nished for the use of such boat or vessel. | SUPPORT (Of person). The Gen. Brady v. Buckley, 6 Mo. 558, 561. Section 1 of the act concerning boats and vessels, giving a lien on a boat on account of debts contracted by the master and owner thereof for stores and supplies for the use of the boat, cannot be interpreted to mean supplies of money for all the purposes for which money may be required in the navigation of the vessel. In its ordinary acceptation "supplies" are understood to mean those articles which a boat may find it necessary to purchase for consumption and use on the voyage. It is something different from wages, for which a lien is also specifically given. Moneys loaned for the specific purpose of enabling a boat to purchase such supplies, or to pay wages or debts incurred already or to be incurred in future, for things which are liens, have been held to be a debt contracted for those things, and therefore a lien also on the boat; but money loaned to enable the boat to pay her debts or expenses generally, which may be for things which are not liens as well as for those which are, will not be a lien under the statute. Gibbons v. The Fanny Barker, 40 Mo. 253, 254; Bryan v. The Pride of the West, 12 Mo. 371, 374. SUPPORT. Not only does the word "support" include "bearing weight," but it is also used by the student and understood in common phraseology as covering "to keep from falling," and other kindred expressions, and will be so construed when necessary to sustain a patent for an invention. Hatch Storage Battery Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co. (U. S.) 100 Fed. 975, 981, 41 C. C. A. 133. Gen. St. c. 25, § 73, declares that it shall not be lawful for any person to drive any horse or other beast at a rate faster than a walk on any bridge with string pieces 30 feet long between the supports on which they rest. Held, that the word "supports," as used in the statute, refers to that on which the bridge stands or rests, and which supports it from beneath, such as abutments, on the banks, or piers or trestles standing between the abutments, on which the string pieces rest. Abbott v. Town of Wolcott, 38 Vt. 666, 668. A condition in a mining lease that the lessee shall "support the superincumbent bed of rock" is not equivalent to a representation or assurance by the lessor that there is such a bed of rock over the coal. Beatie v. Rocky Branch Coal Co., 56 Mo. App. 221, 225. "Support," as used in reference to common schools, means maintaining the schools by continuing the regular expenditures, so that a fund for the support of common schools cannot be used for building a new house or purchasing the site. Sheldon v. Purdy, 49 Pac. 228, 230, 17 Wash. 135. See "Competent Support"; "Good and Comfortable Support and Maintenance"; "Good and Sufficient Support"; "Means of Support"; "Reasonable Support"; "Right of Support." "Support," according to Webster, means to sustain; to supply funds for the means of continuing, as to support the expenses of the government. Opinion of Justices, 13 Fla. 687, 689 (quoting Webst. Dict.). The words "comfort and support," as used in Rev. Code, § 2376, providing that the wife's separate statutory estate shall be liable for all contracts for articles of comfort and support of the household, suitable to the degree and condition in life of the family, and for which the husband would be responsible at common law, have the same meaning and are synonymous with "maintenance," and are expressive of the narrowest signification of necessaries at common law; and, when the household has been supplied with food, raiment, habitation, medical assistance, and medicine, the boundary prescribed by the statute has been reached. Eskridge v. Ditmars, 51 Ala. 245, 255. A declaration which alleged defendant's breach of an undertaking to pay to plaintiff such sums of money as might be necessary for her food, etc., was variant with proof showing the promise to have been to "support" the plaintiff, inasmuch as defendant might have supported plaintiff, without paying or giving to her any money whatever. Bull v. McCrea, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 422, 424. Const. art. 16, § 18, providing that each county and incorporated city shall "make provision for the support of its own officers," subject to such regulations as may be provided by law, means to make provision for the fees or per diem of those officers. The support of an officer is derived from the emoluments of the office, and these emoluments, under the Constitution, consist of fees or per diem. Gadsden County v. Greem, 22 Fla. 102, 110. ough and a county that all prisoners should be confined in the jail of the county, and should receive their "support and maintenance" therein at so much a head, construed to not merely require such prisoners to be supplied with room, clothing, bedding, and fuel, but to