be deemed tenancies from year to year. Rothschild v. Williamson, 83 Ind. 387, 388. "Tenancies from year to year" still exist in Minnesota as at common law, except so far as the length of notice required to terminate them has been changed by Gen. St. 1878, c. 75, § 40, relating to notices to quit. Hunter v. Frost, 49 N. W. 327, 329, 47 Minn. 1. The decided weight of authority is that, when a lease is made not complying with the statute of frauds and possession is taken, there arises by operation of law a "tenancy from year to year." This implied tenancy will arise where occupation is had under a parol demise for years, void because exceeding the period allowed by the statute of frauds. Tayl. Landl. & Ten. 56. An entry under a lease for a term at an annual rent void for any cause, and a payment for rent, creates a tenancy from year to year on the terms of the lease, except as to duration. Arbenz v. Exley, Watkins & Co., 44 S. E. 149, 150, 52 W. Va. 476, 61 L. R. A. 957 (citing Wood, St. Frauds, § 22). The term "year," as used in speaking of the estates from year to year, is merely descriptive, and therefore the estate includes tenancies from month to month, etc. Rosenblat v. Perkins, 22 Pac. 598, 600, 18 Or. 156, 6 L. R. A. 257. TENANT IN COMMON. "Tenants in common" are such as hold by several and distinct titles, but by unity of possession, because none knoweth his own severalty, and therefore they all occupy promiscuously. 2 Bl. Comm. 191; Gould v. Subdistrict No. 3, 8 Minn. 427, 431 (Gil. 382, 384); Coster v. Lorillard (N. Y.) 14 Wend. 336; Manhattan Real Estate & Building Ass'n v. Cudlipp, 80 N. Y. Supp. 993, 996, 80 App. Div. 532; Taylor v. Millard, 28 N. Y. St. Rep. 694, 695; Taylor v. Millard, 23 N. E. 376, 377, 118 N. Y. 244, 6 L. R. A. 667; Griswold v. Johnson, 5 Conn. 363, 365; Silloway v. Brown, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 30, 36; Gittings v. Worthington, 9 Atl. 228, 233, 67 Md. 139; O'Bryan v. Brown (Tenn.) 48 S. W. 315, 316. There is no necessity for unity of interest. Tenants in common are such as have a unity of possession, but distinct and several titles to their shares. Tilton v. Vail (N. Y.) 42 Hun, 638, 640. The quantities of their estate may be different, the shares may be unequal, the modes of acquisition of title may be unlike, and the only unity between them be that of possession. A remainderman may have a constructive possession sufficient to constitute the unity of the right of possession required to exist in a tenancy in common, and enable him to maintain an action for partition during the life of the life tenant. Sullivan v. Sullivan (N. Y.) 4 Hun, 198, 200. Tenants in common are tenants who "are seized per my and per tout, each being entitled before severance to an interest in every inch of the soil." Martin v. Bowie, 15 S. E. 736, 742, 37 S. C. 102. The relation of tenant in common arises where two or more persons are entitled to lands in such a manner that they have an undivided possession, but several freeholds; i. e., no one of them is entitled to the exclusive possession of any particular part of the land, each being entitled to occupy the whole in common with the others or to re ceive his share of the rents and profits. Car ver v. Fennimore, 19 N. E. 103, 104, 116 Ind. 236 (citing Rap. & L. Law Dict.). "Tenants in common are such as hold lands and tenements by any kind of title, either in fee, for life, for years, or at will." Bouv. Law Dict. 580. "There can be no tenancy in common in a mere actual possession by one. There must be some right or title to the possession, and not a mere actual possession, to create a co-tenancy. There may be a partnership or tenancy in common in a right or title to land; but I cannot see how there could be a partnership or tenancy in common in an actual possession, unless all the partners or tenants in common were actually occupying the land." Lillianskyoldt v. Goss, 2 Utah, 292, 297. "Tenants in common" are persons who hold by unity of possession. The possession of one is the possession of the other, and the taking of the whole profits by one does not amount to an ouster of his companions. Tenancy in common is a joint estate, in which there is unity of possession, but separate and distinct titles. The tenants have separate and independent freeholds or leaseholds in their respective shares, which they manage and dispose of as freely as if the estate was one in severalty. There is no restriction upon their power of alienation; and the tenant may dispose of it by will, while the heirs of an intestate tenant will inherit the estate. Gage v. Gage, 29 Atl. 543, 546, 66 N. H. 282, 28 L. R. A. 829. A tenancy in common is not created by several purchases of distinct and specific portions of common property, for it is said "tenants in common are generally defined to be such as