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SURVIVING WIFE

6833

SUSPEND SUSPENSION

her husband is a surviving wife, no matter, and delay; to hinder the proceedings for a how bad her conduct may have been. Wise- time. Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. man v. Wiseman, 73 Ind. 112, 116, 38 Am. Aiken, 82 Va. 424, 428. Rep. 115.

"Surviving wife," as used in Rev. St. 1894, § 2652 (Rev. St. 1881, § 2491), providing that a surviving wife is entitled to one-third of all the real estate of which her husband may have been seised in fee simple at any time during the marriage, and in the conveyance of which she may not have joined in due form of law, etc., does not include a wife who has been divorced for the fault of the husband, who died without remarrying. Fletcher v. Monroe, 43 N. E. 1053, 1054, 145

Ing. 56.

SURVIVORSHIP.

See "With Benefit of Survivorship."

"Title by survivorship" exists only when the estate is held in joint ownership. Denigan v. San Francisco Sav. Union, 59 Pac. 390, 392, 127 Cal. 142, 78 Am. St. Rep. 35.

SUSPECT.

The word "suspension" means the temporary intervention or cessation of labor. Lethbridge v. City of New York, 15 N. Y. Supp. 562, 59 N. Y. Super. Ct. 486.

A corporation has "suspended business," as that term was employed in Gen. St. 1899, 1268, when it commences to wind up its affairs, ceases to hold meetings of stockholders and board of directors, and fails to transact the business for which it was incorporat

ed. Jones v. Slonecker, 71 Pac. 573, 66 Kan.

286.

The word "suspended," in the books of a subordinate lodge of an insurance order, is not sufficient to show the suspension of a member of the order, as such member can of the lodge. Scheu v. Grand Lodge I. O. O. only be suspended by some affirmative action F. (U. S.) 17 Fed. 214, 215.

"Suspension," as used when speaking of the suspension of a priest of the Catholic church, is a judicial act imposing a sentence forbidding such priest to exercise the functions of a priest. A sentence of suspension follows a trial for an offense, from which the priest may appeal. Stack v. O'Hara, 98 Pa. 213, 232.

As discharge.

The word "suspend" ordinarily means a which it is used may give it a stronger meantemporary cessation, but the connection in ing; and hence, as used in a notice to an inspector of masonry, etc., appointed by the

commission for the construction of aque

"Suspect," as used in a complaint on oath stating that the complainant had reasonable cause to suspect, and did suspect, that certain property was concealed in a certain place, and praying for a warrant to search for the same, cannot be construed to have the same meaning as "believe," as used in Rev. St. c. 142, § 1, providing that when complaint shall be made on oath that personal property has been stolen or embezzled, or obtained by false tokens or pretenses, and that the complainant believes that it is concealed in any particular place, the magis- ducts, pursuant to Laws 1883, c. 490, that, trate, if he be satisfied that there is reason- "owing to lack of work, you are hereby susable cause for such belief, shall issue a war-pended without pay until such time as your rant to search for the property. "The words 'suspect' and 'believe' are not technical words, and have not by the approved use of the language the same meaning. Suspecting is not believing. That may be a ground for suspicion which will not induce belief." Commonwealth v. Certain Lottery Tickets, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 369, 371.

The use of the word "suspect," in a complaint for search warrant, that the complainant has cause to suspect and does suspect, etc., is not a sufficient compliance with the statute, requiring the complainant to make oath or affirmation that he believes the stolen goods are concealed in some house or place described in the complaint. "Suspicion may be upon very slight grounds, and imports a less degree of certainty than belief." Humes v. Tabor, 1 R. I. 464, 470.

SUSPEND SUSPENSION.

"Suspend" is defined to mean to interrupt; to cause to cease for a time; to stay

services may be required," given after notice that all inspectors were only to be paid for the time they were on duty on the work, will be construed to amount to a discharge. MeNamara v. City of New York, 46 N. E. 507, 509, 152 N. Y. 228.

As discontinue.