also include salaries of officers and expenses of repairs of the prison, and hence that the borough was not responsible for the latter charges in addition to the agreed compensation. Reg. v. Council of Borough of Gravesend, 5 El. & Bl. 459, 467. A contract between the council of a bor "Supporting," as used in St. 1892, No. 55, § 1, providing that the town shall give assistance to one in need, and that, if such person has not resided in such town for three years supporting himself and family, | child, was meant to include the performance the town so furnishing assistance may re- of all those duties which are due from a cover the expense from the town in which father to a child, and which the public may such person last resided for the space of be called upon to execute in case of the fathree years supporting himself and family, ther's default. It includes those services on is synonymous with "maintaining." In con- behalf of the infant, against the expenses struing the words "maintains himself and for which, in the entire history of the basfamily," it was said in Town of Tunbridge tardy statutes, the father has been comv. Town of Norwich, 17 Vt. 493: "It is not pelled to indemnify the parish or the townto be inferred from the expression 'and fam- ship. Education is one of the duties owing ily' that a man, in order to change his settle- to the child. State v. Such, 53 N. J. Law (24 ment, must have a family, or that he must Vroom) 351, 354, 21 Atl. 852, 853. necessarily have maintained himself and family, independent of all aid from any source whatever besides his own personal labor and services. This would be an unreasonable, not to say an absurd, construction. But the meaning of the statute undoubtedly is that he shall maintain himself, or himself and family, if he have one, so that neither shall become chargeable to any town for support. But if the man or his family should receive presents, or if either should inherit property, or if the family should maintain him, instead of his maintaining the family, as is sometimes the case, it would not prevent the change of settlement. All that is necessary is that he should have his permanent domicile in the town, and keep himself and family from being chargeable to either town." Town of Craftsbury v. Town of Greensboro, 29 Atl. 1024, 1026, 66 Vt. 585. The word "supported," as used in the statute providing that every insane person supported in any county asylum shall be personally liable for his maintenance, means every person maintained in any county asylum, and the provision was not intended to be limited to the pauper or indigent insane. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Camden County v. Ritson, 54 Atl. 839, 840, 68 N. J. Law, 666. As used in Gen. Laws Dak. 1891, c. 123, relating to the amount recovered by administrators for the wrongful death of their decedent, and providing that any demand "for the support of the deceased" and funeral expenses shall be first deducted and paid, does not extend to demands for the support of the family and does not make the sum subject to payment of all debts incurred by the deceased for the support of himself and family, but means only such as were incurred in consequence of, or at any rate after, the injury causing the death. State v. Probate Court, 53 N. W. 463, 464, 51 Minn. 241. amended by Act March 23, 1893 (St. 1893, Act March 11, 1889 (St. 1889, p. 111), as p. 328) § 24, providing that money to be contributed by counties of the state for the care school should be placed in the state treasury and support of the inmates of the reform in the fund of such school for its use, and the "keeping and taking care of each minor also providing that county funds were for committed to such institution," did not authorize the trustees of such reform school to erect buildings out of such fund; the court saying: "Of course, the word 'support' of such institution'; but, conceding this, it may be said to mean 'for the use does not, in our opinion, aid the plaintiff's construction. On the contrary, as we view it, it is strong proof that the Legislature never intended to give the trustees unlimited power to convert the county and state money to the erection of buildings, which money was appropriated by the state and contributed by the counties for the support and the care and keeping of the children comMitchell v. Colgan, mitted to the school." * 122 Cal. 296, 300, 54 Pac. 905, 907. The word "support," as used in the section relating to insane paupers and indigent persons, shall be construed to mean all necessary food, clothing, medicine, and medical attendance. Gen. St. Conn, 1902, § 2742, Benefit distinguished. See "Benefit." As limited to board. "Support," as used in Pub. St. c. 87, § 31, providing that the price for the support of paupers in state lunatic hospitals should be a certain sum per week, should be construed