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321: People v. Gillis, 21 Pac. 404, 405, 6 Utah, 84; People v. McDonald, 43 N. Y. 61, 63; State v. Friend, 50 N. W. 692, 693, 47 Minn. 449.

The term "taking," in the law of larceny, imports a trespass, and there is no such a taking when a bailee converts the particular article bailed; but where a trunk is left in possession of a bailee, and the latter opens it and extracts money therefrom, there is a taking which renders him guilty of larceny. Robinson v. State, 41 Tenn. (1 Cold.) 120, 121, 78 Am. Dec. 487.

Same-Lost property.

The act of the finder of bank notes in converting them to his own use with the full knowledge of who is the owner thereof does not constitute a taking, as there is no trespass in obtaining possession of the notes. Porter v. State (Tenn.) Mart. & Y. 226.

Taking possession of lost property is not such a taking, though it is with felonious intent; but taking a package from a place where it has been inadvertently left by the owner constitutes such a taking. Lawrence v. State, 20 Tenn. (1 Humph.) 228, 234, 34 Am. Dec. 644.

The term "taking," as used in the law of larceny, includes a taking of lost property with the present intention to appropriate it. Tanner v. Commonwealth (Va.) 14 Grat. 635, 637.

TAKING BAIL.

See "Bail."

TAKING BY FORCE.

"Taking by force," in the sense of the law as applied to the action of trespass, is taking without right or permission, in violation of the lawful possession of another. North Bridgewater v. Howard, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 206, 208.

TAKING DOWN TESTIMONY.

The phrase "taking down testimony," as used in section 4696b of the Code, and in Act Oct. 12, 1885, providing for the compensation of official stenographic reporters, embraces the whole process of reproducing the testimony of a witness in ordinary and intelligent writing, when necessary to comply with the law, including both the stenographic notes taken by the reporter and the translation of these notes and writing out the same in ordinary language. Where there is no conviction, so as to make it legally necessary to record the evidence, the process of taking down is complete without writing out the stenographic notes, and hence in such cases the compensation of the reporter should be limited to the time occupied in making

TALESMAN

his notes. Henderson v. Parry, 21 S. E. 144, 93 Ga. 775.

TAKING POISON.

"Taking poison," as used in a life insurance policy insuring against death from injuries through external violence and accidental means, unless it is caused from taking poison, suicide, etc., means the voluntary, intentional taking of poison, and does not include cases of accidental poisoning. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Dunlap, 43 N. E. 765, 160 III. 642, 52 Am. St. Rep. 355.

"Taking of poison," as used in an accident policy, providing that the insurer shall not be liable for death caused by the taking of poison, will be construed to include the accidental taking of poison. Hill v. Hartford Acc. Ins. Co. (N. Y.) 22 Hun, 187, 189.

TALC.

"Tale" is defined as a mineral, and it is composed chiefly of silica, magnesia, and water. Jenkins v. Johnson (U. S.) 13 Fed.. Cas. 525, 527.

TALES.

A "tales" is a supply of such men as are summoned on the first panel in order to make up a deficiency. Boyer v. Teague, 106 N. C. 576, 11 S. E. 665, 678, 19 Am. St. Rep. 547 (quoting Black. Com.).

TALES JUROR.

"Tales jurors" are persons called for no other purpose than to serve on a petit jury. They may also be designated by the term "petit jurors." State v. McCrystol, 9 South. 922, 924, 43 La. Ann. 907.

A "tales juror" is one added to a deficient panel, so as to supply the deficiency.

Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Mask, 2 South. 360, 361, 64 Miss. 738.

TALESMAN.

A "talesman" is a juror summoned to fill up a panel for the trial of a particular cause. The provision of 2 Rev. St. p. 437, 54, only authorizes the summoning of talesmen for the single case ready and moved for trial. Talesmen can, therefore, only be summoned for a single trial, and not for a circuit. Shields v. Niagara County Sav. Bank (N. Y.) 5 Thomp. & C. 585, 587.

When, by reason of challenges or any other cause, it is rendered necessary to supply any deficiency on a regular jury, or to form one or more juries, as the occasion may require, such jurors are made "talesmen." Talesmen must not be compelled to serve

longer than the day for which they were | TAMPER.
respectively summoned, unless detained long-
er on the trial of an issue or the execution of
a writ of inquiry submitted to the jury of
which they are respectively members, or
unless they are resummoned as talesmen.
Linehan v. State, 21 South. 497, 501, 113 Ala.
70.

