, and abbreviations as fol- Held, that the terms in the complaint were lows: "Gentlemen: Could you furnish the per se intelligible in themselves, and hence following: 40 Brack. 3x5, 3 Mem. ; 36 Brack, plaintif properly alleged their meaning in 12x8, 3 Mem.? At what price, and how the trades and business in which they were soon ?" The complaint averred that by the used, and that he was entitled to prove such usages and customs of the business of man- meaning by parol at the trial. Jaqua v. ufacturing, buying, and selling dressed lumber Witham & A. Co., 106 Ind. 547, 548, 7 N. E. and brackets, the abbreviation "brack.” is 314, 315.
Time shall continue to be computed in
this state according to the Gregorian or new As barge, see "Barge."
style. The first day of each year after the year 1752 is the 1st day of January, accord
ing to such style. For the purpose of comYARD.
puting and reckoning the days of the year See "Gravity Yard”; “In Yard”; “Rail- in the same regular course in the future, evroad Yard"; "Square Yard.”
ery year, the number of which in the Chris
tian era is a multiple of four, is a bisextile The word "yard," by common and cur
or leap year, consisting of three hundred and rent acceptation, is an inclosure within sixty-six days, unless such number of the which any work or business is carried on. year is a multiple of one hundred and the In an insurance policy on lumber in yard, it first two figures thereof treated as a separdoes not de lumber in a clearing in a ate number is not a multiple of four, and forest. Cook v. Loew, 69 N. Y. Supp. 614, 34 every year which is not a leap year is a comMisc. Rep. 276.
mon year, consisting of three hundred and
sixty-five days. The term "year,” in a stat. Webster's definition of the word "yard” | ute, contract, or other public or private inis an inclosure, usually a small inclosure in strument, means three hundred and sixtyfront of or around a house or barn. The five days; but the added day of a leap year word "yard," as generally used in speaking and the day immediately preceding shall for of a dwelling, does not necessarily mean or the purpose of such computation be counted suggest the idea to the American mind of an as one day. In a statute, contract, or pubinclosure, but rather the plat immediately lic or private instrument the term "year" surrounding and upon which is situated the means twelve months, the term “half year" dwelling and other buildings used in connec- six months, and the term "a quarter of a tion therewith for domestic purposes. State year" three months. Laws N. Y. 1892, c. 677, V. Bugg, 72 Pac. 236, 66 Kan. 668.
8 25. "Yard,” as used in Act 1876, known as Under a statute for the relief of persons the jury law, prohibiting the summoning of robbed of their goods, and providing that no Jurors within the courthouse or yard, does person should take any benefit thereby unnot include an uninclosed public square used less he should commence his suit or action as an open market and public resort, though within one year next after such robbery, the situated only 20 feet from the courthouse. day when the robbery was committed was Matthews v. State, 6 Tex. App. 23, 39. to be included in computing the year. Rex
V. Addersly, 4 Doug. 463, 465. YARD FIXTURES.
A will in which testator gave to his son The term "yard fixtures,” in a fre pol- “in one year next after my decease” certain
all his real estate, on condition that he pay icy excepting store and yard fixtures, etc., does not include an awning attached to the the day of the testator's death in the com
legacies, should not be construed to include front of the insured building. Commercial Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 1 South. 202, 207, 80 putation of the time within which the son
was required to make the payment of money Ala. 571.
mentioned in the devise. Sands v. Lyon, 18
Conn. 18, 25. YEAR.
Such words as "eighteen hundred and See “Calendar Year"; "Current Year";
seventy-one," as used in an indictment, in “Each Year”; “Fiscal Year"; "Full mediately following the month and day of
stating the time of the alleged offense, imYear”; “Half Year”; “Previous Year.” the month, sufficiently denote the year, See "By the Year."
though the word "year" is not used. State Agreement to be performed within a
V. Munch, 22 Minn. 67, 71. year, see “Perform."
The words "eighteen hundred and fifty. The term "year" means a period of 365 eight," immediately following the month and days. Pol. Code Cal. 1903, § 3257.
day of the month, in an indictment or comFractions of a year are to be computed plaint, in stating the time of the alleged ofby the number of months, thus: Half a year the words "the year of our Lord” are omit
fense, sufficiently denote the "year," though is six months. Fractions of a day are to be ted. Commonwealth v. Doran, 80 Mass. (14 disregarded in computations which include more than one day and involve no questions
Gray) 37, 38. of priority. Rev. Codes N. D. 1899, $ 5132 ; Laws N. Y. 1892, c. 677, as amended by Civ. Code S. D. 1903, § 2466.