hold the same land together by several and distinct title and by unity of possession, because none knows his own sevly." Hunter v. State, 30 S. W. 42, 44, 60 Ark. eralty, and therefore all occupy promiscuous312 (citing Black, Law Dict.). Where one rents land for the purpose of having a single crop raised on it, of which the lessor is to have a part for the use of the land and the cultivator a part for his labor, and there is no evidence that it was the intention that the relation of landlord and tenant should exist between them, the TENANT IN COMMON 6909 TEND TO EXPOSE parties are to be considered as tenants in the sale until a redemption, and a redempcommon in the crop. Ponder v. Rhea, 32tioner from the time of his redemption until Ark. 435, 437. There can be neither a tenancy in common, nor a common interest, nor a joint tenancy and survivorship, in a mere expectancy; but, in order to create the object of a tenancy in common, there must be an actual estate in possession. Betts v. Betts (N. Y.) 4 Abb. N. C. 317, 353. Wherever two or more persons from any cause are entitled to the possession simultaneously of any property in the state, a tenancy in common is created. Tenants in common may have unequal shares. They will be held to be equal, unless the contrary appears. The fact of inequality does not give the person holding the greater interest any privileges, as to possession, superior to the person owning a lesser interest, so long as the tenancy continues. Civ. Code Ga. 1895, § 3143. Joint tenants distinguished. The essential difference between joint tenants and tenants in common is that joint tenants have the land by one joint title and in one right, and tenants in common have several titles or by one title and several rights, which is the reason joint tenants have one joint freehold, and tenants in common have several freeholds. Coster v. Lorillard (N. Y.) 14 Wend. 265, 336. The only practical difference between the estates of joint tenancy and tenancy in common is the right of survivorship, and, as the statute has abolished this and provided that the estate holden should be considered in the same manner as if they had been tenants in common, all distinction has been destroyed. Redemptorist Fathers v. Lawler, 54 Atl. 487, 488, 205 Pa. 24. As owner. See "Owner." TENANT IN DOWER. "Tenancy in dower" arises where the husband is seised of an estate of inheritance and dies. In this case the wife shall have a third part of all the lands and tenements whereof he was seised at any time during the coverture, to hold to herself for the term of her natural life. Combs v. Young's Heirs, 12 Tenn. (4 Yerg.) 218, 225, 26 Am. Dec. 225 (citing 2 Bl. Comm. 12a; Co. Litt. 31a). TENANT IN FEE SIMPLE. See "Fee Simple." another redemption, shall be entitled to receive from the tenant in possession the rents of the property sold or the value of the use and occupation thereof." Held, that the phrase "tenant in possession" was intended to designate the class of persons from whom the purchaser was to receive the rents, and embraced the judgment debtor, as well as his lessee. Harris v. Reynolds, 13 Cal. 514, 516, 73 Am. Dec. 600 (quoted in Whithed v. St. Anthony & D. Elevator Co., 83 N. W. 238, 239, 9 N. D. 224, 50 L. R. A. 254, 81 Am. St. Rep. 562). The language is not that, when a tenant of the debtor is in possession, the tenant shall pay the purchaser, or that the debtor, when in possession, shall not pay; but the phraseology designed evidently to fix a general right, applying to all cases of tenancy, for none are excluded. Walker v. McCusker, 12 Pac. 723, 724, 71 Cal. 594. TENANT OF THE FREEHOLD. The phrase "tenant of the freehold," in a statute relating to the acquisition of land for public purposes, and providing for certain notice to be served on the tenant of the freehold, means tenant in possession appearing as a visible owner. Culpeper County v. Gorrell (Va.) 20 Grat. 484, 511. TENANTABLE REPAIR. See "Good Tenantable Repair." TENANT'S FIXTURES. The term "tenant's fixtures," in a strict legal definition, is to be understood to signify things which are fixed to the freehold of the demised premises, but which nevertheless the tenant is allowed to disannex and take away, provided he seasonably exert his right to do so. A cistern and sinks, put into a building leased as a hotel, though fastened by nails or set into the floor by cutting away the boards, and water pipes fastened to the walls by hooks and passing through holes cut for the purpose in the floors and partitions, were held to be tenant's fixtures. Wall v. Hinds, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 256, 270, 64 Am. Dec. 64. TEND TO EXPOSE. An instruction in a libel suit stating that matter is libelous which "tends to expose a man to public hatred" is a substantial compliance with Pen. Code, § 242, defining