TALLAGIUM.

"Tamper," as used in Acts 1891, c. 102, § 25, as amended by Acts 1893, c. 267, providing that after an election is over, when the ballots have been sorted and counted and the result declared and recorded, all the ballots shall in open meeting be sealed in a package, which package shall be forthwith delivered to the city, town, or plantation clerk, to be preserved by him as a public rec"Tallagium," or "tailagium," coming of ord for six months, and forbidding him to the French word "tailler," to share or cut extract from or in any manner tamper with out a part, metaphorically is taken when such package, does not mean open, though the king or any other hath a share or part the word "tamper," in a criminal statute, at of the value of a man's goods or chattels, least, has the limited meaning of improper or a share or part of the annual revenues of interference, as for the purpose of alteration his lands, or puts any charge or burden upon and to make objectionable or unauthorized another; so that "tallagium" is a general changes. Keefe v. Donnell, 42 Atl. 345, 348, word, and doth include all subsidies, taxes, 92 Me. 151 (citing Cent. Dict.). tenths, fifteenths, impositions, or other burdens or charges put or set upon any man. People v. City of Brooklyn (N. Y.) 9 Barb. 535, 551 (citing 2 Co. Inst. 532).

Sir Edward Coke, in his comment on the `statute de tallagio non concedendo says that "the word 'tallagium' is a general word, and doth include all subsidies, taxes, tenths, fifteenths, impositions, and other burdens or charges put or set on any man." Inhabitants of Bernards Tp. v. Allen, 39 Atl. 716, 718, 61 N. J. Law, 228 (citing 2 Co. Inst. 533).

TALLIAGE.

Lord Coke defined the word "talliage" to mean burdens, charges, or impositions put or set upon persons or property for public uses. State ex rel. Garth v. Switzler, 45 S. W. 245, 248, 143 Mo. 287, 40 L. R. A. 280, 65 Am. St. Rep. 653 (citing 2 Co. Inst. 532); Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. City of Grand Rapids, 60 N. W. 767, 769, 102 Mich. 374, 29 L. R. A. 195.

TALLIES OF LOAN.

The words "tallies of loan" was originally used in England to describe exchequer bills, which were issued by the officers of the exchequer when a temporary loan was necessary to meet the exigencies of the government, and charged on the credit of the exchequer in general, and made assignable from one person to another. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U. S. (11 Pet.) 257, 328, 9 L. Ed. 709, 928.

TALLOW.

TANNING.

The art of "tanning" is to change a raw skin into leather. The Century Dictionary defines tanning as "the art or process of converting hides and skins into leather." Tannage Patent Co. v. Donallan (U. S.) 93

Fed. 811, 817.

TANTAN.

The game of "tantan" is one of pure chance, and when played for anything of value comes within the inhibition of the (U, S.) 18 Fed. 253, 257. statute against gambling. In re Lee Tong

TAPERING BRUSH.

A brush differing from a common one in no other respect than in the circumstance that the hair or bristles were purposely made of unequal lengths is improperly described in a patent as a "tapering brush," there being no converging to a point. Rex v. Metcalf, 2 Starkie, 249.

TAPERING SOCKET.

A "tapering socket" is one which is adapted to receive a tapering screw. Allison v. New York & Brooklyn Bridge (U. S.) 29 Fed. 517, 521.

TAPIOCA.

"Tapioca," as a commercial term, includes tapioca flour, which is used to a slight extent in the thickening of soups, but mostly

The word "tallow," as used in the reve-by calico printers and carpet manufacturers nue act, does not include "stearin"; the lat- to thicken colors and in the manufacture of ter being a manufacture of "tallow," and a substitute for gum arabic or other gum. not tallow in its natural condition. Fair In re Townsend (U. S.) 56 Fed. 222, 223, 5 banks v. Spaulding (U. S.) 19 Fed. 416. C. C. A. 488.

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“Tare,” as used in Act March 2, 1799, § 58 (1 Stat. 671), providing that a certain allowance should be made for "tare" on articles subject to duty by weight, is the amount allowed for the outside or covering of the article imported, whether it be box, barrel, bag, bale, mat, etc., and in a commercial sense and usage has a separate and distinct meaning and application from "draft," which is an allowance to the merchant, when the duty is ascertained by weight, to insure good weight to him. Napier v. Barney (U. S.) 17 Fed. Cas. 1149.

