As place without a license.

A "tippling house," within the meaning of the statute, is a place where spirituous liquors are sold without license in less quantities than a quart to be drank at the place. Harney v. State, 76 Tenn. (8 Lea) 113, 114.

"Tippling shop," as used in an ordinance providing that no tippling shop shall be kept within corporate limits of the city without a license, is not identical with "disorderly house." Bouvier defines a tippling house as a place where spirituous liquors are sold and drank in violation of law. To like effect are the definitions in Webster's and Worcester's Dictionaries. An instruction that a tippling house is a place of public resort, where spirituous, fermented, or other intoxicating liquors are sold and drank in small quantities without having a license therefor, was incorrect. City of Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622, 629.

An indictment charging the defendant with "keeping a tippling house" for three consecutive months imports an unlawful selling of spirituous liquors by retail without license. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 311, 312.

as "appellant" and "respondent." Held, that the phrase "but the title of the action shall not be changed," etc., had reference only to the names of the parties to the cause and their order, and not to the name of the court; and hence the motion papers on appeal must be entitled "In the Appellate Court," notwithstanding the requirement that the title shall not be changed. Clickman v. Clickman, 1 N. Y. (1 Comst.) 611.

Of affidavit.

The "title of an affidavit" embraces its entire heading; that is, the name or style of the court, as well as the names of the parties. Bowman v. Sheldon, 10 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 339, 340.

Of legislative act.

The title of an act is part of the act and a guide to its right construction. Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 35 Atl. 816, 818, 178 Pa. 308.

The term "title," when used in speaking of the title of an act, means that part of the act by which it is known and distinguished from other acts. It does not include the divisions, subdivisions, arrangement, and classification of the provisions of an act. Robinson v. State, 15 Tex. 311, 312.

Originally in the English courts the ti tle was held to be no part of the act. "No more," says Lord Holt, "than the title of a book is part of the book." It was generally framed by a clerk of the House of Parlia ment, where the act originated, and was intended only as a means of convenient reference. At the present day the title constitutes a part of the act, but it is still considered as only a formal part. It cannot be used to extend or restrain any positive provisions contained in the body of the act. It is only when the meaning of these are doubtful that resort may be had to the title, and even then it has little weight. Hadden v. Collector, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 107, 110, 18 L. Ed. 518.

"In England the title is no part of a statute. Lord Mansfield gives as a reason for this that it does not pass with the same solemnity. One reading is often sufficient. Rex v. Williams, 1 W. Bl. 93. With us, however, it is always read three times. There may be good reason for holding that the title, as well as the preamble, may be resorted to for the purpose of assisting the construction, whenever the enacting clause is doubtful, but it certainly is not to overrule or control it." Yeager v. Weaver, 64 Pa. (14 P. F. Smith) 425, 428.

"The title of an act is a label, and not an index. In the interpretation of the constitutional provision that every law shall em brace but one object, which shall be embraced in the title, the object of a law must not be confused with its product. The ob

as against persons in peaceable and adverse possession thereof under title, to be commenced within three years next after the cause of action shall have accrued, is meant a regular chain of transfer from or under the sovereignty of the soil. Rev. St. Tex. 1895, art. 3341; Buford v. Bostick, 58 Tex. 63, 70; Horton v. Crawford, 10 Tex. 382, 386; Rice v. P. J. Willis & Bro., 87 Fed. 626, 628, 31 C. C. A. 154; Miller v. Texas & P. R. Co., 10 Sup. Ct. 206, 216, 132 U. S. 662, 33 L. Ed. 487.

As estate in fee.

The word "title," when used in reference to title to real estate, implies an estate in fee. Nothing short thereof is a complete title. Gillespie v. Broas (N. Y.) 23 Barb. 370, 381.

