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Quanstrom, 53 N. W. 165, 166, 93 Mich. 254, 17 L. R. A. 723.

"Wrongs" are divided into two sorts: Private wrongs and public wrongs. The former are an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to the individuals, considered as individuals, and are therefore frequently termed "civil injuries." The latter are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community considered as a community, and are distinguished by the harsher appellation of "crimes and misdemeanors." Cullinan v. Burkhard, 84 N. Y. Supp. 825, 827, 41 Misc. Rep. 321; McDonald v. Brown, 51 Atl. 213, 214, 23 R. I. 546, 58 L. R. A. 768, 91 Am. St. Rep. 659.

Clearly, the word "wrong," in its broad sense, includes every injury to another, independent of the motives causing the injury; yet, taken as used in an instruction that, if the jury find from the evidence that the defendant has done wrong and caused an injury thereby, a prima facie case of compensation is made out, unless they further find that the negligence of the plaintiff contributed directly to the injury complained of, it meant and could mean nothing but the kind of wrong the court was defining to the jury. In defining "negligence" as the failure to exercise great or extraordinary care, or as a want of that care which an ordinarily prudent man would ordinarily exercise, or as the want of slight diligence, and the failure to take this kind of care, where others are liable to injury, was the wrong, the court was charging the jury that as to an injury caused thereby there was a prima facie case of compensation made out. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Henry, 14 Pac. 1, 3, 36 Kan. 565.

WRONGDOER.

The term "wrongdoer" embraces every one who violates an express statute. In re Long, 15 N. Y. Supp. 657, 659, 60 Hun, 585.

WRONGFUL-WRONGFULLY.

Where one heedlessly, recklessly, and carelessly injures trees of another, the act is wrongful, within the meaning of the statute allowing prosecution for wrongful injury to property. Daily v. State, 37 N. E. 710,

713, 51 Ohio St. 348, 24 L. R. A. 724, 46 Am. St. Rep. 578.

Dishonesty.

The word "wrongfully,” as used in an entry upon the records of a society which was printed and sent to its subordinate lodges, ordering that a claim for the balance of salary be rejected, and that, if the claimant should institute suit therefor, a cross-action be brought against him to recover the amount "wrongfully" obtained by him upon a claim of salary for a time subsequent to the termination of his office, does not impute dishonesty, so as to make the matter libelous. The words "wrongfully obtained" import no more than the words "illegally obtained" or "obtained without right.” The substance of the statement is that after the termination of his office the person in question obtained money on a claim of salary that should not have been paid to him. Keyer v. Rives (Ky.) 56 S. W. 4.

Knowledge and intention.

The phrase "wrongfully and illegally conveyed away a slave" is not of the same import as the phrase "guilty of conveying away such slave," as it lacks the essential ingredients of knowledge and intention. Boice v. Gibbons, 8 N. J. Law (3 Halst) 324,

330.

Negligence.

term than the word "negligence." As used "Wrongful" is a more comprehensive in Const. § 241, giving a right to recover damages whenever the death of a person shall result from an injury inflicted by negligence or "wrongful act," the words denote or embrace all acts, other than those constituting mere negligence, which are wrong and inflict an injury resulting in death. Clarke's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 39 S. W. 840, 841, 101 Ky. 34.

Unauthorized.

Where the board of equalization increases an assessment without authority, such unauthorized interference was wrongful, within the meaning of Rev. St. 1881, § 3813, providing that, where a person shall make it appear to the board of commissioners that any taxes were assessed wrongfully, the board shall order the same refunded. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Marion County Com'rs, 49 N. E. 51, 53, 19 Ind. App. 58.

Laws 1873, c. 263, § 1, fixing the rule of damages in actions brought to recover the An allegation that an arrest was "wrong-value of logs "wrongfully" cut from the lands ful" states but a conclusion of law. Con- of another at the highest market value of nelly v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 69 such logs or timber between the time of such S. W. 959, 961, 113 Ky. 903.

Three things are necessary to constitute a "wrongful attachment," viz.: want of proper cause, malice in the defendant, and damage to the plaintiff. Parmer v. Keith, 20 N. W. 103, 16 Neb. 91.

cutting and the trial of the action, means any unlawful or unauthorized cutting of logs or timber on the lands of another, or by any act of this description which is a civil wrong or without right. Such cutting may be wrongful, and yet done by mistake. Webber v. Quaw, 49 N. W. 830, 831, 46 Wis., 118.

WRONGFUL-WRONGFULLY

Unlawfully.

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The words "wrongfully" and "unlawfully" are not synonyms or equivalents of each other, nor convertible terms; so that, under a statute authorizing an action for personal property which has been wrongfully taken or unlawfully detained, it is held that an allegation that the property was wrongfully detained was not sufficient. Louisville, E. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Payne, 2 N. E. 582, 584, 103 Ind. 188.

