which have the effect of law in no country any further than they are accepted and received as such; or, like the case of the civil law, which forms the basis of most European laws, but which has the force of law in each state only so far as it is adopted therein, and with such modifications as are deemed expedient. The adoption of the common law by the several states of this Union also presents an analogous case. It is the basis of all the state laws; but it is modified as each sees fit. Perhaps the maritime law is more uniformly followed by commercial nations than the civil and common laws are by those who use them. But, like those laws, however fixed, definite, and beneficial the theoretical code of maritime law may be, it can have only so far the effect of law in any country as it is permitted to have."

And again,

"Each state adopts the maritime law, not as a code having any independent or inherent force, proprio vigore, but as its own law, with such modifications and qualifications as it sees fit. Thus adopted and thus qualified in each case, it becomes the maritime law of the particular nation that adopts it." 1

In The Manhasset2 Judge Hughes, speaking of the maritime law, said: 3

"It is not to be supposed, however, that this law has any force in any particular jurisdiction contrary to the will of that sovereign power. Only so far as it is adopted by the legislation and enforced by the judicial tribunals of each sovereignty, has it force in each jurisdiction."

In Lloyd v. Guibert Mr. Justice Willes, in dealing with the plaintiff's contention that the case should be governed by the general maritime law, said: 5

1 Mr. Justice Bradley repeated these declarations in The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24, saying: "But, whilst the rule adopted by Congress is the same as the rule of the general maritime law, its efficacy as a rule depends upon the statute, and not upon any inherent force of the maritime law. As explained in The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, the maritime law is only so far operative as law in any country as it is adopted by the laws and usages of that country." See also The Gaetano & Maria, L. R. 7 P. D. 137, 143.

2 18 Fed. 918.

8 P. 921.

4 L. R. 1 Q. B. 115.

5 P. 123. See also Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands, etc., Co., 10 Q. B. D. 521; Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 444; Butler v. Boston Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527, 556; In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1, 13; Ralli v. Troop, 157 U. S. 386, 407; The John G. Stevens. 170 U. S. 113, 126, 127; In re Long Island, etc., Transportation Co., 5 Fed. 599, 614; The Katie, 40 Fed. 480, 494; Swift v. Phila. & R. R. Co., 64 Fed. 59, 68.

"We can understand this term in the sense of the general maritime law as administered in the English courts, that being in truth nothing more than English law, though dealt out in somewhat different measures in the Common Law and Chancery Courts, and in the peculiar jurisdiction of the Admiralty; but as to any other general maritime law by which we ought to adjudicate upon the rights of a subject of a country which, by the hypothesis, does not recognize its alleged rule, we were not informed what may be its authority, its limits, or its sanction. . . . It would be difficult to maintain that there is, as to such questions as the present, depending in a great measure upon national policy and economy, any general in the sense of universal law binding at sea, any more than upon land, nations which either have not assented or have withdrawn their assent thereto."

It follows that, when an admiralty court of any nation entertains a suit relating to transactions occurring on the high seas, the right administered or enforced will be a right given by that branch of the law of the nation which deals with maritime matters. If, for instance, a libel is instituted in a British admiralty court to recover damages caused by a collision on the high seas between a British and an American vessel, and a recovery is had, it will be based on a right conferred on the libellant, not by any independent system of law called the general admiralty law, for there is no such thing, but by that part of the law of England that concerns itself with such matters.

The right which an admiralty court is called upon to enforce is not necessarily a right acquired under the law of the nation in which the court sits; it may arise under the law of some foreign state; but it is invariably true that the right enforced is created by the fiat of some state or nation. In any litigated case there always is or may be a question as to what the law governing the controversy is. In suits in admiralty courts where such a question arises, resort is properly had to the mass of ordinances, decisions, and treatises of all the civilized states to ascertain what the consensus of opinion is on the point under discussion as bearing on the real issue, that is, what the maritime law of the forum may be on the point. This mass of ordinances, decisions, and treatises is for convenience appropriately enough termed "the law of the sea," or the "general maritime law." But as a system creating legal rights and imposing legal duties there is no such thing as a general maritime law, except as it forms a part of the judicial code of a particular nation.

By what right, then, do the maritime states adjudicate upon con

troversies arising out of transactions upon the high seas in which foreigners are involved? To put the question in another way, why is it that a decree of a British admiralty court casting an American ship in damages by reason of a collision on the high seas, which are not within British jurisdiction, will be recognized as valid in the United States? The answer to both questions is the same, and is that the various civilized states have agreed to allow each other to take full cognizance of controversies upon the high seas. It is not enough to say that as the court has jurisdiction over the res its decree in rem will be valid everywhere. The court must also, in cases where the cause of action depends upon the locality of the transaction, have jurisdiction over the place where the transaction occurred. If that place is the high seas, the courts of no nation can have jurisdiction, as against the citizens of other nations, in respect to transactions occurring thereon, except by consent. The foundation, therefore, of the admiralty jurisdiction is the common consent of the different maritime states.

