THEREON 6953 THEREUPON which has not arrived in port, that, if the vessel be lost before reaching port of loading, other vessels will be substituted for same shipment, or as near thereto as practicable, the word "thereto" means as near to the date fixed in the original contract for shipment as is possible. Browne v. Paterson, 55 N. Y. Supp. 404, 408, 36 App. Div. 167. struction, we cannot see how 'thereof can | certain vessel, which has been chartered, but include 'manufactured by himself.' The section, expressed more fully, would be thus: No person shall be allowed to be a manufacturer of any spirituous or intoxicating liquors for sale, or a common seller of spirituous or intoxicating liquors.' The article is not drawn with the highest degree of skill and precision. These two offenses are brought together, probably because they are punishable in the same manner." Commonwealth v. Bralley, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 456, 457. THEREON. A deed describing the land as commencing at the west part of lot No. 10, thence The phrase "avenue leading thereto," in thief to frequent any river, canal, dock, quay, a statute making it criminal for any reputed wharf, or warehouse near or adjoining thereto, or any street, highway, or avenue leading thereto, means avenue leading to a street or highway. Reg. v. Brown, 17 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 833, 837. east 20 feet, etc., "with a brick tenement The word "theretofore," as used in an indictment alleging that defendant on a certain date, having theretofore fraudulently devised a scheme to defraud, etc., means "beHume v. United States (U. S.) fore then." 118 Fed. 689, 696, 55 C. C. A. 407. "Thereon," as used in the sixteenth section of the New Jersey act incorporating the Camden & Amboy Railway Company, authorizing the company to demand and receive such sum or sums of money for tolls and the transportation of persons and property thereon as they shall from time to time think THEREUNTO BELONGING. reasonable and proper, provided that they shall not charge more than the rate of eight cents per mile for the transportation of property and more than ten cents per mile for the carriage of passengers, does not mean the railroad, but means the whole line of connection between the cities to which the company built their road, and the company is entitled to charge on this whole line the rate of toll per mile fixed by the act, and applies to a steamboat used by the company to take passengers and goods across the Delaware river. Camden & A. R. & Transp. Co. v. Briggs, 22 N. J. Law (2 Zab.) 623, 641. The word "thereon," in a statute providing that, on the failure of a railroad to fence its track as required, it shall be liable for all damages which may be done by the agents, employés, engineer, or cars of such corporation to any cattle and other stock thereon, "seems to indicate that the animal must be injured on the track, and, if so, it is reasonable to conclude that the intention was that the injury should be done by the engine or cars. Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co. v. Dunlap, 13 N. E. 403, 408, 112 Ind. 93. The word "thereon" has exactly the same meaning as if the expression had been "on the same," as used in a policy insuring a ship for a voyage to a port on the north side of Cuba, with the liberty of a second port thereon. Nicholson v. Mercantile Marine Ins. Co., 106 Mass. 399, 400. THERETO. In a writing on the margin of a contract for the shipment of purchased goods by a These words are, in common speech, of different import, according to the subject of which they are spoken. If we speak of a farm or a field, with reference to the ownership, we say it belongs to such a one, meaning thereby that it is the property of that person; if with reference to any estate of a particular name, we say it belongs to such an estate, as to the Britton Ferry estate, meaning that it is parcel of that estate; if with reference to its locality, we say it belongs to such a parish or township, meaning that it is situate in or part of that manor, in the ordinary and popular sense of the word "part," and not in the strictly legal sense, as part of the demesnes of that manor, or as holden of the manor, or of the lord thereof. Doe v. Langton, 2 Barn. & Adol. 680. THEREUPON. Webster defines "thereupon" to mean upon this, or that, and sometimes immediately, at once, without delay; and hence, where a case-made stated that parties in support of their motions introduced affidavits, and thereupon the court made an order, etc., it sufficiently appeared that the court's order was based on the affidavits, and nothing else, since, if the word "thereupon" had been used in one sense, it meant that on the testimony the court ordered, and, if it was used in another sense, it meant then that immediately on the reading