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her husband is a surviving wife, no matter, and delay; to hinder the proceedings for a
bow bad her conduct may have been. Wise- time. Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. V.
man v. Wiseman, 73 Ind. 112, 116, 38 am. Aiken, 82 Va. 424, 428.
Rep. 115.

The word “suspension" means the tem-
"Surviving wife," as used in Rev. St. porary intervention or cessation of labor.
1894, § 2652 (Rev. St. 1881, $ 2491), providing Lethbridge v. City of New York, 15 N. Y.
that a surviving wife is entitled to one-third Supp. 562, 59 N. Y. Super. Ct. 486.
of all the real estate of which her husband
may have been seised in fee simple at any as that term was employed in Gen. St. 1899,

A corporation has "suspended business," time during the marriage, and in the conveyance of which she may not have joined in 1268, when it commences to wind up its afdue form of law, etc., does not include a wife fairs, ceases to hold meetings of stockholdwho has been divorced for the fault of the ers and board of directors, and fails to trans

act the business for which it was incorporathusband, who died without remarrying. Fletcher v. Monroe, 13 N. E. 1053, 1054, 145 ed. Jones v. Slonecker, 71 Pac. 573, 66 Kan.

286. Ina. 56.

The word “suspended," in the books of a SURVIVORSHIP.

subordinate lodge of an insurance order, is

not sufficient to show the suspension of a See "With Benefit of Survivorship." member of the order, as such member can

only be suspended by some affirmative action "Title by survivorship" exists only when of the lodge. Scheu v. Grand Lodge I. O. O. the estate is held in joint ownership. Deni- F. (U. S.) 17 Fed. 214, 215. gan v. San Francisco Sav. Union, 59 Pac. 390, 392, 127 Cal. 142, 78 Am. St. Rep. 35.

“Suspension," as used when speaking of the suspension of a priest of the Catholic

church, is a judicial act imposing a sentence SUSPECT.

forbidding such priest to exercise the func

tions of a priest. A sentence of suspension "Suspect," as used in a complaint on follows a trial for an offense, from which oath stating that the complainant had rea- the priest may appeal. Stack v. O'Hara, 98 sonable cause to suspect, and did suspect, Pa. 213, 232. that certain property was concealed in a certain place, and praying for a warrant to As discharge. search for the same, cannot be construed to

The word "suspend” ordinarily means a have the same meaning as "believe,” as used in Rev. St. c. 142, § 1, providing that when which it is used may give it a stronger mean

temporary cessation, but the connection in complaint shall be made on oath that personal property has been stolen or embezzled, ing; and hence, as used in a notice to an or obtained by false tokens or pretenses, and inspector of masonry, etc., appointed by the

commission for the construction of aquethat the complainant believes that it is con

ducts, pursuant to Laws 1883, c. 490, that, cealed in any particular place, the magistrate, 11 he be satisfied that there is reason. “owing to lack of work, you are hereby sus able cause for such belief, shall issue a war- pended without pay until such time as your rant to search for the property. “The words services may be required,” given after notice 'suspect' and 'believe' are not technical that all inspectors were only to be paid for words, and have not by the approved use of the time they were on duty on the work, will the language the same meaning. Suspect- be construed to amount to a discharge. Meing is not believing. That may be a ground Namara v. City of New York, 46 N. E. 607, for suspicion which will not induce belief." 509, 152 N. Y. 228. Commonwealth v. Certain Lottery Tickets, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 369, 371.

As discontinue.

Under Act Feb. 28, 1861, which authorThe use of the word “suspect,” in a com-izes the postmaster under certain circumplaint for search warrant, that the complain- stances specified to discontinue the postal ant has cause to suspect and does suspect, service on any route, a suspension during the etc., is not a sufficient compliance with the late Rebellion, at the Postmaster General's statute, requiring the complainant to make discretion, of the route in certain rebel states, oath or affirmation that he believes the stolen with notice to the contractor that he would goods are concealed in some house or place be held responsible for a renewal when the described in the complaint. “Suspicion may Postmaster General should deem it safe to be upon very slight grounds, and imports a

renew the service there, was held to be a less degree of certainty than belief.” Humes discontinuance, so that under a mail carrier's 1. Tabor, 1 R. I. 464, 470.

contract with a government calling for a

month's pay if the postmaster discontinued SUSPEND-SUSPENSION.

the service it was adjudged that he was en

titled to the month's pay. Reeside v. Unit"Suspend” is defined to mean to inter-ed States, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 38, 42, 19 L Ed. rupt; to cause to cease for a time; to stay | 318.

