« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »
oaths therein prescribed, the word "sworn", demnation, sufficient to constitute shall refer to those oaths; and, when ap- “swearing." The use of the word "damned" plied to any other officer, it shall, unless is profanity, without being used in connecotherwise expressly provided, mean sworn tion with the name of the Deity State v. to the faithful performance of his official | Wiley, 24 South. 194, 76 Miss. 282, 71 Am. duties. Rev. Laws díass. 1902, p. 89, c. 8, St. Rep. 531 (citing Holcomb v. Cornish, 8 § 5, subd. 22.
Conn. 375). The word "Sworn," when applied to public officials required by the Constitution SWORN ACCORDING TO LAW. to take the oaths therein prescribed, shall refer to those oaths; when applied to other
Rev. St. c. 1, § 3, provides that “whenofficers, it shall mean sworn to the faith- ever the expression 'duly sworn,' or 'sworu ful discharge of the duties of their offices according to law,' is used or applied to any before a justice of the peace or other person the oath prescribed in the Constitution, it
officer who is required to take and subscribe authorized to administer oaths in such cases. shall be construed to mean that such officer Pub. St. N, H. 1901, p. 64, c. 2, 88 24, 25.
has taken and subscribed the same, as well The word "sworn," when applied to as the oath faithfully and impartially to perpublic officers required by the Constitution form the duties of the office to which he has to take certain oaths, shall refer to those been elected and appointed, and when apoaths; when applied to other officers, it plied to any person other than such officer shall mean to the faithful discharge of the it shall be construed to mean that such perduties of their offices before a person au son has taken an oath faithfully and imparthorized to administer oaths. V. S. 1894, 14. tially to perform the duties assigned to him The words "sworn," "duly sworn," or
in the case specified.” In the case of an “sworn according to law,” used in a statute, assessor, where the records of the town rerecord, or certificate of administration of cite that he was duly sworn, it is not necesan oath, refer to the oath required by the sary that the oath administered should have Constitution or laws in the cases specified, been set out in full; but such record is suf
ficient to show that he had taken the oath and include every necessary subscription to such oath. Rev. St. Me. 1883, p. 59, c. 1, 8
which qualified him to act. Bennett v. Treat,
41 Me. 226, 227. 6, subd. 20.
The words “sworn," "duly sworn," or Affirm or affirmed.
"sworn according to law,” used in a statute, By statute in many states it is provided record, or certificate of administration of that the words "swear" or "sworn" shall an oath, refer to the oath required by the include the words "affirm" or "affirmed." | Constitution or laws in the cases specified, Code Miss. 1892, § 1516; V. S. 1894, 13; and include every necessary subscription to Gen. St. N. J. 1895, p. 3195, $ 35; Rev. St. such oath. Rev. St. Me. 1883, p. 59, c. 1, $ Tex. 1895, art. 3270; Ky. St. 1903, § 451; 6, subd. 20. Rev. St. Wis. 1898, $ 4971; Oomp. Laws Mich. 1897, § 50, subd. 11; Sand. & H. Dig.
“Sworn complaint," as used in Rev. St. 10; Gen. St. Conn. 1902, § 1; Mills' Ann. c. 27, 8 40, requiring a sworn complaint for St. Colo. 1891, § 4185, cl. 7; Gen. St. Minn. the search and seizure of intoxicating liquors, 1894, § 255, subd. 10; Gen. St. Minn. 1894, includes a complaint made on affirmation by 8 1511; Code Va. 1887, $ 5; Hurd's Rev. St.one conscientiously scrupulous of taking an Ill. 1901, p. 1720, c. 131, § 1, subd. 12; Hor- oath. State v. Welch, 8 Atl. 348, 349, 79 ner's Rev. St. Ind. 1901, § 1285; Rev. Codes Me. 99. N. D. 1899, § 1176; Comp. Laws N. M. 1897, § 2900; Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. Wash.
SWORN FALSELY. 1897, § 1658; Gen. St. Kan. 1901, § 7342, subd. 12; Code Iowa 1897, 8 48, subd. 12;
The words, "she swore a false oath, and Rev. St. Utah 1898, § 2498; Rev. Laws Mass. I can prove it,” spoken concerning a person, 1902, p. 89, c. 8, § 5, subd. 22; Pub. St. N. do not import a false swearing in a court of H. 1901, p. 64, c. 2, $$ 24, 25; Code N. C. justice, so as to constitute the crime of per1883, § 3765, subd. 5; Rev. St. Tex. 1895, jury; and hence they are not actionable per art. 3270; Rev. St. Tex. 1895, art. 5064.