of the affidavits, and without anything intervening, the court ordered. Dewey v. Linscott, 20 Kan. 684, 687. In an action for malicious prosecution the declaration alleged in one count that the defendant made a false and malicious complaint against the plaintiff before a trial justice, and testified falsely at the trial thereof before the justice, and thereupon the justice found the plaintiff guilty. Held, that the use of the words "and thereupon" marked the succession of events in order of time, and did not exclude the existence of other facts than those previously recited, and hence the declaration did not show that the convic tion before the trial justice was obtained solely on the false testimony of the defendant. Dennehey v. Woodsum, 100 Mass. 195, 197. As concurrently. In a plea alleging that plaintiff had committed a forcible entry and breach of the peace in the presence of the constable, and that the defendant thereupon gave the plaintiff in charge, and the constable took him for the purpose of carrying him before a magistrate "thereupon" would indicate that the act was concurrent with the breach of the peace. Derecourt v. Corbishley, 5 El. & Bl. 188, 190. As in consideration thereof. "Thereupon," as used in a declaration that plaintiff delivered certain logs to the defendants at their request, and thereupon defendants delivered their agreement to the plaintiff, may fairly be considered as referring to the reason of the promise of the defendants. Wherever the connecting matter would seem to require such an interpretation, the word may be taken to mean "in consideration thereof." Bean v. Ayers, 67 Me. 482, 487. As in consequence of. "Thereupon," as used in a plea by defendant in an action on a bond of a corporate officer, alleging that the corporation had obtained a certificate of complete registration by and under a different name, and thereupon said officer ceased to be appointed as such, the word "thereupon" meant in "consequence of." Groux's Improved Soap Co. v. Cooper, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 800, 814. "Thereupon," in Revision, p. 762, § 52, providing for inventory, appraisement, and selection of certain property for the family of a deceased person, and further providing that the goods and chattels, money, or effects so selected "shall thereupon become" the property of such family and remain for their use, means that, upon the selection, that which shall be selected, not having theretofore been the property of the family, shall thereupon become its property. Before the selection, it, with the other personal estate, is the property of the personal representative of the decedent for the execution of his trust, and therein primarily reserved for selection for the use of the family. Until the selection is made, and title to that which is selected is thereby secured to the family, all that the family has is a personal right to take by selection. Carey v. Monroe, 35 Atl. 456, 458, 54 N. J. Eq. 632. As immediately. The word "thereupon" means without delay or lapse of time. Putnam v. Langley, 133 Mass. 204, 205. "Thereupon," as used in Code Civ. Proc. $1283, providing that a submission to arbitrators may stipulate that it be entered as an order of the Supreme Court, for which purpose it must be filed with the court, who must thereupon enter in his register of ae tions a note of a submission, with the names of the parties, the names of the arbitrators, and the dates, does not mean immediately. California Academy of Sciences v. Fletcher, 33 Pac. 855, 857, 99 Cal. 207. The word "thereupon" means immediately, at once, or without delay; and hence, as used in Const. art. 5, par. 16, providing that a bill passed by the Assembly, being approved and signed by the Governor, shall thereupon become a law, it is and does become a law immediately after receiving such approval, though by express provisions it does not go into effect until a future time. People v. Inglis, 43 N. E. 1103, 1104, 161 IIL 256. "Thereupon," means immediately, at once, or without delay, and as used in Laws 1893, p. 301, § 31, relating to establishment of roads, and requiring the clerk of the county commissioners, when a certificate of the work of construction has been filed, to thereupon issue a warrant, requires the issuance of a warrant within less than 10 days. State v. Van Wyck, 54 Pac. 768, 771, 20 Wash. 39. rendering of judgment against defendant, he "Thereupon," as used in a record that, in thereupon filed his motion for a new trial, means immediately after, and upon the same day of, the occurrence last before cited. Hill v. Wand, 47 Kan. 340, 27 Pac. 988, 27 Am. St. Rep. 288; Hallam v. Huffman, 48 Pac. 602, 603, 5 Kan. App. 303. "Thereupon," as used in Code Civ. Proc. district court in certain cases and thereupon § 1039, requiring a justice to certify to the file the original