Prior to 1844, the Congress of Texas authorized contracts to be made for
settling emigrant families on vacant lands to be designated in the con-
tracts. Subsequently, that Congress passed an act to repeal this law,
and presented it to the President of Texas for his signature. He
vetoed the repealing act. Congress then passed it over the veto.
While the repealing act was thus suspended, the President contracted
with one Mercer and associates to settle families on a designated tract,
capable of identification. Preston, the appellant in one suit and ap-
pellee in the other, was assignee under Mercer. In February, 1845,
the Congress of Texas enacted that, on failure of the associates to
have the tract surveyed and marked by the first day of the next April,
the contract should be forfeited. In October following, suit was begun
to have the contract annulled for non-compliance with these provisions.
A decree was entered declaring it forfeited, but it did not appear that
proper service of the subpoena, or other process or notice, was made
to give the court jurisdiction. After lapse of several years, suit was
brought against the commissioner of the land office of Texas to obtain
certificates for location of land for which claim was made under the
contract, either within the limits of the grant, or in case the land there
had been appropriated, then land of equal value elsewhere. The
bill also prayed for an injunction to restrain the commissioner from
issuing patents for lands outside the grant, until the claims under the

contract should be satisfied. The defendant denied the principal al-
legations of the bill, and demurred on the ground that the State of
Texas had not been made a party, averring that it was a necessary
party. The court below found for the plaintiff on the facts, and made
a decree enjoining the commissioner and his subordinates forever from
issuing patents within the boundaries of the contract tract except to
Preston or his order: Held,

1. That the decree was defective in not defining specifically the rights of
the plaintiff in the land; in not adjusting the conflicting rights of
Texas and the plaintiff; and in tying up forever the hands of the
government and all other interested parties without affording final
relief.

2. That as the court could give no affirmative relief, and in the absence of
the State of Texas could not settle its rights in the tract, it was with-
out jurisdiction.

3. That even if the court had jurisdiction, the case was without equity on
the merits. Walsh v. Preston, 297.

When the evidence given at the trial, with all the inferences that the jury
could justifiably draw from it, is insufficient to support a verdict for
the plaintiff, so that such a verdict, if returned, must be set aside, the
court may direct a verdict for the defendant. Randall v. B. & O. Rail-
road Co. 478.

VESSELS.

See COMMON CARRIERS.

VIRGINIA.

See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1.
WASHINGTON CITY, 3.

VOID AND VOIDABLE.

See WRIT, 2, 3.

WASHINGTON CITY.

1. In 1791, one Young, then owning a tract of land containing about 400
acres on the Potomac conveyed the same in fee simple with all its ap-
purtenances to two trustees (who were also trustees with similar trusts,
for other owners of land), as a site for the City of Washington. The
trust provided that the lands laid out in streets, squares, etc., should
be for the use of the United States forever, and that a fair and equal
division of the remainder should be made. In 1794 the plan of the
city was adopted and promulgated. On this plan a public street called
Water street was represented as laid out on the margin of the river
over the tract so conveyed by Young; but this street was not in fact
constructed until after the close of the late civil war. In 1796 the trustees
conveyed the tract so deeded to them (including Young's), "in fee
simple subject to trusts yet remaining," to commissioners appointed
to receive title, under the act of July 16th, 1790, entitled, "An Act
for establishing the temporary and permanent seat of the government
of the United States." 1 Stat. 130. In 1797 the commissioners, in ex-
ecution of the trust, and in pursuance of a statute of the State of
Maryland, recorded certificates in their record book, which stated that
one tract, defined by metes and bounds, had been allotted to Young,
and that another tract, in like manner defined, had been allotted to
the United States. Each of these tracts was on the northerly side of
Water street, and was described as bounded on that street. The title
to both became subsequently vested in the plaintiffs. Held, That these
transactions were equivalent to a conveyance by Young to the United
States in fee simple of all his lands; and of a conveyance back by the
United States of the first tract described by metes and bounds, leaving
in the United States the title in fee simple to the other tract and to
the strip known as Water street. Van Ness v. The Mayor, &c., of
Washington, 4 Pet. 232; approved and followed. Potomac Steamboat
Company & others v. Upper Potomac Steamboat Company, 672.

