person who cuts any live oak or red cedar trees or other timber on the lands of the United States, etc., includes mesquite; it being a wood very hard and almost inde structible, and used for beams and underpinnings of adobe houses, or for posts, fencing, fuel, and furniture. United States v. Soto (Ariz.) 64 Pac. 419, 420 (overruling Bustamente v. United States [Ariz.] 42 Pac. 111). Pulp wood. "Timber," as used in Rev. St. c. 42, § 6, providing that the cost of driving timber so intermixed with logs that it cannot be conveniently separated may be recovered from the owner of such timber, comprises all products of the forest conveniently floatable to market. It includes, not only logs, but other wood products, and is intended to have a comprehensive meaning suited to the purpose of the statute, and would include pulp wood. Bearce v. Dudley, 34 Atl. 260, 88 Me. 410. Railroad ties. TIME Shingles or shingle bolts. The word "timber," as a generic term, properly signifies only such trees as are used in building either business houses or dwellings. Castillero v. United States, 67 U. S. (2 Black) 281, 17 L. Ed. 360; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. § 20; Burrill, Law Dict. tit. "Timber." But its signification is not limited to trees. It applies to the wood, or the particular form which the tree assumes when no longer growing or standing in the ground. It does not include shingles and shingle bolts. United States v. Schuler (U. S.) 27 Fed. Cas. 978. Logs and timber, in Rev. St. c. 91, § 34, giving a labor lien on logs and timber for cutting the same, includes cedar shingle rift, cut four feet in length. Cutting up the logs does not defeat the lien. Sands v. Sands, 74 Me. 239, 240. Soil. "Timber and other trees," as used in a lease of a tenement, save and except all timber and other trees, does not include the soil. Leigh v. Heald, 1 Barn. & Adol. 622, 625. SELS. "Timber," as used in a contract to enter upon defendant's land and cut all tim- TIMBER BEING WROUGHT IN VESber, etc., on the land, and remove such timber within a certain time, and the contract also providing that all such timber not removed from such land within the stated time, whether cut or standing, is to be the property of the defendant, means trees standing or felled and lying in their natural state upon the land, and does not include railroad ties made out of the trees. Hubbard v. Burton, 75 Mo. 65, 67. "Timber," as used in Rev. St. § 3330, as amended by Laws 1879, c. 167, § 1, in that part of the section which applies to the county of Marathon and provides for a lien in favor of persons furnishing supplies to men engaged in getting out logs and timber in that county, means the stems or trunks of trees when cut and shaped for use in the erection of buildings or other structures, and not manufactured into lumber within the ordinary meaning of the word "lumber," and it therefore includes railroad ties. Kollock v. Parcher, 9 N. W. 67, 69, 52 Wis. 393. Saw logs. A contract for the purchase of "merchantable timber" meant merchantable saw logs, and not merchantable lumber. Bullock v. Consumers' Lumber Co. (Cal.) 31 Pac. 367, 368 Scrub oaks. "Timber," as used in the act of Congress forbidding any one to cut and sell timber from government lands, would not include scrub oaks. O'Hanlon v. Denvir, 22 Pac. 407, 408, 81 Cal. 60, 15 Am. St. Rep. 19. The terms "timber in process of being wrought in vessels," in a fire policy on such timber, was construed to include capstans of locusts partly prepared for vessels which Webb v. National the insured was building. Fire Ins. Co., 4 N. Y. Super. Ot. (2 Sandf.) 497, 504. TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY. The expression "timber culture entry" has an accepted and well-recognized signification in the acts of Congress, in the decisions of the courts, and in common parlance. It is an entry under the provisions of "An act to encourage the growth of timber on Western prairies," approved March 3, 1873 (17 Stat. 605, c. 277), and the amendments and additions thereto. Rev. St. §§ 2464, 2469. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 1534, 1557]. Hartman v. Warren (U. S.) 76 Fed. 157, 160, 22 C. C. A. 30. TIMBER TREES. A grant of "timber trees" will not pass fruit trees, nor will a grant of "all timber trees, but not the annual fruit thereof," pass apple trees. Bullen v. Denning, 5 Barn. & C. 842, 847. TIME. See "Actual Time"; "Additional Time"; "Business Time"; "Fixed Time"; "Unreasonable Time." All times, see "All" An offer to buy certain stock at any time after January 1st, if "at that time you desire to have me do so," means "at that date," and required an acceptance on January 1st. Park v. Whitney, 19 N. E. 161, 148 Mass. 278. A certificate of publication, stating that notice of a special assessment had been published "five times" in a certain daily newspaper, cannot be construed so as to sufficiently show that the notice was published for five successive days. Chandler v. People, 43 N. E. 590, 591, 161 Ill. 41. Gen. Laws, c. 46, § 4, requires the assessor to assess the taxes at the time or dered by the town, and the town voted that the tax be assessed in the month of September of each year. It was claimed that the assessment did not comply with the statute, because fixing a month is not fixing a time. It was held that the word "time" is of a more general character, and implies a discretion within fixed limits which may be necessary or convenient for assessors, and that there was no intention to fix a particular day on which the assessment must be made, and the assessment made during the month of September was valid. Warwick & Coventry Water Co. v. Carr, 52 Atl. 1030, 1031, 24 R. I. 226. The time given or limited for the performance of an obligation is called its "term." Civ. Code La. 1900, art. 2048. Computation. In a computation of time, where the time must be computed from an act done, the day on which the act is done is to be included, especially where the computation must be from and after the doing of the act. Arnold v. United States, 13 U. S. (9 Cranch) 104, 105, 3 L. Ed. 671. In computing the time within which a statute requires a chattel mortgage to be recorded (Rev. St. 1881, § 4913), the day on which it was executed is excluded, and that on which it was recorded is included. Towell v. Hollweg, 81 Ind. 154, 158. The day of an act or statute from which a future time is to be ascertained is to be excluded from the computation. This rule is applicable, not only to contracts, wills, and other instruments, but to statutes and proceedings under them. Thus, where a court shall become a law. Held that, in counting the three days within which the bill is to be returned by the Governor, the day on which the bill was presented to him must be excluded. Corwin v. Comptroller General, 6 S. C. (6 Rich.) 390, 395. St. 1815, c. 137, § 1, providing that a right in equity sold on execution may be redeemed within one year next after the "time of executing the deed" thereof by the officer to the purchaser, means in legal acceptation the day of delivery, which is the same as the date, or the day of the date, and in computing the time the day in which the deed was executed should be excluded. No moment of time can be said to be after a low v. Willson, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 485, 494. given day until that day has expired. Bige An order made Monday, November 21st, extending for two weeks the time to file a bill of exceptions, extends the time so as to include Monday, December 5th, one day being excluded and the other included. Cavanaugh v. Corckran, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 855. ing a bill of exceptions by an order made In computing the time allowed for signin term time permitting it to be done within a stated time after the adjournment of the term, the first day after the adjournment must be excluded under Code 1896, § 11, providing that, in computing the time within which an act required by law must be done, the first day shall be excluded and the last included. Ragsdale v. Kinney, 24 South. 443, 447, 119 Ala. 454. The statutory rule that the "time" with in which an act is to be done is to be computed by excluding the first day and including the last applies to the filing of bills of exceptions. State v. Thorn, 28 Ind. 306, 308. Where 60 days' "time" from the 3d of December is allowed within which to file a bill of exceptions, the 2d day of February following is too late. Schoonover v. Irwin, 58 Ind. 287, 289. Where, by agreement of parties, appellant was to have 60 days from March 17th in which to file a bill of exceptions, and it appeared that said bill was filed May 17th, it is too late. McCoid v. Rafferty, 84 Iowa, 532, 51 N. W. 24. done shall be computed by excluding the first The time within which an act is to be of probate on the 14th of December passed day and including the last. If the last day an order