TARIFF.

"As defined by the law dictionaries, the word 'tariff' is a cartel of commerce; a book of rates; a table or catalogue, drawn usually in alphabetical order, containing the names of several kind of merchandise, with the duties or customs to be paid for the same as settled by authority or agreed on between the several princes and states that hold commerce together." This definition is practically the same as that given by Webster, Worcester, and the Standard Dictionaries. Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Cushman, 50 S. W. 1009, 1010, 92 Tex. 623.

TARIFF RATE.

Rev. St. art. 4560d, provides that if no part of a railroad passenger ticket be used the holder shall be entitled to receive the full amount thereof, and if only a part is used he shall be entitled to the remainder of the price after deducting the tariff rate between the points for which the ticket was actually used. Held, that the words "tariff rate" referred to the rate per mile which the law authorized railroad companies to charge for transportation of passengers within the state, and, where an excursion ticket sold at reduced rates was only partially used, the sum to be deducted was the regular rate, and not the excursion rate, per mile. Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Cushman, 50 S. W. 1009, 1010, 92 Tex. 623.

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TAVERN

taverns, is not only a place where wine is sold and drinkers are entertained, but where a provision is made also for the lodging of wayfaring people. State v. Heise (S. C.) 7 Rich. Law, 518, 520.

Barroom synonymous.

The word "tavern" has been judicially defined in the case of State v. Chamblyss (S. C.) Cheves, 220, 34 Am. Dec. 593, to be a house in which a license to sell liquors in small quantities to be drunk on the spot had been granted. The word "tavern" is practically synonymous with "barroom" or "drinking shop." In re Schneider, 8 Pac. 289, 290, 11 Or. 288.

House of entertainment synonymous.

"Tavern," as used in Act Ga. 1791, requiring a license for keeping a tavern or house of entertainment, is synonymous with "house of entertainment," and means the common inns of the common law. Bonner v Welborn, 7 Ga. 296, 306.

tertainment of all travelers and strangers A tavern is a place for the general enComer v. State, 10 S. W. 106, 107, 26 Tex. who apply, paying suitable compensation. App. 509.

Inn or hotel synonymous.

"Tavern" is synonymous with "inn." They are both houses of public entertainment. Town of Crown Point v. Warner (N. Y.) 3 Hill, 150, 156.

"Tavern," as defined by Webster, "is a house licensed to sell liquor to be drunk on the spot. In some of the United States 'tavern' is synonymous with inn' and 'hotel,' and denotes a house for the entertainment of travelers as well as the sale of liquors, licensed for that purpose." Rafferty v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co., 18 N. J. Law (3 Har.) 480, 484, 38 Am. Dec. 525; People v. Jones (N. Y.) 54 Barb. 311, 316 (citing Webst. Dict.); Hall v. State (Del.) 4 Har. 132, 140; Bonner v. Welborn, 7 Ga. 296, 334, 337; People v. Jones (N. Y.) 1 Cow. Cr. R. 381, 384; Werner v. Washington (U. S.) 29 Fed. Cas. 705, 707.

"Tavern," as used in Sess. Acts 1867, p. 63 (St. Louis City Charter) § 18, authorizing

the city to "license, tax, and regulate auctioneers, grocers, retailers, and taverns," applies to all hotels and houses that entertain and accommodate the public for compensation. Webster defines a tavern to mean a commodation for travelers and other guests public house where entertainment and acare provided, an inn, or a hotel, usually li At common law any person was an inn or censed to sell liquors in small quantities. tavern keeper who made it his business to entertain travelers and passengers and provide lodging and necessaries for them and

their horses, and when they were licensed

A license in general terms to keep a

they usually had the privilege of selling liq- "tavern" authorizes the tavern keeper to uors. In this country, "hotel" and "public vend spirituous liquors in his barroom or house" are used synonymously with "tav- tavern to his guests or others in small quanern," and while they entertain the traveling tities, to be drunk in the tavern or elsepublic and keep guests and receive compen- where. Commonwealth v. Kamp, 53 Ky. (14 sation therefor they do not lose their char- B. Mon.) 385. acter, though they may not have the privilege of selling liquors. The words "hotel" and "house" are usually and commonly used to denote a higher order of public houses than the ordinary tavern or inn. City of St. Louis v. Siegrist, 46 Mo. 593, 595.