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As dispense with rules.

nishing the guarantied amount within the Under Code, $ 489, providing that a mu- specified time, as the word “suspended” does nicipal ordinance shall be read on three dif- not mean postponed only, and therefore the ferent days, unless three-fourths of the coun- purchaser cannot demand delivery of coke cil vote to dispense with the rules, an ordi- after the expiration of the fixed period. The nance is valid, if passed by three-fourths two words are not synonymous. Hull Coal vote upon a motion to "suspend” the rules; & Coke Co. v. Empire Coal & Coke Co. (U. S.) there being no substantial difference in the 113 Fed. 256, 239, 51 C. C. A. 213. terms. Town of Baird v. Baker, 40 N. W. 818, 819, 76 Iowa, 220.

As quash.

“Suspend” means to cause to cease for Dissolution of partnership distin- a time; to interrupt; to delay. Under Rev. guished.

St. 1889, § 2522, providing that, if there be The suspension and dissolution of a pending against the same defendant two inpartnership are not synonymous; "suspen- dictments for the same offense, the indictsion" meaning a mere cessation of its busi- ment first found shall be deemed to be susness operations for a period of time, while pended by the second indictment and shall "dissolution” is the entire termination of the be quashed, the second indictment does not relation. Partnership results from contract, ipso facto quash the first; but the operation and its dissolution, when not brought about of the section seems to leave the first indict. by death, bankruptcy, or some operation of ment endowed with life, so that, if the seclaw, rests in the same sourcethe will or ond indictment is quashed, the first one reaction of the partners themselves. Thus, vives. State v. Melvin, 66 S. W. 534, 536, 166 Stors, in his work on Partnership (section Mo. 565. 101), declaring that the general assignment of a partnership for the benefit of creditors As remove. would amount of itself to a suspension or

“Suspended,” as used in Comp. St. C. dissolution of a partnership, did not mean 18, art. 2, § 9, providing for the removal of that such an assignment would absolutely county officers from office, and authorizing terminate the partnership, but that it would the court to supply the place of such an suspend its operations and perhaps ultimate officer by an appointment for the term, when ly result in its dissolution. Williston v.

the accused is an officer of the court and is Camp, 22 Pac. 501, 503, 9 Mont. 88.

suspended, is not synonymous with “remov

ed," as used in section 7 of the act, providExtinguish distinguished.

ing that, if the accused is found guilty, judg. The “suspension" of a right in an estate ment shall be entered removing him from is a partial extinguishment thereof, or an office. State v. Meeker, 27 N. W. 427, 429, extinguishment for a time. It differs from 19 Neb. 444. an extinguishment in this: A suspended right may be revived, while one extinguished

An order issued to a public officer, stato is absolutely dead. Dyer v. Dyer, 23 Atl. ing that his services are no longer needed, 910, 911, 17 R. I. 547.

and that he is "suspended” from further duty

after that date, amounts to an absolute re An agreement between the holder and moval from the position, and not a mere payee of promissory notes, by which it was suspension from duty. Donnell v. City of mutually agreed that the payee should pay New York, 22 N. Y. Supp. 661, 663, 68 Hun, £25 per annum by quarterly payments, and 55. as long as he so paid the right of action on the notes should be “suspended,”, did not Feb. 28, 1887 (Acts 1886–87, p. 1), authorizing

“Suspension,” as contemplated in Act mean that the agreement should have the effect, from the moment of its being signed, the Governor to suspend assessors and apof forever extinguishing the plaintiff's claim point tax commissioners to perform the duon the notes, or of ever maintaining an ac

ties of assessors so suspended, and provided

that such suspension shall continue indefition for the recovery; but the agreement merely gave the payee a right of action for nitely until the General Assembly restore a breach thereof, if the holder sued while such assessors to office, is the same in legal the payments were continued.

Ford v.

contemplation as a removal from office. NoBeech, 11 Q. B. 832, 867.

len v. State, 24 South. 251, 253, 118 Ala. 154.