limiting six months from that time be Sunday, it shall be excluded. Clark's for the exhibition of claims against a de- Code N. C. 1900, § 596. cedent's estate, a claim exhibited on the 14th of June following was exhibited in time. Weeks v. Hull, 19 Conn. 376, 380, 50 Am. Dec. 249. Const. art. 3, § 22, declares that, if a bill or joint resolution shall not be returned by the Governor within three days after the TIME BEING. See "For the Time Being." TIME CHECK. A certificate signed by the master me ame shall have been presented to him, it chanic or other person in charge of laborers, reciting the amount due to the laborer for labor for a specified time. Burlington Voluntary Relief Department v. White, 59 N. W. 747, 748, 41 Neb. 547, 43 Am. St. Rep. 701. TIME FIXED BY AGREEMENT. The phrase "time fixed by agreement," in Pub. St. c. 188, § 5, providing that the time by which an award shall be made and reported may be varied according to the agreement of the parties, but no award made after the time fixed by the agreement shall have any legal effect or operation, unless made upon a recommitment by the court to which it is reported, has the same meaning as the phrase “time limited in the submission" in section 9, which provides that the award may be returned at any term or session of the court held within the time limited in the submission. Bent v. Erie Telegraph & Telephone Co., 10 N. E. 778, 781, 144 Mass. 165. TIME GIVEN. "Time given," as used in Code Civ. Proc. 1187, requiring a claim for a mechanic's lien to contain a statement of the terms of the "time given" and conditions of the contract, means the time of payment for the work and labor performed and materials furnished as agreed on, as expressed in the contract. If the words "time given" refer to the time agreed on for the completion of the contract, and no period of time for such completion is fixed by the contract, but such time is allowed as the law gives, no time need be stated in the claim. Where there is no express agreement as to time in the contract, it is not necessary to give the time in the claim. Hills v. Ohlig, 63 Cal. 104. TIME OF BANKRUPTCY naming the day, in the absence of evidence that anything depended upon the nature of the defect or upon the particular hour of the accident. Donnelly v. City of Fall River, 130 Mass. 115. Gen. St. § 2673, requiring notices of the time and place of the occurrence of an injury by means of a defective road or bridge, means the day on which it occurred, together with the month and the year, stated in the common and ordinary manner. Gardner v. City of New London, 28 Atl. 42, 43, 63 Conn. 267. "Time," as used in a statute providing that in an action against a railroad for injuries for killing or injuring live stock, etc., the time when and the place where the killing or the injury occurred must be alleged in the complaint, is complied with by a statement of a specified day of a given month and year on which the accident occurred. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Carloss, 77 Ala. 443, 447. TIME OF ADJUDICATION. Bankr. Act, § 38, provided that the filing of a petition for adjudication in bankruptcy shall be deemed to be the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, and section 14 provided that the assignee should be substituted for the bankrupt in suits pending "at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy." Held, that the phrase "at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy" meant the time when proceedings were commenced by the filing of a petition, as provided by section 38. In re Patterson (U. S.) 18 Fed. Cas. 1315, 1316. TIME OF BANKRUPTCY. "Time of bankruptcy," as used in the bankruptcy act, providing that, where the bankrupt is liable to pay rent, the creditor may prove for a proportionate part thereof up to the "time of the bankruptcy," means the time when the petition was filed, to which time the adjudication relates. In re May (U. S.) 16 Fed. Cas. 1205, 1206. "Time of bankruptcy," as used in the bankruptcy act, with reference to time, shall mean the date when the petition was filed. U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3419. Under St. 6 Geo. IV, c. 16, § 72, empowering the commissioners in bankruptcy to dispose of goods being in the possession, order, or disposition of the bankrupt, as reputed owner, at the time he becomes bankrupt, held, that the phrase "at the time he becomes bankrupt" means the time of cornmitting the act of bankruptcy, and not the time when the fiat issues. Fawcett v. Fearne, 6 Q. B. 20. TIME OF INJURY. The "time of injury," within the meaning of the divorce statute, when applied to impotency, applies to any time while the impotency lasts, as it is a continuing injury. A. B. v. O. B., 34 N. J. Eq. (7 Stew.) 43, 44. TIME OF MEMORY. At the common law "time of memory" commenced from the beginning of the reign of Richard I. Any custom may be destroyed by evidence of the nonexistence of such custom in any part of the period in the beginning of the reign. Ackerman v. Shelp, 8 N. J. Law (3 Halst.) 