Packer v. Spangler (Pa.) 2 Bin. 60.
The words, "he swore a false oath, and SWEARING.
I can prove it," as addressed to a person, See "False Swearing”; “Public Swear- do not import perjury, or that the swearing ing."
was in some judicial proceeding. They might
have been spoken in relation to some private Any words importing an imprecation of and extrajudicial transaction. Hence the divine vengeance, or implying divine con- words are not actionable as slander, where
they were not spoken in a conversation con- , matter. United States V. Three Hundred cerning a particular judicial procedure. Casks of Juniper Cordial (U. S.) 28 Fed. Cas. Martin v. Melton, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 99.
141. The words "Sworn falsely," as used in Insolvent Act, $ 49, which provides that no
SWELLS. discharge shall be granted if the debtor shall
"Swells," as used in a contract for the have sworn falsely in relation to any ma- sale of canned corn containing the clause terial fact concerning bis estate or debts, "usual guaranty against swells," primarily necessarily import a willful act done with a refers to cans whose ends are forced outfraudulent intent, from which the element of ward by the gases engendered by fermentafraud cannot be eliminated. A mistake in tion, and it includes all cans whose contents his verified schedule of liabilities, which is are sour. Sleeper v. Word (U. S.) 60 Fed. made in good faith, does not constitute such 888, 889, 9 C. C. A. 289. false swearing. De Martin v. De Martin, 24 Pac. 596, 85 Cal. 76.
SWINDLE-SWINDLING. To charge one with having "sworn falsely” does not of itself import a charge of per: and defrauding with deliberate artifice.
"Swindling" is defined to be cheating Jury, and to render such words actionable it must be averred that they were spoken in Wyatt v. Ayres (Ala.) 2 Port. 157, 161. reference to a judicial oath and to have been Pen. Code 1895, art. 790, defines "swinmeant as a charge of perjury. Barger v. lling" to be the acquisition of any personal Barger, 18 Pa. (6 Harris) 489, 492.
or movable property, money, or instrument
in writing conveying or securing a valuable The words "he has sworn falsely” are right by means of some false or deceitful held not to be actionable per se, inasmuch as pretense or device, or fraudulent representathey alone do not necessarily include the tion, with intent to appropriate the same to idea of willful intention. "They may mean,"
the use of the party so acquiring, or of desays the court, “perfidiously, or merely not truly.” “Swearing to that which is false," stroying or impairing the rights of the party
justly entitled to the same. May v. State, says Chancellor Kent, “does not imply that 15 Tex. App. 430, 436; Blum v. State, 20 the party has in judgment of law perjured Tex. App. 578, 591, 54 Am. Rep. 530; Cline himself. It may mean that he has sworn to
v. State, 43 Tex, 494, 497. See, also, Pen. a falsehood, without being conscious at the Code Tex. 1895, art. 943. time that it was false.” Schmidt v. Witherick, 29 Minn. 156, 157, 12 N. W. 448.
A fraudulent sale of goods, for the pur
pose of preventing them from being attachSWORN TO A LIE.
ed by the creditors, by the vendor, is a fraud
in law, which in an action of slander will The words "swore a lie," contained in an justify the application of the epithets “cheatalleged libel, do not of themselves impute a ing” and “swindling." Odiorne v. Bacon, 60 charge of perjury, and hence are not action- Mass. (6 Cush.) 185, 191. able per se. Knight v. Sharp, 24 Ark. 603, 608.
As actionable per se.
“Swindled," as used in a statement that A statement that a person “swore false
a certain person had swindled the county and swore to a lie" does not imply that the person spoken of was guilty of perjury, and and a person, out of certain sums of money, is not actionable. Sheely v. Biggs, 2 Har. & cannot be construed to imply that the monJ. (Md.) 363, 364, 3 Am. Dec. 552.
ey was obtained under false pretenses, and
is not actionable per se, for it did not charge The words "sworn to a lie," as used in an indictable offense. Weil v. Altenhofen, an allegation that a person has sworn to a 26 Wis. 708, 709. lie, are not actionable; for they do not necessarily imply that the party has in judgment crime known to the law, and hence words
The term “swindling" does not import a of law perjured himself. They may mean that he has sworn to a falsehood, without charging one with being a swindler are not being conscious at the time that it was a
actionable per se. Chase v. Whitlock (N. Y.) falsehood. It does not imply that it was
3 Hill, 139, 140. sworn to before any court or competent of The term "swindling' does not import ficer. It may mean extrajudicial swearing a crime. Imprisonment on a charge of Hopkins v. Beedle (N. Y.) 1 Caines, 347, 348, swindling, by making false representations 2 Am. Dec. 191.