"As maritime commerce came to be extended, and international commerce and intercourse became more frequent, the sea was considered the common highway of nations, where, for the purposes of business, all nations must be equal in right, and the common convenience, as well as the common right, rendered necessary and ultimately established general rules, as the Law of the Sea, to which all submitted as to a sort of maritime law of nations, and the courts of each nation enforced it." 1

As said by Mr. Justice Strong, delivering the opinion of the court in The Scotia,2

"Undoubtedly, no single nation can change the law of the sea. That law is of universal obligation, and no statute of one or two nations can create obligations for the world. Like all the laws of nations, it rests upon the common consent of civilized communities. It is in force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power, but because it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct. Whatever may have been its origin, whether in the usages of navigation or in the ordinances of maritime states, or in both, it has become the law of the sea only by the concurrent sanction of those nations who may be said to constitute the commercial world."

1 Benedict, Adm. Pr., 3 ed., 2.

214 Wall. (U. S.) 170, 187.

This language was quoted with approval in The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677, 711. See also In re Long Island, etc., Transportation Co., 5 Fed. 599, 622.

In Thomassen v. Whitwell it was said by Judge Benedict:

"There is also a general maritime law in force on the sea which is part of the law of nations, and consists of certain rules applicable to affairs of the sea, which have been so often acted upon, and by so many different nations, that they are deemed to have been assented to by all, and according to which all persons going on the sea may justly be supposed to have agreed to be judged in respect to acts there done. This law courts of admiralty by the comity of nations are in a proper case authorized to administer."

In The Manhasset 2 Judge Hughes said:3

"The maritime law. . . is a system of usages and principles which has been adopted by the general consent of commercial nations. It is not to be found in any distinct code or body of legislation, but is so thoroughly exemplified in treatises and recorded adjudications as to have lost the character of an unwritten law. It has its authority and sanction in the consent of all nations, whose courts enforce its principles. After its claim to be founded on principles of natural justice, its highest value consists in its world-wide uniformity and acceptance."

The significance of this common agreement is that while, as a general proposition, it is true that the law of no state can have any efficacy beyond the territories thereof, and that the high seas, being under the territorial jurisdiction of no nation, are subject to the laws of no nation, nevertheless the maritime states are content to recognize the right of the maritime courts of each of them to adjudicate upon transactions occurring on the high seas and are content to abide by the result of such adjudications.

For example, a British ship collides with a Dutch ship on the high seas and is libelled in a French admiralty court. A decree of the French court condemning the British ship is valid and conclusive not only in Great Britain but all over the world.1 Why? Because all the maritime states have agreed that France may adjudicate upon transactions taking place on the high seas where her forum is sought, and have further agreed to be bound by the result.

The offending ship, as is common knowledge, might be libelled in the proper admiralty court of any nation where jurisdiction could be obtained, because at the moment of the collision a right of property in the ship arose under the law of that nation which

2 18 Fed. 918.

8 P. 920.

4 Croudson v. Leonard, 4 Cranch (U. S.) 434; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 167.

its court will enforce, and a decree establishing which will be valid all over the world by reason of the fact that all other nations have consented that such right might be created and that such jurisdiction should be exercised.

In short, by reason of this common consent of the nations, a state may, by that branch of its general law dealing with maritime matters, give a right of action in consequence of transactions occurring outside of its territorial jurisdiction and upon the high seas; and a decree of an admiralty court of such nation enforcing such right will be as universally binding and valid as though rendered in a cause arising out of transactions occurring within its territorial jurisdiction, although one or more or all of the parties be foreigners, and whether the proceeding be instituted by or against foreigners, and whether the result be in their favor or against them.

If, therefore, that branch of the law of France that relates to transactions upon the high seas gave a right of action for death occurring thereon, and a French admiralty court enforced that right in favor of a French citizen against a foreigner, it would seem unmistakably to follow that the decree of the French court would everywhere be regarded as being just as valid as a decree in a suit concerning events taking place within French territorial jurisdiction.

So here, if the libellant had obtained a decree in a French court, it would be regarded as binding in the United States if in rem, and just as effectual as any other decree of a French court if in personam.

It might conceivably be urged that there is a limit to the jurisdiction which any single nation, by reason of the consent of the other nations, may exercise; that in event of any wide departure from received doctrines it must be presumed that there has been no such consent, and that a decree of a foreign admiralty court proceeding on any such basis should not be treated as valid; that a right of action for death is such a departure, and that an admiralty court of the United States should refuse to recognize the validity of a decree of a French admiralty court awarding damages against a citizen of the United States for causing death on the high seas; that, in short, the French law was incompetent to confer such a right at any rate against any one but a French citizen.

It was some such consideration as this that prompted the Court of Appeals in the Rundell case to declare that "it is not within the