oaths therein prescribed, the word "sworn" | demnation, shall refer to those oaths; and, when ap- "swearing." The use of the word "damned” plied to any other officer, it shall, unless is profanity, without being used in connec otherwise expressly provided, mean sworn tion with the name of the Deity. State v. to the faithful performance of his official Wiley, 24 South. 194, 76 Miss. 282, 71 Am. duties. Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, p. 89, c. 8, St. Rep. 531 (citing Holcomb v. Cornish, 8 5, subd. 22. Conn. 375).

The word "sworn," when applied to public officials required by the Constitution SWORN ACCORDING TO LAW. to take the oaths therein prescribed, shall refer to those oaths; when applied to other officers, it shall mean sworn to the faith-ever the expression 'duly sworn,' or 'sworu ful discharge of the duties of their offices before a justice of the peace or other person

See "False Swearing"; "Public Swear- do not import perjury, or that the swearing ing."

SWORN FALSELY

6839

SWINDLE-SWINDLING

they were not spoken in a conversation con- | matter. United States v. Three Hundred cerning a particular judicial procedure. Casks of Juniper Cordial (U. S.) 28 Fed. Cas. Martin v. Melton, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 99.

The words "sworn falsely," as used in Insolvent Act, § 49, which provides that no discharge shall be granted if the debtor shall have sworn falsely in relation to any material fact concerning his estate or debts, necessarily import a willful act done with a fraudulent intent, from which the element of fraud cannot be eliminated. A mistake in his verified schedule of liabilities, which is made in good faith, does not constitute such false swearing. De Martin v. De Martin, 24 Pac. 596, 85 Cal. 76.

To charge one with having "sworn falsely" does not of itself import a charge of perjury, and to render such words actionable it must be averred that they were spoken in reference to a judicial oath and to have been meant as a charge of perjury. Barger v. Barger, 18 Pa. (6 Harris) 489, 492.

141.

SWELLS.

"Swells," as used in a contract for the sale of canned corn containing the clause "usual guaranty against swells," primarily refers to cans whose ends are forced outward by the gases engendered by fermentation, and it includes all cans whose contents are sour. Sleeper v. Word (U. S.) 60 Fed. 888, 889, 9 C. C. A. 289.

SWINDLE-SWINDLING.

"Swindling" is defined to be cheating and defrauding with deliberate artifice. Wyatt v. Ayres (Ala.) 2 Port. 157, 161.

Pen. Code 1895, art. 790, defines "swindling" to be the acquisition of any personal or movable property, money, or instrument The words "he has sworn falsely" are right by means of some false or deceitful in writing conveying or securing a valuable held not to be actionable per se, inasmuch as pretense or device, or fraudulent represéntathey alone do not necessarily include the idea of willful intention. "They may mean,' tion, with intent to appropriate the same to the use of the party so acquiring, or of desays the court, "perfidiously, or merely not truly." "Swearing to that which is false,"stroying or impairing the rights of the party

says Chancellor Kent, "does not imply that the party has in judgment of law perjured himself. It may mean that he has sworn to a falsehood, without being conscious at the time that it was false." Schmidt v. Witherick, 29 Minn. 156, 157, 12 N. W. 448.

SWORN TO A LIE.

The words "swore a lie," contained in an alleged libel, do not of themselves impute a charge of perjury, and hence are not actionable per se. Knight v. Sharp, 24 Ark. 603, 608.

A statement that a person "swore false and swore to a lie" does not imply that the person spoken of was guilty of perjury, and is not actionable. Sheely v. Biggs, 2 Har. & J. (Md.) 363, 364, 3 Am. Dec. 552.

The words "sworn to a lie," as used in an allegation that a person has sworn to a lie, are not actionable; for they do not necessarily imply that the party has in judgment of law perjured himself. They may mean that he has sworn to a falsehood, without being conscious at the time that it was a falsehood. It does not imply that it was sworn to before any court or competent officer. It may mean extrajudicial swearing. Hopkins v. Beedle (N. Y.) 1 Caines, 347, 348, 2 Am. Dec. 191.

SWEET CORDIAL.

A sweet cordial is a plain spirit, flavored by an essential oil or other aromatic sub

15 Tex. App. 430, 436; Blum v. State, 20
justly entitled to the same. May v. State,
Tex. App. 578, 591, 54 Am. Rep. 530; Cline
Code Tex. 1895, art. 943.
v. State, 43 Tex. 494, 497. See, also, Pen.

A fraudulent sale of goods, for the purpose of preventing them from being attached by the creditors, by the vendor, is a fraud in law, which in an action of slander will justify the application of the epithets "cheating" and "swindling." Odiorne v. Bacon, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 185, 191.