as to the solvency of another, is false imprisonment; the conduct described as swin
dling not being a punishable offense, but SWEET CORDIAL.
only the ground of a civil action,
Hall v. A sweet cordial is a plain spirit, flavored Rogers (Ind.) 2 Blackf. 429, 430. by an essential oil or other aromatic sub In J'Anson v. Stuart, 1 Term R. 753, it stance, and sweetened by some saccharine is said to be formerly held that the word
"swindling” was in general use, and that, No offense against the laws is charged by the court could not say they were ignorant the term, and a notification to a police ofof it. In the same case, Ashburst, J., held it ficer to keep track of certain parties “swinto imply crimes for which the person might dling" commission merchants does not au. be indicted, and Buller, J., said it contained thorize the arrest of the persons. Cunningas libelous a charge as can well be imagined. ham v. Baker, 16 South. 68, 71, 104 Ala. 160, In Berr
nan Wise, 4 Term R. 366, there 53 Am. St. Rep. 27. was no question but the word was actionable when applied to an attorney in his of As requiring intent to appropriate. ficial character; and in the argument of the One of the essential elements of the present case, it seemed to be agreed that it crime of "swindling,” as defined by Pen. was a word which had come into use since Code 1895, art. 790, and the most important, St. 30 Geo. II, c. 24, and was generally un- is the intent with which the property is acderstood to imply a charge of the crimes, orquired. It must be with the intent to apsome of them, mentioned in that statute. propriate the same to the use of the party One of the principal offenses mentioned in so acquiring it. Without an allegation to that statute, and the one to which the term that effect an indictment for swindling does “swindling” seems to be most appropriately not charge the offense. Stringer v. State, 13 applied, is that of “knowingly and designed-TexApp. 520, 522. ly, by false pretenses, obtaining from any person money, goods," etc., "with intent to As requiring actual deception. cheat or defraud any person of the same."
In order to constitute "swindling," there This offense is substantially and accurately must be an intent to defraud, an actual act the common-law offense of cheating, which of fraud committed, false pretenses, and the is described in 1 Hawk. P. C. 343, to be “de- fraud must be committed or accomplished by ceitful practices, in defrauding or endeavor- means of the false pretenses made use of ing to defraud another of his known right, for the purpose; that is, they must be the by means of some artful device, contrary to cause which induced the owner to part with the plain rules of common honesty." To his property. An essential element of the charge a man with swindling seems, there offense of swindling is that the party infore, to be substantially to charge him with jured must have relied upon, believed as an offense for which he may be liable to a true, and been deceived by the fraudulent prosecution at common law. Forrest v. Han representations or devices of the party acson (U. S.) 9 Fed. Cas. 456.
cused. Prosecutor was applied to by de
fendant for a loan of $5; the latter stating Theft distinguished.
that he would give prosecutor a check on a "Swindling" may be committed in ei- certain bank to cover the $5 and a previous ther of two ways under Pen. Code 1895, art. loan. Prosecutor told defendant that he did 790: First, where the unlawful acquisition not believe he had a cent in the bank, but is accomplished by the means named, and that he would give defendant $5 to catch the intent is to appropriate the property so him, and, if defendant had no money in the acquired to the use of the party so acquiring; bank, he would prosecute him. Defendant and, second, where the unlawful acquisition had no money in the bank. Held not to conis accomplished by the means named, with stitute swindling, since the false pretense the intent of destroying or impairing the was not the inducement for the loan. Thorpe rights of the party justly entitled thereto. v. State, 50 S. W. 383, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 346. In the one case the intent of the party is to benefit himself; in the other, to injure the As requiring false representation. right of some one else. It is true that the
In order to constitute a swindle, there two intents and the two modes of accom- must be a representation of a past or presplishing the crime may combin and occurent condition of things knowingly made by in the perpetration of a single act. That the party engaged in the swindling operathey should, however, is not necessary to tion, which was false, calculated to deceive, the completeness of either of the two modes. and doing so in fact, and in reliance upon It follows, then, that the crime may be com- which property which is the subject-matter mitted without destroying or impairing the of the swindle is parted with. Where de rights of the party justly entitled to the fendant was given $5 to get changed, to property, and the swindle may be perpe-take out the sum of 80 cents due her, and trated in fact upon one who is not even just offered 20 cents back, claiming that only a $1 ly entitled to the property; and this is a bill had been given her, she was not guilty distinction between swindling and theft. of swindling; there being no false repreMay v. State, 15 Tex. App. 430, 436.
sentation. De Young v. State (Tex.) 41 S. W.