Under Act Feb. 28, 1861, which authorizes the postmaster under certain circumstances specified to discontinue the postal service on any route, a suspension during the late Rebellion, at the Postmaster General's discretion, of the route in certain rebel states, with notice to the contractor that he would be held responsible for a renewal when the Postmaster General should deem it safe to renew the service there, was held to be a discontinuance, so that under a mail carrier's contract with a government calling for a month's pay if the postmaster discontinued the service it was adjudged that he was entitled to the month's pay. Reeside v. United States, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 38, 42, 19 L. Ed. 318.

As dispense with rules.

Under Code, § 489, providing that a municipal ordinance shall be read on three different days, unless three-fourths of the council vote to dispense with the rules, an ordinance is valid, if passed by three-fourths vote upon a motion to "suspend" the rules; there being no substantial difference in the terms. Town of Baird v. Baker, 40 N. W. 818, 819, 76 Iowa, 220.

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nishing the guarantied amount within the specified time, as the word "suspended" does not mean postponed only, and therefore the purchaser cannot demand delivery of coke after the expiration of the fixed period. The two words are not synonymous. Hull Coal & Coke Co. v. Empire Coal & Coke Co. (U. S.) 113 Fed. 256, 259, 51 C. C. A. 213.

As quash.

"Suspend" means to cause to cease for distin- a time; to interrupt; to delay. Under Rev. St. 1889, § 2522, providing that, if there be pending against the same defendant two indictments for the same offense, the indictment first found shall be deemed to be suspended by the second indictment and shall be quashed, the second indictment does not ipso facto quash the first; but the operation of the section seems to leave the first indictment endowed with life, so that, if the second indictment is quashed, the first one revives. State v. Melvin, 66 S. W. 534, 536, 166 Mo. 565.

The suspension and dissolution of a partnership are not synonymous; "suspension" meaning a mere cessation of its business operations for a period of time, while "dissolution" is the entire termination of the relation. Partnership results from contract, and its dissolution, when not brought about by death, bankruptcy, or some operation of law, rests in the same source the will or action of the partners themselves. Thus, Story, in his work on Partnership (section 101), declaring that the general assignment of a partnership for the benefit of creditors would amount of itself to a suspension or dissolution of a partnership, did not mean that such an assignment would absolutely terminate the partnership, but that it would suspend its operations and perhaps ultimately result in its dissolution. Williston v. Camp, 22 Pac. 501, 503, 9 Mont. 88.

Extinguish distinguished.

The "suspension" of a right in an estate is a partial extinguishment thereof, or an extinguishment for a time. It differs from an extinguishment in this: A suspended right may be revived, while one extinguished is absolutely dead. Dyer v. Dyer, 23 Atl.

910, 911, 17 R. I. 547.

An agreement between the holder and payee of promissory notes, by which it was mutually agreed that the payee should pay £25 per annum by quarterly payments, and as long as he so paid the right of action on the notes should be "suspended," did not mean that the agreement should have the effect, from the moment of its being signed,

of forever extinguishing the plaintiff's claim on the notes, or of ever maintaining an action for the recovery; but the agreement merely gave the payee a right of action for a breach thereof, if the holder sued while the payments were continued. Ford V. Beech, 11 Q. B. 852, 867.

As postpone.

A provision, in a contract for the sale of coke, that deliveries under the contract may be suspended in case of strikes, accidents, or other causes causing a stoppage in the works of the seller, relieves the seller from the obligation of his guaranty, when such causes have prevented him from fur

As remove.

"Suspended," as used in Comp. St. c. 18, art. 2, § 9, providing for the removal of county officers from office, and authorizing the court to supply the place of such an officer by an appointment for the term, when the accused is an officer of the court and is suspended, is not synonymous with "removed," as used in section 7 of the act, providing that, if the accused is found guilty, judgment shall be entered removing him from office. State v. Meeker, 27 N. W. 427, 429, 19 Neb. 444.

An order issued to a public officer, stating that his services are no longer needed, and that he is "suspended" from further duty after that date, amounts to an absolute removal from the position, and not a mere suspension from duty. Donnell v. City of New York, 22 N. Y. Supp. 661, 663, 68 Hun, 55.