As actionable per se.

"Swindled," as used in a statement that a certain person had swindled the county and a person, out of certain sums of money, cannot be construed to imply that the money was obtained under false pretenses, and is not actionable per se, for it did not charge an indictable offense. Weil v. Altenhofen, 26 Wis. 708, 709.

The term "swindling" does not import a crime known to the law, and hence words charging one with being a swindler are not actionable per se. Chase v. Whitlock (N. Y.) 3 Hill, 139, 140.

The term "swindling" does not import a crime. Imprisonment on a charge of swindling, by making false representations as to the solvency of another, is false imprisonment; the conduct described as swindling not being a punishable offense, but only the ground of a civil action. Hall v. Rogers (Ind.) 2 Blackf. 429, 430.

In J'Anson v. Stuart, 1 Term R. 753, it stance, and sweetened by some saccharine is said to be formerly held that the word

the term, and a notification to a police officer to keep track of certain parties "swindling" commission merchants does not au thorize the arrest of the persons. Cunningham v. Baker, 16 South. 68, 71, 104 Ala. 160, 53 Am. St. Rep. 27.

As requiring intent to appropriate.

“swindling" was in general use, and that No offense against the laws is charged by the court could not say they were ignorant of it. In the same case, Ashhurst, J., held it to imply crimes for which the person might be indicted, and Buller, J., said it contained as libelous a charge as can well be imagined. In Berryman v. Wise, 4 Term R. 366, there was no question but the word was actionable when applied to an attorney in his official character; and in the argument of the One of the essential elements of the present case, it seemed to be agreed that it crime of "swindling," as defined by Pen. was a word which had come into use since Code 1895, art. 790, and the most important, St. 30 Geo. II, c. 24, and was generally un- is the intent with which the property is acderstood to imply a charge of the crimes, or quired. It must be with the intent to apsome of them, mentioned in that statute. propriate the same to the use of the party One of the principal offenses mentioned in so acquiring it. Without an allegation to that statute, and the one to which the term that effect an indictment for swindling does "swindling" seems to be most appropriately not charge the offense. Stringer v. State, 13 applied, is that of "knowingly and designed-Tex. App. 520, 522. ly, by false pretenses, obtaining from any person money, goods," etc., "with intent to cheat or defraud any person of the same." In order to constitute "swindling," there This offense is substantially and accurately must be an intent to defraud, an actual act the common-law offense of cheating, which of fraud committed, false pretenses, and the is described in 1 Hawk. P. C. 343, to be "de-fraud must be committed or accomplished by ceitful practices, in defrauding or endeavor- means of the false pretenses made use of ing to defraud another of his known right, by means of some artful device, contrary to the plain rules of common honesty." To charge a man with swindling seems, therefore, to be substantially to charge him with an offense for which he may be liable to a prosecution at common law. Forrest v. Hanson (U. S.) 9 Fed. Cas. 456.

Theft distinguished.

As requiring actual deception.

for the purpose; that is, they must be the cause which induced the owner to part with his property. An essential element of the offense of swindling is that the party injured must have relied upon, believed as true, and been deceived by the fraudulent representations or devices of the party ac

cused.

Prosecutor was applied to by defendant for a loan of $5; the latter stating that he would give prosecutor a check on a certain bank to cover the $5 and a previous loan. Prosecutor told defendant that he did not believe he had a cent in the bank, but that he would give defendant $5 to catch him, and, if defendant had no money in the

had no money in the bank. Held not to constitute swindling, since the false pretense was not the inducement for the loan. Thorpe v. State, 50 S. W. 383, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 346.

As requiring false representation.

"Swindling" may be committed in either of two ways under Pen. Code 1895, art. 790: First, where the unlawful acquisition is accomplished by the means named, and the intent is to appropriate the property so acquired to the use of the party so acquiring; | bank, he would prosecute him. Defendant and, second, where the unlawful acquisition is accomplished by the means named, with the intent of destroying or impairing the rights of the party justly entitled thereto. In the one case the intent of the party is to benefit himself; in the other, to injure the right of some one else. It is true that the two intents and the two modes of accomplishing the crime may combine and occur in the perpetration of a single act. That they should, however, is not necessary to the completeness of either of the two modes. It follows, then, that the crime may be committed without destroying or impairing the rights of the party justly entitled to the property, and the swindle may be perpetrated in fact upon one who is not even justly entitled to the property; and this is a distinction between swindling and theft. May v. State, 15 Tex. App. 430, 436.

As authorizing arrest.