libel to be a malicious publication, etc., which exposes any person to contempt, ridicule, etc. Practice Act, § 236, provided that "the Turton v. New York Recorder Co., 22 N. Y. purchaser at sheriff's sale from the time of | Supp. 766, 769, 3 Misc. Rep. 314. TENANT IN POSSESSION. TENDED LINE. "Tended line," as used in V. S. § 4583, imposing a penalty upon certain fishing, except fishing through ice with not more than 15 tended lines, means a line with a single hook fastened to any object upon the bank or upon the ice. State v. Stevens, 38 Atl. 80, 81, 69 Vt. 411. TENDER. "Tender" is defined to be the offer of money in satisfaction of a debt, by producing and showing the amount to the creditor or party claiming, and expressing verbally a willingness to pay it. Tompkins v. Batie, 7 N. W. 747, 748, 11 Neb. 147, 38 Am. Rep. 361 (citing Worcest. Dict.). "Tender" is an offer to perform an act which the party offering is bound to perform. McClain v. Batton, 50 W. Va. 121, 130, 40 S. E. 509. Actual or manual production. To constitute a valid legal tender there must be an actual offer of the sum due, unless the actual production of the money be dispensed with by a refusal to accept or something equivalent thereto; and this offer must be an absolute one, not coupled with any condition. See 2 Starkie, Ev. 778, 779, and cases there cited. Hunter v. Warner, 1 Wis. 141, 147. Under a plea of tender, however, the party is not required to prove a literal and actual compliance with all the requisites of a legal tender, as it is defined in the books, in order to maintain the issue. He may prove his affirmance by showing an offer to pay in bank notes, which was not rejected on account of the character of the medium, or he may show that, when about to produce the money or thing to be tendered, his adversary told him it was unnecessary, and that he would not accept it, or any other act or decites of a stated legal tender were dispensed laration by which some of the formal requiswith. Holmes v. Holmes (N. Y.) 12 Barb. 137, 144. Equivalent to payment. For the purpose of avoiding a penalty and forfeiture, or the loss of any rights or privileges, tender is the exact equivalent of payment, and it does not have to be repeated. Beatty v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (U. S.) 75 Fed. 65, 72, 21 C. C. A. 227. Tender, if of sufficient amount, when accepted, is payment. When rejected, it opBrown v. Lawton, 32 Atl. 733, 735, 87 Me. 83. erates as payment so long as it is kept good. . A legal tender is equivalent to payment as to all things that are incidental or consequential to the debt. The creditor, while not losing his rights to the prior debt by refusal of the tender itself, loses all collateral benefit and securities; and, where the tender is followed by payment into the court, interTo prove a plea of tender it must appear that there was a production and manual est and costs cannot be recovered. Wright offer of the money, unless the same be dis-V. John A. Robinson & Co., 32 N. Y. Supp. pensed with by some positive act or dec- 463, 466, 84 Hun, 172. laration on the part of the creditor; and it is not enough that the party has the money in his pocket, and says to the creditor that he has it ready for him, and asks him to take it, without showing the money. Bakeman v. Pooler (N. Y.) 15 Wend. 637, 638. A plea of tender, offered at any time, at rules, or in court, ought not to be received unless the money tendered accompanies it. Downman v. Downman's Ex'rs (Va.) 1 Wash. 26, 31. A tender must be made in money current at the time; otherwise, it is not money at all, and there is no tender. Downman v. Downman's Ex'rs (Va.) 1 Wash. 26, 31. "Tender" has a definite legal signification. It imports, not merely the readiness and an ability to pay the money or to deliver over the deed or the property at the time and place mentioned in the contract, but also the actual production of the thing to be paid or delivered over, and an offer of it to the person to whom the tender is to be made. A money tender means an offer to pay in specie, and in the description of coin made current by the act of Congress. The word "tender," as used in connection with mutual and concurrent promises, does not mean the same kind of offer as when it is used with reference to the payment or offer to pay an ordinary debt due in money, where the money is offered to a creditor who is entitled to receive it and nothing further remains to be done, and the transaction is completed and ended, but it only means a readiness and willingness, accompanied with the ability, on the part of one of the parties to do the acts which the agreement requires him to perform, provided | dition that the party who receives the money that the other will concurrently do the acts shall acknowledge that no more is due, it which