“Suspension" from office is in no proper As postpone.

sense the same thing as a removal, and it A provision, in a contract for the sale cannot be held, by construction or otherwise, of coke, that deliveries under the contract that the provisions of a constitution with remay be suspended in case of strikes, acci- gard to removals from office apply equally dents, or other causes causing a stoppage in to suspensions therefrom, and a constitu. the works of the seller, relieves the seller tional provision authorizing remoral after from the obligation of his guaranty, when I written charges have been made, and a trial such causes have prevented him from fur-, thereof had, and a finding oĉ the jury on





the truth of the charges, does not deprive til the condition is accomplished, or the Legislature of the power to provide that, sidered as accomplished. The “suspensive where charges are made, the court may tem- condition" under the Louisiana Civil Code is porarily suspend the officer until the de- the equivalent of the "condition precedent" termination of such charges. Poe v. State, at common law. City of New Orleans v. 10 S. W. 732, 739, 740, 72 Tex, 625.

Texas & P. R. Co., 18 Sup. Ct. 875, 171 U. S.

312, 43 L. Ed. 178. Repeal distinguished. See “Repeal."



Discovery distinguished, see “Discov

ery." "Suspension of payment," as applied to commercial paper, means something more

The word "suspicion" is defined as bethan a failure of the maker of such paper ing "imagination of the existence of someto seek the holder thereof and pay him. thing without proof, or upon very slight eviBusiness men understand very well what dence, or upon no evidence at all," and to the term means.

There is the idea in it of hold that, when plaintiff's own case exposes a failure to pay from an inability to do so.

him to suspicion of negligence, the burden In re Wolf (U. S.) 30 Fed. Cas. 406.

is on the plaintiff, would place the burden of proof on plaintiff in all cases, on

the question of contributory negligence, for SUSPENSION OF POWER OF ALIEN- an accident could rarely occur but that there ATION.

would be some slight evidence of plaintiff's The suspension of all power to alienate negligence. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. the subject of a trust, other than a power Shieder, 30 S. W. 902, 905, 88 Tex. 152, 28 to exchange it for other property to be held L. R. A. 538. upon the same trust, or to sell it and rein

The trial court, in charging on the subvest the proceeds to be held upon the same 'ject of corroboration of the testimony of an trust, is a "suspension of the power of alien- accomplice, stated that, if the facts outside ation." Civ. Code Mont. 1895, § 1220.

of his testimony were sufficient to cast on

him a grave suspicion of guilty knowledge, SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE,

it was sufficient. The court, in reversing

the case, said that “suspicion” is defined "Suspension of sentence" means ,an in- by standard lexicographers to be the “act terregnum of the period between conviction of suspecting or the state of being susand final judgment. People v. Webster, 36 pected; imagination, generally of something N. Y. Supp. 745, 746, 14 Misc. Rep. 617. ill; distrust; mistrust; doubt;" that the evi

dence ought to tend to show the guilt, and The distinction between a "reprieve"

not mere suspicion, whether grave or and a “suspension of sentence” is that a re- light; that the human mind is so constitutprieve postpones the execution of the sen

ed that where one is indicted for a grave tence to a day certain, whereas a suspension offense the mere charge itself will excite a is for an indefinite time. Carnal v. People suspicion. Involuntarily it springs into ac(N. Y.) 1 Parker, Cr. R. 262. Therefore,

tion, and we look upon such a one with diswhere a reprieve is granted by a Governor, trust and doubt. McCalla v. State, 66 Ga. it is the duty of the sheriff on the expira- 346, 348. tion of the time to execute the sentence without further orders by the court. In re "Knowledge" and "suspicion" are not Buchanan, 40 N. E. 883, 886, 146 N. Y. 264. synonymous terms. Thus, where an

ployé's indemnity policy provided for notice

of any act of dishonesty as soon as it came SUSPENSIVE CONDITION.

to the knowledge of the employer, notice A suspensive condition is one in which was not required when the employer merely the obligation depends on an uncertain event, entertained suspicions as to the employé. and which is not to take effect until the American Surety Co. v. Pauly (U. S.) 72 Fed. event happens. Moss v. Smoker, 2 La. Ann. 470, 477, 18 C. C. A. 644. 989, 991.