"Swindling" has no legal or technical meaning, and commonly implies a recourse to petty and mean artifices for obtaining mon

In order to constitute a swindle, there must be a representation of a past or present condition of things knowingly made by the party engaged in the swindling operation, which was false, calculated to deceive, and doing so in fact, and in reliance upon which property which is the subject-matter of the swindle is parted with. Where defendant was given $5 to get changed, to take out the sum of 80 cents due her, and offered 20 cents back, claiming that only a $1 bill had been given her, she was not guilty of swindling; there being no false representation. De Young v. State (Tex.) 41 S. W. 598.

SWINDLER.

The word "swindler" means no more

ey, which may or may not be strictly illegal. | than "cheat." Therefore, to charge one with

being a swindler, or with swindling, is not actionable. Stevenson v. Hayden, 2 Mass. 406, 408.

A swindler is one who obtains money or goods under false pretenses. Weil v. Altenhofen, 26 Wis. 708, 711.

To charge a man with being a swindler or a cheat does not impute a crime, and is not slanderous. Pollock v. Hastings, 88 Ind. 248, 250.

SWITCH

been held not to be actionable, and "swindler" means no more. Stevenson v. Hayden, 2 Mass. 406, 408.

The word "swindler," as applied to a person, does not charge a crime, so as to be actionable per se in slander. Odiorne v. Bacon, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 185, 191.

The term "swindling," or "swindler," does not charge an infraction of the crim. inal law, so as to be actionable per se in slander. Pollock v. Hastings, 88 Ind. 248, 250.

SWINE.

"Swine" is the original generic term for "hog" or "shoat." State v. Godet, 29 N. C. 210, 211.

Pen. Code 1895, art. 679, makes it an offense to kill, etc., any horse, mule, cattle, swine, or other domesticated animal, etc. Held, that the term "swine" includes and is synonymous with the word "hog," and hence an information under the statute alleging the killing of a hog was sufficient as a description of the animal. Rivers v. State, 10 Tex. App. 177, 179.

"Swine," as used in St. 1805, c. 100, exempting from the liability of attachment one swine, includes a swine butchered, but not cut up. Gibson v. Jenney, 15 Mass. 205, 206.

The word "swindler" is an exotic, which came from Germany, and has but recently become naturalized in our language. In Todd's Johnson "swindler" is defined to be a sharper, or a cheat; and "to swindle" is to cheat, to impose upon the credulity of mankind, and thereby to defraud the unwary by false pretenses. Webster defines "swindler" as a cheat, a rogue, one who defrauds grossly, or one who makes a practice of defrauding others by imposition or deliberate artifice. In Tomlins' Law Dictionary (edition of 1836) the word is defined as a cheat, or one who lives by cheating. Swindling is not a crime known to our law. To call one a swindler is about equivalent to saying he is a cheat, which has never been held actionable. Either of these charges may, under certain circumstances, imply that the accused is guilty of the crime of obtaining goods by false pretenses. But they do not necessarily mean so much. There are many ways in which a man may wrong another, in such a manner as to earn the title of "swindler" or "cheat," without subjecting himself to an indictment for a criminal offense. This question has been considered as settled ever since the decision in Savile v. Jardine, 2 H. Bl. 531. It was there held that the words charging the plaintiff with being a swindler were not actionable. Eyre, C. J., said: "The word is only equivalent to 'cheat.' It cannot be carried further, and that is not actionable." He added: "Thief always im- SWISS MUSLINS. plies felony, but cheat not always." Buller, J., said: "Swindler means no more than cheat. When a man is said to be swindled, it means tricked or outwitted." That case was followed by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Stevenson v. Hayden, 2 Mass. 406. Chase v. Whitlock (N. Y.) 3 Hill,

139, 140.

SWIPE.

steal, or to steal by snatching; and hence, "Swipe" means to pluck, to snatch, to where a defendant admitted that he "swiped" a watch, he was not entitled to an instruction that "swiped" did not mean "stole." State v. Lee, 70 N. W. 594, 595, 101 Iowa,

389.

"Swiss muslins"

are bleached cotton

goods which are woven upon a loom. The warp, or threads which run longitudinally, extend from one end of the piece to the other, and the filling, or threads that extend from side to side, run from edge to edge through the width of the piece. In addition to the plain loom, there is an attachment The words "swindler," "swindling," etc., which produces the spots, dots, or other fig. have been very lately adopted into the Eng- ures which ornament the goods, and which lish language, and are as yet of indefinite are woven at the same time with the rest of meaning, and do not with certainty import the cloth. United States v. Albert (U. S.) an indictable offense. These terms were im- 60 Fed. 1012, 1013, 9 C. C. A. 332. ported into this country from England, and

into that from Germany. In their passage

hither, when first used in the English language, and before they became naturalized here, they obtained a meaning, and what that meaning was we learn from the report of the case of Savile v. Jardine, by which it appears that the word "swindle" means no more than "cheat." "Cheat" has always

SWITCH.