he is required to do by it, and a no- will invalidate the tender. The reason of tice of the former to the latter of such readi- this rule is manifest; for if the tender be of ness. Smith v. Lewis, 26 Conn. 110, 119; a sum as all that is due, that being disputed, Raudabaugh v. Hart, 55 N. E. 214, 218, 61 and the creditor receives it, under these cirOhio St. 73, 76 Am. St. Rep. 361; Aborn v. cumstances it might compromise his rights Mason (U. S.) 1 Fed. Cas. 37, 39 (citing in seeking to recover more; whereas, if the Smith v. Lewis, 26 Conn. 110; Adams v. same sum were tendered unconditionally, no Clark, 63 Mass. [9 Cush.] 215, 57 Am. Dec. such effect would follow. Thompkins v. 41); Cook v. Doggett, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) Batie, 7 N. W. 747, 748, 11 Neb. 147, 38 Am. 439, 441; Guilford v. Mason, 48 Atl. 386, 388, Rep. 361. 22 R. I. 422. See, also, Manistee Lumber Co. v. Union Nat. Bank, 32 N. E. 449, 452, 143 Ill. 490; Shouse v. Doane, 21 South. 807, 811, 39 Fla. 95. In the case of mutual and concurrent promises, the word "tender" does not mean the same kind of an offer as when used in reference to the payment of a debt due in money; but it only means a readiness and willingness, accompanied with an ability on the part of the party, and such a tender does not require the bringing of money into court to keep it. Clark v. Weis, 87 Ill. 438, 441, 29 Am. Rep. 60. Payment into court distinguished. "Tender" is defined to be an offer by a debtor to the creditor of the amount of the debt. The offer must be in lawful money, which must be actually produced to the creditor, unless by words or acts he waives production, and the offer must be definite and unconditional. The payment of money into court under order is more than a simple tender. A tender is an offer to pay the debtor before suit, and cannot be made after suit is brought. It is purely ex parte. If it is not accepted, the debtor must retain his money; and, if established on plea, the only effect is to stop interest thenceforward on the amount tendered. But a payment into court is different. It is not ex parte, but done by order of court. The money paid in is for the plaintiff, and the possession of it cannot be resumed by the debtor. Salinas v. Ellis, 2 S. E. 121, 122, 26 S. C. 337. When a strict tender of money is required, it must be an unconditional offer of the full amount due, leaving it only at the will of the other to accept it. Irvin v. Gregory, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 215, 218. Where an offer is made to pay money by way of compromise, and with the understanding between the parties that, if the money is accepted, it shall be a complete and final settlement of all matters of dispute between the parties, such offer is not a tender in law, since a tender must be without condition, absolutely. Latham v. Hartford, 27 Kan. 249, 251. An offer of money, coupled with the statement that it is a tender, in payment in full of all claims of the person to whom the money is thus offered, does not constitute a tender. Shiland v. Loeb, 69 N. Y. Supp. 11, 12, 58 App. Div. 565. TENDER YEARS. The phrase "minor of tender years," used in various connections in pleadings, may embrace as well minors of 20 years as of 20 months. It cannot be said absolutely what is or is not a tender age, and, applying to the rule that a pleading is to be taken most strongly against the pleader, little more effect can apparently be given to the phrase "minor of tender years" than that it indicates a minor not endowed with the discretion of maturity. Meyer v. King, 16 South. 245, 246, 72 Miss. 1, 35 L. R. A. 474. Unconditional offer necessary. A tender, in order to be effective, must TENDING TO SHOW. be unconditioned. United States v. World's Columbian Exposition (U. S.) 56 Fed. 630, 638. A tender of money for the payment of a debt, to be available as a defense or as the foundation of an action in favor of the party making the tender, must be without qualification. Noyes v. Wyckoff, 21 N. E. 158, 114 N. Y. 204. Tender must be unconditional. Thus, although a party who tenders money has a right to exclude any presumption against himself that the sum tendered is in part payment of the debt, yet, if he add a con The statement that there has been evidence "tendin', to show" a particular fact is equivalent to a statement that evidence has been off red relating to such fact; the force and effect of the evidence being in no sense suggested by the term. White v. State, 54 N. E. 763, 765, 153 Ind. 689. TENEMENT. See "Single Tenement." "Tenement" signifies anything that may be holden, provided it be of a permanent na ture, whether it be of a substantial and sensible, or of an unsubstantial, ideal kind. Mitchell v. Warner, 5 Conn. 497, 517 (citing 2 Bl. Comm. 16, 17; 1 Inst. 6); Lenfers v. Henke, 