125, 130. TIME OF PEACE. See "Peace." TIME OF WAR. See "War." TIME OPTION. A "time option" to purchase contains the following elements: An offer to sell, accompanied by an agreement to hold such offer of sale open for a specified time, supported by a sufficient consideration. Peterson v. Chase (Wis.) 91 N. W. 687, 688. TIME POLICY. A time policy, as the term is used in the law of marine insurance, is a policy on a vessel for any prescribed time, which covers the vessel during such time on any voyage she may undertake. Wilkins v. Tobacco Ins. Co., 30 Ohio St. 317, 339, 27 Am. Rep. 455 (citing 1 Arn. Ins. 333, 409). A "policy on time," as the term is used in marine insurance, "insures no specific voyage, but covers any voyage within the prescribed time. It is of the nature of a policy on time that it limits the vessel to no geographical track, and deviation is therefore not predicable of it." Greenleaf v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 37 Mo. 25, 29 (citing Bradlie v. Maryland Ins. Co., 37 U. S. [12 Pet.] 378, 9 L. Ed. 1123; Union Ins. Co. v. Tysen [N. Y.] 3 Hill, 118; Keeler v. Firemen's Ins. Co., Id. 250). TIME WHEN EXECUTION IS ISSUABLE. "Time when execution is legally issuable," within the meaning of 2 Comp. Laws, § 5462, which provides that no execution issued on a judgment rendered on appeal to the circuit court against the plaintiff and the surety on his appeal bond shall be levied on the property of the surety, unless such execution, if issued in the circuit court, is issued within 30 days from the time when the same shall be legally issuable, means the date of the taxation of costs. Weiss v. Chambers, 15 N. W. 63, 64, 50 Mich. 158. TIMIDITY. Doubt distinguished, see "Doubt." TIN CANS. "Tin cans," within the meaning of a fire policy giving permission to keep one barrel of benzine or turpentine in tin cans, is to be construed not to be limited to a number of tin cans, but to include one tin can large enough to hold a barrel of the liquid. Maryland Fire Ins. Co. v. Whiteford, 31 Md. 219, 224, 100 Am. Rep. 45. TIN FOIL. Where a defendant in a patent sult was enjoined from the application of tin foil or its equivalents during the process of vulcanizing India rubber to preserve the form of material, the words "tin foil or its equivalents" do not include sheets of tin similar to roofing tin. Poppenhusen v. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co. (U. S.) 19 Fed. Cas. 1058. TIPPLE. "Tipple," as used in the act of 1877, providing that it shall not be lawful for any person to sell or tipple in intoxicating beverages, etc., means to sell and to be drunk at the place of sale. Tenn. (8 Lea) 113, 114. Harney v. State, 76 TIPPLER. A "tippler" is one who sells liquor by the quart or in larger quantities, which liquor is not drank or intended to be drank on the premises of the seller. State v. Lowenhaught, 79 Tenn. (11 Lea) 13, 14. TIPPLING HOUSE OR SHOP. See "Common Tippling House." see "Disorderly "Tippling houses" are common drinking houses, kept for lucre or gain, where all persons may, if they will, resort and drink ad libitum. Fed. Cas. 705, 707. Werner v. Washington (U. S.) 29 A tippling house is a place where liquor is sold, and formerly represented that class of the liquor traffic now filled by saloons and TIPPLING HOUSE OR SHOP 6977 TIPPLING HOUSE OR SHOP barrooms. Town of Leesburg v. Putman, 29 | and where men are accustomed to tipple, S. E. 602, 603, 103 Ga. 110, 68 Am. St. Rep. and necessarily includes the element of 80. A tippling house is "either a house in which tippling and drinking is allowed, or a house kept for the purpose of making a profit by selling spirituous liquors, without furnishing accommodations for travelers, with or without license." Woods v. Commonwealth, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 74, 75. "Tippling house" has a definite and