The phrase "wrongfully detained," as used in Gen. St. 1875, § 1, providing that an action of replevin may be maintained to recover goods "wrongfully detained in any manner," is of a more extensive meaning than the phrase "unlawfully detained," which phrase would only imply a detention contrary to law, while the phrase "wrongfully detained in any manner" would include any detention which does wrong to another, whether or not it were under color of authority, as the detention of goods under levy of execution. Hilton v. Osgood, 49 Conn. 110,

112.

Wanton or malicious.

Const. 241, provides that, when death results from wrongful act, the damages shall be prosecuted by the personal representative of the deceased. Held, that the words "“wrongful act" applied only to acts from which negligence could arise, and hence did not apply to Gen. St. c. 1, § 6, giving a right of action for damages to the widow of the person killed by the wanton or malicious use of firearms. McClure v. Alexander (Ky.) 24 S. W. 619.

The word "wrongful," as used in Code Tenn. §§ 3471, 4289, providing that plaintiff in attachment shall give a bond conditioned that he will prosecute the attachment with effect, or, in case of failure to so prosecute it, he will pay such damages as the defendant sustains by the wrongful suing out of the attachment, means a mere failure to prosecute with effect, and the court is not authorized, in any suit for statutory damages, to import from the common law any element of malice or want of probable cause, for the suit does not require it, and its object is to create a right or remedy to prescribe its limitations and conditions; but, if there be malice and want of probable cause, the defendant may also recover punitive damages. Jerman v. Stewart (U. S.) 12 Fed. 266, 270.

The word "wrongful," as used in a bond conditioned on the payment of all costs and damages that plaintiff might sustain by wrongful suing out of a writ of ne exeat, is not synonymous with the word "malicious," and the writ may have been wrongfully sued out, though it was done without malice. Spivey v. McGehee, 21 Ala. 417, 422.

WROUGHT BY HAND

Under a statute providing that, when the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representatives of the former may sue, etc., it is held that the word "wrongful" is not used in the sense of "willful" or "malicious." McLean v. Burbank, 12 Minn. 530, 533 (Gil. 438, 443).

The words "wrongful act," as used in Const. § 241, and Ky. St. § 6, giving a right of action for the death of a person resulting from injury inflicted by wrongful act, are comprehensive enough to include negligent acts, but they were intended primarily to cover cases where the act was wantonly or intentionally committed, or where one may have counseled or procured another to do it, when in contemplation of law the act of counseling or advising makes the wrongful act his own; and hence a recovery for the death of a servant, resulting from the master's breach of contract to furnish a guard to protect him from assault by others, cannot be sustained. Lewis v. Taylor Coal Co., 23 Ky. Law Rep. 2218, 2219, 66 S. W. 1044, 112 Ky. 845, 57 L. R. A. 447.

Without sufficient grounds.

Within Code Civ. Proc. § 200, providing that plaintiff in attachment shall give an undertaking conditioned to pay all damages by reason of the attachment, if the order be wrongfully obtained, an attachment will not be held wrongful because dissolved on account of defects in the forms of proceeding, or mere omissions, irregularities, or informalities which the officer may have committed in the issuance of the process, but that the attachment was resorted to without sufficient ground. Storz v. Finklestein, 69 N. W. 856, 50 Neb. 177.

WROUGHT.

A railroad's classification and tariff, fixing a certain rate for marble "wrought," does not necessarily mean worked or worked upon. Marble sawed into slabs is never used in that condition for any purpose, but is sawed into slabs preparatory to being worked or fitted for some particular use or purpose, and is not "wrought" within the meaning of the tariff rate. Bancroft v. Peters, 4 Mich. 619, 625.

WROUGHT BY HAND.

Astrakhan trimmings, with no evidence of hand work save the turning down of the hem and the basting thereof, are not "dress trimmings wrought by hand," within Tariff Act Oct. 1, 1890, c. 1244, par. 398, 26 Stat. 597, imposing a duty on such articles. In re Downing (U. S.) 56 Fed. 815, 817.

X.

X

intended to and does mean "bracket"; that the character "x" is a substitute for and means "by"; and that the abbreviation "mem." stands for the word "member." Held, that the terms in the complaint were per se intelligible in themselves, and hence

A complaint charged that the defendant answered an inquiry to the plaintiff in figures, words, signs, and abbreviations as follows: "Gentlemen: Could you furnish the following: 40 Brack. 3x5, 3 Mem.; 36 Brack. | plaintiff properly alleged their meaning in 12x8, 3 Mem.? At what price, and how soon?" The complaint averred that by the usages and customs of the business of manufacturing, buying, and selling dressed lumber and brackets, the abbreviation "brack." is

the trades and business in which they were used, and that he was entitled to prove such meaning by parol at the trial. Jaqua v. Witham & A. Co., 106 Ind. 547, 548, 7 N. E. 314, 315.

