do not come within the exceptions of a cove- | 198; Speer v. City of Athens, 11 S. E. 802, nant against incumbrances in a warranty 805, 85 Ga. 49, 9 L. R. A. 402; Gosnell v. deed, except taxes. Cleveland Park Land City of Louisville, 46 S. W. 722, 725, 104 Ky. & Improvement Co. v. Campbell, 65 Mo. App. 201; Bond v. City of Kenosha, 17 Wis. 284, 109, 113. 288. There is no doubt that the word "taxes," in a deed conveying land clear from taxes, may be used in such a way as to include or exclude an assessment for a sewer. In Smith v. Abington Sav. Bank, 165 Mass. 285, 42 N. E. 1133, an exception of "the taxes assessed for the year 1893" from a covenant against incumbrances in a deed was held to refer only to the ordinary annual taxes, and not to embrace such a lien; and where a deed conveyed a good title, free of taxes, it included the special assessment. Williams v. Monk, 60 N. E. 394, 179 Mass. 22. Assessments for street and sidewalk improvements are not within the covenant of a lessee to pay the water tax and half of all other taxes levied on the property. De Clercq v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 47 N. E. 367, 167 Ill. 215. Where a covenant in a deed is to the effect that the premises were free from incumbrances, except taxes, it is possible for the grantee to establish a construction of the term "taxes" which would exclude local as sessments. Sullivan v. Hamilton, 43 N. Y. Supp. 302, 13 App. Div. 140. In the ordinary use of the words "tax” and "assessments," there is a recognized difference between their meaning. The one does not in any sense include the other. Thus a constitutional provision that taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state does not apply to local assessments on private property to pay for local improve ments. So a provision of the Constitution of a state which requires "the rule of taxation to be uniform," in connection with another provision that "it shall be the duty of the Legislature to provide for the organization of cities and to restrain their power of taxation, assessment," etc., “so as tion," is also construed not to apply to speto prevent abuses in assessments and taxacial assessments by municipal corporations made by authority of the Legislature for local improvements. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. City of Grand Rapids, 60 N. W. 767, 770, 102 Mich. 374, 29 L. R. A. 195 (quoting Dill. Mun. Corp. § 778). An assessment for improving a street in a city is a tax, and hence must be levied with uniformity. Whiting v. Quackenbush, 54 Cal. 306, 310. "Taxing," as used in the Constitution, providing that laws shall be passed taxing by uniform rule, etc., all property according to its true value, etc., should not be construed as distinguished from the word "assessing," as meaning that the term "tax" is applicable to a general tax, while an assessment relates merely to a levy under a local ordinance, but should be construed to apply to local improvement assessments of a city. Peay v. City of Little Rock, 32 Ark. The word "assessments," as used in a deed of lots sold under ordinance of 1790, providing that the lots shall be held forever on payment of the ground rent, but shall be subject to all such assessments and burdens as might be in common with other lot holders in the city, will not be construed in its more modern meaning of a peculiar kind of tax levied upon land specially benefited by improvements which are to be paid for by such assessments. The fact is notorious that a century ago special assessments of this kind on the lands benefited were not 31, 35. usual in this country, and at that time the word "assessment" was used as synonymous with rates or taxes generally. Hence such lands are not exempt from taxation. Wells v. City of Savannah, 21 Sup. Ct. 697, 701, 181 U. S. 531, 45 L. Ed. 986; Id., 32 S. E. 669, 670, 107 Ga. 1. Same-Equality and uniformity. Constitutional provisions that all "taxes" or "taxation" shall be equal and uniform apply only to general taxation, and have no application to local assessments. Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. v. Smart, 25 South. 443, 446, 51 La. Ann. 416; Motz v. City of Detroit, 18 Mich. 495, 514; Woodbridge v. City of Detroit, 8 Mich. 274, 280; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497; Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345, 356; Taylor v. Boyd, 63 Tex. 533, 541; Beaumont v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 21 Atl. 888, 891, 142 Pa. A tax for lawful improvements, levied on the property within a district created by an act of the Legislature,. authorizing the imposition of the tax, is a tax within the meaning of Const. art. 11, § 13, providing that "taxation" shall be equal and uniform through the state, and that all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law. Smith v. Farrelly, 52 Cal. 77, 81. The term "taxation," as used in Const. art. 1, § 32, declaring that no tax or duty shall be imposed without the consent of the people, or their representatives in the legislative assembly, and that all taxation shall be equal and uniform, can be limited alone to the meeting of such expenses as are necessary for the maintenance of the general government of state, county, city, etc., and that the full power resides in the legislative A special tax on a railroad, in lieu of all other taxes, does not confer an exemption from special assessments for local improvements. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. City of Grand Rapids, 60 N. W. 767, 770, 102 Mich. 374, 29 L. R. A. 195. The word "tax," as used in Connecticut statutes imposing a tax upon a railroad company and providing that the tax so imposed shall take the place and be in lieu of all other taxes on the railroad, does not include a local assessment imposed for a local improvement. City of Bridgeport v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 36 Conn. 255, 262, 4 Am. Rep. 63. A railroad company, which by its charter is exempt from all "taxation" of every kind, is nevertheless liable to a special tax levied on its right of way for street paving; special taxation for local improvements not being in the nature of taxation, but being based on the doctrine of compensation for the benefit received from the improvement. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. City of Decatur, 18 N. E. 315, 316, 126 Ill. 92, 1 L. R. A. 613. The provision of the act "to provide for raising taxes for the use of the state upon certain corporations," etc., exempting from assessment and taxation, save as provided for in the act, the capital stock and personal property of the corporations specified, applies only to state taxation, and does not affect the right of municipal authorities to assess and tax such property for local purposes. People v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 574, 575. A gross earnings tax on a railroad, "in lieu of all taxes and assessments whatever," relieves it from any charge or special tax imposed on the property for local improvements. First Division of St. Paul & P. R. Co. v. City of St. Paul, 21 Minn. 526, 529; City of St. Paul v. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co., 23 Minn. 469, 471. TAX-TAXATION Under the charter of a railroad authorizing the taxation of its capital stock, and providing that "no other or further tax or imposition" should be levied, it was not liable for an assessment for a portion of the damages and expenses of altering and widening a street used by its tracks. New Jersey R. & Transp. Co. v. City of Newark, 27 N. J. Law (3 Dutch.) 185, 193. The phrase "exempt from taxation," as used in the statutes of Illinois, providing that the property of the Illinois & Michigan Canal shall be exempt from taxation of every description, etc., does not include assessments for improvements. Trustees of Illinois & M. Canal v. City of Chicago, 12 Ill. (2 Peck) 403, 406. An exemption of the lands of a manuand impositions" does not relieve it from facturing corporation from "taxes, charges, assessments for street improvements. City of Paterson v. Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures, 24 N. J. Law (4 Zab.) 385, 400. The exemption of the property of a religious or charitable institution from "taxation" does not exempt it from assessments for local improvements. Boston Asylum & Farm School for Indigent Boys v. Street Com'rs of City of Boston, 62 N. E. 961, 962, 180 Mass. 485; Boston Seamen's Friend Soc. V. City of Boston, 116 Mass. 181, 183, 17 Am. Rep. 153; First Presbyterian Church v. City of Ft. Wayne, 36 Ind. 338, 339, 10 Am. Rep. 35; In re College St., 8 R. I. 474, 483; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. City of Grand Rapids, 60 N. W. 767, 769, 102 Mich. 374, 29 L. R. A. 195; In re City of New York (N. Y.) 11 Johns. 77, 80, 81; Roosevelt Hospital v. City of New York, 84 N. Y. 108, 112; Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo. 155, 157, 11 Am. Rep. 412; City of Chicago v. Baptist Theological Union, 2 N. E. 254, 256, 115 III. 245; City of Louisville v. McNaughten (Ky.) 44 S. W. 380. Nor does an exemption from "taxation for governmental purposes." Kilgus v. Trustees of Orphanage of the Good Shepherd, 22 S. W. 750, 751, 94 Ky. 439, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 318. Nor an exemption from "all taxation by state or local laws for any tist Orphans' Home, 17 S. W. 212, 213, 92 Ky. purpose whatever." Zable v. Louisville Bap89, 13 L. R. A. 668. But an exemption from "all taxes and assessments" relieves it from assessments for local improvements. Pro prietors of Swan Point Cemetery v. Tripp, 14 R. I. 199, 203; Hudson County Catholic Protectory v. Board of Township Committee of Kearney Tp., 28 Atl. 1043, 1044, 56 N. J. Law (27 Vroom) 385. Contra, see Protestant Foster Home Soc. v. City of Newark, 35 N. J. Law (6 Vroom) 157, 162, 10 Am. Rep. 223; Id., 36 N. J. Law (7 Vroom) 478, 13 Am. Rep. 464. Likewise