well-understood meaning in the common law and in common language. Though the fact that spirituous liquors are sold on a single occasion in a quantity less than a quart and permitted to be drunk in the house of the vendor will not constitute the place a tippling house, yet the frequent repetition of such acts will constitute the place a tippling house according to the common law and common language of the country and within the meaning of the term as used in the act of 1793 imposing a penalty for keeping a tippling house. Morrison v. Commonwealth, 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 218, 219. A "tippling house" is a place in which intoxicating liquors are sold in quantities less than a quart without a license. The fact that persons became drunk at a place does not make it a tippling house. Dunnaway v. State, 17 Tenn. (9 Yerg.) 350, 352. To constitute a "tippling house," it is necessary that intoxicating drinks should be sold therein. Hence an instruction that it is a place where spirituous liquors or other drinks are sold is rendered erroneous by the addition of the words "or other drinks." Patten v. City of Centralia, 47 Ill. 370, 372. The term "tippling house," within the meaning of a statute prohibiting the keeping open of a tippling house on the Sabbath day, includes a place where liquor is retailed and tippled on the Sabbath day, with a door to get into it so kept that anybody can push it open and go in and drink. It makes no difference in law whether the place be called a barroom, or a glee club resort, or a parlor, or a restaurant, if it be a place where liquor is retailed and tippled on the Sabbath day. It makes no difference if the drinking be done standing or sitting at a bar or round the table. It is tippling, and the place where it is done is a tippling house; and if anybody wishing to drink can have access therein, if ingress and egress be free to all comers, it is a tippling house kept open on Sunday. Hussey v. State, 69 Ga. 54, 58. A tippling house is defined to be a public drinking house, and it is not necessary that the liquors or intoxicating drink be drunk on the premises. Harris v. People, 39 Pac. 1084, 1085, 21 Colo. 95. A tippling shop is a place in which liquors are sold in drams or small quantities, "Tippling houses," within the meaning of a statute prohibiting the keeping open of tippling houses on the Sabbath, was held in Hall v. State, 3 Ga. (3 Kelly) 18, to include one tippling house, and that the keeping open of such a house was criminal within the meaning of the statute. Bethune v. State, 48 Ga. 505, 510. Proof that accused, upon three different Sundays within the same year, at least, sold whisky in her dwelling house to different persons at retail, permitting the same or a portion thereof to be drunk on the premises, held to prove the offense of keeping open a tippling house on the Sabbath. Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 526, 28 S. E. 624, 629, 39 L. R. A. 269. Club rooms. A tippling house is a place where intoxicating drinks are sold in drams of small quantities to be drunk on the premises; a place of public resort, where spirituous, fermented, or other intoxicating liquors are sold or drunk in small quantities without a license therefor; a public drinking house, where intoxicating liquor is either sold by drams to the public, or else given away, and imbibed; and a social club, maintaining club rooms, which were open only to members, wherein members, is guilty of keeping open a “tipa bar was kept and drinks dispensed to the pling house" on Sunday, where such place was open on Sunday. Mohrman v. State, 32 S. E. 143, 145, 105 Ga. 709, 43 L. R. A. 398, 70 Am. St. Rep. 74. Place for sale of beer. "Tippling house," as used in a statute prohibiting the keeping open of a tippling house on Sunday, means a public drinking house, and includes a house wherein beer alone is sold. Koop v. People, 47 III. 327, 329. Place where liquors are given away. "Tippling house," as used in Code, § 4535, prohibiting the keeping open of tippling houses on the Sabbath day, is not limited to places kept for the purpose of selling liquors and where men are accustomed to tipple, but by drams or small quantities to the public, includes a place where liquors are given away by the drink, not merely one or two, but where it was a usual and common thing on Sunday, notwithstanding there was no money given or received for the drinks. Minor v. State, 63 Ga. 318, 321. |