all the improvements in addition thereto. | produce and manufacture, false dice, marked Clack v. Hadley (Tenn.) 64 S. W. 403, 407. "Together," as used in Rev. St. § 1343, providing that to be fellow servants the servants must be working together at the same time and place, will not admit of the construction that they may be associated together in the prosecution of various enterprises and when residing far apart. Dryburg v. Mercur Gold Min. & Mill. Co., 55 Pac. 367, 371, 18 Utah, 410. Where a declaration against the owner of a stagecoach asserted that the owner undertook to carry the plaintiff, her children and servants, "together" in and by a certain stage, evidence that the whole inside of the coach was taken for the plaintiff and her three daughters, and two outside places for her servants, supported the averments. Long v. Horne, 1 Car. & P. 610. "Together," as used in a contract relating to patents, and providing that they should be "sold, leased, or disposed of together," should be construed to mean that one or more of the patents might be sold or disposed of after reasonable exertions had been made, during a reasonable length of time, under all the circumstances that might be found to exist, to sell or dispose of them together. Fowler v. Mallory, 3 Atl. 560, 563, 53 Conn. 420. TOGETHER WITH IMPROVEMENTS. The clause, "together with all improvements which I may make," in an assignment of a patent for a large consideration, was construed to authorize the assignee to make and sell the original invention as improved by the inventor after the assignment. Aspinwall Mfg. Co. v. Gill (U. S.) 32 Fed. 697, 700. TOILET SOAP. "Toilet soap," as used in Tariff Act Oct. 1, 1890, par. 79, will not include a medical soap, containing 20 per cent. of carbolic acid, and used for curative purposes. Park v. United States (U. S.) 66 Fed. 731. TOKEN. See "False Token." cards, and things of a similar kind, false and Middleton (S. C.) Dud. 275, 285. deceptive, used in unlawful games. State v. "Token," as used in 2 Gav. & H. Rev. St. p. 445, § 27, providing for the punishment of any person who, with intent to defraud another designedly, by color of any false "token," obtains the signature of any person to a written instrument or obtains anything of value, means, as defined by Bouvier, a document or sign of the existence of a fact. Tokens are either public and general or privy tokens. They are either true or false. When a token is false, and indicates a general intent to defraud, and is used for that purpose, it will render the offender guilty of the crime of cheating; but if it is a mere privy token, as counterfeiting a letter in any man's name in order to cheat the one individual, it would not be indictable. Jones v. State, 50 Ind. 473, 476. TOLERABLY SAFE. ""Tolerably safe' and 'actually dangerous' are not necessarily conflicting terms; indeed, the former frequently, perhaps usually, implies the latter. To illustrate, it is a dangerous thing to stand on the brink of Table Rock, and gaze into the turbulent waters of the Niagara; yet because hundred of thousands of people have done so safely, and very few have been precipitated into the abyss beneath, the act is tolerably safe." A railroad which was in a tolerably safe condition was . not in a reasonably safe condition, as required by law. Stetler v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 6 N. W. 303, 307, 49 Wis. 609. TOLERATE. "The word 'tolerate' is defined thus: To allow, so as not to hinder; to permit, as something not wholly approved; to suffer; to endure; to admit." It implies knowledge of Gregory V. the thing tolerated. United States (U. S) 10 Fed. Cas. 1195, 1198. TOLL. See "Intermediate Toll." Toll is a settled, certain and defined sum exacted for the use of a common passage. Wadsworth v. Smith, 11 Me. 278, 283, 26 Am. Bank Note as Public Token, see "Bank Dec. 525. A "token" is defined to be a sign or mark. State v. Green, 18 N. J. Law (3 Har.) 179, 181. A toll is a demand of proprietorship. St. Louis Brewing Ass'n v. City of St. Louis, 37 S. W. 525, 528, 140 Mo. 419 (citing Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. State of Pennsylvania, "Token," as used with reference to the 82 U. S. [15 Wall.] 232, 21 L. Ed. 146). offense of cheating, means anything which ""Toll' is defined to be a compensation has the semblance of public authority, as in markets and fairs for goods, cattle, etc., false weights, measures, seals, marks of bought and sold. Jac. Law Dict. "Toll.' A in the Century Dictionary, and the definitions in all other books are substantially the same. McNeal Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Howland, 16 S. E. 857, 860, 111 N. C. 615, 20 L. R. A. 