The "syllabus" is never made up of findings of fact, but is limited to points of law determined. Sometimes the findings of fact are referred to for the purpose of explaining the point of law adjudicated, and only for such purpose. The opinion, and not the syllabus, shows the findings of fact necessary to the adjudication, for the information of the circuit court; and this court only makes SYRINGE preted by musical instruments alone. It cannot be considered a dramatic work, or a dramatic composition, within the meaning of the copyright law. Daly v. Palmer (U. S.) 6 Fed. Cas. 1132, 1135 (cited and approved The Mikado Case [U. S.] 25 Fed. 183). SYNDIC. At common law in England an agent ap the more important points of law a part of pointed by a corporation for the purpose of the syllabus, for the general information of the legal profession and public, and not for the government of the circuit court in the further progress of the case. The opinion furnishes it the rule for its further action. If it be doubtful, and the syllabus does not clear away the doubt, he is justified in independent action; otherwise, it must be obeyed. Koonce v. Doolittle, 37 S. E. 644, 645, 48 W. Va. 592. SYMBOLICAL DELIVERY. "Symbolical delivery" is a substitute for actual delivery, when the latter is impracticable, and leaves the real delivery to be made afterwards. As between the parties, the whole title passes by such delivery, when that is their intention; but when the transaction is a mere pledge, placing the title at the control of the pledgee for the mere purpose of securing the debt without actually transferring the title, no title passes, for the reason that that is not what the parties intended. Winslow v. Fletcher, 4 Atl. 250, 255, 53 Conn. 390, 55 Am. Rep. 122. A stock of goods in a store is "symbolically delivered" by giving to the purchaser the key of the door of the house in which they are kept or stored. Miller v. Lacey (Del.) 30 Atl. 640, 641, 7 Houst. 8. SYMPATHETIC STRIKE. The term "sympathetic strike" is otherwise known in this country as a boycott. Booth v. Brown (U. S.) 62 Fed. 794, 795. SYMPATHY. In a statute disqualifying any person who had manifested his adherence or sympathy with those engaged in carrying on the Rebellion was not used in its most general sense, but as meaning something more than feeling, and must be understood to import some conduct of a treasonable nature. State ex rel. Wingate v. Woodson, 41 Mo. 227, 234. SYMPHONY. A "syphony" is a work of an operatic character, intended or designed to be inter8 WDS.& P.-4 obtaining letters of guardianship and the like was called a syndic, to whom such letters were issued. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Beebe, 41 N. W. 232, 233, 40 Minn. 7, 2 L. R. A. 418. The word "syndic" in the civil law corresponds very nearly with that of assignee under the common law. Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Whitney, 39 Ala. 468, 471. SYNOD. A "synod" is a "convention of bishops and elders within a district including at least three presbyteries. The synod have a supervisory power over presbyteries, but, unlike presbyteries, are not essential to the existence of the general assembly; the only connection between the general assembly and the synod being that the former has a supervisory power over the latter." Commonwealth v. Green (Pa.) 4 Whart. 531, 560. The word "synod" signifies simply a meeting of the few adjoining presbyteries. A synod is in no sense an ecumerical coun cil, which is a council of all, and not of a part. Groesbeeck v. Dunscomb (N. Y.) 41 How. Prac. 302, 344. SYNONYMOUS. The word "synonymous" means conveying the same or approximately the same meaning. Hoffine v. Ewing, 84 N. W. 93, 95, 60 Neb. 729. "Synonymous words" are words expressing the same thing, conveying the same or approximately the same idea. Fritz v. Wil liams (Miss.) 16 South. 