The terms "inn" and "tavern," as used in the statute regulating taverns, are synonymous. The legal definition of an inn is the same as what is understood in this country by a hotel. An inn or hotel is a house where all who conduct themselves properly and who are able and ready to pay for their entertainment are received, if there is accommodation for them, or who, without any stipulated engagement as to the duration of their stay or as to the rate of compensation, are, while there, supplied at a reasonable charge with their meals, their lodging, and such services and attention as are necessarily incident to the use of the house as a temporary abode. Cromwell v. Stephens (N. Y.) 3 Abb. Prac. N. S. 26. This is the same definition applied to the term "hotel" by the liquor tax law. In re Brewster, 80 N. Y. Supp. 666, 667, 39 Misc. Rep. 689.

In the construction of statutes, the word "tavern" includes "inn." Rev. Code Del. 1893, c. 5, § 1, subd. 11.

Licensed grocery.

"Tavern," as used in 1 N. R. L. p. 178, § 8, prohibiting the keeping of a shuffle board, etc., in an inn or tavern, includes a grocery licensed in the city of New York. Cuscadden's Case (N. Y.) 2 City Hall Rec.

A license to "keep a tavern" under au

thority of Act June 1, 1831, should be con-
strued to include a license to retail liquors,
1 Ohio St. 15, 19.
as well as to keep a tavern. Hirn v. State,

Lodging house.

The term "inn," "tavern," or "hotel," does not properly designate a mere lodging house, although the keeper thereof may send out and procure cooked food for his guests. A house which does not contain the means of preparing food for the table in the ordinary way has not the necessary accommodation to entertain travelers, and is not an inn within the meaning of Act 1857 in reference to the licensing of innkeepers. Kelly v. City of New York (N. Y.) 54 How. Prac. 327, 331.

Private room.

In construing a statute which prohibits playing cards in a public place, and express ly named taverns and inns as public houses, but declares that a private room in an inn or tavern is not within the meaning of a public place, unless such rooms are commonly used for gaming, the court said: "Mr. Bishop says an inn, tavern, or hotel is a place for the general entertainment of all travelers and strangers who apply, paying suitable compensation. Bish. St. Cr. (2d Ed.) § 297. Mr. Webster defines inn' as a place of shelter, habitation, residence, abode; a house for the lodging and entertainment of travelers, as a tavern. He defines 'tavern' as a public house where entertainment and accommodation for travelers and other guests are provided. To make a guest room in a hotel (that is, one appropriated to public use as such) a private room, it must have been taken by a guest or lodger seeking rest for a day or night, or a residence for a time, or one desiring to use it for a temporary habitation; that is, a place of abode. Unless so appropriated by a guest, it is a part of the censed house of entertainment, and only such public house, known as 'tavern' or 'inn.' may retail spirits. Braswell v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 544.

53.

Licensed house for sale of liquor.

A license to keep a "tavern" in the licensee's brick house applied to a frame room adjoining it, which was used as the barroom. Gray v. Commonwealth, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 300, 35 Am. Dec. 136.

"Tavern," in Kentucky, means

ali

"Tavern" means "a house licensed to sell liquor in small quantities, to be drunk on the spot," and “denotes a house for the entertainment of travelers, as well as for the sale of liquors." This is the American sense in which the word is used, according to Webster; so that a license to keep a tavern is a license to retail liquor. State v. Chamblyss (S. C.) Cheves, 220, 226, 34 Am. Dec. 593.

The term 'public house,' as used in the gaming statute, does not mean a place solely devoted to the public, as distinguished from private. A house may be said to be a public house either in respect to its proprietorship or its occupancy and uses; and so a guest room in a hotel is a part of the public hotel or tavern, in that it is for the use of the public business of the house in the entertainment of its guests, and only becomes private after it is appropriated by a guest"—and held that a room in an inn provided for the accommodation of guests, which was en

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gaged temporarily for the purpose of private gaming, and not for a guest's habitation or abode, was not a private room, but a part of the public place. Comer v. State, 10 S. W. 106, 107, 26 Tex. App. 509.

Restaurant.

A restaurant, where meals are furnished, is not an inn or tavern. People v. Jones (N. Y.) 1 Cow. Cr. R. 381, 384.

TAVERN KEEPER.

As an innkeeper.

TAX-TAXATION

where meals are furnished. People v. Jones (N. Y.) 54 Barb. 311, 316.

As person selling intoxicating liquor.