Where plaintiff contracted to give a sufficient deed to vest in the defendant the "title of the said farm," a deed which plaintiff's wife had not executed with the solemnities required by law to bar her dower was not such a deed as required or as defendant was obliged to accept. The "title" meant the legal estate in fee, free and clear of all valid claims, liens, and incumbrances whatsoever. It is the ownership of the land dominium directum et absolutum, without any rightful participation by any other person in any part of it. If the plaintiff's wife had a contingent life estate in one-third part of the farm, the defendant had not a clear and absolute title. Jones v. Gardner (N. Y.) 10 Johns. 266, 269.

Sometimes the word "title" is used in a general sense, so as to include any title or interest; but "title" in common acceptance means the full and absolute title. When we speak of a man as having title to certain lands, the ordinary understanding is that he is the owner of the fee, and not that he is

The phrase "title to real estate," as used in Rev. St. § 230, subd. 1, declaring that the jurisdiction of justices shall not extend to any action wherein the title to lands, tenements, etc., may in any wise come in question, and as used in Rev. St. p. 241, § 40, providing that when the defendant shall, as a justification of an act for trespass quare clausum fregit, plead title to any real estate in himself or in another, the plaintiff may thereupon commence his action in the Supreme Court, embraces both freehold and leasehold estates and any right to enter and have possession of the property. Campfield V. Johnson, 21 N. J. Law (1 Zab.) 83, 85.

Interest distinguished.

As used in an insurance policy the terms "interest" and "title" are not synonymous. A mortgagor in possession and a purchaser holding under a deed defectively executed have both of them absolute as well as insurable interests in the property, though neither of them has the legal title. "Absolute" is here synonymous with "vested," and is used in contradistinction to "contingent" or "conditional." Loventhal v. Home

Ins. Co., 112 Ala. 108, 116, 20 South. 419, 33 L. R. A. 258, 57 Am. St. Rep. 17.

As legal title.

In ordinary acceptation "title to land" is considered to mean the legal title, and will be held to be so used in a submission to the title to certain land; and hence "title," of certain matters in controversy in relation as used in Code Civ. Proc. 1884, § 1135, providing that all controversies which might be the subject of civil action, except the question of title to real property in fee or for life, may be submitted for arbitration, means the legal title. Thygerson v. Whitbeck, 16 Pac. 403, 404, 5 Utah, 406.

The word "title," as defined by the Century Dictionary, means "ownership; absolute ownership; the unincumbered fee." Thus allegations that the land was conveyed to third persons, who thereby acquired the title, and that his tenant entered upon and holds possession under him, fairly imports that the conveyance was by deed legally executed, and that the possession by the tenant was lawfully held. Langmede v. Weaver, 60 N. E. 992, 997, 65 Ohio St. 17.

Same-Leasehold.

The word "title," as used in Rev. St. U. S. § 2116, prohibiting contracts for the title or purchase of any Indian lands, does not include a leasehold interest for grazing purposes merely. United States v. Hunter (U. S.) 21 Fed. 615, 617.

Rev. St. U. S. § 2326 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1430], "title to the grounds in controversy" shall not be established by either party, the jury shall so find, and a judg ment shall be entered according to the ver dict, means that in such actions recovery cannot be sustained merely by proof of occupancy of the premises in dispute; but either party, before he can secure judgment, must show compliance with the statutes, state and federal, and also miners' rules and regulations enforced, relating to the loca tion of mining claims on the public domain. Becker v. Pugh, 13 Pac. 906, 907, 9 Colo. 589.

The word "title," in Code, p. 475, c. 74, § 10, declaring that “a purchaser shall not be affected by the record of a deed or contract made by a person under whom his title is not derived," necessarily means a complete

Same-Imperfect title.

"Title," as used in Act 1835, requiring that the person who would avail himself of these provisions should have a connected title in law or equity, deducible of record from the state or the United States, or from any public officer or other person authorized by the laws of the state to sell such land for the nonpayment of taxes, means nothing more than such a title as is evidenced by a deed in proper form and duly executed by one of the officers or persons named in the act as the source with which the person relying upon it is required to connect himself by a regular chain of conveyances. It should not be construed to mean a perfect title, nor is the word in its ordinary acceptation understood in such a restricted sense. There are perfect titles and apparent or imperfect titles. Even a naked possession constitutes a species of title, though it may be the lowest degree. The meaning of the word is to be ascertained from the connection in which it is used. Irving v. Brownell, 11 Ill. (1 Peck) 402, 414.