743. sum tribute or custom paid for passage or a duty for some use or privilege or other reasonable imposed on goods and passengers traveling consideration. This is the definition given public roads, bridges, etc.; a tribute for passage; a reasonable sum due to the lord of a fair for things sold and which are tollable. Burr. Law Dict. "Toll'; Crabb, Real Prop. § 683. It is defined by Webster: (1) A tax paid for some liberty or privilege; particularly for the privilege of passing on a bridge or a highway, or for that of vending goods in a fair, market, or the like. (2) A liberty to buy and sell within the bounds of a manor. (3) A portion of grain taken by a miller as a compensation for grinding." The word, as used in a contract to pay for the passage of boats of one party on the canal of the other party during a specified period, does not necessarily import that payment is to be made at the times of a passage. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 3 Abb. Dec. 470, 477. In order that a demand may constitute a toll, there must be some relation between the payment to be made and the engines or wagons or quantity of coal to be conveyed over the line; some measure upon which the rate or charge or payment is to be made; and that the word "tolls" could not be construed to mean such terms of payment as the parties may agree upon. South Yorkshire R. & River Dun Co. v. Great Northern R. Co., 22 Eng. Law & Eq. 531, 535. "Toll is the price of the privilege to travel over that particular highway, and it is a quid pro quo. It rests on the principle 'that he who receives the toll does or has done something as an equivalent to him who pays it. Every traveler has the right to use the turnpike as any other highway, but he must pay the toll." City of St. Louis v. Green, 7 Mo. App. 468, 476. "Toll," as used in Comp. Laws, c. 77, 8 20, relating to the establishment of the "rates, toll, or fare to be charged" by a street railway company, means a class of dues and exactions which are in the nature of fixed rights, and which cannot be lawfully exceeded. They are generally, if not universally, connected with some franchise which involves duties as well as privileges of a public or general nature. The right to receive fixed tolls is found in fairs, markets, mills, turnpikes, ferries, bridges, and many other classes of interests where the owner If a toll gatherer on a turnpike road exacts and receives from a traveler a greater that he is permitted by law to collect, it is not a collection of toll, but an extortion, so that an action to recover a penalty for it does not involve the legality of a toll, within the meaning of a constitutional provision allowing suits involving the legality of a toll to be brought in the district court. Brown v. Rice, 52 Cal. 489, 491. Stallage. "Toll," as applicable to fairs and marable sum of money due to the owner of the kets, is defined by Lord Coke to be a reasonfair or market on sale of things tollable within the fair or market, or for stallage, piccage, or the like. In Brook, Abridgment, it is said that by common law a man shall but for things sold, but by custom he may pay "toll" for nothing brought into a fair, pay for everything brought into the fair, and he shall pay for his place and his stand though he sell nothing. It may be said that in this case toll and stallage are different things, and unless the owner of the fair or market has the soil, either as a freehold or in possession, he cannot claim stallage. But where the crown grants to a person and his heirs that they may hold a market in a certain town, with all tolls or profits, and such grantee afterwards acquires the soil, he may claim stallage by virtue of the grant. Lockwood v. Wood, 6 Q. B. 31, 43. Tax distinguished. A "toll" is a demand of proprietorship, while a "tax" is a demand of sovereignty. City of St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 13 Sup. Ct. 485, 487, 148 U. S. 92, 37 L. Ed. 380. Tolls exacted under a statute for the use of an improved waterway are merely the floating of logs down a stream is facilicompensation for benefits conferred by which tated. Tolls are the compensation for the of the franchise is obliged to accommodate made by him, and their amount is determinuse of another's property or of improvements the public, and the public, in turn, are pro-ed by the cost of the property or of the tected from extortion by an obligation to pay only regular dues. McKee v. Grand Rapids & R. L. St. Ry. Co., 1 N. W. 873, 876, 41 Mich. 274. The word "toll” in Code, § 671, providing that where a judgment is entered against a corporation authorized to receive fare or toll the franchise of such corporation may be taken on execution, etc., means a tax paid improvement and considerations of the return which such values or expenditures should yield. Taxes are levied for the support of the government, and their amount is regulated by its necessity, and there is no analogy between the imposition of taxes and the levying of tolls for the improvement of highways. Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 8 Sup. Ct. 113, 123 U. S. 288, 31 L. Ed. 149. Tonnage duty. TOLL 6995 TOLLGATE troops. This reservation secures to the government only a free use of the railroad concerned, and does not entitle the government "Tolls," as exacted for passage through locks, are a compensation for the use of artificial facilities constructed, not an impost up-to have troops or property transported by on the navigation of the stream; and the ordinance of the government of the Northwest Territory; July 13, 1787, providing that the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi shall be forever free, does not prevent the state of Illinois from levying tonnage duties for a canal and dam used in improving the navigation of the Illinois river. Huse v. Glover, 7 Sup. Ct. 313, 315, 119 U. S. 543, 30 L. Ed. 487. Trackage charges. The term "tolls" in P. L. 112, imposing a certain tax on the gross receipts of a railroad company for the tolls and transporta tion, includes a sum which one railroad com pany receives from another as compensation for the use of its tracks by the latter company. Commonwealth v. New York, P. & O. R. Co., 22 Atl. 212, 213, 145 Pa. 200. Transportation charges. A “toll" is the tribute or custom paid for passage, not for carriage. It is always something taken for a liberty or privilege, not for a service. Boyle v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 54 Pa. (4 P. F. Smith) 310, 314; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Sly, 65 Pa. (15 P. F. Smith) 205, 210; New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 15 Sup. Ct. 896, 898, 158 U. S. 431, 39 L. Ed. 1043; Geiger v. Perkiomen & R. Turnpike Road, 31 Atl. 918, 919, 167 Pa. 582, 28 L. R. A. 458. “Toll” is a word applied to charges made for the use of a highway, but in railroad legislation it is very often used to express a charge for transportation. Lake Superior & M. Ry. Co. v. United States, 93 U. S. 442, 454, 23 L. Ed. 965. Where the charter of a bridge company makes the bridge and approaches thereto a public thoroughfare or turnpike or highway, for use of which by vehicles and foot passengers it was authorized to charge reasonable toll, for the erection of which gates were established, the word "toll" was strictly applicable to the use of the highway, rather than compensation for transportation services which the bridge company might perform or be permitted to receive. Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (U. S.) 37 Fed. 567, 616, 2 L. R. A. 289. Congress in the legislative acts by which it has made donations of the public lands to the states in which they lie for the purpose of aiding in the construction of railroads has stipulated that the railroads so aided shall be public highways for the use of the government, free from all tolls or other charges of transportation of its property or | the companies over their respective roads free of charge for transporting the same. "In coming to this conclusion we do not place any great stress upon the use of the word 'toll' as being a word peculiarly applicable to charges for the use of a highway, as contradistinguished from the charge for transportation which is more properly denominated as 'freight.' Whilst this is undoubtedly true, it must be conceded that, in the actual language of railroad legislation, the word 'toll' is very often used to express the charge for transportation also. Our opinion is based rather upon that marked distinction which the mind naturally makes, and which is so generally made in railroad legislation, between the road as a thoroughfare and the transaction of the carrier business thereon, whether by the railroad company itself or by other persons, and the manifest intent of Congress in the legislation under review to reserve only the free use of the road, and not the active service of the company in transportation." Lake Superior & M. R. Co. v. United States (U. S.) 12 Ct. Ol. 35, 54. TOLL BRIDGE. As real estate, see "Real Property." TOLL COLLECTING COMPANY. The term "toll collecting company," within the meaning of statutes taxing such companies, does not include a railroad company furnishing its own conveyances, carrying nothing but passengers, and charging a certain price as fares. "It cannot be fairly said to collect tolls at all. Tolls are collected from persons