an exemption from “taxation, excepting for state purposes." Olive Ceme tery Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 129, | for taxes imposed on owners and occupants 132, 39 Am. Rep. 732. merely, and not on their lands. Sharpe ▼. Within Act May 11, 1874, exempting churches and schoolhouses belonging to any county and certain other public buildings from all and every county, city, borough, bounty, road, school, and poor tax, an assessment for the purpose of building a school is a "tax." That such assessment is a tax is definitely settled in the case of Olive Cemetery Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 129, 39 Am. Rep. 732, where it is said: "It is conceded, however, that the authority to make and collect such assessments is delegated by the commonwealth. If it does not emanate from the inherent powers of the government to levy and collect taxes, it is difficult to understand whence it comes. The only warrant for delegating such authority must be either in the right of eminent domain or in the taxing power. It cannot be found in the former; hence it must be in the latter." City of Erie v. First Universalist Church, 105 Pa. 278, 279. An exemption of public buildings from "taxation" does not include special assessments. Adams County v. City of Quincy, 22 N. E. 624, 626, 130 Ill. 566, 6 L. R. A. 155. An assessment for purposes of irrigation against the pueblo lands of a city, which are vacant, unoccupied, and, when irrigated, susceptible of cultivation, by an irrigation district, is not a tax, within the consideration exempting municipal property from taxation. City of San Diego v. Linda Vista Irr. Dist., 41 Pac. 291, 292, 108 Cal. 189. The exemption of real estate of incorporated agricultural societies from taxation by Gen. St. c. 11, § 5, is only from taxation imposed for the general public purposes of the government, and does not apply to taxation for local improvements. Worcester Agricultural Soc. v. City of Worcester, 116 Mass. 189, 191. Same-Forced sale. Within Const. art. 16, § 50, subjecting homesteads to forced sale for taxes due thereon, does not include a special assessment against a homestead for street paving. Lovenberg v. City of Galveston, 42 S. W. 1024, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 162. A power given to a municipal corporation to sell land for taxes will not authorize a sale for a mere assessment for benefit. Sharp v. Johnson (N. Y.) 4 Hill, 92, 102, 40 Am. Dec. 259. The statutes have made a plain distinction between taxes which are burdens or charges imposed on persons or property to raise money for public purposes and assessments for city or village improvements, which are not regarded as burdens; and hence a city has no authority to sell lands Speir (N. Y.) 4 Hill, 76, 82. Same-Jurisdiction. Assessments against the property owner for the cost of the banquette or paving laid in front of his property under the provisions of a city charter are not "taxes" in the meaning of the article of the Louisiana Constitution defining the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Fayssoux v. Denis, 19 South. 760, 761, 48 La. Ann. 850. Const. 1898, art. 85, declaring that the apThe words "tax, toll, and impost," in. pellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases in which the con stitutionality of any tax, toll, or impost whatand every exaction, charge, contribution, burever shall be in contestation, include any den, or tribute levied on the citizen or his property, whenever money or funds are demanded by the law from the citizen or assessed against his property, no matter what the form or method of taxation, whether for general purposes or for local benefits; the language of the Constitution being intentionally made broad enough to cover it. A controversy as to the validity of a city or dinance imposing an assessment on abutting property for the improvement of the street is, therefore, appealable to the Supreme Court, because the cost of the local assessment involved is a tax within the meaning of the constitutional provision. City of Shreveport v. Prescott, 26 South. 664, 667, 51 La. Ann. 1895, 46 L. R. A. 193. "Taxes," as used in Const. art. 6, § 9, providing that the county court shall have jurisdiction in all matters relating to county taxes, has reference to taxation for general county purposes, and does not include special local assessments, which are raised to be expended for the improvement of the property taxed, and not for the common welfare. McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40, 51. Same-Limitation of amount of taxation. An assessment for the grading and paving of a street is not a tax, so as to affect the limit fixed on city authorities as to the extent of a tax they may lay in any one year. Borough of Greensburg v. Young, 53 Pa. (3 P. F. Smith) 280, 284. A local assessment for public works, levied, not on the taxable property generally for mere common public benefit, but only on