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YACHT.

As barge, see "Barge."

YARD.

Y

Time shall continue to be computed in this state according to the Gregorian or new style. The first day of each year after the year 1752 is the 1st day of January, according to such style. For the purpose of computing and reckoning the days of the year

See "Gravity Yard"; "In Yard"; "Rail- in the same regular course in the future, evroad Yard"; "Square Yard."

The word "yard," by common and current acceptation, is an inclosure within which any work or business is carried on. In an insurance policy on lumber in yard, it does not include lumber in a clearing in a forest. Cook v. Loew, 69 N. Y. Supp. 614, 34 Misc. Rep. 276.

Webster's definition of the word "yard" is an inclosure, usually a small inclosure in front of or around a house or barn. The word "yard," as generally used in speaking of a dwelling, does not necessarily mean or suggest the idea to the American mind of an inclosure, but rather the plat immediately surrounding and upon which is situated the dwelling and other buildings used in connection therewith for domestic purposes. State v. Bugg, 72 Pac. 236, 66 Kan. 668.

"Yard," as used in Act 1876, known as the jury law, prohibiting the summoning of Jurors within the courthouse or yard, does not include an uninclosed public square used as an open market and public resort, though situated only 20 feet from the courthouse. Matthews v. State, 6 Tex. App. 23, 39.

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See "Calendar Year"; "Current Year";
"Each Year"; "Fiscal Year"; "Full
Year"; "Half Year"; "Previous Year."
See "By the Year."

Agreement to be performed within a
year, see "Perform."

ery year, the number of which in the Christian era is a multiple of four, is a bisextile or leap year, consisting of three hundred and sixty-six days, unless such number of the year is a multiple of one hundred and the first two figures thereof treated as a separate number is not a multiple of four, and every year which is not a leap year is a common year, consisting of three hundred and sixty-five days. The term "year," in a statute, contract, or other public or private instrument, means three hundred and sixtyfive days; but the added day of a leap year and the day immediately preceding shall for the purpose of such computation be counted as one day. In a statute, contract, or public or private instrument the term "year" means twelve months, the term "half year" six months, and the term "a quarter of a year" three months. Laws N. Y. 1892, c. 677, $ 25.

Under a statute for the relief of persons robbed of their goods, and providing that no person should take any benefit thereby unless he should commence his suit or action within one year next after such robbery, the day when the robbery was committed was to be included in computing the year. Rex v. Addersly, 4 Doug. 463, 465.

A will in which testator gave to his son all his real estate, on condition that he pay

"in one year next after my decease" certain legacies, should not be construed to include the day of the testator's death in the computation of the time within which the son was required to make the payment of money mentioned in the devise. Sands v. Lyon, 18 Conn. 18, 25.

Such words as "eighteen hundred and stating the time of the alleged offense, imseventy-one," as used in an indictment, in mediately following the month and day of the month, sufficiently denote the year, though the word "year" is not used. State v. Munch, 22 Minn. 67, 71.

The words "eighteen hundred and fiftyThe term "year" means a period of 365 eight," immediately following the month and days. Pol. Code Cal. 1903, § 3257.

Fractions of a year are to be computed by the number of months, thus: Half a year is six months. Fractions of a day are to be disregarded in computations which include more than one day and involve no questions of priority. Rev. Codes N. D. 1899, § 5132; Civ. Code S. D. 1903, § 2466.

day of the month, in an indictment or complaint, in stating the time of the alleged ofthe words "the year of our Lord" are omitfense, sufficiently denote the "year," though ted. Commonwealth v. Doran, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 37, 38.

Laws N. Y. 1892, c. 677, as amended by Laws 1894, c. 447, § 25, declare that the term

"year" in a statute, contract, or any public | son, 40 U. S. (15 Pet.) 162, 10 L. Ed. 689; or private instrument means 365 days, and Engleman v. State, 2 Ind. 91, 52 Am. Dec.

also means 12 months. Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Syme, 57 N. E. 168, 169, 163 N. Y. 54, 79 Am. St. Rep. 565.

There is no real difference between "one whole year" and "one whole year at the least." An occupation of premises beginning on September 30th in one year and ending on September 29th in the next year, thus making 365 days, will be deemed "one whole year," within the meaning of a statute relating to landlords and tenants. Reg. v. St. Mary, Warwick, 18 Eng. Law & Eq. 309, 314.

The service to gain settlement must be for a whole year, though it happens to be leap year, and consists of 366 days. A hiring from the 13th day of May, 1819, to the 13th of May, 1820, and service under it till May 12, 1820, namely, 365 days, was not sufficient to give a settlement. Rex v. Inhabitants of Roxby, 10 Barn. & C. 51.