The word "tavern keeper," as used ir Rev. St. § 1564, providing that "if any tavern keeper or other person shall sell, give away, or barter any intoxicating liquors on Sunday, or on the day of the annual town meeting, or the annual fall election, such tavern keeper or other person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," clearly means a person a part at least of whose business is to sell intoxicating liqJensen v. State, 19 N. W. 374, 375, 60

As person obtaining license.

"Tavern keeper" is synonymous with uors. "innkeeper." It means a person who makes Wis. 577. it his business to entertain travelers and passengers, and provide lodging and necessaries for them and their horses and attendants. Commonwealth v. Shortridge, 26 Ky. (3 J. J. Marsh.) 638, 640.

A tavern keeper is one who obtains a license to keep a tavern and for whom it is kept, though another person as his agent may actually keep it. Commonwealth v. Burns, 27 Ky. (4 J. J. Marsh.) 177, 181.

See "Ad Valorem Tax"; "Annual Taxes"; "Back Taxes"; "Business Tax"; "Capital Stock Tax"; "Capitation Tax"; "City Tax"; "Collateral Inheritance Tax"; "County Tax"; "Delinquent Tax"; "Direct Tax"; "Excessive Tax";

"Tavern-keeper" and "innkeeper" are synonymous. "Inns" and "taverns" are both houses of public entertainment. A person who makes it his business to entertain trav- TAX-TAXATION. elers and passengers, and provide lodging and necessaries for them, their horses, and attendants, is a common "innkeeper"; and it is no way material whether he have any sign before his door or not. Though it be the entertainment of passengers that makes a man an "innkeeper," yet, if a person, having put up a sign before his door, afterwards pull it down, he thereby discharges himself of the burden of an "innkeeper"; but if, after he takes it down, he continues to entertain travelers, it is as much a common "inn" as before. At common law any per300 may erect an inn for the public accommodation without a license, as the keeping of it is not a franchise, but a lawful trade, open to every citizen. The Town of Crown Point v. Warner (N. Y.) 3 Hill, 150, 156.

As keeper of boarding or lodging house. At common law any person might be a tavern keeper; but, as every tavern keeper must be licensed, the words have a special meaning, and do not include one who keeps a mere boarding house or lodging house, or even one who keeps a house for lodging strangers for the season. Southwood v. Myers, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 681, 685.

As keeper of house of entertainment.

A person who makes it a business to keep a house of entertainment for travelers is a "tavern keeper," though he keeps no liquor in his house for any purpose. Curtis v. State, 5 Ohio (5 Ham.) 324.

"Faculty Tax"; "Franchise Tax"; "General Tax"; "Income Tax"; "Indirect Tax"; "Inheritance Tax"; "License Tax"; "Municipal Tax"; "Occupation Tax"; "Personal Tax"; "Poll Tax"; "Privilege Tax"; "Property Tax"; "Public Tax"; "Road Tax"; "Sinking Fund Tax"; "Special Tax"; "Specific Tax"; "State Tax"; "Succession Tax"; "Void Tax." See "Double Taxation"; "Duplicate of Taxes"; "Duplicate Taxation"; "Local Taxation"; "Nontaxable"; "Ordinary Yearly Taxes"; "Subject of Taxation."

All taxes, see "All."

"Taxes" are defined to be burdens or char

ges imposed by the legislative power upon persons or property to raise money for public purposes. Day v. Buffington (U. S.) 7 Fed. Cas. 222, 228; Citizens' Savings & Loan Ass'n v. City of Topeka, 87 U. S. (20 Wall.) 655, 664, 22 L. Ed. 455; Pittsburg, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. State, 16 L. R. A. 380, 383, 49 Ohio St. 189, 30 N. E. 435 (citing 2 Bouv. Law Dict. 705); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. City of Decatur, 13 Sup. Ct. 293, 294, 147 U. S. 190, 37 L. Ed. 132; City of Chicago v. Baptist Theological Union, 2 N. E. 254, 256, 115 Ill. 245; Sar Francisco Gaslight Co. v. Brickwedel, 62 A tavern keeper is a person who re- Cal. 641, 644; Dranga v. Rowe, 59 Pac. 944, ceives and entertains as guests those who 945, 127 Cal. 506 (citing Perry v. Washburn choose to visit his house, and it would not 20 Cal. 318); Houghton v. Austin, 47 Cal. Include one who merely keeps a restaurant 646, 654; Trenholm v. City of Charleston, 3

Keeper of restaurant.

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