papers, is an adverb of time, and signifies without delay or lapse of time. Kaufmann v. Drexel, 76 N. W. 559, 560, 56 Neb. 229. "Thereupon," as used in Rev. St. 1841, c. 21, §§ 47, 48, providing that, whenever any highway shall be laid out by the county commissioners, they shall thereupon cause an assessment to be made on the tracts of land, township, or plantation, or divisions thereof, through which it runs, means immediately, or without delay. The word implies close connection, not disconnection. No period of time is to intervene between the steps to be taken. Mansur v. County Com'rs, 22 Atl. 358, 359, 83 Me. 514. "Thereupon," as used in St. 1891, p. 196, relating to street improvements, and providing that, after certain publications of notices of street improvements, the street superintendent shall thereupon cause to be conspicuously posted, etc., means upon those precedent conditions, and does not mean immediately, but that the posting shall follow within a reasonable time. Porphyry Pav. Co. v. Ancker, 37 Pac. 1050, 1051, 104 Cal. 340. "Thereupon" is an adverb, signifying, according to Webster, "immediately, at once, or without delay"; and it is in that sense that it would ordinarily be understood in the connection in which it is used in a bill of exceptions setting out a copy of a deed, and then reading: "It was conceded on the trial that the plaintiffs were residents, etc., when this suit was begun, and thereupon the court announced that his finding was against the interpleader and garnishees." To say the least, it fails to give to the bill of exceptions that degree of certainty which the rules of pleading require. It is suggested that the word "thereupon" should be construed as meaning "upon the foregoing evidence"; but such, however, is not the usual signification which the rule of interpretation-i. e., that a bill of exceptions, like all other pleadings, is to be construed most strongly against the pleader-should give it. First Nat. Bank of Michigan City v. Haskell, 23 III. App. 616, 618. As word of reference. "Thereupon," as used in a statute declaring that in all actions of trespass brought against any person entitled to rent, relating to any entry by virtue of the act upon the premises chargeable with such rent, or to any debts or seizure, or to any sale or disposal of any goods. thereupon, it shall be lawful, etc., refers to the premises chargeable with rent, and not to the debts or seizure. Oliver v. Phelps, 20 N. J. Law (Spencer) 180, 193. The word "thereupon," in Rev. Laws, 629, 635, providing that, if judgment is given against a freeholder for a sum exceeding $60, no execution shall be issued thereon until after six months, unless the party in whose favor judgment may be given shall make it appear to the satisfaction of the justice that the debt will be in danger of being lost if such delay of execution is allowed, and making it the duty of the justice to issue execution immediately, unless the party against whom judgment is given shall thereupon give security, etc., means upon the justice being satisfied, as before mentioned. Krumeick v. Krumeick, 14 N. J. Law (2 J. S. Green) 39, 44. 8 WDS. & P.-11 As then. THESE In a will providing that the executor shall sell certain property and thereupon divide the whole as follows, "thereupon" will be construed to have been used in the sense of "then," and will not vest a present interest in the estate. In re Cameron, 27 N. Y. Supp. 1031, 1033, 76 Hun, 429. As thereby. Where a declaration, after stating certain facts, alleges that it "thereupon" became the duty of the defendant to do a certain act, such allegation is to be understood as a mere acceptation of the legal liability supposed to result from the previously stated facts as an assertion that the defendant became thereby bound to do the act, and not as a distinct substantive allegation. The word "thereupon" is to be understood, not merely as "afterwards," but is equivalent to "thereby." Brown v. Mallett, 5 C. B. 600, 614. THEREWITH. The word "therewith," according to the latest standard dictionaries of the English language, is the equivalent in meaning of the words "with that or this," or "at the same time"; and it is so used in Rev. St. 1899, § 4228, providing that every person who shall board any horse shall have a lien on the animal and on any equipment "coming into his possession therewith." It is plain that no other interpretation can be placed on all the words, other than that the liveryman is given a lien only on the vehicle or equipment when it comes into his possession at the same time with the animal. Zartman-Thalman Carriage Co. v. Reid & Lowe, 73 S. W. 942, 943, 99 Mo. App. 415. THERMOSTAT. A thermostat is a self-acting apparatus for the regulation of temperature. It includes the whole apparatus, as well the expanding strip or strips of metal or other substance upon which the heat first acts. as the intermediate wires, magnets, or other apparatus, if any, by which the dampers of the furnace are open or closed as the strips expand or contract; and hence an application for a patent, stating that it was for a "thermostat" and an automatic machine, the automatic machine will be held to apply solely to the clockwork device, and not to the thermostat. Murphey v. Weil, 66 N. W. 532, 534, 92 Wis. 467. THESE. "These" is the plural of "this," and opposed to "those," and relates to the persons or things nearest or last-mentioned, and "those" to the first-mentioned or most remote. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Beebe, 69 Ill. App. 363, 386 (citing Worcester). A testator devised to his wife "the Draper place of 150 acres, and 125 acres of land on the where we now live, and the Smith lot and the Possession lot, to have the use of in the family," until certain parties should have their lands set off to them, and "these other two lots during her natural life, then to be divided amongst the children as she direct." Held, that the words "these other two lots" meant the lots first mentioned, instead of, as customary, referring to the nearest antecedent. Russell v. Kennedy, 66 Pa. 248, 251. A newspaper advertisement, reciting that sundry houses and other buildings had been recently set on fire, and offering a reward of $500 to any person "who shall give information so that the perpetrator of these outrages shall be convicted," meant past acts, and was not an offer of reward for the detection of a class of crimes to be afterwards committed, without limit of time. Freeman v. City of Boston, 46 Mass. (5 Metc.) 56, 59. THEY. "They," as used in Code 1873, 4030, providing that if any persons, being within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity, carnally know each other, they shall be guilty of incest, will be construed to be equivalent to "both" or "each." State v Hurd, 70 N. W. 613, 615, 101 Iowa, 391. An agreement by two or more persons that they will desist from and discontinue their business is not shown to have been violated by an allegation that one of them has carried on the business, since the word "they," as used in the agreement, would thus be construed to mean that they and each of them would desist from, etc., which construction will not be given in the cases restricting trade. Lawrence v. Kidder (N. Y.) 10 Barb. 641, 655. The word "they," may refer to a corporation. Wiley v. Borough of Towanda (U. S.) 26 Fed. 594, 595. The relative pronoun "they," as used in the Penal Code, includes females as well as males, unless there is some express declaration to the contrary. Pen. Code Tex. 1895, art. 21. THIEF. See "Common Thief." To call one a "thief" does not necessarfly impute to him the crime of larceny, so as to be actionable per se. Egan v. Semrad, 88 N. W. 906, 908, 113 Wis. 84. Where the words used by a defendant in libel were shown to have been that "T. is a thief, and so was his father before him, and I can prove it," but it was also added, "T. received the earnings of the ship and ought to pay the wages," the word "thief" was not used in a sense imputing a felony, and was not actionable, though the word prima facie would carry such imputation. Thompson v. Bernard, 1 Camp. 48. "Thieves," in law as in common parlance, means those who have committed eiAmerica ther compound or simple larceny. Ins. Co. of City of New York v. Bryan (N. Y.) 1 Hill, 25, 28. The words, "He is a thief," import in themselves in their usual sense a charge of larceny. Robinson v. Keyser, 22 N. H. 323, 324. The statement in regard to a person that he is a "thief" is a complete charge of slander in itself, sufficient to sustain the action, without proof of other allegations. Smith v. Moore, 52 Atl. 320, 74 Vt. 81. Simply to call a man a thief is prima facie actionable, as it imputes felony; but if it appears that the word was used as a mere term of abuse, and that there was in point of fact no imputation of actual theft conveyed by it, there is no cause of action. Thus, where the defendant said of the plaintiff, "He is a damned thief, and so was his father before him," and it appears that the words were uttered in the heat of anger, during a conversation respecting plaintiff's refusal to pay over some money which he received as executor, Lord Ellenborough directed a nonsuit, saying that it was manifest from the whole conversation that the words as used did not impute felony. 