As calendar year.

A year at common law, in the absence of anything showing a different meaning, was construed to mean a calendar year. Fretwell v. McLemore, 52 Ala. 124, 145.

The term "year," as used in a contract, does not necessarily mean a calendar year, but its meaning is gathered from the subject-matter of the contract and the connection in which the term is used. Williams v. Bagnelle, 72 Pac. 408, 410, 138 Cal. 699 (citing Brown v. Anderson, 77 Cal. 236, 19 Pac. 487).

While "year" ordinarily means a calendar year, that signification is not always to be given the word; but the meaning of the word "year" in a statute is to be determined by the subject-matter and the context, so as to concur with the intention of the party using it. Thornton v. Boyd, 25 Miss. 598, 605.

The word "year" in Comp. Laws 1897, c. 25, art. 16, § 1, making it unlawful for any board of county commissioners or county clerk to issue county warrants or orders in any one year to a greater amount than the amount of the county tax levied in the same year to defray county expenses, means a calendar year, and not a fiscal year. Garfield Tp., Finney County, v. Dodsworth Book Co., 58 Pac. 565, 567, 9 Kan. App. 752.

"Year," as used in Comp. Laws 1879, c. 25, art. 16, § 1, and chapter 25, § 220, will be construed to mean the calendar year; following Garfield Tp. v. Dodsworth Co., 58 Pac. 565, 567, 9 Kan. App. 752; Garfield Tp. v. Hubbell, 59 Pac. 600, 9 Kan. App. 785.

"Year," when used in the statute, is construed to mean a calendar year, unless a different intent can be gathered from the context or otherwise. United States v. Dick

494. And hence, as used in Act 25th Gen. Assem. Iowa, c. 62, providing for an annual tax for sale of intoxicating liquors, and section 7, providing for a rebate in the tax in case the sales of intoxicating liquors had not been continued for more than six months in the year for which taxes were assessed, then the total tax for the year, exclusive of costs, may be reduced pro rata, the word "year" means calendar year, or from January to January. David v. Hardin County, 73 N. W. 576, 578, 104 Iowa, 204.

Code, 3938, limiting the service of a juror to "four weeks in a year" means a calendar year, and although a juror may have served four weeks during a term of court which began in December, yet he would not be disqualified from another week of service in the succeeding year, although at the same term, which continued into the year. Atlanta & C. Air Line Ry. v. Ray, 70 Ga. 674, 676.

"Section 8 of our Code provides that the word 'year,' when used therein, means a calendar year; and we hold that an agree ment for a performance of a year's service means a year, to commence on the next day. This construction is in accordance with the

ordinary rule for the computation of time, which excludes fractions of a day; and it is in harmony, too, with section 14 of the Revised Code, which provides that, in computing the time within which any act is required to be done, there must be an exclusion of the first day and an inclusion of the last." Dickson v. Frisbee, 52 Ala. 165, 166, 23 Am. Rep. 565.

The term "year," when used in any statute, means a calendar year, unless a contrary intention be expressed. Code Miss. 1892, § 1521; Rev. St. Tex. 1895, art. 3270; Civ. Code Mont. 1895, § 4662, subd. 4; Code Civ. Proc. Mont. 1895, § 3463, subd. 4; Pol. Code Mont. 1895, § 16, subd. 4; V. S. 1894, 12; Code Va 1887, § 5; Civ. Code Ala. 1896, § 8; Hurd's Rev. St. Ill. 1901, p. 1719, c. 131, § 1, subd. 10; Gen. St. Conn. 1902, § 1; Horner's Rev. St. Ind. 1901, § 240, subd. 4; Rev. St. Wyo. 1899, § 2724; Mills' Ann. St. Colo. 1891, § 4185; Rev. St. Wis. 1898, § 4971; Rev. St. Me. 1883, p. 59, c. 1, § 6, subd. 10; Pen. Code Ga. 1895, § 2; Rev. Codes N. D. 1899, § 5132; Civ. Code S. D. 1903, § 2466; Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, p. 88, c. 8, § 5, subd. 11; Rev. Code Del. 1893, c. 5, § 1, subd. 8; Gen. St. Minn. 1894, § 255, subd. 9; Rev. St. Okl. 1903, § 2805; Code W. Va. 1899, p. 132, c. 13, § 14; Pub. St. R. I. 1882, p. 77, c. 24, § 11; Code Iowa 1897, § 48, subd. 11; Code N. C. 1883, § 3765, subd. 3; Gen. St. Kan. 1901, § 7342, subd. 11; Comp. Laws Mich. 1897, § 50, subd. 10; Pub. St. N. H. 1901, p. 63, c. 2, § 8; Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 4160; Gen. St. N. J. 1895, p.

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