359, 360 (citing Webst. Dict.) SYNOPSIS. "Synopsis" means to cut short, diminish, reduce; a brief or partial statement, less than the whole; an epitome. Barker v. Barker, 22 Pac. 1000, 1001, 43 Kan. 91. SYRINGE. A syringe is a kind of pump, so that the application of the principles and appliances already used in pumps to a syringe does not constitute prior invention. Tagliabue v. Son- complete whole, as a system of philosophy, a dermann (U. S.) 67 Fed. 551, 552. SYRUP. system of government," etc. It is so used in Const. art. 8, § 1, authorizing the General Assembly to provide for the organization of the common schools, and directing that body to devise a system of common schools. State Of electric lighting. "Syrup" is defined by Webster as "av. Ogan, 63 N. E. 227, 228, 159 Ind. 119. thick and viscid liquid, made from the juice of fruits, herbs, etc., boiled with sugar." The Standard Dictionary defines the term generally as "a thick, sweet liquid," and specifically as "a saturated solution of sugar and water, often combined with some medicinal substance, or flavored, as with the juice of fruits, for use in confections, cookery, or the preparation of beverages," and adds: "Syrups are commonly named from their source of flavoring." The word "syrup" is necessarily qualified by that of the substance, or one or more of the substances, which distinguish it to the taste, or in its medicinal property. The words "Syrup of Figs" or "Fig Syrup," being descriptive, cannot be sustained as a valid trade-mark or trade-name, as applied to a syrup, one of the characteristic ingredients of which is the juice of the fig. California Fig Syrup Co. v. Stearns (U. S.) 67 Fed. 1008, 1011. that a system of electric conductors and Where a municipal ordinance provided poles provided with street lamps be built in streets as hereinafter specified, the use of the the streets of a village, located upon such word "system" implies that the wires are connected with the power house. Ewart v. Village of Western Springs, 54 N. E. 478, 481, The Century Dictionary describes "syrup" to be "a solution of sugar in water, made according to an official formula, whether simple, flavored, or medicated with some special therapeutic or compound." It is defined by Webster as "a thick and viscid liquid, made from the juice of fruits, herbs, etc., boiled with sugar." The Standard Dictionary defines syrup generally "as a thick, sweet liquid," and specifically as "a saturated solution of sugar in water, often combined with some medicinal substance, or flavored, as with the juice of fruits, for use in confections, cookery, or the preparation of beverages." This authority further states that "syrups are commonly named from their source of flavoring." California Fig Syrup Co. v. Frederick Stearns & Co. (U. S.) 73 Fed. 812, 815, 20 C. C. A. 22, 33 L. R. A. 56. SYSTEM. Of common schools. "System," as used in Const. art. 9, § 4, which provides that the Legislature shall establish a uniform system of public free schools throughout the state, means an organized plan, an institution, something established for the use and benefit of the people, so long as the want of public education will continue. Peay v. Talbot, 39 Tex. 335, 346. "The word 'system' is defined by the Encyclopædic Dictionary as a plan or scheme according to which things are connected or combined into a whole; an assemblage of facts or of principles and conclusions, scientifically arranged or disposed according to certain mutual relations, so as to form a 180 Ill. 318. Of government. Const. § 171, declares that in any county that shall have adopted a system of government by the chairman of the several town. ship boards, the question of continuing the same may be submitted to the electors of such county at a general election in such a manner as may be provided by law, and, if a majority of all the votes case on such question shall be against such system of government, then such system shall cease, and the affairs of said county shall be transacted by the board of county commissioners, as is now provided by the laws of the territory of Dakota. Held, that the words "system of government," as used in such section, were synonymous with the words "fiscal concerns and affairs," as used in the preceding sections 170 and 171, and as so used meant the transaction of all the business of the county and the performance of such duties as by law has been placed on county commissioners. Martin v. Tyler, 60 N. W. 392, 396, 4 N. D. 278, 25 L. R. A. 838. "System," as used in Const. art. 4, § 21, authorizing the Legislature to establish a uniform system of municipal governments, means plan, arrangement, method-simply rules and regulations for the organization and government of municipal corporation. Ex parte Wells, 21 Fla. 280, 305; McConihe v. McMurray, 17 Fla. 238, 269; Town of Enterprise v. State, 10 South. 740, 746, 29 Fla. 128. Const. art. 11, § 4, which directs that the Legislature shall establish a "system of county and town governments," which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable throughout the state, refers to town organizations, which in their general features are like those of other states where the town government had been established when the Constitution was adopted. Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279, 318, 17 Am. Rep. 425. "System," as used in Const. art. 4, § 23, declaring that the Legislature shall establish but one system of town and county government, which shall be as nearly uniform as possible, is not synonymous with "plan," in the sense to mean a mere mode in which powers conferred upon counties are distributed among the various offices established by law for county government, without relation to the number of persons composing county boards, etc., but means that the number of persons composing county boards, etc., shall be the same in each county. State v. Riordan, 24 Wis. 484, 488. Of numbering. The fact that a single block has been subdivided into lots does not constitute a system of numbering. Davis v. Pacific Imp. Co., 70 Pac. 15, 16, 137 Cal. 245. Of pleading. The provision in the act of 1840 regulating proceedings in civil suits, declaring that SYSTEM the adoption of the common law shall not be so construed as to adopt the common-law system of pleading, but the proceedings in all civil suits, shall, as heretofore, be conducted by petition and answer, the clause "petition and answer" is used in opposition to the common-law system of pleading, not to signify the stages of pleading to which these words give name, but to designate the system to which they belong. These words, then, were not intended as a restriction or limitation of the pleadings to the answer, but as the designation of a system of pleadings, and used not to denote a prescribed formulary, but as indicative of their intention to retain the then existing system, in opposition to the common-law and chancery systems of pleading in England. Underwood v. Parrott, 2 Tex. 168, 179. T TABLE. privity between the several occupants. When, however, there is privity of posses See "Billiard Table"; "Gambling Table." sion, and it has continued for the full statu TACIT. “Tacit” is said of that which, although not expressed, is understood from the nature of the thing, or from the provision of the law. Civ. Code La. 1900, art. 3556, subd. 30. TACIT ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance is tacit, when some act is done by the heir which necessarily supposes his intention to accept, and which he would have no right to do but in his quality of heir. Civ. Code La. 1900, art. 988. TACIT HYPOTHECATION. tory period, the bar is complete, for the very plain reason that the claimant out of possession has not in that event been in possession within the statutory period. J. B. Streeter, Jr., Co. v. Fredrickson, 91 N. W. 692, 694, 11 N. D. 300. "Tacking it on as a rider" is a legis lative phrase, designating the practice of putting a measure of doubtful strength on its own merits into the general appropriation bill, in order to compel members to vote for it, or bring the wheels of government to a stop. Commonwealth v. Gregg, 29 Atl. 297, 161 Pa. 582. TACKLE. See "Ship's Tackle, Apparel, and Furniture." The term "tacit hypothecation" is often applied to a maritime lien, which is not, strictly speaking, a Roman hypothecation, though it resembles it. It somewhat re- TAKE. sembles what is called a "privilege" in that law; that is, a right of priority or satisfaction growing out of the proceeds of a thing in a concurrence of creditors. The Nestor (U. S.) 18 Fed. Cas. 9, 13. TACIT MORTGAGE. The law alone in certain cases gives to the creditor a mortgage on the property of his debtor, without it being requisite that the parties should stipulate it. This is called "legal mortgage." It is called "tacit mortgage," because it is established by the law without the aid of any agreement. Civ. Code La. 1900, art. 3311. TACKING. The entire scope of the doctrine of "tacking" is not to determine whether the occupant of the land has been in possession thereof for any fixed period of time, but is to determine whether the claimant out of possession has in fact or in law been in possession within the statutory period, so as to entitle him to maintain his action. In other words, it is merely a uniform rule adopted by the court to determine whether the claimant, out of possession when his action was commenced, has been in possession at any time within the 20-year period. If no privity has been found to exist between the successive disseisors, and the last occupant has not held adversely for the full statutory period, the bar is not complete, as the law presumes that the land returns to the true owner at each change of possession, when there is no See "To Be Taken." "Take," according to Webster's Dictionary, is used as the synonym of "require" or "be necessary." King v. Kent's Heirs, 29 Ala. 542, 555. One of the definitions of the word "take," as defined by Webster, is to move or direct the course; to proceed; to go. State v. Johnson, 22 S. W. 463, 466, 115 Mo. 480. To take an article signifies merely to lay hold of, grab, or seize it, with the hands or otherwise. Gettinger v. State, 14 N. W. 403, 404, 13 Neb. 308; State v. Chambers, 22 W. Va. 779, 790, 46 Am. Rep. 550. The word "take" is broad enough to in. clude "seize"; but that is not its ordinary sense, and it has no such technical meaning. Butts v. Woods, 16 Pac. 617, 620, 4 N. M. (Johns.) 187. To "take" signifies to lay hold of, and, when applied to land, implies to gain or receive into possession; to seize; to deprive one of the possession; to assume ownership. Wulzen v. City and County of San Francisco, 35 Pac. 353, 356, 101 Cal. 15, 40 Am. St. Rep. 17. The words "taking" and "converting" are not appropriate in speaking of real property. One may readily be understood when he says that an action may be sustained for "taking" personal property, or for "converting" it, or for "taking and converting" it; but the words would convey no legal idea when applied to real estate. There is a broad sense in which the word "detaining" might be applied to real estate, of which the expression "forcible entry and detainer" is an illustration. The words "taking, injuring, detaining, and converting," all used in the same sentence in an action, providing that an action for the taking, injuring, detaining, and converting of property must be brought within a certain time, apply to personal property only. Merritt v. Carpenter (N. Y.) 3 Abb. Dec. 285, 289. TAKE The words "take," in a statement that another has taken things, does not, standing sion, import that he has fraudulently taken goods, and therefore is not per se slanderous. Harris v. Burley, 8 N. H. 256, 258; Brown v. Brown, 14 Me. (2 Shep.) 317, 318; Hinesley v. Sheets, 48 N. E. 802, 803, 18 Ind. App. 612, 63 Am. St. Rep. 356. As change of possession. "Taken," as used in the charter provid-alone and by the mere force of the expresing that the owner or occupier of any house, lot, or tenement where water shall be taken, shall each be liable for the payment of the price fixed by the board of public works for the use of water, means at the place where it is delivered for use, and not at the place where it is measured. In its usual signification the word "taken" implies a transfer of possession, dominion, or control. A thing is not taken unless such a change of status is effected. In trespass, trover, or replevin, the taking is not accomplished until the goods are within the power or control of the defendant. A devisee takes under a will only when the possession and control of the devisor has ceased. Where the city placed a meter for measuring water on a person's land, but after being so measured it flowed through the main and was delivered for use at other places than on such land, the water was not taken where the meter was located, but where it was delivered for use. Jersey City v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 41 N. J. Law (12 Vroom) 66, 67. The word "take," in a charge that another has taken tea, etc., does not necessarily import a crime, and therefore an allegation in a slander suit that defendant charged the plaintiff with having stolen tea, etc., is not supported by proof that defendant only charged the plaintiff with having taken it. Coleman v. Playsted (N. Y.) 36 Barb. 26, 28. The use of the word "take," in connection with the other language in a charge that another person did take defendant's straw to feed the cattle of the former, etc., were construed to imply a taking in a secret and blamable manner, and to convey an imputation of theft, which would render the language slanderous. McKennon v. Greer (Pa.) 2 Watts, 352, 353. The word "take," in a charge that "you did take it," does not of itself import a felony, and is not actionable per se; but, if spoken and understood to refer to a recent stealing of bank notes, it is slanderous. McGowan v. Manifee, 23 Ky. (7 T. B. Mon.) 314, 18 Am. Dec. 178. The words "take and steal," in a complaint charging that the defendant did feloniously take and steal certain articles, was construed to be sufficient designation of the crime of larceny, though the words "steal, take, and carry away" are the proper technical words to be used. Green v. Commonwealth, 111 Mass. 417, 418. |