598. As authorizing arrest. “Swindling” has no legal or technical
SWINDLER. meaning, and commonly implies a recourse to petty and mean artifices for obtaining mon The word "gwindler" means no more ey, which may or may not be strictly illegal. than “cheat,” Therefore, to charge one with
being a swindler, or with swindling, is not been held not to be actionable, and "swinactionable. Stevenson v. Hayden, 2 Mass. dler" means no more. Stevenson v. Hayden, 406, 408.
2 Mass. 406, 408. A swindler is one who obtains money or The word "swindler,” as applied to a goods under false pretenses. Weil v. Alten- person, does not charge a crime, so as to be hofen, 26 Wis. 708, 711.
actionable per se in slander. Odiorne v. Ba
con, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 185, 191. To charge a man with being a swindler or a cheat does not impute a crime, and is The term "swindling," or "swindler," not slanderous. Pollock v. Hastings, 88 Ind. does not charge an infraction of the crim. 248, 250.
inal law, so as to be actionable per se in
slander. Pollock V. Hastings, 88 Ind. 248, The word "swindler" is an exotic, which 250. came from Germany, and has but recently become naturalized in our language. In Todd's Johnson “swindler" is defined to be SWINE. a sharper, or a cheat; and “to swindle" is
“Swine” is the original generic term for to cheat, to impose upon the credulity of "hog" or "shoat.” State v. Godet, 29 N. C. mankind, and thereby to defraud the unwary 210, 211. by false pretenses. Webster defines "swindler" as a cheat, a rogue, one who defrauds Pen. Code 1895, art. 679, makes it an of grossly, or one who makes a practice of de- fense to kill, etc., any horse, mule, cattle, frauding others by imposition or deliberate swine, or other domesticated animal, etc, artifice. In Tomlins' Law Dictionary (edi- Held, that the term "swine” includes and is tion of 1836) the word is defined as a cheat, synonymous with the word “hog," and hence or one who lives by cheating. Swindling an information under the statute alleging is not a crime known to our law. To call the killing of a hog was sufficient as a de. one a swindler is about equivalent to saying scription of the animal. Rivers v. State, 10 be is a cheat, which has never been held ac- Tes. App. 177, 179. tionable. Either of these charges may, un
"Swine,” as used in St. 1805, c. 100, exder certain circumstances, imply that the empting from the liability of attachment one accused is guilty of the crime of obtaining swine, includes a swine butchered, but not goods by false pretenses. But they do not
Gibson v. Jenney, 15 Mass. 205, 206. necessarily mean so much. There are many ways in which a man may wrong another, in such a manner as to earn the title of "swin- SWIPE. dler” or “cheat," without subjecting himself to an indictment for a criminal offense. steal, or to steal by snatching; and hence,
“Swipe" means to pluck, to snatch, to This question has been considered as settled where a defendant admitted that he “swipever since the decision in Savile v. Jardine, ed” a watch, he was not entitled to an in2 H. Bl. 531. It was there held that the struction that “swiped" did not mean "stole.” words charging the plaintiff with being a State v. Lee, 70 N. W. 594, 595, 101 Iowa, swindler were not actionable. Eyre, C. J.,
“Swiss musling" are bleached cotton cheat. When a man is said to be swindled, goods which are woven upon a loom. The it means tricked or outwitted.” That case warp, or threads which run longitudinally, was followed by the Supreme Court of extend from one end of the piece to the Massachusetts in Stevenson v. Hayden, 2 other, and the filling, or threads that extend Mass. 406. Chase v. Whitlock (N. Y.) 3 Hill, from side to side, run from edge to edge 139, 140.