Laws 1894, c. 447, § 25, declare that the term
"year" in a statute, contract, or any public, son, 40 U. S. (15 Pet.) 162, 10 L. Ed. 689; or private instrument means 365 days, and Engleman v. State, 2 Ind. 91, 52 Am. Dec. also means 12 months. Aultman & Taylor | 494. And hence, as used in Act 25th Gen. Co. v. Syme, 57 N. E. 168, 169, 163 N. Y. 54, Assem. Iowa, c. 62, providing for an annual 79 Am. St. Rep. 565.
tax for sale of intoxicating liquors, and secThere is no real difference between "one tion 7, providing for a rebate in the tax in whole year” and “one whole year at the case the sales of intoxicating liquors bad not least.” An occupation of premises beginning been continued for more than six months in on September 30th in one year and ending the year for which taxes were assessed, then on September 29th in the next year, thus the total tax for the year, exclusive of costs, making 365 days, will be deemed "one whole may be reduced pro rata, the word "year" year,” within the meaning of a statute relat- means calendar year, or from January to ing to landlords and tenants. Reg. v. St. January. David v. Hardin County, 73 N. W. Mary, Warwick, 18 Eng. Law & Eq. 309, 314. 576, 578, 104 Iowa, 204. The service to gain settlement must be
Code, $ 3938, limiting the service of a for a whole year, though it happens to be juror to "four weeks in a year" means a calleap year, and consists of 366 days. A hiring endar year, and although a juror may have from the 13th day of May, 1819, to the 13th served four weeks during a term of court of May, 1820, and service under it till May which began in December, yet he would not 12, 1820, namely, 365 days, was not sufficient be disqualified from another week of serv. to give a settlement. Rex v. Inhabitants of ice in the succeeding year, although at the Roxby, 10 Barn. & C. 51.
saine term, which continued into the year.
Atlanta & C. Air Line Ry. v. Ray, 70 Ga. As calendar year.
674, 676. A year at common law, in the absence
"Section 8 of our Code provides that of anything showing a different meaning, the word 'year,' when used therein, means was construed to mean a calendar year. a calendar year; and we hold that an agree. Fretwell v. McLemore, 52 Ala. 124, 145. ment for a performance of a year's service
The term “year,” as used in a contract, means a year, to commence on the next day. does not necessarily mean a calendar year,
This construction is in accordance with the but its meaning is gathered from the sub- ordinary rule for the computation of time, ject-matter of the contract and the connec- which excludes fractions of a day; and it is tion in which the term is used. Williams v.
in harmony, too, with section 14 of the RevisBagnelle, 72 Pac. 408, 410, 138 Cal. 699 (cit. ed Code, which provides that, in computing ing Brown v. Anderson, 77 Cal. 236, 19 Pac. the time within which any act is required to 487).
be done, there must be an exclusion of the
first day and an inclusion of the last.” DickWhile "year" ordinarily means a calen- son v. Frisbee, 52 Ala. 165, 166, 23 Am. Rep. dar year, that signification is not always to 565. be given the word; but the meaning of the word "year" in a statute is to be determined
The term "year,” when used in any statby the subject-matter and the context, so as ute, means a calendar year, unless a contrary to concur with the intention of the party us
intention be expressed. Code Miss. 1892, 8 ing it. Thornton v. Boyd, 25 Miss. 598, 605. 1521; Rev. St. Tex. 1895, art. 3270; Civ. Code
Mont. 1895, § 4662, subd. 4; Code Civ. Proc. The word "year" in Comp. Laws 1897, Mont. 1895, $ 3463, subd. 4; Pol. Code Mont. c. 23, art. 16, § 1, making it unlawful for any 1895, 8 16, subd. 4; V. S. 1894, 12; Code Va board of county commissioners or county 1887, § 5; Civ. Code Ala. 1896, § 8; Hurd's clerk to issue county warrants or orders in Rev. St. Ill. 1901, p. 1719, c. 131, § 1, subd. any one year to a greater amount than the 10; Gen. St. Conn. 1902, § 1; Horner's Rev. amount of the county tax levied in the same St. Ind. 1901, $ 240, subd. 4; Rev. St. Wyo. year to defray county expenses, means a 1899, Š 2724; Mills' Ann. St. Colo. 1891, $ calendar year, and not a fiscal year. Garfield 4185; Rev. St. Wis. 1898, § 4971; Rev. St. Tp., Finney County, v. Dodsworth Book Co., Me. 1883, p. 59, c. 1, § 6, subd. 10; Pen. Code 58 Pac. 565, 567, 9 Kan, App. 752.
Ga. 1895, $ 2; Rev. Codes N. D. 1899, $ 5132;
Civ. Code S. D. 1903, § 2466; Rev. Laws “Year," as used in Comp. Laws 1879, c. 25, art. 16, § 1, and chapter 25, $ 220, will be Code Del. 1893, c. 5, § 1, subd. 8; Gen. St.
Mass. 1902, p. 88, c. 8, § 5, subd. 11; Rev. construed to mean the calendar year; fol. Minn. 1894, $ 255, subd. 9; Rev. St. Okl. 1903, lowing Garfield Tp. v. Dodsworth Co., 58 Pac. $ 2805; Code W. Va. 1899, p. 132, c. 13, & 14; 565, 567, 9 Kan. App. 752; Garfield Tp. V.
Pub. St. R. I. 1882, p. 77, c. 24, § 11; Code Hubbell, 59 Pac. 600, 9 Kan. App. 785.
Iowa 1897, § 48, subd. 11; Code N. C. 1883, “Year," wben used in the statute, is con- 8 3765, subd. 3; Gen. St. Kan. 1901, $ 7342, strued to mean a calendar year, unless a subd. 11; Comp. Laws Mich. 1897, § 50, subd. different intent can be gathered from the 10; Pub. St. N. H. 1901, p. 63, c. 2, § 8; Rer. context or otherwise. United States v. Dick St. Mo. 1899, $ 4160; Gen. St N. J. 1895, p.