73 Ill. 405, 408, 24 Am. Rep. 263; Keller v. Pagan, 32 S. E. 353, 355, 54 S. C. 255. The word "tenement" embraces, not only what may be inherited, but whatever may be holden. Pond v. Bergh (N. Y.) 10 Paige, 140, 156. The word "tenement," in its most extensive signification, comprehends everything which may be holden, provided it be of a permanent nature. In a more restricted sense, it is a house or building. Oskaloosa Water Co. v. Board of Equalization, 51 N. W. 18, 19, 84 Iowa, 407, 15 L. R. A. 296. The word "tenement," in its legal sense, means an estate in land, or some estate or interest connected with, pertaining to, or growing out of the realty, of which the owner might be disseised. A tenement comprises everything which may be holden so as to create a tenancy in the feudal sense of the word. Field v. Higgins, 35 Me. 339, 341, 342 (citing 3 Kent, Comm. 401). "Tenement," in its ordinary acceptance, is applied to houses and other buildings, yet in its proper legal sense it signifies everything that may be holden. It not only in cludes land, but rents and other interests. Oskaloosa Water Co. v. Board of Equalization, 51 N. W. 18, 19, 84 Iowa, 407, 15 L. R. A. 296. The word "tenement." in legal acceptation, means property held by a tenant. Marmet Co. v. Archibald, 17 S. E. 299, 300, 37 W. Va. 778. "Tenement" is frequently used in a restricted sense, as signifying a house or building; but it is also used in a much more enlarged sense, as signifying land or any corporeal inheritance, and it will be understood in its enlarged sense in remedial statutes, like St. 1825, c. 89, providing further remedies for landlord and tenants. Sacket v. Wheaton, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 103, 105. "Tenement" is a large word which will pass, not only lands and other inheritances, which are holden, but also offices, rents, commons, and profits arising from lands. 1 Co. Litt. 219; Shep. Touch. 91. 'With us the word 'tenement' is applied exclusively to land, or what is usually denominated real property.' Gibson v. Brockway, 8 N. H. 465, 470, 31 Am. Dec. 200 (quoting Stearns, 99 Real Actions, 150). "Tenements." as used in the common law, entitling a wife to dower in all lands and tenements of which the husband died seised, is, according to Blackstone, a word of greater extent than "lands," which in cludes any ground, soil, or earth whatever, and has in its legal signification an indefinite extent upward as well as downward. Lenfers v. Henke, 73 Ill, 405, 408, 24 Am. Rep. 263. "Tenements" is a word of greater meaning and extent sometimes than "land," and includes, not only land, but rents, commons, and several other rights and interests issuing out of or concerning land. Canfield v. Ford (N. Y.) 28 Barb. 336, 338. Pier or wharf. A wharf or pier, reclaimed from tide water by embankment or by raising the bottom with stone, earth, or other material, is a "tenement," within the meaning of 2 Rev. St. p. 512, which authorizes summary proceedings in favor of a landlord to recover the possession of houses, lands, or tenements. The word "tenement" signifies everything which may be holden, if it be of a permanent nature. People v. Kelsey (N. Y.) 14 Abb. Prac. 372, 376. Railroad franchise. The word "tenements," while embracing simple franchises, nevertheless, as used in a statute relative to forcible entry and detainer, must be restricted to tenements upon which an entry can be made and of which there can be tangible possession, and hence does not include a railroad franchise. Gibbs v. Drew, 16 Fla. 147, 150, 28 Am. Rep. 700. Term for years. In an action for damages sustained by a breach of an implied covenant for quiet enjoyment in a lease of a wharf, with the right to collect wharfage for one year, the court said: "A term for years in lands is not in law a 'tenement' or a 'hereditament.' Coke says that "tenementum," or "tenement," is a large word, which will pass, not only lands and other inheritances, which are holden, but also offices, rents, commons, profits à prendre out of lands, and the like, wherein a man hath any frank tenement, and whereof he is seised ut de libero tenemento.' 1 Co. Litt. (by Thomas) 219. 'But "hereditaments," ' word of all that kind; for whatsoever may ," he says, 'is the largest be inherited is a hereditament, be it corporeal or incorporeal, real, personal or mixed.' Id. The first of these definitions requires that the estate or interest, to amount to a tenement, should be a freehold at least, and the second, it must be descendible by into be termed a hereditament, according to heritance." The "terms for years" fall within the definition of things personal. They go to the executors, like other chattels, and, although they are denominated "chattels real," to distinguish them from mere movables, they are not, when speaking with legal ac |