2. After the execution of the commissioners' certificate in 1797, allotting
to Young a tract of land on the north side of Water street and to the
United States another tract, also on the north side of that street, no
wharfage rights remained connected with the use and enjoyment
of those lots, and not being thus connected with them, such right was
not annexed as an incident to them, so as to become appurtenant to
them. Id.

3. The agreement of March 28th, 1785, between Virginia and Maryland,
provides that citizens of each should have full property in the shores
of the Potomac and the privilege of constructing wharves and im-
provements. The Maryland act of December 19th, 1791, authorized
the commissioners appointed under the act of July 16th, 1790, 1 Stat.
130, to license the building of wharves on the Potomac. Held, That
the United States, as owners in fee of Water street, in the city of

Washington, were in the enjoyment of all the rights which were at-
tached to that property by this compact and by this legislation, or
which belonged or appertained to it by virtue of general principles of
law relating to riparian rights. The authorities in this court, and
other federal courts, and in State courts and the courts of Great
Britain, on that subject examined. Id.

4. The act of the legislature of Maryland of December 28th, 1793, under
which the commissioners entered in their record book the certificate
to Young and to the United States, provided that they should “be
sufficient and effectual to vest the legal estate in the purchasers, with-
out any deed or formal conveyance." Held, That parol evidence is
only admissible to contradict, vary, or explain them, when it would
have been admissible if they had been formal conveyances. Id.
5. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Union Bank of Georgetown, 5 Cranch C.
C. 509, cannot be regarded as the law of the District of Columbia on the
point involved in this case. In so far as in conflict with it, the court
in that case did not follow Van Ness v. Mayor, &c., of Washington, 4
Pet. 232, or Kennedy v. Washington, 3 Cranch C. C. 595. Id.

WILL.

The probate of a will in one State does not establish the validity of the
will as a will devising real estate in another State, unless the laws of
the latter State permit it. The validity of the will for that purpose
must be determined by the laws of the State in which the property is
situated. Robertson v. Pickrell, 608.

See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1, 2, 3;

JURISDICTION, B, 6, 7, 8.

WITNESS.

1. A creditor of A obtained judgment against him. He levied on capital
stock in a corporation claimed by B under an assignment from A, and
in the original suit summoned B as garnishee of A to answer. Pend-
ing these proceedings A died, and his administrator was substituted
as defendant. B and the administrator were offered as witnesses on
B's behalf in regard to the transactions at the time of the assign-
ment. Held, That each was a competent witness on his own motion,
notwithstanding the proviso in § 858 Rev. Stat., "That in actions
by or against executors, administrators, or guardians in which judg-
ment may be rendered for or against them, neither party shall be
allowed to testify against the other as to any transaction with or
statement by the testator, intestate, or ward unless called to testify
thereto by the opposite party or required to testify thereto by the
court." Monongahela National Bank v. Jacobus, 275.

WOOL.

See CUSTOMS DUTIES, 3.

WRIT.

1. Where the evident purpose of an application for a writ of prohibition
is the correction of a supposed error in a judgment on the merits,
the court will not grant the writ. Ex parte Pennsylvania, 174.
2. A writ issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, with power to
compel its enforcement, and in a case where the cause of action and
the parties to it are before the court and within its jurisdiction, is
not absolutely void by reason of mistakes in the preliminary acts
which precede its issue. If not avoided by proper proceedings, it is
in all other courts a sufficient protection to the officer executing it.
Matthews v. Densmore, 216.

3. The marshal for the Eastern District of Michigan seized the goods of
the defendants in error, under a writ of attachment issued from the
circuit court of that district, on a defective affidavit. Held, That in
proceeding in the State courts of Michigan against the marshal, the
process is sufficient to protect him if the property seized under it was
liable to be attached in that suit. Id.