"Suspension," as contemplated in Act Feb. 28, 1887 (Acts 1886–87, p. 1), authorizing point tax commissioners to perform the du the Governor to suspend assessors and ap

ties of assessors so suspended, and provided that such suspension shall continue indefinitely until the General Assembly restore such assessors to office, is the same in legal contemplation as a removal from office. Nolen v. State, 24 South. 251, 253, 118 Ala. 154.

"Suspension" from office is in no proper sense the same thing as a removal, and it cannot be held, by construction or otherwise, that the provisions of a constitution with regard to removals from office apply equally to suspensions therefrom, and a constitutional provision authorizing removal after written charges have been made, and a trial thereof had, and a finding of the jury on

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The word "suspicion" is defined as being "imagination of the existence of something without proof, or upon very slight evidence, or upon no evidence at all," and to hold that, when plaintiff's own case exposes him to suspicion of negligence, the burden is on the plaintiff, would place the burden of proof on plaintiff in all cases, on the question of contributory negligence, for

SUSPENSION OF POWER OF ALIEN- an accident could rarely occur but that there

ATION.

The suspension of all power to alienate the subject of a trust, other than a power to exchange it for other property to be held upon the same trust, or to sell it and reinvest the proceeds to be held upon the same trust, is a "suspension of the power of alienation." Civ. Code Mont. 1895, § 1220.

SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE.

"Suspension of sentence" means an interregnum of the period between conviction and final judgment. People v. Webster, 36 N. Y. Supp. 745, 746, 14 Misc. Rep. 617.

The distinction between a "reprieve" and a "suspension of sentence" is that a reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. Carnal v. People (N. Y.) 1 Parker, Cr. R. 262. Therefore, where a reprieve is granted by a Governor, it is the duty of the sheriff on the expiration of the time to execute the sentence without further orders by the court. In re Buchanan, 40 N. E. 883, 886, 146 N. Y. 264.

SUSPENSIVE CONDITION.

A suspensive condition is one in which the obligation depends on an uncertain event, and which is not to take effect until the event happens. Moss v. Smoker, 2 La. Ann. 989, 991.

The obligation contracted on a suspensive condition is that which depends either on a future and uncertain event, or on an event which has actually taken place, without it being yet known to the parties. Civ.

Code La. 1900, art. 2043. The effect of a suspensive condition is, as its name necessarily implies, to suspend the obligation un

would be some slight evidence of plaintiff's negligence. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Shieder, 30 S. W. 902, 905, 88 Tex. 152, 28 L. R. A. 538.

The trial court, in charging on the subject of corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice, stated that, if the facts outside of his testimony were sufficient to cast on him a grave suspicion of guilty knowledge, it was sufficient. The court, in reversing the case, said that "suspicion" is defined by standard lexicographers to be the "act of suspecting or the state of being suspected; imagination, generally of something ill; distrust; mistrust; doubt;" that the evidence ought to tend to show the guilt, and not a mere suspicion, whether grave or light; that the human mind is so constituted that where one is indicted for a grave offense the mere charge itself will excite a suspicion. Involuntarily it springs into action, and we look upon such a one with distrust and doubt. McCalla v. State, 66 Ga. 346, 348.

"Knowledge" and "suspicion" are not synonymous terms. Thus, where an employé's indemnity policy provided for notice of any act of dishonesty as soon as it came to the knowledge of the employer, notice was not required when the employer merely entertained suspicions as to the employé. American Surety Co. v. Pauly (U. S.) 72 Fed. 470, 477, 18 C. C. A. 644.

Where, in an action for libel, the words used were that the defendant had a suspicion that plaintiff and another had robbed his house, and therefore arrested them, the word "suspicion" was legally susceptible of involving a positive charge of felony. Royce v. Maloney, 5 Atl. 395, 400, 58 Vt. 437.

"Suspicion" is weaker than "belief," and "opinion" no stronger. The expression of a

suspicion that another has committed a crime is actionable. Giddens v. Mirk, 4 Ga. 364, 370.

SUSPICIOUS CHARACTER.

An ordinance of the city of San Antonio declares that all persons who entice any other person or persons to commit any irreputable act or deed, all persons found loitering about the city under suspicious circumstances or places and who are unable to give a proper account of themselves, all persons in the act of committing theft not amounting to a felony or misdemeanor, and all persons following any business by soliciting orders whereby the person or persons giving such orders are defrauded, shall be considered "suspicious characters." McFadin v. City of San Antonio, 54 S. W. 48, 49, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 140.