2 Add. Torts, § 1119. If it is doubtful whether the term is used in an actionable sense, the question is for the jury; but if, from the plaintiff's own showing, it appears that they were not used in such a sense, he will be nonsuited Bridgman v. Armer, 57 Mo. App. 528, 532. To call a man a "thief" is not necessarily actionable, as importing a felony, when it is apparent, from the circumstances under which the words are spoken, that they are not intended nor understood to be used in Smith, 388, 389. Quinn v. O'Gara (N. Y.) 2 E. D. such sense. A "thief" being one who steals, to charge another with being a thief is actionable, as importing that he is a criminal. Little v. Barlow, 26 Ga. 423, 425, 71 Am. Dec. 219. The word "thief," in a charge that a man is a thief, is equivalent to the statement that he belongs to one of the class known as "thieves," and is libelous, as importing a charge of being a criminal. Tillman v. Willis, 61 Ga. 433, 435. A charge that plaintiff is a "thief" is not actionable per se, when it is made in connection with other language showing that the remark is predicated on a taking of marl, which in its natural state is a part of the freehold and not a subject of larceny. Formerly a distinction was made between saying, "You are a thief, you have stolen," or "and have stolen my trees," and saying, "You are a thief, for you have stolen," etc.; but latter opinions make no difference, if the words are spoken at the same time. Ogden v. Riley, 14 N. J. Law (2 J. S. Green) 186, 187, 25 Am. Dec. 513. The charge that another man is a "thief," though actionable per se as charging a felony, is not actionable if spoken in relation to a subject as to which no larceny or felony was capable of being committed. Fawsett v. Clark, 48 Md. 494, 502, 30 Am. Rep. 481. Eyre, C. J., in Saville v. Jardine, 2 H. Bl. 531, in holding that charging plaintiff with being a swindler was not slanderous, said: ""Thief' always implies felony, but 'cheat' not always." Chase v. Whitlock (N. Y.) 3 Hill, 139, 140. The term "thieves," as used in a marine policy insuring against thieves, etc., "is not intended as a mere translation of the word 'pillage,' used in the ordinance of Louis IX and the present Commercial Codes of France and other continental powers, and hence it is not confined to assaulting thieves, or those who assault and rob the ship by violence from without, but includes persons on shipboard as passengers who commit larceny without the fault of the assured." American Ins. Co. v. Bryan (N. Y.) 26 Wend. 563, 573, 37 Am. Dec. 278; Id., 1 Hill, 25, 28. THIEVING. The adjective "thieving" imports an act committed, and not merely an inclination to commit it; and to charge one with being a thieving person is to charge him with be ing guilty of stealing. Allen v. Neely (Ind.) 5 Blackf. 200, 201; Reynolds v. Ross, 42 Ind. 387. The words "He gets his living by thieving," are actionable per se. Rutherford V. Moore (U. S.) 21 Fed. Cas. 95. The term "thieving puppy", or "thieving wretch," imports a felony, and would be so understood by any one of ordinary understanding; and therefore a charge that another is a thieving puppy is actionable. Little v. Barlow, 26 Ga. 423, 425, 71 Am. Dec. 219. THIN. THING OF VALUE "Thin" is defined as slender, slight, or flimsy; so that an instruction that "I think it is a very thin case" expresses an opinion as to the merits of the case detrimental to the plaintiff, and is erroneous. Sieling v. Clark, 41 N. Y. Supp. 982, 985, 18 Misc. Rep. 464. THING. See "Incorporeal Thing." Other thing, see "Other." The word "thing" is of extensive signification, and in common parlance may intend all matters of substance, in contradistinction to person; but in a deed in which the grantor grants, assigns, bargains, and sells all goods, chattels, debts, moneys, and all other things whatsoever, as well real or personal, without any description or allusion to any particular tract of land, does not pass real estate. Ingell v. Nooney, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 362, 367, 13 Am. Dec. 434. The civil law of Spain, after dividing things into those of divine right and those of human right, subdivides the former into things sacred and religious, and the latter (or human) things, into things common, things public, things of a corporation or a university, and things private. Things are also divided into those which are corporeal and those which are incorporeal. Sullivan v. Richardson, 14 South. 692, 708, 33 Fla. 1. THING ADJUDGED. "Thing adjudged" is said of that which has been decided by a final judgment, from which there can be no appeal, either because the appeal did not lie, or because the time fixed by law for appealing has elapsed, or because it has been confirmed on the appeal. Civ. Code La. 1900, art. 3556, subd. 31; New Orleans Nat. Bank Ass'n v. Adams (U. S.) 18 Fed. Cas. 118, 120. THING APPENDANT. See "Appendant." THING IN ACTION. See "Chose in Action." THING OF VALUE. See, also, "Anything of Value"; "Valuable Thing." Other thing of value, see "Other." The term "thing of value," in 2 Hill's Pen. Code, § 234, providing for the punishment of any person who shall by false pretense obtain from any person anything of |