through the width of the piece. In addition
to the plain loom, there is an attachment The words "swindler," "swindling," etc., which produces the spots, dots, or other fig. have been very lately adopted into the Eng- ures which ornament the goods, and which lish language, and are as yet of indefinite are woven at the same time with the rest of meaning, and do not with certainty import the cloth. United States v. Albert (U. S.) an indictable offense. These terms were im- 60 Fed. 1012, 1013, 9 C. C. A. 332. ported into this country from England, and into that from Germany. In their passage SWITCH. hither, when first used in the English language, and before they became naturalized See "Flying Switch." here, they obtained a meaning, and what See, also, “Side Track"; "Siding." that meaning was we learn from the report of the case of Savile v. Jardine, by which
In electrical appliances. it appears that the word "swindle” means A "switch," as the term is used in no more than "cheat." "Cheat” bas always speaking of an electrical switch, is any de
vice by which one line may be electrically grantor “the right to make or cause to be connected with another. The form in com- made and built on his own lands such 'switch mon use on switchboards in the telephone road' connection with the said line of switch, exchanges consists of a socket set in the provided such connection shall in no manner switchboard containing the terminals of the obstruct or interfere with the use of said two sides of the subscribers' circuit, and this switch," the courts say that the words “conis used by means of a plug which contains nection" and "switch road" used as synthe terminals of the two wires that are at-onymous terms. Palfrey v. Foster, 17 South. tached to it in a cord. The insertion of the 423, 426, 47 La. Ann. 963. plug in the socket makes the electrical connection between the subscriber's line and the
SWITCH YARD. wires attached to the plug, and these wires usually lead to another similar plug, or to The words "switch yard," as employed in the telepbone of the operator. Kinloch Tel. connection with and descriptive of railway ephone Co. v. Western Electric Co. (U. S.) service, consists of side tracks upon either 113 Fed. 659, 660, 51 C. C. A. 362.
side of the main track, and adjacent to some An “electric switch,” in general terms, principal station or depot grounds where is a device for opening and closing a single cars are placed for deposit, and where arrivcircuit in some regular and systematic man-ing trains are separated and departing trains ner. The switch which is in ordinary com- made up. It is the place where such switchmercial use involves two stationary termining is done as is essential to the proper als connected to the opposite branches of a placing of cars, either for deposit or for de circuit, and a removable bridging piece in parture. Baltimore & 0. S. W. Ry. Co. v. serted between such two terminals to com- Little, 48 N. E. 862, 863, 149 Ind. 167.. plete the continuity of the circuit, or withdrawn therefrom to interrupt the circuit. SWITCHING. Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Nassau El. R. Co. (U. S.) 107 Fed. 277, 278, 46 C. C. A. The test of distinction between trans263.
portation service, relatively to loaded freight
cars, for which a railway company can lawIn railroad,
fully charge tonnage rates and switching or A "switch,” as the term is used in rail-transfer service, for which it is restricted to roading, is defined as a “device for moving a a fixed charge per car, is not whether the small section of track, so that rolling stock movement of the cars involves the use of a may be run or shunted from one line to an- portion of the company's main line, or that other," and "in railroads, in its simplest of another; for there may be a transportaform, two parallel lengths of rail, joined to- tion service over one or more spur tracks of gether by rods, pivoted at one end, and free the same company, if the contract of af. to move at the other end, forming a part of freightment requires no movement orer other the track at its junction with a branch or tracks or lines of railway, whereas a switchsiding." Standard Dict., Cent. Dict. As ing or transfer service is one which precedes used in Railroad Law, § 7, subd. 3, authoriz- or follows a transportation service, and aping a railroad to take lands for the construc-plies only to a shipment on which legal tion of switches, etc., the term does not in freight charges have already been earned or clude a parallel line of track, to be used as are to be earned. Dixon v. Central of Georanother main line, parallel to the construct gia Ry. Co., 35 S. E. 369, 372, 110 Ga. 173. ed road. Erie R. Co. v. Steward, 70 N. Y. Supp. 698, 700, 61 App. Div. 480.
A switch is but a mechanical contrivance SWIVEL. or movable opening to pass the cars from one
A “swivel” is defined by Ainsworth in track to another. A power to construct side his Dictionary as something used in or on tracks implies a power to connect the side another body so as to turn round in or upon tracks with the main track by switches. it. Denise v. Swett, 22 N. Y. Supp. 950, 953, Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Maddox, 42 S. 68 Han, 188. E. 315, 322, 116 Ga. 64 (citing Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. (6 P. F. Smith) 323, 334, 94 Am. Dec. 84).
SYCOPHANT. Freight yards containing 450 acres, op
The word "sycophant" comes from the erated as one yard, are not "turnouts" or "switches," as those terms are understood by would scarcely be contended to-day that a
Greek words meaning "fig informer," but it railroad men in railway parlance. People v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 51 N. E. man could not properly be called a sycophant
unless he had dealings in figs. In short, 312, 314, 156 N. Y. 570.
words by use are sometimes degraded, some
times ennobled; sometimes narrowed in SWITCH ROAD.
meaning, sometimes broadened. People v. In construing an act granting a right of Cogswell, 113 Cal, 129, 137, 45 Pac, 270, 271, way for a switch road, and reserving to the 35 L. R. A. 269.