See "Flying Switch."

See, also, "Side Track"; "Siding."
In electrical appliances.

A "switch," as the term is used in speaking of an electrical switch, is any de

made and built on his own lands such 'switch road' connection with the said line of switch, provided such connection shall in no manner obstruct or interfere with the use of said switch," the courts say that the words "connection" and "switch road" are used as synonymous terms. Palfrey v. Foster, 17 South. 425, 426, 47 La. Ann. 963.

vice by which one line may be electrically | grantor “the right to make or cause to be connected with another. The form in common use on switchboards in the telephone exchanges consists of a socket set in the switchboard containing the terminals of the two sides of the subscribers' circuit, and this is used by means of a plug which contains the terminals of the two wires that are attached to it in a cord. The insertion of the plug in the socket makes the electrical connection between the subscriber's line and the wires attached to the plug, and these wires usually lead to another similar plug, or to the telephone of the operator. Kinloch Tel-connection with and descriptive of railway ephone Co. v. Western Electric Co. (U. S.) 113 Fed. 659, 660, 51 C. C. A. 362.

SWITCH YARD.

The words "switch yard," as employed in service, consists of side tracks upon either side of the main track, and adjacent to some An "electric switch," in general terms, principal station or depot grounds where is a device for opening and closing a single cars are placed for deposit, and where arrivcircuit in some regular and systematic man- ing trains are separated and departing trains ner. The switch which is in ordinary com- made up. It is the place where such switchmercial use involves two stationary termin- ing is done as is essential to the proper als connected to the opposite branches of a placing of cars, either for deposit or for decircuit, and a removable bridging piece in-parture. Baltimore & O. S. W. Ry. Co. v. serted between such two terminals to com- Little, 48 N. E. 862, 863, 149 Ind. 167. plete the continuity of the circuit, or with

drawn therefrom to interrupt the circuit. SWITCHING.
Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Nassau El.
R. Co. (U. S.) 107 Fed. 277, 278, 46 C. C. A.
263.

In railroad.

The test of distinction between transportation service, relatively to loaded freight cars, for which a railway company can lawfully charge tonnage rates and switching or transfer service, for which it is restricted to a fixed charge per car, is not whether the movement of the cars involves the use of a portion of the company's main line, or that of another; for there may be a transportation service over one or more spur tracks of the same company, if the contract of affreightment requires no movement over other tracks or lines of railway, whereas a switching or transfer service is one which precedes or follows a transportation service, and ap

A "switch," as the term is used in railroading, is defined as a “device for moving a small section of track, so that rolling stock may be run or shunted from one line to another," and "in railroads, in its simplest form, two parallel lengths of rail, joined together by rods, pivoted at one end, and free to move at the other end, forming a part of the track at its junction with a branch or siding." Standard Dict., Cent. Dict. As used in Railroad Law, § 7, subd. 3, authorizing a railroad to take lands for the construc-plies only to a shipment on which legal tion of switches, etc., the term does not include a parallel line of track, to be used as another main line, parallel to the constructed road. Erie R. Co. v. Steward, 70 N. Y. Supp. 698, 700, 61 App. Div. 480.

A switch is but a mechanical contrivance or movable opening to pass the cars from one track to another. A power to construct side tracks implies a power to connect the side tracks with the main track by switches. Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Maddox, 42 S. E. 315, 322, 116 Ga. 64 (citing Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. [6 P. F. Smith] 325, 334, 94 Am. Dec. 84).

Freight yards containing 450 acres, operated as one yard, are not "turnouts" or "switches," as those terms are understood by railroad men in railway parlance. People v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 51 N. E. 312, 314, 156 N. Y. 570.

SWITCH ROAD.

In construing an act granting a right of way for a switch road, and reserving to the

freight charges have already been earned or are to be earned. Dixon v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 35 S. E. 369, 372, 110 Ga. 173.

SWIVEL.

A "swivel" is defined by Ainsworth in his Dictionary as something used in or on another body so as to turn round in or upon it. Denise v. Swett, 22 N. Y. Supp. 950, 953, 68 Hun, 188.

SYCOPHANT.

Greek words meaning "fig informer," but it The word "sycophant" comes from the would scarcely be contended to-day that a man could not properly be called a sycophant unless he had dealings in figs. In short, words by use are sometimes degraded, some times ennobled; sometimes narrowed in meaning, sometimes broadened. People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 137, 45 Pac. 270, 271, 35 L. R. A. 269.