SUSPICIOUS PERSON.

The words "suspicious person" are used to designate one against whom there is reasonable cause to believe that he has com

necessary food and drink which is sufficient to support life and maintain health; and where it appears that the defendant did furnish such food and drink, but merely refused to permit them to take medicine, a conviction cannot be sustained. Justice v. State, 42 S. E. 1013, 1014, 116 Ga. 605, 59 L. R. A. 601.

SWAMP.

In larger streams, such as the Santee and the Edisto, the "swamp" is spoken of distinct from the river; but in creeks with a margin of swamp the usage is universal in the state of South Carolina to speak of the creek and swamp as one, and in a call in a survey for "Dean swamp" the name is appropriate to the run, and not to the swamp. Felder v. Bonnett (S. C.) 2 McMul. 44, 47, 37 Am. Dec. 545.

The word "swamp," as contained in Act Cong. 1849, granting to the state of Louisiana certain lands to aid in reclaiming the swamp lands therein, without the addition of the word "overflowed," would have conmitted a felony, and whose arrest without veyed the lands so lacking in drainage as warrant is authorized by Code Cr. Proc. to be temporarily covered by water in the McDade v. Bossier Levee 177. The belief necessary to authorize such Board, 33 South. 628, 631, 109 La. 625. arrest is generally nothing more than a well-grounded suspicion. People v. Russell, 72 N. Y. Supp. 1, 2, 35 Misc. Rep. 765.

SUSTAIN.

A bond of a bank teller, conditioned to make good to said bank all damages "sustained" by it through his unfaithfulness or want of care, means any damages caused by his want of care, if by any degree of care on his part such damages could have been avoided. Union Bank of Georgetown v. Forrest (U. S.) 24 Fed. Cas. 559.

“Maintaining and sustaining" a railroad means keeping it in repair, supplying it with machinery, and such like acts; and thus a grant of a power to a corporation of "maintaining and sustaining" a railroad does not apply to projects for maintaining its business by schemes and enterprises not con

templated and expressed in clear, unambiguous terms by the charter itself. A power of maintaining and sustaining a railroad is included within a corporate grant of the power of laying, building, and making the road. Central R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582, 624.

SUSTENANCE.

rainy seasons.

SWAMP AND OVERFLOWED LANDS.

"Swamp and overflowed lands," as used in a complaint to compel conveyance of certain land which the plaintiff claimed as swamp and overflowed lands purchased from the state, and which the defendant claimed as a pre-emption, should be construed as merely equivalent to the phrase "wet and unfit for cultivation." Land which is too wet for cultivation is "swamp and overflowed lands," whether the water flows over or stands upon it. In this sense the adjectives "swamp" and "overflowed," taken together, qualify the noun "land" in but one particu

lar, and express but one fact concerning it; that is, it is too wet for cultivation. Hence a traverse of the allegations of the complaint land" is sufficient, in alleging that the land that the land was "swamp and overflowed is not too wet for cultivation. Miller v.

Tobin (U. S.) 18 Fed. 609, 614.

"Swamp lands," as used in Act Cong. Sept. 20, 1850, granting swamp and overflowed lands to the states, as distinguished from "overflowed lands," may be considered to be such as require drainage to fit them for cultivation. San Francisco Sav. Union v. Irwin (U. S.) 28 Fed. 708, 712.

"Sustenance" is that which supports The "swamp and overflowed lands" life; food; victuals; provisions; and, as granted to the state of Iowa by Act Cong. used in a statute declaring that whoever 1850, mean lands which by reason of swamp shall deprive of necessary sustenance shall or overflow become unfit for cultivation. be guilty of misdemeanor, it means that Merrill v. Tobin (U. S.) 30 Fed. 738-739.

SWAMP AND OVERFLOWED LANDS 6837

SWEAR-SWORN

"Swamp and overflowed lands," within to periodical overflow, so as to include within

Act Cong. March 7, 1857, confirming to the several states the swamp and overflowed lands, are lands on which, after the subsidence of the waters, grain or other staple crops cannot be raised. Keeran v. Allen, 33 Cal. 542, 546.