Where, in an action for libel, the words The obligation contracted on a suspen

used were that the defendant had a sussive condition is that which depends either picion that plaintiff and another bad robbed on a future and uncertain event, or on an

his house, and therefore arrested them, the event which has actually taken place, with word "suspicion” was legally susceptible of out it being yet known to the parties. Civ. involving a positive charge of felony. Royce Code La. 1900, art. 2043. The effect of a

v. Maloney, 5 Atl. 395, 400, 58 Vt. 437. suspensive condition is, as its name neces "Suspicion” is weaker than "belief," and sarily implies, to suspend the obligation un- "opinion" no stronger. The expression of a





suspicion that another has committed a necessary food and drink which is sufficient crime is actionable. Giddens v. Mirk, 4 Ga. to support life and maintain health;

and 364, 370.

where it appears that the defendant did fur

nish such food and drink, but merely re SUSPICIOUS CHARACTER.

fused to permit them to take medicine, a

conviction cannot be sustained. Justice y. An ordinance of the city of San Antonio State, 42 S. E. 1013, 1014, 116 Ga. 605, 59 declares that all persons who entice any L. R. A. 601. other person or persons to commit any irreputable act or deed, all persons found loitering about the city under suspicious

SWAMP. circumstances or places and who are unable

In larger streams, such as the Santee to give a proper account of themselves, all and the Edisto, the “swamp" is spoken of persons in the act of committing theft not distinct from the river; but in creeks with amounting to a felony or misdemeanor, and a margin of swamp the usage is universal all persons following any business by solicit- in the state of South Carolina to speak of ing orders whereby the person or persons the creek and swamp as one, and in a call giving such orders are defrauded, shall be in a survey for “Dean swamp" the name is considered "suspicious characters.” McFa- appropriate to the run, and not to the swamp. din v. City of San Antonio, 54 S. W. 48, 49, Felder v. Bonnett (S. C.) 2 McMul. 44, 47, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 140.

37 Am. Dec. 545.

The word "swamp," as contained in Act SUSPICIOUS PERSON.

Cong. 1849, granting to the state of LouisiThe words “suspicious person" are used ana certain lands to aid in reclaiming the to designate one against whom there is swamp lands therein, without the addition reasonable cause to believe that he has com- of the word “overllowed,” would have conmitted a felony, and whose arrest without veyed the lands so lacking in drainage as warrant is authorized by Code Cr. Proc. & to be temporarily covered by water in the 177. The belief necessary to authorize such

rainy seasons. McDade V. Bossier Levee arrest is generally nothing more than a Board, 33 South. 628, 631, 109 La. 625. well-grounded suspicion. People v. Russell, 72 N. Y. Supp. 1, 2, 35 Misc. Rep. 765. SWAMP AND OVERFLOWED LANDS.


"Swamp and overflowed lands," as used SUSTAIN.

in a complaint to compel conveyance of cer

tain land which the plaintiff claimed A bond of a bank teller, conditioned to swamp and overflowed lands purchased from make good to said bank all damages "sus- the state, and which the defendant claimed tained” by it through his unfaithfulness or as a pre-emption, should be construed as want of care, means any damages caused merely equivalent to the phrase "wet and by his want of care, if by any degree of unfit for cultivation." Land which is too care on his part such damages could have wet for cultivation is “swamp and overflowbeen avoided. Union Bank of Georgetown ed lands," whether the water flows over or v. Forrest (U. S.) 24 Fed. Cas. 559.

stands upon it. In this sense the adjectives "Maintaining and sustaining" a railroad

"swamp" and "overflowed,” taken together, means keeping it in repair, supplying it with qualify the noun "land" in but one particu

lar, and express but one fact concerning it; machinery, and such like acts; and thus a grant of a power to a corporation of main that is, it is too wet for cultivation. Hence taining and sustaining” a railroad does not a traverse of the allegations of the complaint apply to projects for maintaining its busi- land” is sufficient, in alleging that the land

that the land was “swamp and overflowed ness by schemes and enterprises not contemplated and expressed in clear, unambig-Tobin (U. S.) 18 Fed. 609, 614.

is not too wet for cultivation. Miller v. uous terms by the charter itself. A power of maintaining and sustaining a railroad is “Swamp lands," as used in Act Oong. included within a corporate grant of the Sept. 20, 1850, granting swamp and overflowpower of laying, building, and making the ed lands to the states, as distinguished from road. Central R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582, 1 "overflowed lands," may be considered to be 624.

such as require drainage to fit them for cul

tivation. San Francisco Sav. Union V. IrSUSTENANCE.

win (U. S.) 28 Fed. 708, 712. "Sustenance" is that which supports The "swamp and overflowed lands” life; food; victuals; provisions; and, as granted to the state of Iowa by Act Cong. used in a statute declaring that whoever 1850, mean lands which by reason of swamp shall deprive of necessary sustenance shall or overflow become unfit for cultivation. be guilty of misdemeanor, it means that Merrill v. Tobin (U. S.) 30 Fed. 738-739.