particular property severally benefited by the works as an equivalent for the direct benefit conferred, are not taxes within the meaning of constitutional restrictions on the power of taxation. Charnock v. Fordoche & Grosse-Tête Special Levee Dist. Co., 38 La. Ann. 323, 325. "Taxes," as used in Act March 30, 1871, providing that coupons on state bonds should be receivable for all taxes, debts, dues, and demands due the state, includes the "charges or assessments made by law as a condition precedent to obtaining license for pursuing a business or profession." Royall v. Virginia, 6 Sup. Ct. 510, 513, 116 U. S. 572, 29 L. Ed. 735. Assessment of road labor. The assessment and performance of labor on a highway is not the payment of a tax within the poor laws. Overseers of Poor of Town of Amenia v. Overseers of Stanford (N. Y.) 6 Johns. 92, 93 (cited in Town of Starksborough v. Town of Hinesburgh, 13 Vt. 215, 221). TAX-TAXATION assessed, creates no new lien. Biggins v. People, 106 Ill. 270, 276. Debt distinguished. Eminent domain distinguished. "Taxation" exacts money or services from individuals as and for their respective shares of contribution to any public burden. Private property taken for public use by right of eminent domain is taken, not as the owner's share of contribution to a public burden, but as so much beyond his share. Special compensation is therefore made in the latter case, because the government is the debtor for the property so taken, but not in the former, be cause the payment of taxes is a duty, and creates no obligation to repay otherwise than in the proper application of the tax. TaxaThe word "taxes," in the absence of a tion operates on a community, or a class of clear indication to the contrary, must be con- persons in a community, and by some rule of sidered to refer exclusively to the ordinary apportionment. The exercise of the right of public taxes, and to be used in the sense of eminent domain operates on an individual, money, and not labor or imposts. The intent without reference to the amount or value is to be deduced from the instrument in which exacted from any other individual or class the terms are used. The assessment of road of individuals. Keeping these distinctions in labor or payment of commutation in lieu mind, it will never be difficult to determine thereof is not a tax. The ordinance of a town which of the two powers is exerted in any in Florida providing that all able-bodied male given case. People v. City of Brooklyn, 4 N. residents thereof should be subject to work | Y. (4 Comst.) 419, 424, 55 Am. Dec. 266. upon the streets and highways of said town for six days in each year does not impose a tax. Galloway v. Town of Tavares, 19 South. 170, 171, 37 Fla. 58. Assessment to pay judgment against parish. A statute which imposes damages for wrongfully enjoining the collection of taxes does not apply to an assessment made under an order of court to pay a judgment against a parish, as such an assessment is not a tax. Wilson v. Anderson, 28 La. Ann. 261. Bonus distinguished. See "Bonus." Commutation tax. The provisions of Const. art. 7, § 14, requiring three-fifths to form a quorum on the passage of bills to impose taxes, has no reference to the passage of a military law, by which a commutation tax is imposed on the un-uniformed militia in lieu of militia service. People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y. (4 Seld.) 317, 325. Costs, interest, and penalties. The word "taxes," as used in Revenue Act 1872, § 253, by which taxes are made a lien on the land, is declared by the act to embrace taxes, costs, interest, or penalties. Therefore the act of 1881, amending section 253, in terms making the taxes, penalties, interest, and costs a lien upon the property Fees of officers. The word "tax" in its broadest significance includes fees, costs, and all of the pecuniary burdens imposed upon the people under authority of law. But it does not follow that, because taxes might in certain cases include fees, it was necessarily intended that it should have such meaning in Const. § 20, forbidding the passage of local laws for the assessment and collection of taxes; and hence a local law regulating the fees of county officers was not unconstitutional. v. Fogus, 9 Pac. 123, 124, 19 Nev. 247. State A statute requiring, in all counties of more than 50,000 inhabitants, the sheriff and certain other officers to exact in all civil actions, suits, or proceedings certain fees and charges for the benefit of the counties, is not in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution that "the legislative assembly shall not pass special or local laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say, regulating the practice in courts of justice, * * and for the assessment and collection of taxes for state, county, township, or road purposes." The terms "assessment" and "taxation" are often used in the sense coextensive with the sovereign power under which the right