who pass or travel by their own conveyances over the roads or bridges of another." Jersey City & B. R. Co. v. Haight, 30 N. J. Law (1 Vroom) 447. TOLLGATE. "Tollgate," as used in Code, § 4918 (New Code, § 5751), requiring any person or body corporate privileged by act of Assembly to open and keep any tollbridge or tollgate, to keep the same in repair, means the road on which the gate is allowed to be erected, as the use of the word in such sense is a not uncommon figure of speech. Fayetteville & C. Turnpike Co. v. State, 83 Tenn. (15 Lea) 578, 580. The words "turnpikes," "tollgates," and "tollbars," in the act relating to the taking of tolls, are used synonymously. Company of Proprietors of Northam Bridge & Roads v. London & S. Ry. Co., 6 Mees. & W. 428, 439. "Tollgate" is synonymous with "turnpike | of the toll, but without any interest or claim gate," as used in a statute punishing the in the soil. King v. Nicholson, 12 East, 330, running of tolls. Barnes v. White, 1 C. B. 340. 192, 214. TOLL ROAD. As street, see "Street." A "toll road" is a public highway, differing from ordinary public highways chiefly in the fact that the cost of its construction in the first instance is borne by individuals or by a corporation having authority from the state to build it, and, further, in the right of the public to use the road after its completion, subject only to the payment of toll. Virginia Canon Toll Road Co. v. People, 45 Pac. 398, 399, 22 Colo. 429, 37 L. R. A. 711. "Toll roads are in a limited sense public roads, and are highways for travel, but we do not regard them as public roads in the largest sense, since there is in them a private proprietory right. The private right which turnpike companies possess in their roads deprives these ways, in many essential parts, of the character of public roads. It seems to us that, strictly speaking, toll roads owned by a private corporation, constructed and controlled for the purpose of private gain, are not public roads, though the people have the right to freely travel them on the payment of the toll prescribed by law. They are, of course, public in a limited sense, but not in such a sense as are the public ways under full control for the state; for public ways, in the strict sense, are completely under legislative control. Elliott, Roads & S., p. 5." Board of Shelby County Com'rs v. Castetter, 33 N. E. 986, 987, 7 Ind. App. 309. TOLL SERVICE. The term "toll service," as used in relation to telephones, refers to that service which is rendered by placing at the disposal of the patron at the transmitting station and the one at the receiving station instruments connected by electric wires, by means of which the two are enabled to carry on a conversation, as distinguished from that telephone service accomplished by means of instruments placed in the residences or places of business of the patrons for their private and personal enjoyment and benefit, and which needs no agent or messenger to carry such service into execution, except the operator of the central office. Central Union Telephone Co. v. Swoveland, 42 N. E. 1035, 1039, 14 Ind. App. 341. TOLL-THOROUGH. "Toll-thorough" is a toll which is taken for passing over a highway in consideration of repair or other benefit done by the owner A "toll-thorough" is a toll which is demanded by an express grant, by custom or prescription, on a public highway in a public port, or for the use of public property. It is termed "toll-thorough" because the party claiming it is presumed to have had no original right to the place where he demanded toll. The claimant must show not only his right to toll by custom, prescription, or grant, but must show some consideration for it, some burden on himself, some benefit to the public, and that he or those under whom he claims had once a right to the locus in quo which had been commuted for the toll, and this consideration must be applied to the precise spot where toll is claimed. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U. S. (11 Pet.) 420, 582, 9 L. Ed. 773, 938. TOLL-TRAVERSE. A "toll-traverse" is a charge originating in the liberty given to pass over the owner's soil. King v. Nicholson, 12 East, 330, 340. "Toll-traverse" is a toll demanded for passing on or over the private property of the claimant, or using it in any other way, and is founded on the right which every man has to the exclusive enjoyment of what is exclusively his private property, its use by others being a sufficient consideration for the exaction of toll. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U. S. (11 Pet.) 420, 582, 9 L. Ed. 773, 938. TOMB. The word "tomb" signifies, among other meanings, a monument or tombstone erected in memory of the dead, so that a provision in a will that an executor should expend a certain amount for a tomb for testatrix does not lapse because the body of deceased could not be recovered and deposited in it, but such provision should be used for the erection of a suitable monument. Succession of Langles, 29 South. 739, 750, 105 La. 39. TON. See "Gross Ton." A "ton" is a certain weight in pounds or a certain weight or space by which the burden of a ship is estimated. Reck v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 7 N. Y. Supp. 492, 54 Hun, 637. A "ton" in weight and a ton in measurement are not the same thing. The expressions are not simply different terms to indicate the same idea. A ton in measurement is 40 cubic feet (McCulloch Commercial Dic tionary; Webster's Dictionary). A ton in weight is 2,240 pounds. Roberts v. Opdyke, 40 N. Y. 259, 262. The word "ton,” as applied to the meas urement of vessels, has a certain definite meaning, well settled by custom and by the navigation laws of the United States, and it means 100 cubic feet of interior space. The Thomas Melville (U. S.) 62 Fed. 749, 751, 10 C. C. A. 619. A "ton" is understood in commerce to mean twenty hundredweight, each hundred consisting of 112 pounds. Helm v. Bryant, 50 Ky. (11 B. Mon.) 64, 65. The word "ton," as used in chapter 6 of title 34, relating to the collection of duties upon imports, being the chapter on appraisal, when used in reference to weight, shall be construed as meaning twenty hundredweight, each hundredweight being one hundred and twelve pounds avoirdupois. U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1941. TONNAGE amount so represented by this unit. The Miantinomi (U. S.) 17 Fed. Cas. 254, 256. In an action of trover by a mortgagee to recover certain wire, described in the mortgage as "one ton of wire," it may be shown that the parties did not mean a precise ton by weight, but the mass of wire stored in a certain place, which they denominated a ton. Barry v. Bennett, 48 Mass. (7 Metc.) 354, 361. TONIC. A "tonic" is defined to be any remedy which improves the tone or vigor or the muscular fibers generally. Among the drugs or preparations which are classed as tonics are weak alcoholic beverages in very moderate quantities. A preparation labeled as a tonof the hop in proportions that made it a ic containing alcohol and the bitter principle mild tonic instead of an intoxicating beverage is a tonic as that term is defined by standard authorities. It is common knowledge that physicians frequently prescribe some kinds of beer as a tonic. The word "tonic" in itself signifies to the common understanding a preparation having medicinal qualities; and where the proprietor of such a prepara100 pounds each, constitute a ton. Pol. and put it on the market as such, it is liable, tion labeled his product "Rochester Tonic," In Pennsylvania 2,000 pounds avoirdupois weight constitute a ton. Weaver v. Fegely, 29 Pa. (5 Casey) 27, 70 Am. Dec. 151. Twenty hundredweight, consisting of Code Idaho, 1901, § 611. a under the War Revenue Act June 13, 1898, c. 448, 30 Stat. 448 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2286], as a medicinal preparation or compo Twenty hundredweight constitute "ton." Pol. Code, § 3215; Higgins v. California Petroleum & Asphalt Co., 120 Cal.sition, to the tax named under that section. 629, 631, 52 Pac. 1080, 1081. By Sess. Acts 1841, p. 86 (Rev. Code 1845, p. 1077), a "ton" of hemp is 2,000 pounds avoirdupois, and cannot be shown to consist of a larger amount by evidence of custom. Green v. Moffett, 22 Mo. 529, 536. As used in a contract for the purchase and sale of a certain number of tons of iron, the word "tons" should be construed in a suit at law to mean statute ton-2,000 pounds avoirdupois. Many v. Beekman Iron Co. (N. Y.) 9 Paige, 188, 195. When parties contract for any material by weight, using terms that have come to us from the past with a different meaning, such as "ton," which had commonly been regarded as meaning 2,240 pounds, the mere fact that a state has undertaken to regulate weights and measures, and in discharge of such office has fixed the ton at 2,000 pounds, will not dispense with an obligation to furnish the old measure. When the ton is used to represent, for convenience or calculation, 2,000 pounds, the contract should, and usually does, so state it as per ton of 2,000 pounds, or per ton neat; but as coal and other cheap and heavy articles have never been sold by the pound as a unit for calculating its price, but by the ton, convenience of calculation has never required, nor has custom sanctioned, any reform, so called, or any change in the United States v. J. D. Iler Brewing Co. (U. |