to include, not merely board, but everything necessary to proper maintenance. Gould v. City of Lawrence, 35 N. E. 462, 463, 160 Mass. 232. The word "support," according to WebThe word "support," like most words, ster, means maintenance, subsistence, or an has a variety of meanings. One of the il- income sufficient for the support of a famlustrative examples of its use, given by Web-ily. As used in a contract whereby one ster, is "to support a student at college." The use of the word "support" in Bastardy Act (Revision, p. 72) § 12, requiring a bond to indemnify the township against costs and expenses incurred for the support of the agrees to support another and his wife, it does not include merely sufficient provisions, but such other conveniences and necessaries as are reasonable and suitable to make such party and his wife comfortable. Wall v. "Support," as used in the act for the relief of insolvent debtors, providing that, when a person imprisoned for debt shall be unable to support himself in prison, the plaintiff shall stand chargeable, etc., embraces food and lodging; but as, under the law, the county must furnish the lodging, such plaintiff is only compelled to furnish food. Buttles v. Carlton, 1 Ohio, 33, 35. "Support," as used in a will by which a husband gave his wife, in lieu of dower, a decent and comfortable support out of his estate, in sickness and in health, during her lifetime, does not mean such sum as would be requisite to support her in a boarding house, but means a sufficient amount to maintain her in housekeeping at the place of her residence and in the manner to which she had been accustomed while living with her husband. Tolley v. Greene (N. Y.) 2 Sandf. Ch. 91, 94. A will directing that the interest accruing on the residue of testator's estate after the death of his wife, or so much thereof as might be necessary, should be applied to the "support and maintenance" of his infant grandchildren during their minority, should be construed to include their proper education at a private school. Patterson v. Read, 9 Atl. 579, 580, 42 N. J. Eq. 146, 621. In a will providing that property shall be applied to the support of S. and his family, the word "support" was intended to include the education of the children. Whelan v. Reilly, 3 W. Va. 597, 610. Family expense distinguished. SUPPORT As food, clothing, and shelter. "Support and maintenance," as used in a petition to recover damages for death, which alleges that the plaintiff and children were dependent upon deceased for support and maintenance, means food, clothing, and Kearney Electric Co. v. Laughlin, 63 N. W. 941, 943, 45 Neb. 390. shelter. Irregular gifts. The irregular and infrequent bestowal of comparatively diminutive gifts upon a person cannot properly be regarded as "support of a family." Gregg v. Brickley, 59 N. E. 1072, 1073, 27 Ind. App. 154. Keeping boarding house. In construing Code, § 1826, providing that no married woman may contract, so as to affect her estate, except for the support of the family, without the written consent of the husband, the court said, in answer to the claim that family supplies procured to keep up a boarding house, from which the family derived their support, were embraced within the words: "We think it has a more restricted meaning, and is confined to goods bought for the direct benefit of the members of the family, such as food, clothing, and other necessaries, and not for the successful prosecution of a business from the profits of which such support is to be obtained, whether by keeping a boarding house, or a hotel, or by engaging in any other general occupation. For these larger outside operations, whose results are speculative, the written consent of the husband, whose advice should be sought, must be obtained, and this is the protection secured to her by the statute." Clark v. Hay, 4 S. E. 190, 192, 98 N. C. 421. Medical attendance. conducted the business of a store belonging In an agreement whereby a person who to another was to have a support for himself and family out of it as a compensation for his services, "support" includes clothing and food for the family and necessary medical attendance to those of them that are sick. Morse v. Powers, 45 Vt. 300, 302. Medicines. "Support" generally means articles for ordinary sustenance, as food, etc., and does not include medicines, unless the context shows such intention. An order to let a family have whatever they want for their "support," addressed to one who is not a physician or druggist, does not authorize him to buy drugs for them in sickness. Grant v. Dabney, 19 Kan. 388, 389, 27 Am. Rep. 125. Money. An allegation in a claim against a decedent's estate for services in the care of and "alding and supporting" decedent's sis- in a will, giving the income of property to ter and minor children includes aid and sup- the use and support of