is exercised, as, for instance, when applied to the raising of a special fund to defray the expenses of a public local improvement. But the long and well-established meaning of the terms, as ordinarily used in the Constitution and statutes, and as gen Fee on trackage of railroad. erally understood, imports a burden imposed to be paid by the unsuccessful party in an for general revenue, for the ordinary expen-action in court, and such fee is not a tax ses of the state, county, or township govern- within section 1, art. 11, of the Constitution. ment. The term "taxation," both in common Beebe v. Wells, 15 Pac. 565, 567, 37 Kan. 472. parlance and in the laws of the several states, has been ordinarily used, not to express the idea of sovereign power which is exercised, but the exercise of that power for a particular purpose, viz., to raise a revenue for the general and ordinary expenses of the government, whether it be the state, county, town, or city government. It is in this sense the word is used in the section of the Constitution under consideration. A law providing a salary for the sheriffs and other court officers in certain counties, and fees to be paid to the county by litigants for the services of such officers and the court, are in no sense an exercise of the taxing power, and do not con stitute the levy of a tax. State v. Frazier, 59 Pac. 5, 7, 8, 36 Or. 178. The "tax" provided for in Rev. Code, c. 28, 4, providing that on every indictment or civil suit the parties convicted or cast shall pay a tax of one dollar, and in every suit in equity a tax of two dollars, is not repealed by the general revenue act of 1858-59, repealing all taxes not therein imposed, because the tax is not the kind of taxes embraced in that revenue act. Indeed, it is not a tax at all, in the sense public taxes are understood. It is a part of the bill of costs taxed by the clerk, to be paid by the unsuccessful party in every suit, to pay the expenses of the court, the aid of which he has wrongfully invoked at the public expense. The fact that it is called a "tax" makes no difference. "Tax" is a familiar and appropriate term in judicial proceedings. The fees of clerks, sheriffs, witnesses, referees, and lawyers are all taxes upon the losing party, and are taxed by the clerk as costs. One of the definitions of tax in Webster is "to assess, fix, or determine judicially as to the amount of costs on actions in court, as 'the court taxes bills of cost.'" Hewlett v. Nutt, 79 N. C. 263, 264. Whether the sum required by Rev. St. § 148a, as amended February 12, 1889, requiring a payment to the Secretary of State for filing articles of incorporation and also of consolidation, be termed a "fee" or "tax" or "assessment," is immaterial; for it is clearly not a tax on property. The filing and record of such articles is simply an authority or license to the persons filing them to form a corporation, and the sum paid therefor is the consideration demanded and paid the state for the grant of the right to be a corporation. Ashley v. Ryan, 31 N. E. 721, 724, 49 Ohio St. 504. The word "taxed," as used in Sess. Laws 1895, c. 189, § 6, requiring the stenographer's fee to be taxed as costs in each case in the district court, is here used in the sense of assessing, fixing, or determining the amount A fee of $1 per mile for each mile of track operated within a state by a railroad, to be paid to the commissioner of railroads and telegraphs, is a tax; its nature not being affected by the name assigned to it. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. State, 16 L. R. A. 380, 383, 49 Ohio St. 189, 30 N. E. 435. Fines and forfeitures. limiting the appropriation of taxes by the "Taxes," as used in Act March 18, 1879, county court to "90 per cent. of the taxes for that year," means all the taxes levied upon the assessments of property and to be extended upon the tax books. The term does not comprehend or embrace the revenue accruing to the county from fines, forfeitures, and licenses, and does not prevent the court from appropriating that also, in addition to the appropriation of 90 per cent. of the taxes levied on the assessments of property, since the revenues to arise from fines, forfeitures, penalties, or licenses are wholly independent. and have no connection with nor relation to the amounts levied on property. Allis v. Jefferson County, 34 Ark. 307, 311. Import duties. Under Rev. St. § 3369 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2204], providing that, when forfeited cigars offered for sale will not bring a price equal to the tax due and payable thereon, such goods shall not be sold for consumption in the United States, it is held that the term "tax" is not intended to include import duties, but refers merely to the internal revenue tax. United States v. Fifty-Nine Demijohns Aguadiente and Four Barrels of Cigarettes (D. C.) 39 Fed. 401. As incumbrance. See "Incumbrance (On Title).” Judgments are the judicial sentences of |