The expression "title," in the general proposition that, when equities are equal, he that has the legal title will be preferred, includes, in its broadest sense, all rights capable of being enjoyed and secured under the law. One holding a legal title to lands is certainly included, but rights amounting to less than the full legal title are equally included with it; and it is not necessary that one should acquire the full legal title to lands to entitle him to the protection of the defense of purchase for valuable consideration without notice of a prior lien. Haynsworth v. Bischoff, 6 S. C. (6 Rich.)

159, 167.

As ownership.

Where a policy provided that, if the interest of the assured should be other than the sole ownership, the policy should be void, the word "ownership" was synonymous with "title." Woodward v. Republic Fire Ins. Co. (N. Y.) 32 Hun, 365, 369.

The "title" to goods and chattels "means the right to the property and the right to the possession thereof; in short, the ownership thereof." Frank v. Forgotston, 61 N. Y. Supp. 1118, 1119, 30 Misc. Rep. 816.

“Title,” as used in an assignment by a Judgment creditor of his right, title, and interest in the judgment, "relates to the assignor's ownership of the judgment; that is, by the use of the word, they indicate the intention to transfer whatever property they may hold in it." Scofield v. Moore, 31 Iowa,

241, 245.

When it is alleged that plaintiff has title to certain premises, in an action to re

dinarily attached to such statement is that plaintiff is the owner of the premises or is seised of the same. Livingston v. Ruff, 43 S. E. 678, 679, 65 S. C. 284.

If

A party may have a title to property, though he is not the absolute owner. he has the actual or constructive possession of property, or the right of possession, he has a title thereto, though another person may be the owner. An instruction, in an action of trespass for taking and carrying away goods, that, in order to entitle plaintiff to a verdict, he must show a title to the property or some part of it, is, therefore, not erroneous. Roberts v. Wentworth, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 192, 193.

As right of possession.

"Title" means right of possession. Dunster v. Kelly, 18 N. E. 361, 362, 110 N. Y. 558.

"Title" is generally applied to signify the right to land and real estate. It is a right of possession or of property in lands, and distinct from actual possession. Campfield v. Johnson, 21 N. J. Law (1 Zab.) 83, 85.

"Title," as used in the statute in relation to summary process, providing that, if the lessee obtain a title after the date of the lease against the lessor, he may show it, means a right to the possession paramount to that of the complainant. Rodgers v. Palmer, 33 Conn. 155, 156.

The question of actual possession of lands is not one of title, within the meaning of the statute providing that a justice of the peace shall have no jurisdiction of cases involving the title of land. Ehle v. Quackenboss (N. Y.) 6 Hill, 537, 539.

"Title," as used in Code Civ. Proc. 2951, requiring a justice of the peace to discontinue an action for trespass where it is shown that title to real property will come in question, means right of possession. Manfredi v. Wiederman, 35 N. Y. Supp. 680, 14 Misc. Rep. 342.

The word "title," as used in Comp. Laws, § 642, declaring that a justice of the peace shall have no jurisdiction of an action for an injury to real property, where the title to such property comes in question, does not embrace the different degrees or

stages of right; but it is limited to the right before a justice he has no jurisdiction of the of possession, for where that is in question case. The word "title," as used in the statute, means precisely what it means in reference to the common-law action of ejectment. It is synonymous with the right of possession. Therefore, where plaintiff in his complaint alleged that he was entitled to the possession of certain premises, which allegation defendant denied, a question of title was

raised, ousting the justice of his jurisdiction. Grosso v. City of Lead, 68 N. W. 310, 9 S. D. 165.

The word "title," in 2 Rev. St. p. 226, § 4, providing that a justice of the peace shall have no cognizance of any action "where the title to land shall in any wise come in question as hereinafter provided," is synonymous with the right of possession, and a question of "actual possession" is not one of title within the statute. Ehle v. Quackenboss (N. Y.) 6 Hill, 537, 539.