the testator's son, port by the contribution of money. Grimm implies the creation of a spendthrift trust, v. Taylor's Estate, 55 N. W. 447, 448, 96 and prevents the vesting of the property in Mich. 5. the son in fee. The word indicates that the son is to have out of the income those things which are essential to his personal physical subsistence. Winthrop Co. v. Clinton, 46 Atl. 435, 437, 196 Pa. 472, 79 Am. St. Rep. 729. Necessaries. "Support," as used in Rev. St. 1894, 7288, making licensed saloon keepers liable on their bond for illegal sales to any person who shall sustain any injury or damage to his means of support on account of the use of such intoxicating liquors so sold, is necessarily a flexible term, and should not be limited to mean actual necessaries of life, or that one's means of support is only damaged, where such person is reduced to a state of dependency; and hence the loss of the services of a son, who contributed by his earnings to the expenses of his father's family, is a damage to the father's means of sup port, though the earnings of the father may be sufficient to keep the family from becoming dependent. Reath v. State, 44 N. E. 808, 809, 16 Ind. App. 146. As determined by position in life. The word "support," as used in Comp. Laws, pp. 218, 220, § 27, providing that, when a divorce is granted a wife, the court may set apart such portion for her support and the support of the children as shall be deemed just and equitable, includes everythingnecessities and luxuries-which a person in such wife's position is entitled to have and enjoy. Lake v. Bender, 7 Pac. 74, 78, 18 Nev. 361. "Support and education," as used in a will in which the testator charged his estate with the support and education of a child, without naming any amount therefor, means such sum as would support the child in a comfortable manner. Williams v. MacDougall, 39 Cal, 80, 83. An undertaking whereby one agrees to "support and take care of another" is to be construed according to the various circumstances of the party, and does not necessarily imply that the person to be supported is not to use any exertions to support himself. Bull v. McCrea, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 422, 425. As creating a trust. The phrase "for the support of himself and family, and for no other purpose," incorporated into a will, in which testator bequeaths a sum of money to his son, for the support of himself and family, and for no other purpose, operates to make the bequest in trust for the declared purpose. White's Ex'r v. White, 30 Vt. 338, 343. SUPPORT OF THE POOR. A bequest for the "support of the poor" of the county is to be construed as a charitable bequest. Heuser v. Harris, 42 Ill. 425. SUPPOSE. "Suppose," as used by a witness who, after stating that he had known a slave, in answer to interrogatories as to such slave's value, said "I suppose he was worth dollars," is used in the sense of "believe," and the witness really gave his opinion of the slave's value. Ward v. Reynolds, 32 Ala. 384, 389. "Supposed," as used in an instruction that if plaintiff in an action in good faith supposed he had a cause of action against the defendant on account of personal injuries, which he believed resulted from the conduct of the defendant, and threatened to sue defendant on account thereof, and defendant executed the note sued on in consideration that the plaintiff would not sue him, which was accepted by plaintiff in settlement, such compromise and settlement was a good and lawful consideration for such note, means substantially the same thing as "believed." The definition of "suppose" is given in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary as "imagine, to believe, or to receive as true"; and the same authority gives the definition of "believe" as "to think; to suppose." Parker v. Enslow, 102 Ill. 272, 276, 40 Am. Rep. 588. "Support," as used in a will giving all the testator's estate, both personal and real, to his wife for life, for her support and com"Supposed to have been forfeited" as fort, merely express the purpose and motive used in Act March 28, 1797 (Laws N. Y. 1797, of the gift, and does not make the gift conditional. It has little, if any, more signifi- P. 162, c. 52), providing that no person havcance than the words "to be for her benefiting any claim or demand in or to any lands, and enjoyment," and is not sufficient to cut down the clearly expressed absolute gift to a qualified or conditional one. Maynard v. Cleaves, 149 Mass. 307, 21 N. E. 376. As the word "support" means sustenance, maintenance, subsistence, etc., its use messuages, tenements, or hereditaments "supposed to have been forfeited" to the people of the state, in consequence of the attainder or conviction of any persons for any act or crime done or committed during the late war after the lapse of a certain period of time, referred