"Swamp and overflowed lands," within to periodical overflow, so as to include within Act Cong. March 7, 1857, confirming to the the meaning of the section above referred several states the swamp and overflowed to lands which are described in the plats lands, are lands on which, after the sub- as land subject to periodical overflow. Heath sidence of the waters, grain or other staple v. Wallace, 11 Pac. 842, 846, 71 Oal. 50. crops cannot be raised. Keeran v. Allen, 33 Cal. 542, 546.

SWAMP LAND ASSESSMENT. Land which is not susceptible of cultivation in grain or other staple products, by imposed on property by authority of the

A "swamp land assessment" is a charge reason of overflow, is “swamp and over. Legislature, and hence is a liability created flowed land,” within the meaning of Act by statute, the enforcement of which is barCong. Sept. 28, 1850, relating to the graut: red by the lapse of three years, under Code ing of swamp and overflowed lands; and Civ. Proc. $ 338, subd. 1. People v. Hulbert, the fact that a crop of grass may spring 12 Pac. 43, 71 Cal. 72 up after the overflow subsides does not prevent it from being swamp and overflowed. Keeran v. Griffith, 31 Cal. 461, 462, 466.

SWEAR-SWORN. “Swamp and overflowed lands"

See “Duly Sworn." lands rendered unfit for successful cultivation by reason of the overflow. If lands by

The word "sworn" legally means “sworn reason of the overflow were generally ren. to." Commonwealth v. Bennett, 89 Mass. dered unit for the successful cultivation of|(7 Allen) 533, 534. the staple crops, they are swamp and overflowed lands, within the meaning of the act.

“Swear," as used in an indictment for The fact that staple productions, such as perjury, charging that the defendant did potatoes, corn, barley, or buckwheat, may depose and swear, is not equivalent to an be cultivated and raised on the land, is not allegation that, being duly sworn, he did de all that is required; but such productions, pose and say. “Swear” does not imply that or some of them, must be usually culti- defendant was duly sworn, for he may swear vated successfully. Thompson v. Thornton, without being duly sworn. In one case the 50 Cal. 142, 144.

oath, so to speak, is self-imposed, and the

swearer incurs no legal liability thereby; "Swamp and overflowed lands,” as used while in the other the oath is administered in an act of Congress granting to the state by a person having authority so to do, and of California swamp and overflowed lands the affiant takes it subject to the pains and made thereby unfit for cultivation, includes penalties for perjury. United States v. Mconly such legal subdivisions according to Conaughy (U. S.) 33 Fed. 168, 169. the congressional system of surveys the

An ind greater part of which was swamp and over

tment for perjury which charflowed lands, and unless a tract constitutes ged that, defendant being lawfully required the greater part of the legal subdivision by the magistrate to make out in fact a according to such systems of surveys. they being then and there duly sworn, “he did

written statement of his circumstances and do not come within the provisions of the then and there swear in and by such writstatute. Hogaboom v. Ehrhardt, 58 Cal. 231,

ten statement," meant that he made a writ233.

ten statement under oath, and the indictAs overflowed annually.

ment was not insufficient, as not charging

the making of a false oath. Commonwealth It is not necessary that land should be v. Carel, 105 Mass. 582, 585. overflowed annually to make it "swamp lands," under the act of Congress donating

The words “or swear” may be rejected swamp and overflowed land to Arkansas and as surplusage, where the rest of the affirother states. Keller v. Brickey (111.) 3 Cent. mation is correct. State v. Shreve, 4 N. J. Law J. 457.

Law (1 Southard) 297.

A charge that another “will swear, lie, Periodically overflowed land.

cheat, or steal” may import that he lies, "Swamp and overflowed land,” as used swears, cheats, and steals; and, if used in in Act Cong. July 23, 1866, § 4 (14 Stat. 219), the latter sense, it is to be determined by which provides that in all cases where town. the jury whether the language is actionable. ship surveys have been or shall hereafter Dottarer v. Bushey, 16 Pa. (4 Harris) 204, be made under authority of the United 209. States, and the plats thereof approved, it shall be the duty of the Commissioner of the authorized by law for administering an oath.

The term "swear" includes every mode General Land Office to certify over to the Laws N. Y. 1892, c. 677, $ 14. state of California as swamp and overflowed land represented as such on such approved When applied to public officers, who are plats, etc., does not include land subject required by the Constitution to take the

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