In Pub. St. c. 196, § 30, providing that whenever an action of trespass shall be brought before any justice court, and the defendant shall plead the general issue, he shall not be allowed to offer any evidence that may bring the title to real estate in question, the word "title" signifies, not the fact of plaintiff's possession, but his right of possession. Carroll v. Rigney, 23 Atl. 46, 47, 15 R. I. 81.

"Title," as used in a statute declaring that the jurisdiction given to justices of the peace shall not extend to any action wherein the title of any lands, tenements, hereditaments, or other real estate shall or may in any wise come in question, is to be understood in a strict technical sense. "An action wherein the title comes in question is, in the meaning of the statute, one in which some thing more is brought into controversy than the actual occupation, or mere pedis possessio. It is one which involves justa causa possidendi." Gregory v. Kanouse, 11 N. J. Law (6 Halst.) 62, 63.

As right to property.

"It is insisted that the complainant has not acquired a title to the land by the issuing and levying of an execution thereon before the filing of the bill. Much learning has been expended in this case as to the meaning of this word 'title.' We take it to mean no more than this: that the party has acquired a right to the property in dispute, a right to question the title of the fraudulent grantee, who holds by conveyances giving him a perfect title as against the grantor, but which may be avoided by a creditor." McKibben v. Barton, 1 Mich. (Manning) 213,

214.

"Title," as defined by Jacob, in his Law Dictionary, includes a right, but is the more general word. Abbott defines "title" to be such a claim to the exclusive control and enjoyment of a thing as the law will recognize and the courts, and, as applied to lands or goods, signifies either a party's right to the enjoyment thereof or the means whereby such right is approved or by which it is evidenced. Webster defines it as a right, as a good title, or an imperfect title; the instrument which is evidence of a right; that by which a heneficiary holds a benefice by the

canon law. Worcester defines it as that which gives a right or claim to ownership; that by which the owner of lands or personal property has the just possession of his property; the instrument or document by which a title to something is approved. Pratt v. Fountain, 73 Ga. 261, 262.

Same-Evidence of right.

The word "title," as used in reference to

bona fide purchasers, has reference to the evidence of rights held by the vendor, which by a conveyance becomes the purchaser's evidence of right, and not to what may be the real beneficial interest of that person, as may be shown outside of such evidence by extrinsic proof. Patty v. Middleton, 82 Tex. 586, 591, 17 S. W. 909, 911.

"Title" may be defined generally "to be the evidence of right which a person has to the possession of property." 2 Abb. Law Dict. 566; Chapman v. Dougherty, 87 Mo. 617, 620, 56 Am. Rep. 469.

The word "title," when used in connection with real estate, is generally defined to be the evidence of right by which a person has possession of property. Guier v. Bridges (Ky.) 70 S. W. 288, 289.

One's title to land is the evidence of his right or of the extent of his interest; the means whereby the owner is enabled to assert or maintain his possession; the right of the owner, considered with reference either to the manner in which it has been acquired or its capacity of being effectually transferred. Robertson v. Vancleave, 29 N. E. 781, 129 Ind. 217, 15 L. R. A. 68.

TITLE BOND.

Though a title bond has become a common mode of making an equitable conveyance, it is in fact but an executory contract in writing for the sale of real estate, to be afterwards consummated by further action when the conditions are complied with. It has been assimilated to a conveyance from the vendor, followed by a reconveyance to him from the vendee by way of mortgage to secure the purchase money. It does resemble that, and in effect has substantially the same consequences in most respects; yet, where the real justice of the case requires a distinction, the general analogy should not be suffered to mislead. In every respect a title bond is but an agreement to convey, from which a court of equity creates an equitable estate in the vendee, holding the vendor as his trustee for the land and the purchaser as the vendor's trustee for the money. Atkinson v. Hudson, 44 Ark. 192, 196.

A title bond has always been considered a lien merely. Light v. Greenwich Ins. Co. (Tenn.) 58 S. W. 851, 853.