to the estate which has been sold where there might be room for supposition and mistake, but not to the fact of attainder or conviction, which must ever be a matter of record and notoriety, and about which there could be no doubt or mistake. There must have been an actual forfeiture by the attainder or conviction of some person, and a sale by the commissioners of some property supposed to have belonged to such attainted and convicted person, but in fact claimed by some one else. Fisher v. Harnden (U. S.) 9 Fed. Cas. 129, 132. Death is "supposed to have been caused by violence," within Rev. St. § 1221, providing for inquest by the coroner when a dead body is found within the county and when death is supposed to have been caused by violence, whenever, from such observation as the coroner may be able to make and from the information that may come to him, there is substantial reason for belief or surmising that death was caused by unlawful means. State v. Bellows, 56 N. E. 1028, 1029, 62 Ohio St. 307. SUPPOSED CODICIL. An instruction in a will contest, referring to an instrument as the "supposed codicil," is not equivalent to telling the jury that the codicil was not the real codicil of the testator. Such use of the word casts no discredit upon its validity, and the instruction cannot be considered to amount to a statement that the instrument is not a codicil. Smith v. Henline, 51 N. E. 227, 232, 174 Ill. 184. SUPPOSED DEBT. It has been held that a reference in a plea to the "supposed debt" is a virtual admission. Gale v. Capern, 1 Adol. & E. 102. But a reference to the "supposed debt, if any such there be," is not an admission. Margetts v. Bays, 4 Adol. & E. 489. And the words "claimed and demanded" are equivalent to "supposed." Scadding v. Eyles, 9 Q. B. 858, 860, 862. SUPPOSED LEGAL TITLE. A conveyance under which defendant claimed title, which vested an estate for life in the plaintiff, with remainder in fee to the defendant, subject to be revested in the plaintiff on the nonperformance by the defendant of conditions annexed, was not a "supposed legal title," within the meaning of Gen. Laws, c. 224, § 6, relating to the right of betterments of one holding under a supposed legal title. Walker v. Walker, 5 Atl. 460, 461, 64 N. H. 55. SUPPOSITION. In ar instruction that "if the evidence, though in part circumstantial, is to your SUPPRESS mind consistent with the supposition that defendant is guilty of this charge and inconsistent with the supposition that he is innocent of it," etc., "it is your duty to find him guilty," the word "supposition" is used in the sense of hypothesis, and as meaning primarily what is not known to be true and not proved; and hence the instruction was not erroneous. State v. Harras, 65 Pac. 774, 775, 25 Wash. 416. Requested instructions in a criminal case used the words "suppositions, hypotheses, and theories," and asserted, if two of them may be drawn or may arise out of the testimony, one consistent with the defendant's innocence and the other tending to establish his guilt, the defendant shall be acquitted. The court said: "These charges are faulty in several respects. Supposition has no legitimate sphere or habitation in judicial determination. So, in the connection in which they were invoked, the words 'hypotheses' and 'theories' have very doubtful and indefinite significations." Johnson v. State, 102 Ala. 1, 16 South. 99, 104. On a criminal prosecution it is error to instruct that the evidence should exclude every supposition, save the guilt of accused, in order to warrant a conviction. Baldwin v. State, 111 Ala. 11, 15, 20 South. 528. SUPPRESS. See "Motion to Suppress Deposition." Under a charter authorizing the common council to provide for the suppression of vice and immorality, the council has authority to pass ordinances making certain acts misdemeanors and providing for their punishment, since "suppress" means to prevent, put down, or end by force, and no better way exists to put down than to provide for punishment. Ogden v. City of Madison, 87 N. W. 568, 569, 111 Wis. 413, 55 L. R. A. 506. The words "abate" and "suppress," in a statute giving a city power to abate nuisances and suppress gambling houses, are practically synonymous. Incorporated Town of Nevada v. Hutchins, 13 N. W. 634, 635, 59 Iowa, 506. Power to license implied. "Suppress," as used in the Chicago charter, empowering the council to suppress and restrain disorderly houses and groceries, means to prevent, and not to license or sanction, and the city was authorized to prohibit the sale of liquor absolutely. Schwuchow v. City of Chicago, 68 Ill. 444, 448. Where a penal statute of Texas prohibits disorderly houses in the state, and another statute confers on a certain city power to "suppress and restrain" such houses, and authorizes the city council to "restrain and punish" the inmates and to prevent and |