Land which is not susceptible of cultivation in grain or other staple products, by reason of overflow, is "swamp and overflowed land," within the meaning of Act Cong. Sept. 28, 1850, relating to the grant ing of swamp and overflowed lands; and the fact that a crop of grass may spring up after the overflow subsides does not prevent it from being swamp and overflowed. Keeran v. Griffith, 31 Cal. 461, 462, 466.

the meaning of the section above referred to lands which are described in the plats as land subject to periodical overflow. Heath v. Wallace, 11 Pac. 842, 846, 71 Cal. 50.

SWAMP LAND ASSESSMENT.

A "swamp land assessment" is a charge imposed on property by authority of the Legislature, and hence is a liability created by statute, the enforcement of which is barred by the lapse of three years, under Code Civ. Proc. § 338, subd. 1. People v. Hulbert, 12 Pac. 43, 71 Cal. 72.

SWEAR-SWORN.

See "Duly Sworn."

The word "sworn" legally means "sworn Commonwealth v. Bennett, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 533, 534.

"Swamp and overflowed lands" are lands rendered unfit for successful cultivation by reason of the overflow. If lands by reason of the overflow were generally ren- to." dered unfit for the successful cultivation of the staple crops, they are swamp and overflowed lands, within the meaning of the act. The fact that staple productions, such as potatoes, corn, barley, or buckwheat, may be cultivated and raised on the land, is not all that is required; but such productions, or some of them, must be usually cultivated successfully. Thompson v. Thornton, 50 Cal. 142, 144.

"Swear," as used in an indictment for perjury, charging that the defendant did depose and swear, is not equivalent to an allegation that, being duly sworn, he did depose and say. "Swear" does not imply that defendant was duly sworn, for he may swear In one case the without being duly sworn. oath, so to speak, is self-imposed, and the swearer incurs no legal liability thereby; while in the other the oath is administered by a person having authority so to do, and the affiant takes it subject to the pains and penalties for perjury. United States v. McConaughy (U. S.) 33 Fed. 168, 169.

"Swamp and overflowed lands," as used in an act of Congress granting to the state of California swamp and overflowed lands made thereby unfit for cultivation, includes only such legal subdivisions according to the congressional system of surveys the An indictment for perjury which chargreater part of which was swamp and overflowed lands, and unless a tract constitutes ged that, defendant being lawfully required the greater part of the legal subdivision according to such systems of surveys. they do not come within the provisions of the statute. Hogaboom v. Ehrhardt, 58 Cal. 231,

233.

As overflowed annually.

It is not necessary that land should be overflowed annually to make it "swamp lands," under the act of Congress donating swamp and overflowed land to Arkansas and other states. Keller v. Brickey (Ill.) 3 Cent. Law J. 457.

Periodically overflowed land.

by the magistrate to make out in fact a written statement of his circumstances and being then and there duly sworn, “he did ten statement," meant that he made a writthen and there swear in and by such writ

ten statement under oath, and the indictment was not insufficient, as not charging the making of a false oath. Commonwealth v. Carel, 105 Mass. 582, 585.

The words "or swear" may be rejected as surplusage, where the rest of the affirmation is correct. State v. Shreve, 4 N. J. Law (1 Southard) 297.

A charge that another "will swear, lie, cheat, or steal" may import that he lies, swears, cheats, and steals; and, if used in the latter sense, it is to be determined by the jury whether the language is actionable. Dottarer v. Bushey, 16 Pa. (4 Harris) 204,

"Swamp and overflowed land," as used in Act Cong. July 23, 1866, § 4 (14 Stat. 219), which provides that in all cases where township surveys have been or shall hereafter be made under authority of the United 209. States, and the plats thereof approved, it shall be the duty of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to certify over to the state of California as swamp and overflowed land represented as such on such approved plats, etc., does not include land subject

authorized by law for administering an oath. The term "swear" includes every mode Laws N. Y. 1892, c. 677, § 14.

When applied to public officers, who are required by the Constitution to take the

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